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Chapter 1:  
Introduction 
Mass media are an omnipresent element of our everyday life, and the modern world cannot be 
imagined without them. Watching television, listening to the radio, readings newspapers or 
magazines and surfing on the Internet are part of the daily routine for most citizens, at least in 
industrialized countries. Hence, there seems to be a widespread consensus that media are im-
portant for democracy, and increasingly so in today’s complex, highly differentiated societies. 
Media have moved to the center of the social, economic and political life, and they constitute 
the key carriers of democratic public spheres. Therefore, contemporary democracies are often 
dubbed “media societies” (Habermas 2006: 419). The cause of this phenomenon is the fact 
that modern democracies are to a greater or lesser degree based on the principle of representa-
tion because they are too big for a large proportion of the citizens to always directly partici-
pate in all democratic decisions (Von Rautenfeld 2005: 184). Manin (1995) argues that mod-
ern representative democracies have gone through two major phases of transformations since 
their foundation. First, in the middle of the 19
th
 century, with the ongoing industrialization 
and extension of universal suffrage, parliamentarianism was replaced by the party democracy. 
Parliamentarianism was characterized by a political elite who was mainly elected on the basis 
of prestige or social status (Manin 1995: 260). Thus, political representatives stood out from 
the crowd but at the same time, the relationship to their voters was personal, direct and apolit-
ical. Accordingly, the elected were highly independent of their constituents’ wishes and polit-
ical debates only took place within the secluded parliamentary arena. In party democracies, by 
contrast, the society was split into solid social milieus, which were represented by their re-
spective parties in the political sphere and by party organs in the public sphere (Manin 1995: 
267f.). Members of parliament no longer belonged to a superior elite but rather acted as party 
delegates or bureaucrats who had to promote their party’s program. Blumler and Kavanagh 
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(1999: 211) call this “the golden age of parties”. The second transformation took place in the 
middle of the 20
th
 century. In the wake of modernization, a change from the party to the so-
called audience democracy became evident (Manin 1995: 279). As the strongly separated so-
cial milieus slowly dissolved, mass parties lost their stable constituencies whom they could 
directly influence. This so-called dealignment process is a consequence of various trends as-
sociated with modernization such as secularization, growing levels of education and prosperi-
ty, rise of the tertiary sector, commercialization and individualization (Dalton et al. 1984). 
Accordingly and similar to the former days of parliamentarianism, the distance between elites 
and citizens is growing
1
, and elections focus more on more on the personal characteristics of 
single candidates. These act increasingly independently from their parties’ programs and 
communicate and present themselves to the voters more directly in the public sphere (Manin 
1995: 280f.). This means that today the communication of political affairs primarily takes 
place via the mass media, which have mostly freed themselves from direct partisan ties and to 
which the vast majority of the fluid and fragmented electorate turns to receive political news 
(Bennett and Entman 2001; De Vreese and Semetko 2004: 14; Froehlich 2001: 21). To put it 
simply: „It is not possible to advance even the most limited and formal definitions of democ-
racy which do not recognise the integral role of the media to the actual functioning of all its 
elements” (Sparks 1995: 45). Chan (2001) is even more to the point. He notes that a „democ-
racy in the contemporary society is by definition a mediated democracy, with the media serv-
ing as a means of information and as a means of expression” (Chan 2001: 115). This short 
excerpt already gets to the heart of what the role of mass media in a democracy consists of 
according to normative thinking. As will be argued in the course of this study, there are two 
central functions of media in democracy: information and expression, or diversity, as it will be 
referred to here. These two media functions will be of key importance throughout this book. 
 
                                                 
1
 In the sense that a candidate is no longer just one among many partisans. 
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Hence, following a research tradition and strategy famously specified by McQuail (1992), the 
present study deals with the democratic requirements that mass media are supposed to fulfill. 
It examines a) by what standards the democratic performance of mass media can be assessed 
in a systematic, comparative framework, b) to what degree media actually live up to these 
standards in a cross-national perspective and c) how that affects different aspects of the dem-
ocratic process. So far, the literature is somewhat vague concerning the first question and 
highly controversial with regard to the second and the third question. 
On the one hand, the media’s actual democratic performance is very often criticized as flawed 
and even seen as a threat to democracy. One of the first and most prominent representatives of 
this position is Habermas (1962) but he has been followed by numerous scholars (see e.g. 
Champlin and Knoedler 2006; Curtis 2004; Jackson and Stanfield 2004). Gunther and 
Mughan (2000), for example, call it a paradox that media have actually been crucial in pro-
moting democratization processes in many transition countries but that at the same time, they 
do not play their part in enhancing the quality of democracy in more mature democratic socie-
ties. The reasons for such opinions are twofold. First, in terms of media structures, media sys-
tems are increasingly controlled by a few large and private media conglomerates, and it is 
feared that this reduces the diversity of viewpoints in the public sphere or the independence of 
media from political or economic players (Champlin and Knoedler 2006; Habermas 2006; 
Petley 2004; Woods 2007). Second, in terms of media content, mass media adapt their politi-
cal news coverage to criteria which seem to attract the highest attention of a wide public, 
namely the so-called news values. As a consequence, as plenty of studies have shown, politi-
cal news focus more and more on personalization, privatization, scandals and sensational 
events as well as the conflict and competition between political actors and their strategies 
(game framing) instead of substantive political issues (Bennett 2003; Gerhards 1994; Gulati et 
al. 2004; Habermas 2006; Imhof 2002; Jarren 1998; Gunther and Mughan 2000; Rhee 1997). 
And even if substantive issues are covered they are presented in an episodic style, e.g. by re-
Chapter 1 
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porting about individual stories or fates detached from the wider social context (Iyengar 
1991). All of this is taken as evidence that the mass media fail to meet their democratic duties, 
and – even worse – it is supposed that political news coverage fosters the citizen’s disen-
gagement, mistrust and a crisis of political legitimacy (Cappella and Jamieson 1997; Gunther 
and Mughan 2000: 427; Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2006; De Vreese and Semetko 2004: 16). Norris 
(2000) gives a good overview of all of these supposed trends and summarizes them under the 
term “videomalaise”. They are sometimes also more generally referred to as ‘commercializa-
tion’ or ‘mediatization’. For another comprehensive review of the respective literature see 
Kriesi et al. (2012, chapter 8). 
 
On the other hand, other authors argue against judging media by highly normative and unreal-
istic expectations that media have neither the capacities nor the motivations to fulfill. Graber 
(2003: 148) articulates this most clearly:  
„Rather than being a venue for teaching civic knowledge, the media, as currently struc-
tured, are for-profit enterprises that must be concerned about their financial bottom line. 
[…] Under these circumstances, the surprise is not that media have failed to perform the 
functions that are deemed so essential for […] democracy, but that they have retained a 
public-service orientation at all.” 
Taking the same line of argument, it is claimed that the democratic ideal of the well-informed 
and eagerly participating citizen is not accurate to capture how politics works in advanced, 
industrialized societies (Graber 2004: 561). Only a very small part of the population is actual-
ly interested in receiving substantive and detailed political information. Most citizens, by con-
trast, base their political decisions on very limited and selective knowledge and heuristics 
(Ettema 2007; Graber 2004; Lupia 1994). Accordingly, a realistic model of democratic citi-
zenship in today’s social context would be that of the so-called “monitorial citizen” (Schud-
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son 1998).
2
 Monitorial citizens do not need to pay close attention to politics all the time. They 
only have to follow the news often enough to notice when their interests are in danger and 
when political action is therefore required (Schudson 1998: 310f.). And this, as Schudson 
(2008: 2) holds, is actually more likely when the news is presented in a newsworthy way. 
Sensationalist media coverage of drastic events, such as natural disasters or political scandals, 
may be more successful in engaging people and changing their minds than the best in-depth 
political analysis. Following up on Schudson (1998), Zaller (2003) calls for a “Burglar Alarm 
news standard” rather than a “Full News standard”. „The key idea is that news should provide 
information in the manner of attention-catching ‘burglar alarms’ about acute problems, rather 
than ‘police patrols’ over vast areas that pose no immediate problems” (Zaller 2003: 110). In 
light of these assumptions, high-quality journalism does not only seem to be unprofitable for 
media organizations but not even really necessary either.  
Nevertheless, Graber (2004) actually outlines for the U.S. context – which is mostly thought 
of as the worst case – that the amount of substantive political news in the mass media is not as 
low as usually expected and that there is a wide range of different channels of communication 
through which citizens can receive political information and observe government actions. 
Furthermore, studies rate only one third of the political news coverage as qualitatively poor 
while one third is judged to be mediocre or excellent, respectively (Graber 2004: 554). This 
means that for monitorial citizens, the media news digest might be adequate enough. Norris 
(2000) supports this. In her comparative study she follows the claims of the so-called “mobi-
lization theory” (Newton 1999) and finds that contrary to the conventional wisdom, media 
news consumption is positively related to political knowledge and mobilization (Norris 2000: 
                                                 
2
 In a way that is surprisingly congruent with Manin’s (1995) metamorphosis of representative democracy out-
lined above, Schudson (1998) describes how conceptions of the ideal form of civic participation changed 
throughout the history of representative democratic government in the United States. In a later essay he actually 
equates each of these different historical ideal types with one character from the famous TV show “The Simp-
sons” (Schudson 2006). 
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17). Further empirical studies also seem to contradict the rather pessimistic conclusions of 
proponents of the videomalaise perspective (see e.g. Kriesi 2012). 
 
Rather than adopting one or the other perspective in this important controversy, however, the 
starting point of this book is the observation that verdicts of the media’s compliance with 
democratic requirements – no matter if positive or negative – mostly lack comprehensive em-
pirical support. In other words, many studies deal with media and democracy more or less 
explicitly but they are mostly limited to the analysis of single or a few countries or only se-
lected aspects of this complex field. Thorough, comparative studies are largely missing. As a 
consequence, it seems that for every study finding something – say an increasing negativity of 
news media coverage or a positive impact of soft news consumption on individuals’ level of 
political interest – there is at least another study finding the opposite, maybe in a different 
context, at a different time (see Kriesi et al. 2012, chapter 8).  
One reason for the lack of large-scale cross-national studies is the limited availability of relia-
ble comparative media data (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 16; Leckner and Facht 2010: 7; Pud-
dephatt 2010: 43), which is something the present study admittedly struggles with as well.
3
 
Nevertheless, it at least attempts to provide an empirical basis for the discussion of democrat-
ic media performance. More precisely, it is guided by the following two research questions: 
1. How can the performance of media and media systems for democracy be measured sys-
tematically and how does it compare across democracies worldwide? 
2. How do differences in media performance actually affect the functioning of different as-
pects of democracy? 
These two questions imply a division of the book into two parts. The first part is concerned 
with the first question above. Accordingly, the already mentioned aim of this book is to de-
                                                 
3
 This problem cannot be stressed enough. Thus, I fully agree with Leckner and Facht (2010: 7) who call for „the 
development of reliable international media and communication statistics of relevance in various global fora”.  
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velop a framework which allows assessing to what extent mass media’s compliance with their 
supposed role in a democracy varies between more or less established democracies. At this 
point, a word on what I mean by mass media is in order. I consider the traditional mass media, 
namely the press, television and – to a lesser degree – radio. This is mainly because democrat-
ic requirements are usually defined for traditional mass media (Christians et al. 2009: 29f.). 
Thus, the Internet is only included where this seems possible and appropriate. Moreover, I 
deliberately exclude authoritarian states or countries in transition from autocratic to democrat-
ic regimes in this study because there seems to be broad consensus about the role of mass me-
dia in these political systems (see Gunther and Mughan 2000; Norris and Inglehart 2010).
4
 
Probably more in line with representatives of the pessimistic videomalaise position, I will rely 
on normative democratic standards for media performance because they serve „well as an 
ideal type – that is, as a construct against which different real-world approximations can be 
evaluated” (Bennett and Entman 2001: 3; see also McQuail 1992: 17 or Norris and Odugbemi 
2010: 12). In this sense, two key functions of media for democracy are derived from norma-
tive theory. They are referred to as the vertical and the horizontal function. While the vertical 
function asks for the widespread access to and provision of political information, the horizon-
tal function requires that the diversity of different political viewpoints held in society is ade-
quately reflected in the public sphere. The operationalization of these two functions, however, 
possibly rather follows the considerations of those who advocate the monitorial citizen model. 
Because of the comparative approach, the specific factors included to evaluate media perfor-
mance are somewhat rough indicators which not necessarily make very high demands on 
mass media and media systems. They could also be regarded as minimal standards. Thus, the 
conceptualization of media performance proposed in this book might be considered as build-
                                                 
4
 Media are widely considered to support the state in autocratic regimes and facilitate democratization processes 
in countries in transition. 
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ing a bridge between the two opposing camps of the controversy outline above or, to use 
McQuail’s (1992: 17) words, between normative standards and objective research.  
The second part of the book relates to the second research question. Once democratic media 
performance is measured and compared, it will be analyzed how that actually impacts differ-
ent elements of democracy. There is not a lot of empirical research actually linking features of 
mass media to democratic outcomes across different countries. Most often, positive or nega-
tive consequences of media’s failure of or compliance with democratic requirements are 
simply assumed without a systematic test of such claims. Moreover, democracy is a complex, 
multidimensional phenomenon (Bühlmann et al. 2011a, 2012). Neither might media perfor-
mance affect all of these democratic dimensions equally, nor can the two media functions be 
expected to have the same influence on the same aspects of democracy. Sweeping generaliza-
tions of the relationship between media and democracy might therefore be inappropriate. 
Hence, the objective of the second part of the present study is to provide evidence that gives 
more insights into the effective importance of media for various aspects of democracy, being 
aware that the difficulty of keeping the two concepts apart makes this a challenging endeavor. 
Nevertheless, the results will hopefully allow drawing conclusions about whether the contro-
versy between video- or media malaise and mobilization theorists about what to make of the 
current state of media in established democracies is actually worthwhile. That said, however, 
it is not the intention of this book to take sides and assert which perspective is right. Its goal is 
to contribute to the debate by offering it a more solid empirical grounding. 
 
To conclude this introductory chapter, I would like to give a brief overview of the following 
eight chapters. Chapter 2 positions this study in the current field of comparative media re-
search and provides a review of existing studies which focus on media and democracy in a 
cross-national perspective. In a first part the discussion shows that previous empirical assess-
ments of democratic media performance have either been purely qualitative or have had a 
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9 
limited conceptual scope. In this context, the distinction between analyses on the structural 
and on the content level is introduced. While the former refers to features of the media system 
(media landscape and infrastructure), the latter comprises the output of media outlets, i.e., 
their news coverage. The distinction between these two levels is crucial in the present study 
and will be used continuously. A second part of chapter 2 summarizes different strands of 
research which link media-specific variables to democratic outcomes. Again, it is argued that 
even though giving interesting insights, these contributions do not provide a comprehensive 
picture of the relationship between media and democracy. While the first part of chapter 2 is 
important for the first research question guiding this book, the second part relates to the focal 
point of the second research question on page 6. 
The subsequent four chapters form the first part of this book, which includes the definition, 
measurement and comparison of democratic media performance. Chapter 3 develops the con-
ceptual framework of the present study. In a first step, drawing on the normative literature 
about media and democracy, the supposed democratic role of mass media according to differ-
ent models of democracy is discussed. Next, these different conceptualizations are synthe-
sized and consolidated to two key functions of media for democracy. Accordingly and as al-
ready mentioned, I argue that there is basically a vertical and a horizontal function that media 
are required to fulfill in a democracy from a normative perspective. In the remainder of chap-
ter 3 each function is further justified and specified in more detail by various components and 
constitutive elements, both on the structural and the content level. 
Chapter 4 turns to the operationalization of the two media functions and discusses the re-
search design and methodological approaches chosen to examine media performance. Again, 
the distinction between the structural and the content level is important here. More specifical-
ly, since the media’s compliance with their democratic functions is assessed and studied on 
both levels of analysis, the country samples, the data and the indicators used for each type or 
level of analysis are explained separately. The analysis of democratic media performance on 
Chapter 1 
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the structural level is based on secondary data on media system characteristics for the years 
1990 to 2008 and for two different samples ranging from 47 to 24 countries. The data for the 
analysis of democratic media performance on the content level, by contrast, comes from a 
content analysis of 50 newspapers from ten countries (usually five newspapers per country) 
during 2008, which was conducted by the author herself. 
The next two chapters proceed to the empirical analyses and they present the results of the 
first part of this book. While chapter 5 exclusively deals with the structural level, chapter 6 
focuses on the content level. For each level of analysis, the corresponding chapter is com-
posed of the following tests. First, factor analyses provide evidence as to how the indicators 
relate to each other and whether this conforms to the theoretical dimensions, i.e., the two me-
dia functions. Second, descriptive and cluster analyses allow for a comparison of media per-
formance across different countries and the identification of various patterns of democratic 
media performance. And third, explanations for the differences in media performance are ex-
amined by means of multivariate regressions. 
In chapter 5, the correlation structure of the system-level indicators for media performance 
really reproduces the two theoretical media functions. But whereas the vertical function is 
one-dimensional, the horizontal function is not. Instead, the respective indicators form two 
latent factors, according to two theoretical components of the horizontal function, quantitative 
and qualitative media diversity. Furthermore, countries vary greatly with respect to their com-
parative degree of fulfillment of the vertical and the horizontal media function and a simulta-
neous maximization of both does not seem to be possible. Countries either score low or mod-
erately on both functions, or perform well with respect to only one of two functions or its 
components, respectively. 
Chapter 6 again shows that the indicators for media performance can not only be theoretically 
but also empirically divided into the two media functions by factor analysis. But contrary to 
Introduction  
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the structural level in chapter 5, it is the vertical function that splits into its two components 
on the content level, namely the amount and the balance of information. Furthermore, the 
findings in chapter 6 indicate that democratic performance in terms of media content varies 
more across than within countries. Hence, although the characteristics of individual newspa-
pers shape the democratic quality of their output, the broader news culture, political traditions 
and also structural media performance are more decisive. Finally, different configurations of 
the two media functions and thus multiple types of media performance are also evident with 
respect to the content level.  
Chapters 7 and 8 form the second part of this book, which focuses on the question of how 
media performance relates to the well-functioning of democratic regimes. To this aim, chapter 
7 first provides a definition of the quality of democracy. Drawing on the theoretical concept 
of the Democracy Barometer (Bühlmann et al. 2011a, 2012), it is argued that a high-quality 
democracy relies on the maximization of nine functions or aspects. Although all of these 
might be affected by democratic media performance, particular attention will be paid to four 
of them. In a next step, chapter 7 justifies why and derives hypotheses regarding the effects of 
the two media functions as measured in chapters 4 through 6 on the four aspects of democra-
cy. More specifically, the vertical media function is expected to enhance the level and equali-
ty of political participation as well as transparency. The horizontal function, by contrast, is 
assumed to promote the strength of the civil society and the adequacy of political representa-
tion. Finally, chapter 7 also discusses the design applied to test these hypotheses. On the one 
hand, the data used to operationalize the dependent variables and control variables is present-
ed. On the other hand, the statistical methods used are outlined.  
In chapter 8 the theoretical expectations from chapter 7 are examined by means of multivari-
ate regression analyses. All hypotheses are tested first in a purely cross-sectional and conse-
quently a panel data framework. Due to the low number of countries for which content level 
data exists, chapter 8 is limited to the impact of structural media performance on the four el-
Chapter 1 
  
 
12 
ements of democracy. The findings suggest that there is empirical support for most of the hy-
potheses. Media performance in terms of the vertical function indeed has a positive effect on 
the extent of political participation and transparency but does not seem to be related to the 
equality of participation. In addition, media performance in terms of the horizontal function 
has the expected positive influence on political representation. The results are inconclusive 
and contradictory with respect to the strength of the civil society, however. While the first 
component of the horizontal media function seems to lead to more interest group organiza-
tion, the opposite can be observed for the second component of the horizontal media function. 
Finally, the concluding chapter 9 summarizes and discusses the findings and implications 
from both parts of the present study, reflects on its limitations and provides an outlook for 
future research in the field. 
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Chapter 2:  
The state of comparative research on media and de-
mocracy
The aim of this chapter is to shed light on the state of research and the existing empirical liter-
ature regarding media and democracy. This is of course a very wide field. It is therefore first 
of all important to narrow the subject down to what is really of interest to the present study. In 
this sense, it needs to be emphasized once again that I am primarily concerned with empirical 
studies with a comparative focus and a broad perspective of media and democracy. This is 
further outlined in the following section. The remainder of the chapter then consists of a dis-
cussion of the most important contributions within this delimited area of research. The discus-
sion is divided into two sections. Section 2.2 deals with studies which assess the democratic 
performance of mass media and media systems across countries, either adopting a qualitative 
or a quantitative approach. This speaks to the first of the two research questions highlighted in 
chapter 1 and, accordingly, the first part of this book. Section 2.3, by contrast, presents differ-
ent strands of research which examine the influence of media-related factors on various dem-
ocratic and political outcomes in a cross-country perspective. This is relevant for the second 
research question from chapter 1 and the second part of the present study, respectively. 
2.1 Delimiting the research field of interest 
Many scholars have devoted much of their time studying the interplay between media and 
democracy. This has even prompted Curran to claim that „media and democracy is one of the 
most intensively ploughed areas in media studies” (Curran 2011: 1). There are indeed count-
less studies which can somehow be related to this question. Seven years ago Graber (2005) 
conducted a meta-analysis of political communication studies and came to the following con-
clusions: media research has mostly focused on election campaigns, media effects on citizens’ 
levels political knowledge and opinion formation (e.g. agenda-setting, priming and framing), 
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“problem areas” (Graber 2005: 484) such as media coverage of international conflicts or dis-
advantaged groups as well as more recently the new media. This short summary reveals that 
the empirical literature has illuminated the media’s impact from different angles of the demo-
cratic process but rarely aimed at providing a comprehensive and systematic picture of the 
media’s role for democracy. Accordingly, borrowing from Lippman (1922), Graber consid-
ered media research to be „like the beam of a searchlight that moves restlessly about, bringing 
one episode and then another out of darkness into vision” (Graber 2005: 495). But analyses of 
media coverage of such highly salient and exceptional issues like elections or wars can hardly 
be generalized (Norris 2000: 54; Vowe and Dohle 2007: 344). Moreover, as Graber (2005: 
496) conceded herself, most of the research is based on a specific country context, mostly the 
United States, and truly comparative studies are scarce. And even though the body of cross-
national media research is rapidly and constantly growing (see Engesser and Franzetti 2011) 
this observation is still true, at least in terms of the central research question of this book. Just 
recently Curran (2011: 1) stated that „most books on media and democracy are either theoret-
ical or grounded in the experience of one nation”. In addition and despite offering valuable 
insights, the comparative studies that do exist in this field are often limited in one way or an-
other. First, like many non-comparative studies (see above), they usually focus on single is-
sues. Second, they mostly include only a handful of countries and usually the extreme case of 
the United States, where – due to specific cultural, political and economic characteristics of 
that country – the media-related processes supposed to inhibit the quality of democracy are 
most pronounced (Mancini 1999: 238; Scammell 1998: 260). Third, a number of books which 
are called comparative and consider a larger range of countries simply take the form of a col-
lection of individual country chapters (e.g. Gunther and Mughan 2000; Dobek-Ostrowska et 
al. 2010; Hallin and Mancini 2012). 
This chapter exclusively focuses on studies which try to avoid these limitations. This means 
that of interest here is only research which explicitly links the media to the functioning of 
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democracy in a wider sense and analyzes these links within a single, common framework 
across at least ten countries (with two exceptions; see section 2.2.2). This number of countries 
– admittedly somewhat arbitrary – derives from the fact that the literature with such samples 
is rather manageable whereas the number of analyses covering fewer countries is vast, to say 
the least. To cite a few examples, I will therefore not be able to discuss studies which com-
pare election campaign coverage in Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States (Es-
ser and D’Angelo 2006), the norms and perceived roles of journalists in Germany, Great Brit-
ain, Italy, Sweden and the United States (Donsbach and Patterson 2004) or the impact of tele-
vision news on political knowledge in Denmark, Finland, the United Kingdom and the United 
States (Curran 2011, chapter 3), although there is no doubt that they, and this kind of litera-
ture in general, provide important knowledge for the field of cross-cultural media research 
and political communication. 
2.2 Comparative assessments of media performance 
To repeat, the following overview of the state of the art is limited to comparative research on 
media systems and on media and democracy which have a wide geographic scope and evalu-
ate media and media systems according to democratic standards. Some of the most influential 
contributions which fit this perspective are purely qualitative. They are the subject of the next 
section 2.2.1. The subsequent section 2.2.2, by contrast, deals with studies with a clearly 
quantitative approach. As will be shown, these are often confined to certain aspects of demo-
cratic media performance, especially either media structures or media content. 
2.2.1 Qualitative studies 
Among the numerous studies that might be discussed in this section, two deserve particular 
attention. The first is Siebert et al.’s (1956) seminal Four Theories of the Press, the other Hal-
lin and Mancini’s (2004) more recent but probably just as widely acclaimed Comparing Me-
dia Systems. Both of them try to give a comprehensive picture of the mechanisms at work 
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when it comes to media and democracy or political regimes in general. So strictly speaking, 
their aim is not so much to explain how mass media contribute to the well-functioning of dif-
ferent democracies but rather to look at the interplay of media and politics and build typolo-
gies thereof. 
Over half a century ago Siebert et al. (1956) developed their famous typology of media sys-
tems in light of different political regimes. Let us briefly look at their “four theories of the 
press”. First, according to the authoritarian theory, media and journalists are directly con-
trolled by the government and heavily censored. Second, media also depend on the govern-
ment and are supposed to propagate the state’s ideology in the Soviet communist theory. 
However, control is less rigorous, and media are subject to self-regulation and a certain duty 
towards the audience. Third, the social responsibility theory entails a strong public service 
ethos. Media have an interdependent relationship with the government and are supposed to 
provide citizens with accurate, objective and diverse information. Fourth, in the libertarian 
theory, journalists are allowed to act autonomously. Media are free to publish whatever they 
want, and they survey the actions of the political rulers. In short, the four theories range from 
a highly dependent to a highly independent press from the state.  
Siebert at al.’s (1956) typology has been cited and used very often. But it has also been wide-
ly criticized. The main reproach is that the four theories are not applicable to the contempo-
rary world and are based on a political and cultural bias (Christians et al. 2009: 4; McQuail 
1992: 66). Accordingly, Ostini and Fung (2002: 42) hold that „theoretical models should not 
be bounded by dominant ideological perspectives and hinged on certain historical blocs – 
namely those of Communism and the Cold War – and subsequently void with the demise of 
these concepts”. Furthermore, the authors assumed an evolutionary development of media 
systems away from the authoritarian and the Soviet to the social responsibility and the liber-
tarian model which is problematic. Finally, Siebert et al. (1956) entirely neglect economic 
influences and only look at structural factors of media systems (Ostini and Fung 2002: 44, 
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46). Nevertheless, the four theories of the press remained influential for a very long time and 
have prompted various refinements, revisions and follow-up studies (for a good overview see 
Christians et al. 2009: 6-14), including Ostini and Fung (2002) themselves. 
 
Thus, it is fair to say that Siebert et al. (1956) were omnipresent until Hallin and Mancini 
(2004) came up with a new typology of media systems almost 50 years later. The latter gained 
such widespread popularity that it seems to have become the new “bible of comparative me-
dia studies” (Curran 2011: 28). Hallin and Mancini (2004) provide a rich analysis of the de-
velopment of media systems in 18 Western societies against the backdrop of their respective 
political-institutional and historical contexts. The analysis builds on four dimensions: 1) the 
degree of commercialization of media systems (especially the development of a mass circula-
tion press), 2) the so-called political parallelism, i.e., the independence of the media from the 
political sphere and from political divisions, 3) the professionalization of journalism and 4) 
the degree of state control or media regulation (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 27).  
On the basis of these dimensions, the authors design three intuitively plausible models of me-
dia systems to which they assign the countries scrutinized. First, the Mediterranean or polar-
ized pluralist model is mainly found in Southern European countries (France, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain). These are characterized by a broad and fragmented spectrum of political 
forces as well as a strong social divide within the society, both of which are related to rela-
tively young democratic and liberal institutions. Accordingly, neither a strong commercial 
mass press nor a professionalized journalism has ever really emerged in these countries and 
political parallelism is still wide-spread. Furthermore, the state traditionally plays a strong 
role so that media are highly regulated. Second, the North/Central European or democratic 
corporatist model, to which Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden and Switzerland belong, has three somewhat paradoxical features: 1) the 
coexistence of partisan newspapers and a commercial mass press, 2) correspondingly, the 
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coexistence of political parallelism and a high degree of professionalized journalism and 3) 
the coexistence of early democratization and liberalization with an active, interventionist state 
(e.g. a strong welfare state). The first two features can be attributed to the formerly highly 
organized and institutionalized political, economic and religious cleavages structuring these 
societies as well as to their long tradition of negotiating and power sharing between different 
interest groups, political parties and state authorities. The democratic corporatist countries are 
thus mostly multi-party systems and consensus democracies. The third model, finally, is the 
North Atlantic or liberal model (Canada, Ireland, United Kingdom and United States). The 
early evolving industrialization and democratization in the corresponding countries led to an 
equally early development of a politically neutral mass press, professional journalism and 
limited state interventionism in the media sector. Politically, these countries are predominant-
ly two-party systems and majoritarian democracies. Roughly, the three models can be placed 
on the ends and the middle position of a continuum ranging from close proximity of the media 
to the political sphere to close proximity to the economic sphere. But Hallin and Mancini 
(2004) emphasize that their typology should not be regarded as a hierarchy even though they 
recognize that a certain convergence into the direction of the liberal model can be observed. 
Thus, one cannot help but reading into their analysis that they would at least consider the 
Mediterranean or polarized pluralist model to be inferior to the other two. 
Despite its huge acclaim, Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) typology has also met with doubts and 
criticism. Curran (2011), for example, argues that the authors artificially overstate the differ-
ences between and simultaneously downplay the differences within the three types of media 
systems. He points out that the countries of the liberal or North Atlantic model vary consider-
ably with regard to many institutional characteristics, such as the party system, the degree of 
federalism, the electoral system, the type of democracy (parliamentary vs. presidential), the 
broadcast system and the tradition of tabloid newspapers (Curran 2011: 43). He makes similar 
observations for the other two models, by noting that very different countries are lumped to-
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gether in one model (Belgium and Sweden) whereas common features of all Western Europe-
an countries such as public broadcasting are neglected. In Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) de-
fense, Curran (2011) thinks that these exclusions were probably done unconsciously: „They 
clearly believe that their work is driven by evidence rather than normative preconceptions. 
Yet, in reality it comes out of an identifiable academic tradition that is so dominant, and so 
little challenged, that it is largely unaware of its own partiality” (Curran 2011: 45). Neverthe-
less, even Curran (2011) recognizes the importance of the three models of media systems in 
integrating political science and media studies. In a similar vein, it has also been objected that 
Hallin and Mancini (2004) only included those countries into the analysis which fit well into 
their framework. The three models can, however, hardly be applied to the media systems in 
Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and the Arab world (Blum 2005a: 8). In his essay, Blum (2005a) 
therefore tries to extend the three-fold typology to countries beyond the Western context and 
subsequently comes up with a somewhat different but still preliminary typology. It consists of 
six models which are defined by their position on nine different dimensions. Three of these 
dimensions are derived from Hallin and Mancini (2004). Without going into further detail, the 
six models are: 1) Atlantic-Pacific liberalism model (e.g. Australia, New Zealand, United 
States); 2) Southern European clientelist model (e.g. Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, 
Spain, and maybe some Eastern European countries too); 3) Northern European public service 
model (e.g. Germany as well as Benelux, Scandinavian and modernized Eastern European 
countries like Estonia); 4) Eastern European shock model (e.g. Belarus, Iran, Russia, Turkey 
Ukraine); 5) Arab-Asian patriot model (e.g. Indonesia, Morocco, Syria as well as the former 
regimes in Egypt and Tunisia); 6) Asian-Caribbean commando model (e.g. Burma, China, 
Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam). 
In sum, qualitative analyses of media systems and democracy can be illuminating and provide 
plausible analytical frameworks, especially in the case of Hallin and Mancini (2004). But they 
are largely descriptive and lack systematic evidence. Consequently, they should be followed 
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by thorough empirical examinations. For this reason, we now turn to studies which made ef-
forts to quantify and compare democratic media performances across different national con-
texts. 
2.2.2 Quantitative studies 
This section highlights four exemplary studies which illustrate how the democratic perfor-
mance of media and media systems is measured in the tradition of quantitative comparative 
communication research. Most studies in this field deliberately limit their conceptual scope in 
one way or another. For example, while some exclusively look at the diffusion of access to 
the media in the population, others are only concerned with the quality of policy discourses in 
the media. It is therefore helpful to organize the literature according to its level of analysis. 
The following studies can be classified with respect to whether they operate on the macro or 
the micro level. The macro level refers to the analysis of media systems as a whole. In this 
sense, news media are regarded as a political institution (Kriesi et al. 2012, chapter 7) with 
distinct characteristics and varying interaction patterns, which are reflected by different com-
munication infrastructures and media landscapes. The micro level, by contrast, refers to phe-
nomena which relate to single media organizations. Starting from this perspective, scholars 
might be interested in specific editorial policies, different organizational forms of newsrooms 
or the output of individual news outlets, i.e., their actual media coverage. Such properties of 
individual news organizations are not necessarily independent of a country’s cultural and in-
stitutional context. Thus, they might also be aggregated to the macro level and then consid-
ered as media system features, which is usually done in cross-national studies. 
Following McQuail (1992) and Voltmer (2000: 5), the levels of analysis proposed in this 
study distinguish between media structures or „the institutional arrangements in which mass 
communication takes place” and media content or in other words „the information the media 
are actually producing, which is usually measured by means of content analysis”. While me-
The state of comparative research on media and democracy 
  
 
 21 
dia structures are clearly located on the macro level, media content is rather associated with 
the micro level. The distinction between these two levels of analysis is crucial for the present 
contribution. It will guide the subsequent discussion of the four quantitative comparative me-
dia studies which, in my view, are among the most sophisticated or insightful in their respec-
tive research areas. Moreover, the two levels will be of major importance for the theoretical 
and empirical framework of this book, as developed in chapters 3 and 4 and applied in chap-
ters 5 and 6. 
 
Voltmer (2000) is the first study to be presented in this section. The article offers a promising 
approach to analyze structural media diversity in countries of the Organization of Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD). It is therefore an example for a macro-level study 
according to the definition above. Based on Dahl’s (1971, 1998) “polyarchy” concept, Volt-
mer (2000) defines media diversity – or a broad marketplace of ideas – as the key criterion 
media need to fulfill for democracy and sets out to measure it and classify countries accord-
ingly. In a first step, press and broadcast systems are assessed separately. For press systems, 
Voltmer (2000) considers indicators for the degree of media regulation and media concentra-
tion, the number of newspaper titles per capita as well as the degree to which a country’s 
press is characterized by politically neutral newspapers and/or by an equilibrium of newspa-
pers with different political orientations. These parameters, which in fact incorporate all of 
Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) dimensions of media system except the professionalization of 
journalism, are compared for the years 1970 and 1990. Probably the most notable result is that 
Voltmer (2000) finds considerable cross-national variation. In a nutshell, Great Britain per-
forms quite badly while other European countries, e.g. Denmark, Austria and Greece, score 
well. For broadcast systems Voltmer (2000) examines whether they are dual, i.e., whether 
both private and public providers are present, but also the number of providers of each type, 
the modes of financing and the strength of public broadcasting. Again, all of these factors are 
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assessed at two different points in time, namely 1980 and 1990. Differences between coun-
tries are discovered with regard to broadcast systems as well. Here, however, Iceland and 
Norway rank lowest whereas Western European countries such as Germany and Great Britain 
come off well. In a second step, the two separate evaluations are combined into a joint typol-
ogy.  
Overall, Voltmer’s (2000) paper is inspiring and innovative with regard to the measurement 
of some of the indicators she uses. And even though it merely covers two points in time and 
some of the measures presented are somewhat crude, it is to date still the most comprehensive 
attempt to assess the democratic performance of media systems that I am aware of. Alterna-
tive evaluations and evaluation strategies have been proposed in later research contributions. 
However, these mostly present about the same kind of data in a very similar fashion as Volt-
mer (2000) but do not cover as many countries (such as e.g. Engesser and Franzetti 2011) or 
lack a sound theoretical framework (such as e.g. Färdigh 2010). 
 
Contrary to Voltmer (2000), Aalberg et al. (2010) and Woods (2007) focus on the content 
level. They can therefore be cited as examples of micro-level media studies, although in the 
latter case the data is eventually aggregated to the macro level. These contributions also con-
stitute the two exceptions from the country threshold established at the beginning of this chap-
ter because large-scale cross-national analyses (≥ 10 countries) are especially few and far be-
tween in this area. The majority of the comparative literature about media content is based on 
three to five countries, for the obvious reason that content analyses across a wide range of 
countries face tremendous practical obstacles (language, access to material, time and effort 
etc.). Aalberg et al. (2010) circumvent this problem by comparing the simple amount of polit-
ical news broadcasts in six countries as collected from TV guides. More specifically, they 
count the number, duration and timing of news and current affairs programs in two major 
public service and two commercial television channels at three different points in time – 
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1987, 1997 and 2007 – in the following countries: Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Swe-
den, the United Kingdom and the United States. The authors’ point of departure is that de-
mocracy requires well-informed citizens, which in turn depends on the flow of information 
from mass media. Relying on Hallin and Mancini (2004), Aalberg et al. (2010) expect differ-
ences in the availability of political information between different types of media systems and 
broadcasters but also general trends of convergence, both cross-nationally and across organi-
zations. Their results indicate that overall a decline in the amount of political news over time 
can only be observed in the United States. However, the average number of minutes of news 
in the U.S. still exceeds the respective number in any of the other countries examined, even 
though most of the news is broadcast outside of prime time and consists of local news, which 
mostly focuses on crime, accidents and sport (Aalberg et al. 2010: 260-262). Furthermore, 
public service channels provide significantly more political news than their commercial coun-
terparts in all six countries. Finally, the authors seem to find little support for the convergence 
thesis and also observe that news broadcast patterns in the United Kingdom resemble more 
those from other European countries than from the United States. These conclusions lead 
them to question the adequacy of Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) three models of media systems. 
This, however, seems rather unjustified since in my reading, Hallin and Mancini (2004) make 
no assumptions about the frequency of news broadcasts. And even if they do, this would only 
be one of many aspects of relevance for their typology. Nevertheless, Aalberg et al. (2010) 
raise an important question in terms of media and democracy and their empirical approach is 
commendable. 
The same applies to Woods (2007), who is not interested in the amount of news but rather the 
degree of diversity in newspaper coverage within a quite heterogeneous set of seven coun-
tries: China, Colombia, Egypt, Germany, India, Lithuania and Russia. The author actually 
speaks of press pluralism, which he defines as „newspaper content that contains an array of 
opposing viewpoints” and which he considers important for democracy (Woods 2007: 214). 
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In order to measure the variety of different positions in the press coverage, a content analysis 
of news reports of ten issues related to 9/11 in the ten largest newspapers of each country in 
2001 is conducted. The codings are then aggregated to the country level by means of the so-
called “index of qualitative variation (IQV)” (Woods 2007: 220). The data reveals on average, 
pluralism is lowest in China and Germany, moderate in Colombia and Lithuania and highest 
in Egypt, India and Russia. At least with respect to Germany and Egypt, these findings are 
somewhat surprising and rather counterintuitive. Correspondingly, associations between the 
Freedom House democracy score
5
 and the IQV are generally weak but actually negative for 
six out of ten issues. Overall, there seems to be no relationship between pluralism in media 
content and a country’s degree of democracy (Pearson’s r = -0.08). However, as Woods 
(2007) concedes himself, these results are most likely an artifact due to the issue chosen for 
the content analysis. It makes sense to assume that opinions on 9/11 were less divided in the 
Western world than in a Muslim country like Egypt. Hence, although it is understandable that 
the author would have wanted to choose a topic which provoked a lot of media coverage 
worldwide, his actual choice is very unfortunate. It might have been more reasonable to either 
study comparable domestic issues or a politically and ideologically less sensitive event like 
for example a major natural disaster and the world community’s reaction to it. Nevertheless, I 
think that Woods’ (2007) article is noteworthy because it makes an attempt to quantify by 
means of a large-N content analysis (7 countries x 10 newspapers) how well media fulfill a 
key requirement of democracy: reflecting various points of view in their news output. Moreo-
ver, his methodological approach is original although there is a lot of room for improvement. 
The seemingly wrong calculation of the mean value for China is just one piece of evidence in 
this regard. Woods (2007) further deserves credit for trying to empirically link media perfor-
mance with actual measures for democracy even if a correlation analysis with seven cases 
                                                 
5
 http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world (08/28/2012). 
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seems dubious. But other research testing the interaction between – at least elements of – me-
dia and democracy is rare. I will come back to this subject in section 2.3. 
 
The final study of interest in this section is Norris (2000). This is the only contribution I am 
familiar with that compares a large number of countries and takes both the structural and the 
content dimension, or in other words the macro and the micro level, into account. Other stud-
ies that apply normative standards to examine media performance and link the national with 
the organizational context do usually not go beyond the ten-country threshold defined at the 
outset of this chapter (see e.g. Lucht and Udris 2010; Trappel and Maniglio 2011). Norris’s 
(2000) aim is to test the general notion that media have a negative impact on civic engage-
ment, i.e., citizens’ political knowledge, trust and participation. Based on democracy theory, 
the author derives three basic functions of the media in a democracy, which can be evaluated 
by looking at the production, contents and effects of modern political communication (Norris 
2000: 13). First, news production refers to the structural or what was also termed macro level 
above. It is measured by a range of indicators on the press, television and Internet market, 
giving insight into the transformation of the news industry since the end of World War II in 
29 OECD countries. Examples are the number of daily newspapers, changes in press circula-
tion, the competition between public service and commercial television channels, the share of 
news and current affairs programs relative to all programming and Internet usage (Norris 
2000: 59). From this part of the analysis, Norris concludes that there are major differences 
between the countries but that in general, old media have not been replaced by new media. 
Instead, „many post-industrial societies have seen a diversification in the channels, levels, and 
formats of political communications that have broadened the scope, reach and audience for 
news, at both highbrow and popular levels” (Norris 2000: 311).  
Second, news contents, i.e., the micro level, is analyzed by media coverage from 1995 to 
1997 on the European Union (EU) in newspapers and television news bulletins from 15 and 
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six EU member countries, respectively. The results suggest that news coverage about the EU 
is not only rather scarce but usually tends to be negative as well. Third, Norris (2000) also 
tests how her media performance measures relate to civic engagement, which is what she 
means by media effects. This question, however, corresponds to the subject of the next section 
2.3 and will therefore be discussed in 2.3. 
In my view, Norris’s (2000) study is innovative and a remarkable contribution to the field of 
comparative media research. It combines a large amount of data for many countries, which 
allows the author to illuminate the media’s democratic performance from different angles and 
on different levels. It therefore provides comprehensive insight into media content and media 
system features in light of normative standards. However, due to data constraints, i.e., the 
need to rely on existing datasets, the picture remains somewhat fragmented. For instance, me-
dia content is only examined with regard to the specific issue of EU coverage. Further limita-
tions of Norris’s (2000) study can mainly be identified with respect to the third part of her 
analyses, the assessment of media effects. Again, this discussion is postponed to section 2.3. 
 
In sum, all of the quantitative contributions described in this section shed light on important 
aspects of the topic of this study, democratic media performance, on either the structural or 
content level or both. But they all have more or less severe methodological shortcomings 
and/or problems with the coherence of their conceptual frameworks and research designs. 
This is especially evident when it comes to the empirical connection with democracy in the 
case of Woods (2007). The next section will thus further elaborate on this issue and discuss 
additional studies which link media attributes with political outcomes in a comparative and 
quantitative perspective. 
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2.3 Comparative analyses of media performance effects on de-
mocracy and political outcomes 
Two of the four studies presented in the previous section also connect their media measures to 
indicators assessing the functioning of democracy or aspects of democracy. This was already 
briefly discussed with respect to Woods (2007) and will be outlined in more detail further 
below for Norris (2000). But Woods (2007) and Norris (2000) are not the only ones who try 
to study the relationship between media (system) features and political outcomes. The aim of 
this last section of chapter 2 is therefore to highlight a number of further examples. 
In fact, this line of research is quite established and includes the media studies with the largest 
country samples. However, few of these have a very comprehensive focus, i.e., few explicitly 
build on media performance on the basis of normative standards and its impacts on different 
aspects of democratic governance. The majority of this literature uses media indicators to ex-
plain either a highly aggregated democracy measure or just one specific phenomenon related 
to democracy, most frequently political participation or corruption. Hence, the larger part of 
this section discusses such kind of studies. 
 
Djankov et al. (2003) study the political and social consequences of different forms of media 
ownership. Their paper might be considered as an example for an analysis of the relationship 
between media systems and overall democracy with a somewhat undifferentiated approach.
6
 
In the first part of the paper, the authors present their quite remarkable data collection. In each 
of 97 countries they determined the ultimate owner, i.e., the largest shareholder, of the five 
largest daily newspapers, the top five TV stations and the top radio station. Based on this in-
formation, the media outlets were classified as either owned by the state, by private actors or 
by intermediary organizations. The final indicators reflect the share of private and state media 
                                                 
6
 Though to be fair, Djankov et al.’s (2003) dependent variables consist of two dimensions of democracy and 
also include a measure for corruption. 
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ownership in terms of the number of outlets and in terms of their market share. Descriptive 
statistics of the ownership variables show considerable variation across different world re-
gions. But on average, two thirds of a country’s newspapers are owned by private actors 
whereas almost two thirds of the television stations and even more of the top radio stations are 
owned by the state. In the second part of the paper, the impact of the degree of state owner-
ship on various external factors is tested by regression analyses. Generally, higher shares of 
state media ownership are attributed with ‘worse’ political outcomes, including press freedom 
(as measured by the number of journalists jailed) and democracy (as measured by the two 
dimensions “civil liberties” and “political rights” of the Freedom House democracy index, see 
footnote 5) (Djankov et al. 2003: 367-369). However, the interpretation of the statistical evi-
dence by the authors seems very bold and somewhat sketchy. A look at their regression tables 
reveals that the conclusions above only apply to state ownership of newspapers whereas the 
coefficients for state-owned radio and television stations are not statistically significant for 
most of the dependent variables. Though this is mentioned, it is heavily downplayed in the 
text.  
 
The studies by Norris (2004) and Adserà et al. (2003) provide more nuanced pictures while 
still retaining quite a broad focus on democratic governance. 
Norris (2004) explores the relationship between good governance, human development and 
mass media in a cross-national analysis with about 130 countries. Borrowing from democracy 
theory, she argues that media can foster good governance and human development if 1) they 
are free and independent and 2) public access to the media is widespread. The former is 
measured by a press freedom index compiled by Freedom House
7
, the latter by a composite 
index consisting of daily newspaper circulation, the number of television and radio receivers 
per 1’000 inhabitants as well as the share of Internet users. Norris (2004) then goes on to 
                                                 
7
 http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-press (08/28/2012). 
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show that both of these components as well as a combination of them correlate highly posi-
tively and significantly with several indicators for good governance (political stability, rule of 
law, government efficiency and absence of corruption) as taken from the World Bank’s 
“Governance Indicators” (Kaufmann et al. 1999). Furthermore, she finds even higher positive 
correlations between the media measure and a range of indicators for human development, 
such as income, health and education.
8
 These results are interesting and research efforts with a 
similar approach are desirable. However, the implications of Norris’s (2004) findings remain 
unclear in light of simple correlation analysis. Even though the author admits that it is diffi-
cult to draw a conclusion without causal analysis she assumes from her results that media are 
a driving force for democratization and human development. This is highly questionable. It 
seems more plausible that the causal direction goes the other way around. Hence, future at-
tempts should focus on providing causal inference with respect to media and democracy, 
keeping in mind that endogeneity problems make this a challenging undertaking (see chapter 
7 for more on this issue). 
Adserà et al. (2003) have a similar focus as Norris (2004) but actually apply very sophisticat-
ed methods to study the impact of what they call free press circulation on different factors of 
the quality of government. Unlike Norris (2004), their point of departure is not a normative 
ideal of media performance but rather a political accountability model. The model holds that 
the quality of government is higher when citizens can effectively control their political lead-
ers, which in turn is a function of the political regime type and the level of information among 
the public (Adserà et al. 2003: 448). Hence, the authors examine the impact of a country’s 
degree of democracy as measured by the Polity index
9
 and daily newspaper circulation per 
capita on different indicators for the quality of government from the International Country 
                                                 
8
 Indicators for human development include the United Nation’s Human Development Index (http://hdr.undp.org 
(08/28/2012)), GDP per capita, the Gini Index, infant mortality (reversed), public health expenditures, life expec-
tancy, adult literacy rate and secondary school enrolment. 
9
 http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (08/28/2012). 
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Risk Guide (ICRG)
10
 and – like Norris (2004) – from Kaufmann et al. (1999) (measuring the 
absence of corruption, the rule of law and bureaucratic quality). Moreover, they explain that 
„since newspaper readership can only generate real political accountability under conditions 
of democratic freedom, the circulation of newspapers is interacted with the existing level of 
democratic liberties in each country” (Adserà et al. 2003: 455). It is not entirely clear how this 
is done as no interaction terms are included in the regression models. In addition to press cir-
culation and democracy, a large range of control variables accounts for various political, eco-
nomic and cultural factors. The authors then test their assumptions in different empirical set-
ups: 1) panel analysis for over 100 countries across four five-year periods, 2) cross-sectional 
analysis for 117 countries as well as 3) cross-sectional and panel analysis for 48 U.S. states. 
The results show a consistently strong and positive impact of press circulation on the quality 
of government, especially the absence of corruption, in all samples and with or without con-
trol variables. The degree of democracy seems to be less influential in comparison and has 
often insignificant estimates. I would suspect, however, that this might at least partly be due 
to the fact that the press variable is already interacted with democracy. Finally, Adserà et al. 
(2003) also further apply the method of instrumental variables (IV) and Granger causality 
tests to check the robustness of their findings to reverse causality issues.  
 
A question which is related to the ones pursued by Norris (2004) and especially Adserà et al. 
(2003) and which has received considerable academic attention deals with the influence of 
media freedom on corruption (see e.g. Besley and Prat 2006; Brunetti and Weder 2003; 
Chowdhury 2004; Lindstedt and Naurin 2005; Treisman 2000, 2007). It therefore stands for a 
research field with a rather narrow focus on a specific aspect within the larger context of me-
dia and democracy. For example, Chowdhury (2004) argues that a free press brings corrup-
tion cases to the public which prompts voters in democratic states to elect corrupt politicians 
                                                 
10
 http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx (08/28/2012)). 
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out of office and consequently, a country’s level of corruption is reduced. This assumption is 
tested on the basis of about 80 countries, employing three widely used indicators: 1) the al-
ready mentioned Freedom House index for media freedom as independent variable, 2) Trans-
parency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)11 as dependent variable and 3) 
Vanhanen’s (2003) democracy index as key control variable. Chowdhury (2004) then per-
forms simple ordinary least squares (OLS) as well as instrumental variable (IV) and panel 
regression analysis for the years 1995 to 2002, using different combinations of control varia-
bles to account for possible omitted variable bias and endogeneity. Overall, it can be shown 
that both democracy and press freedom have the expected influence on corruption.  
Lindstedt and Naurin (2005) are concerned with corruption and media freedom as well, but 
they argue that rather than serve as a control variable, democracy should be interacted with 
press freedom. Along the lines of Adserà et al.’s (2003) accountability model, and in fact sim-
ilarly to Chowdhury (2004), they assume that press freedom only decreases corruption in de-
mocracies because only there do political elites have to fear sanctions if their corrupt behavior 
is publicized by the media (Lindstedt and Naurin 2005: 5). Accordingly, the press freedom 
should only have a significant impact on corruption at a certain threshold of democracy. On 
the basis of data for 107 countries and cross-national regression analysis with proper interac-
tion terms, this assumption is tested and indeed confirmed. The authors use the same data for 
press freedom and corruption as Chowdhury (2004) but also cross-check their results with 
alternative indicators. In order to measure democracy, they employ the Polity index. 
 
A completely different field of comparative media research focuses on the impact of media 
factors on political participation and civic engagement, also simply one aspect of the complex 
democratic process. For example, rightly arguing that comparative electoral research has 
largely neglected mass media, Baek (2009) aims to explain cross-national variation in voter 
                                                 
11
 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi (08/28/2012). 
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turnout by what she calls “political communication systems”. The theoretical assumption is 
that an environment which lowers the information costs for citizens will rather mobilize them 
to go to the polls (Baek 2009: 376). Systems of political communication are characterized and 
measured, on the one hand, by media system attributes such as the structure of the broadcast 
sector (private, public or dual), the audience share of public television channels, newspaper 
subscribers per 1’000 inhabitants and the extent of a partisan press. On the other hand, the 
author considers legislation regulating whether political competitors receive free airtime on 
television during election campaigns, whether paid political TV advertising is possible, 
whether political competitors receive public funding for their campaigns and whether there 
are campaign funding and spending limits. The relationship between turnout and political 
communication systems is tested by regression analyses for up to 74 countries, taking a num-
ber of institutional control variables into account. In a nutshell, Baek (2009) finds little impact 
of the media system factors except for a positive influence of public broadcasting but signifi-
cant results for the campaign finance and access to television laws. While campaign spending 
limits seem to depress voter turnout, public campaign funding and free airtime for electoral 
contesters promote turnout.  
The absence of a partisan press effect on turnout according to Baek (2009) stands in contrast 
to the results of Van Kempen (2007), who examines the exact same hypothesis in 16 EU 
countries. However, contrary to Baek (2009), the analyses are performed at the individual 
level on the basis of survey data. Accordingly, a measure for “media-party parallelism” is 
constructed by regressing respondents’ party preferences on their exposure to different news-
papers and television news programs (Van Kempen 2007: 307). The R
2
s of all party regres-
sions per country are weighted by the corresponding party’s vote share and summed up to 
produce an aggregate indicator for partisan bias on the national level. In her logistic regres-
sion model the author finds a significant effect of media-party parallelism in both the press 
and the TV sector on participation in EU elections, while controlling for several of the usual 
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individual- and country-level factors employed in electoral research (party attachment, atti-
tude towards the EU, media exposure, age, compulsory voting etc.). Moreover, an interaction 
term suggests that the impact of media-party parallelism is stronger among citizens with low-
er levels of political interest. Van Kempen (2007) further conducts a series of robustness tests 
to validate her results. Unfortunately, no effect sizes are presented although this is important 
to correctly interpret interaction effects (see Brambor et al. 2006). In addition, it would have 
been appropriate to at least complement the empirical analysis by a multilevel approach even 
though this is of course difficult with a sample of only 16 countries. 
Coming back to Norris (2000), the third part of her study may be assigned to this area of re-
search, the cross-national comparison of media effects on political participation. But unlike 
both Baek (2009) and Van Kempen (2007), Norris (2000) is not only interested in electoral 
turnout but in how civic engagement defined more broadly is influenced by her media per-
formance measures, which are evaluated in the previous parts of her book (see the respective 
discussion in section 2.2.2 above). To this aim, the content analysis data is combined with 
indicators for media consumption and civic engagement from different international surveys 
in correlation and regression analyses. On the aggregate country level, negative media cover-
age seems to decrease public confidence in the EU and its institutions. However, on the indi-
vidual level, Norris (2000) finds that contrary to the conventional wisdom, high media news 
consumption generally corresponds with more political knowledge, higher trust in the gov-
ernment and the political system and more political activity (Norris 2000: 313f.). She further 
assumes that media news and civic engagement are linked in a two-way causal mechanism, or 
a virtuous circle as she calls it: it is the already engaged citizenry who turns to political news 
and who consequently becomes even more engaged. Politically passive citizens, by contrast, 
are not interested in political information in the first place (Norris 2000: 317). But considering 
the constantly diversifying news market, chances that even these unengaged members of soci-
ety are reached by information about public affairs increase. 
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As already mentioned in the previous section, Norris’s (2000) study deserves a lot of praise. 
Nevertheless, its shortcomings, especially with respect to her analyses of media effects just 
outlined, need to be pointed out. First of all, the independent variables are not systematically 
connected to the dependent variables. On the one hand, the structural media data is only ana-
lyzed descriptively and not combined with civic engagement in a causal analysis. On the other 
hand, the influence of media coverage is only tested for public confidence but not the other 
civic engagement measures. Furthermore, her statistical analyses are not beyond any doubt. 
For example, it is problematic to estimate simple OLS regression models on the basis of a 
dataset whose units are country-months, as she does in chapter 9. 
 
Finally, a third strand of research addresses the relationship between media penetration and 
public spending (see Besley and Burgess 2002; Bruns and Himmler 2007; Strömberg 2004). 
What is interesting about these contributions is that they all look at this process within one 
country but compare various subnational units. In a similar vein like the corruption studies 
cited above, this literature argues that in order to avoid sanctions from voters which they an-
ticipate to be well-informed, political incumbents provide more public services for areas 
where media access is more widespread (Besley and Burgess: 1445f.; Bruns and Himmler 
2007: 1; Strömberg 2004: 215). In order to test their assumptions, Besley and Burgess (2002) 
regress annual amounts of food distribution and calamity relief expenditures by governments 
on yearly newspaper circulation per capita in 16 Indian states from 1958 to 1992, controlling 
for election turnout and party competition. Strömberg (2004), another example, deals with the 
share of households owning a radio in about 2’500 U.S. counties in the 1930s and links this to 
unemployment relief spending as part of the New Deal programs implemented around the 
same time. He also takes into account voter turnout (since media access might also indirectly 
affect public spending via electoral participation) and various socio-demographic variables 
and tests the robustness of his results by means of an IV approach. Finally, Bruns and Himm-
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ler (2007) rely on county-level data from the United States as well. However, they do not 
measure media penetration but rather a county’s distance to “media cities” (Bruns and Himm-
ler: 1), postulating that media tend to cover political affairs that are closer to where they are 
located. Thus, politicians have fewer incentives to spend money in areas that receive little 
news coverage. Bruns and Himmler (2007) therefore estimate the effects of a county’s close-
ness to the nearest location of a major TV station and of the number of local TV stations li-
censed within a county on the amount of federal grants per capita allocated to it for about 
3’000 counties. Just like the other two studies, the authors include a range of control variables 
such as electoral turnout and socio-demographic factors, and they use methods which allow 
them explore possible omitted variable or endogeneity bias (two-stage least squares). In all 
these papers, the authors find a positive influence of media penetration – or media density in 
the case of Bruns and Himmler (2007) – on political output, both directly and indirectly via 
election turnout.  
 
To conclude, what all of the different studies discussed in this section have in common is that 
they give interesting insights into their rather limited fields of research. Moreover, their theo-
retical assumptions are plausible and, with the exception of Norris (2000, 2004) and possibly 
Van Kempen (2007), they are tested by means of appropriate empirical analysis. However, 
even the most sophisticated statistical methods do not solve the problem of inadequate data. 
This is something that especially the cross-national studies presented here suffer from and that 
also applies to the quantitative media performance studies presented in section 2.2.2. On the 
one hand, both press freedom indices mentioned (Freedom House and Reporters Without 
Borders) are not very valid and reliable. Despite being very widely used and offering a metric 
scale which seems to allow for a nuanced gradual measurement, it is not clear how these 
scores are really produced. This is because they lump together many different forms and de-
grees of potential media freedom violations. Lindstedt and Naurin (2005: 12), for example, 
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point out that the version of the Freedom House press index that Chowdhury (2004) uses ac-
tually includes corruption. Moreover, neither the exact coding procedures nor all sub-scores 
are publicly available, especially in the case of the measure from Reporters Without Borders.  
On the other hand, Djankov et al. (2003) and Baek (2009) might be criticized for the opposite. 
Eight out of Baek’s (2009) ten indicators for political communication systems are dummy 
variables and therefore too simplistic. For instance, simply assessing the degree of a politi-
cized press by a dichotomous indicator seems improper. The fact that Van Kempen’s (2007) 
more nuanced measure produces quite different results lends support to this claim. Similarly, 
Baek’s (2009) mere distinction of private, public and dual broadcast systems is very crude, 
not to mention that nowadays there is hardly any system that consists of either purely com-
mercially or exclusively publicly funded providers. Thus, a more appropriate measure would 
capture the degree to which either organizational form prevails, just like Djankov et al. (2003) 
do. But their study, in turn, might be questioned on grounds of inaccurate classifications too. 
These probably explain why no significant relationship between TV ownership and democra-
cy is found. While it makes indeed sense that extensive ownership of newspapers only occurs 
in nondemocratic regimes, state ownership of broadcasters may take many different forms. As 
the authors note themselves, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) is hardly the same 
thing as state television in Myanmar (Djankov et al. 2003: 351). Hence, it might be reasonable 
to distinguish publicly owned broadcasters from those actually run by the government. Yet 
both fall into the same category in Djankov et al.’s (2003) dataset. They largely fail to 
acknowledge this problem and instead offer a rather implausible explanation for their results: 
„One reason might be that the private press, which is more common, provides a check on state 
television, ensuring freer flows of information than would occur if both were in state hands” 
(Djankov et al. 2003: 369).  
But data problems also arise with regard to some of the dependent variables used in the stud-
ies cited above. The difficulty of reliably measuring corruption is well-known and much-
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debated. Treisman (2007) notes that especially corruption indices which rely on expert judg-
ments – in contrast to those based on surveys of corruption victims – may suffer from serious 
biases. Most notably, if experts equate democracy and press freedom with less corruption 
while coding countries, then analyses of the influence of democracy and press freedom on 
corruption indices are largely tautological. In addition, Munck (2009: 9) reveals the irony of 
international organizations’ demand for transparency while they themselves provide highly 
intransparent corruption data. 
The criticism of inadequate data is, however, only partly justified. In fact, finding solid data 
on media and media systems for a large range of countries is not an easy task (Hallin and 
Mancini 2004: 16; Leckner and Facht 2010: 7; Puddephatt 2010: 43). The lack of proper data 
can therefore be considered as the most important challenge for comparative media studies. 
This problem is discussed in more detail in chapter 4. 
Besides data problems, a further objection to the cross-national studies presented above is of 
conceptual nature. Apart from the contributions examining political participation, the litera-
ture discussed in this section includes countries covering the full continuum between authori-
tarian and democratic regimes. Thereby, they ignore that the media might have very different 
effects for different types of political regimes – as is suggested by Gunther and Mughan 
(2000). But a joint analysis for such diverse sets of countries blurs these differences, despite 
the fact that the sizes of such country samples are impressive. Lindstedt and Naurin (2005) 
account for this by introducing interaction terms into their models. But the impact of the me-
dia on democracy could probably be more adequately assessed by focusing on just one type of 
regime. Baek (2009: 380) recognizes this problem and estimates models for different subsets 
of countries. Similarly, the present study limits the diversity of regime types since it is con-
fined to the category of established democracies. 
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2.4 Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide an overview of the theoretical concepts and the 
data used in empirical media studies which have a cross-national design comparing at least 
ten countries – with two exceptions – and which relate to democratic media performance or 
the effects of mass media on (attributes of) democracy. 
With regard to studies trying to evaluate and compare media performance, qualitative and 
quantitative approaches were distinguished. As for the former, two seminal typologies of me-
dia and political systems were highlighted: Siebert et al.’s (1956) four theories of the press 
and Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) three models of media systems (see section 2.2.1). Studies 
with a quantitative design were further divided according to their levels of analysis. More 
specifically, section 2.2.2 discussed one contribution with a focus on the structural or macro 
level (Voltmer 2000), two on the content or micro level (Aalberg et al. 2010; Woods 2007) 
and one on both levels (Norris 2000), respectively. 
Section 2.3 presented various studies which empirically link and analyze the relationship be-
tween media system features and democratic governance as a whole (Djankov et al. 2003), 
various attributes thereof (Adserà et al. 2003; Norris 2004) or only one specific democratic 
element such as the absence of corruption (e.g. Chowdhury 2004; Lindstedt and Naurin 2005) 
or political participation and civic engagement (Baek 2009; Norris 2000; Van Kempen 2007). 
Furthermore, attempts to predict political output by media penetration and density on the sub-
national level (Besley and Burgess 2002; Bruns and Himmler 2007; Strömberg 2004) were 
outlined. 
The significance of all of these contributions for the field of comparative media research 
needs to be emphasized once again. Nevertheless, the limitations which were identified with 
respect to all of them throughout the chapter should not be neglected either. To briefly reca-
pitulate, the qualitative media system typologies have not been followed by comprehensive 
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empirical analysis and their assumptions therefore remain largely untested. The quantitative 
assessments of media performance, by contrast, might be criticized on the grounds that they 
are either conceptually limited to one level of analysis or do not apply a systematic empirical 
framework. Similarly, the research associating media with democracy usually focuses on a 
very narrow question, i.e., one specific element of democracy only, and does not differentiate 
between types of political regimes. Finally, all of the studies illustrated in the last two sections 
suffer to various extents from problems with their data and/or methodology. In short, they do 
not provide a systematic test of the media’s contribution to the quality of democracy. 
The aim of the present study is to offer an analysis of media performance and its contribution 
to democracy which avoids at least some of these shortcomings. First, various indicators are 
deduced from a sound theoretical model to measure democratic media performance on both 
the structural and the content level. Second, attempts are made to compile data as reliable as 
possible, for as many democracies as available and across almost two decades. Finally, the 
effects of media performance on four different aspects of democracy are tested with adequate 
statistical methods. 
After this review of empirical media studies the next chapter will turn to the normative litera-
ture about media and democracy. The goal of chapter 3 is to determine what functions media 
have to fulfill for a well-functioning democracy according to democracy theory, in order to 
develop a conceptual model which will guide the practical analyses. 
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PART I:  
ASSESSING DEMOCRATIC MEDIA PERFOR-
MANCE 
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Chapter 3:  
The functions of the media for democracy
Normative standards or roles that define how institutions which hold a specific function in 
society should operate serve well as benchmarks to evaluate their actual performance 
(McQuail 1992: 17; Norris and Odugbemi 2010: 12). Hence, this chapter aims to clarify the 
normative standards of democratic media performance. To carry out a systematic analysis of 
mass media’s contribution to democracy, it is first of all necessary to identify the functions 
that media are supposed to fulfill in a democracy. This further requires specifying how the 
media’s compliance with such functions manifests itself in reality, i.e., how their democratic 
performance can be empirically observed.  
The chapter therefore proceeds as follows. In a first step, the normative literature regarding 
the role of media in a democracy is reviewed by looking at democracy theory as well as the 
varying number and configurations of democratic media functions that have been suggested 
by media scholars. Next, I synthesize these different notions and develop my own theoretical 
concept. It suggests that – normatively speaking – media have two functions in a democracy: 
a vertical and a horizontal function. While the vertical function is concerned with the dissem-
ination of information about politics and politicians to as many citizens as possible, the hori-
zontal function holds that media need to provide a public forum which reflects the diversity of 
interests within the society. Finally, both of these functions are discussed in more detail and 
their basic empirical features in terms of media system structures and media content are de-
rived. These features serve as the variables for the empirical media assessment. 
3.1 The role of the media in contemporary democracy according 
to normative theories 
Throughout its existence – from the ancient Greek philosophers to political thought of the 21st 
century – democracy theory has produced a large variety of different traditions or conceptions 
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of democracy (see Held 2006; Schmidt 2010). In modern times, these range from the rather 
minimalist theories like the elitist (Weber 1976 [1922]; Schumpeter 1950) or the economic 
models (Downs 1957) to the pluralist (Fraenkel 1991 [1964]; Dahl 1956) and participatory 
tradition (Barber 1984; Pateman 1970) as well as even more ambitious conceptions such as 
for example the deliberative (Fishkin 1991; Habermas 1962, 1981, 1992), social (Heller 1971; 
Meyer 2005) or cosmopolitan models (Archibugi and Held 1995; Held 1995). Except for 
maybe the deliberative theory, none of these models seem to have much to say about the role 
of the media beyond the call for a free and independent press, at least not explicitly (Schudson 
2008: 11; Trappel and Maniglio 2011: 81). Nevertheless, deducing assumptions about demo-
cratic media functions from these models’ properties is quite straightforward, as many contri-
butions have shown (e.g. Beierwaltes 2000; Ferree et al. 2002; Strömbäck 2005; Trappel and 
Maniglio 2011). Or conversely, it is possible to align the media functions that media scholars 
such as Christians et al. (2009), Graber (2003), Norris (2000, 2004), Norris and Odugbemi 
(2010) or Schudson (2008) put forward with specific normative democratic traditions.  
 
Beierwaltes (2000), for example, examines the role of communication – which in today’s me-
dia societies can be regarded as media functions – in representative democracies according to 
three strands of democracy theory: the elitist or liberal, the participatory and the pluralist tra-
dition. The liberal and the participatory theory can be considered ideal type models of democ-
racy (see e.g. Kriesi 2005, chapter 1; Williams and Edy 1999) because they represent two 
easily distinguishable and contrastable positions under which the models mentioned above 
may be subsumed. Broadly speaking, the elitist and economic models are supposed to consti-
tute the liberal theory, whereas the deliberative model might be seen as a variant of the partic-
ipatory theory. Beierwaltes (2000: 61) argues that the demands made on the media do not 
fundamentally differ across the three normative models of democracy, but rather their relative 
importance does.  
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Hence, the first task of the media for democracy is to establish publicity (Beierwaltes 2000; 
“Publizität” in the original German version). This refers to the duty of elected representatives 
to be answerable to the people and to comment on and give reasons for the results of their 
political decision making. Publicity therefore guarantees the transparency of the political sys-
tems and enables citizens to make electoral choices, by informing them about political incum-
bents and their challengers (Ferree et al. 2002: 206; Froehlich 2001: 31). For Beierwaltes 
(2000), Ferree et al. (2002), Norris (2000) as well as Strömbäck (2005), this aspect is strongly 
stressed by the classical liberal model of democracy.
12
 This theory focuses on a strong politi-
cal elite who acts as representatives of the people and takes all political decisions (Ferree et al. 
2002: 206). Citizens are only assigned a minimal role because it is assumed that public affairs 
are too complex and too boring for them in most cases (Lippman 1922; Schumpeter 1950). As 
a consequence, their duty is basically restricted to choosing their representatives by means of 
regular, free, fair and competitive elections (Schumpeter 1950). Elections give the people the 
possibility to hold the elite accountable, by punishing and replacing those who have not acted 
in the public interest. This requires that the citizens can correctly attribute responsibilities. For 
Lippman (1922), media should thus provide all citizens with full and fair information about 
what they need to know and would not learn otherwise. This notion that media need to enable 
individuals to make sound political choices, i.e., to retrospectively judge the performance of 
the representatives and to prospectively decide which candidates match their preferences best, 
resonates in many contributions about media and democracy (Christians et al. 2009: 30; Fer-
ree et al. 2002: 207; Norris 2000: 29f.; Norris and Odugbemi 2010: 11; Strömbäck 2005: 
339). Without linking his six democratic functions of the media to a specific model of democ-
racy, Schudson (2008: 12f.) even explicitly calls one of them “information” (Schudson 2008: 
12f.).  
                                                 
12
 Strömbäck (2005) actually refers to the “competitive model of democracy”, which in essence reflects the same 
ideas as the liberal model described here. 
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Moreover, this idea of ‘information’ is closely related to a further concept often discussed 
with regard to media and democracy. Media, by informing the public about political affairs, 
simultaneously impose control on the elected representatives (Champlin and Knoedler 2008: 
138). Accordingly, further claims by Norris (2000), Norris and Odugbemi (2010), Schudson 
(2008) and Trappel and Maniglio (2011) hold that media need to act as guardians of the pub-
lic interest. They constantly have to scrutinize the political office-holders and make their ac-
tivities and performance records as well as misconduct and mismanagement publicly visible. 
This is of course especially important for citizens’ retrospective judgments of political incum-
bents (Strömbäck 2005: 339). While Christians et al. (2009: 30) refer to the media’s “monito-
rial” role as “vigilant informers” in this respect, Schudson (2008: 14) speaks of “investiga-
tion” by which the media are supposed to „make the powerful tremble”. Similarly, Graber 
(2003: 143) posits that media have to „serve as citizens’ eyes and ears to survey the political 
scene and the performance of politicians” and „act as a public watchdog that barks loudly 
when it encounters misbehavior, corruption, and abuses of power in the halls of government”. 
This dog metaphor is very often used to describe the media as vigilant observers. Hence, me-
dia are supposed to act as “watchdogs” or “guard dogs” (looking after vested interests) instead 
of tame “lapdogs” which serve politicians as if they were their masters (Christians et al. 2009: 
30). However, neither should media turn into “attack dogs” by being too cynical and negative 
about politics in general (Kriesi et al. 2012: 209). In addition to watchdogs, media have also 
been equated to a fourth power or a fourth estate. However, as Sparks (1995) points out, these 
terms are not necessarily synonymous but could instead be adequate for certain types of me-
dia only. So while the reference to the fourth power might best apply to public broadcasting, 
the watchdog role would rather be performed by marginal or small elite media (Sparks 1995: 
53). 
A third media function that Schudson (2008) identifies is “analysis”. Media should not only 
passively observe and pass on information but also put them in understandable narratives and 
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thereby actively explain complex matters to the public (Schudson 2008: 16f.). In my view, 
this third function also fits into Beierwaltes (2000) broad concept of ‘publicity’ since it is 
more an extension or qualifications of the previous two roles rather than a fundamentally dif-
ferent idea. Accordingly, providing analysis and interpretation belongs to media’s information 
and watchdog function (Norris 2000: 29). 
In sum, the liberal model of democracy mainly requires the media to distribute critical infor-
mation about public affairs in order to empower citizens to participate in elections and hold 
those who govern them accountable. 
 
Following Beierwaltes (2000), the second requirement that media should fulfill for democracy 
is discursiveness (originally “Diskursivität”). This means that the media are responsible for 
allowing a free public exchange of arguments among the citizens in order to find commonly 
accepted compromises. For the liberal model of democracy, this is mainly important during 
election campaigns because voters need information about all political competitors (Ferree et 
al. 2002: 207; Strömbäck 2005: 339). By contrast, the notion of a public forum, where all po-
litical interests and alternatives have an equal chance to be heard not only during but also in 
between elections, is especially valued in the participatory model of democracy (Ferree et al. 
2002: 211f.).
13
 The main concern of this model is the maximization of the direct involvement 
of as many citizens as possible and the equal consideration of their interests in the political 
decision-making process (Barber 1984). Proponents of this theory assume that political partic-
ipation fosters the cohesion of a society and equips citizens with political competences. But 
realistically, it is not possible that every single citizen is always able to participate directly in 
large democracies. Therefore, based on Ralph W. Emerson’s theory of political representa-
tion, Von Rautenfeld (2005) argues that all communities should have delegates to represent 
                                                 
13
 Ferree et al. (2002) actually discuss two further models of democracy beside the liberal and participatory, 
namely the discursive and the constructionist theory. However, with regard to the points mentioned here, these 
are in line with the participatory model. 
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them, not only in the political but also in the public sphere, so that civic engagement is not 
limited to elections. The more voices exist in the public sphere, the better. Because there is no 
such a thing as an absolute truth „democracy is the more valuable, the more ‘stupidities’ are 
given public expression through representation” (Von Rautenfeld 2005: 193). Moreover, the 
more diverse and proportional public representation is, the more it equals direct participation 
by the people. Such a focus on public discourse is especially prominent in the deliberative 
model of democracy, which – as mentioned above – might be regarded as a subtype of the 
participatory theory of democracy. In line with Von Rautenfeld (2005), this approach empha-
sizes the need for a free public sphere as a space between households and state institutions 
which everyone should have unhindered access to in order to express his or her opinions and 
engage in debates with others (Ferree et al. 2002: 215f.; Habermas 1962, 1981; Norris and 
Odugbemi 2010: 6). This is also reflected in general definitions of the public sphere, which 
has famously been described as „a group of people (a) who are confronted by an issue, (b) 
who are divided in their ideas as to how to meet the issue, and (c) who engage in discussion 
over the issue” (Blumer 1946: 189).  
The means of communication by which the public sphere is constituted are essential. The 
public sphere has its roots in the agora of the Greek city states, a space where citizens actual-
ly came together to „trade goods, information, concepts and ideas” (Norris and Odugbemi 
2010: 6). In modern, large-scale democracies, however, mass media are assumed to play the 
role of the agora. Hence, in order for Von Rautenfeld’s (2005) system of public representation 
to work, media need to guarantee a diverse platform where the variety of social and political 
interests, viewpoints and issues can be articulated and where public opinion can emerge, not 
only during but also in between elections. Again, this idea is expressed in most contributions 
of media’s normative place in society even though not all of them specifically refer to partici-
patory theories of democracy (see e.g. Ferree et al. 2002: 210; Graber 2003: 143; Norris 2000: 
25, 2003: 138; Norris and Odugbemi 2010: 18; Schudson 2008: 20; Strömbäck 2005: 340; 
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Trappel and Maniglio 2011: 86). Christians et al. (2009), for example, do not explicitly speak 
of the media as a public forum but outline journalism’s “facilitative” and “radical” role, both 
of which seem to point in the same direction. While according to the former, media should 
support and strengthen the civil society, the latter means that media need to „provide a plat-
form for views and voices that are critical of authority” (Christians et al. 2009: 31). Further-
more, Schudson (2008: 17f.) points out that media should foster “social empathy” and mutual 
respect by presenting different perspectives and ‘lifeworlds’, especially of minorities and dis-
advantaged groups who are often marginalized in the public sphere. But again, rather than 
being two separate aspects “social empathy” and “public forum” (which constitute the fourth 
and fifth media function in Schudson’s (2008) essay) are two sides of the same coin in that 
the former should thrive given the latter, in my opinion. 
In addition to facilitating public discourse, an inclusive media platform is also considered to 
contribute to the mobilization of citizens. Interest groups do not only seek public attention to 
have a voice and debate with other actors. They also want to rally and gain supporters. Nor-
ris’s (2000) third and Schudson’s (2008) sixth and last media function is therefore “mobiliza-
tion”. On the one hand, Norris’s (2000) understanding of mobilization includes the provision 
of necessary information for participation in elections by the media, something which has 
been discussed above with respect to the liberal model of democracy though. On the other 
hand, and in line with Schudson (2008), she conceives of mobilization as stimulating grass-
roots interest and discussion among citizens as a result of a lively public discourse (Norris 
2000: 30). In this sense, it might be questioned whether ‘mobilization’ really is a media func-
tion in its own right or just a possible consequence of media establishing a diverse public fo-
rum. Regardless, mobilization is also prominently promoted by Dewey (1927), who is typical-
ly pitched against Lippman (1922) and a liberal perspective. Dewey stresses that the role of 
the media is to educate and engage the people. This brings us back to the participatory model 
of democracy and its focus on self-education through participation. 
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In short, the mandates of the media that are especially important with regard to the participa-
tory theory of democracy are to „provide a forum for discussion of diverse, often conflicting 
ideas” and „give voice to public opinion” (Graber 2003: 143), ultimately to promote civic 
engagement. 
 
Beside publicity and discursiveness, the third function of democratic communication accord-
ing to Beierwaltes (2000) is responsiveness (originally “Responsivität”). Responsiveness re-
quires that political representatives are sensitive to their constituents’ preferences and needs. 
This establishes a linkage between those who govern and those who are governed. Beierwal-
tes (2000) mainly assigns this third function to the pluralist theory of democracy. This model 
focuses on a strong intermediary system operating between the society and the state in which 
all kinds of organized interest groups compete for public attention and articulate their de-
mands to be considered by political representatives (Beierwaltes 2000: 130; Dahl 1956). 
Hence, it is not difficult to see why responsiveness would be crucial for the pluralist theory. 
By contrast, rather hard to imagine is the media’s active role in this respect. It seems that, 
unlike the other two of Beierwaltes’s (2000) functions, responsiveness is not something media 
are actually able to enforce through their own activities. I would think instead that respon-
siveness might be a potential consequence of mass media’s fulfillment of publicity and espe-
cially discursiveness. Responsiveness „is what occurs when the democratic process induces 
the government to form and implement policies that the citizens want” (Powell 2004a: 91). 
Thus, it is something that possibly results from watchdog media who denounce politicians’ 
neglect of public opinion. And more importantly, it might emerge from an open and plural 
discourse which allows office-holders to learn about public opinion in the first place.  
In other words, I suggest that media can only establish the prerequisite for the responsive be-
havior of political elites, specifically by complying with the functions already discussed 
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above. This implies that the tasks of the media with respect to the liberal and the participatory 
models of democracy should also apply to the pluralist theory. 
 
The discussion of the normative roles of the media as identified by various scholars and ac-
cording to different theoretical conceptualizations of representative democracy has revealed 
two main bundles of democratic media functions. One is more in line with the liberal model 
of democracy and requires the media to act as vigilant informers. The other rather applies to 
the participatory model of democracy and refers to the media as a public forum. Against this 
background, I will subsequently develop my theoretical framework which highlights these 
two functions that media are supposed to fulfill in modern democracies. 
3.2 Two normative functions of the media for democracy and two 
levels of analysis 
Following up on the previous discussion of the requirements that media have to fulfill in a 
democracy, and in order to integrate the different views and concepts in a few words, I argue 
that there are basically two ways in which media can contribute to democracy. First, media 
have to guarantee the vertical communication from the policy-making arenas to the citizens. 
Second, media should facilitate the horizontal communication among citizens, intermediary 
actors and political representatives. I will therefore distinguish between the vertical and the 
horizontal media function for democracy hereafter.  
Sketched in broad strokes, the aim of the vertical media function is to disseminate politically 
relevant information to as many citizens as possible in order to allow them to make sound 
election choices and judge political incumbents. This corresponds to the first set of require-
ments discussed in section 3.1 above. The aim of the horizontal media function, by contrast, is 
to reflect the diversity of interests within the society and enable public debate among them. 
This was the main focus of the second set of requirements in the preceding discussion of sec-
tion 3.1. However, it is important to note that the distinction between the vertical and the hor-
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izontal function primarily serves analytical purposes. In reality, it is not always easy to keep 
the two functions apart and overlaps between them might well exist. For example, the public 
competition among political parties in election campaigns could be regarded as both a public 
debate among diverse members of the civil society in the sense of the horizontal function or 
the distribution of necessary information about political institutions and processes as stipulat-
ed by the vertical function. Hence, it will be subject to analysis whether the two dimensions 
also manifest themselves empirically as distinct dimensions of media performance. 
So how can the media meet the democratic demands imposed on them by the two media func-
tions and how can this be measured? Providing answers to this question is the subject of the 
following sections in which the two functions and their characteristics are further specified. 
As a general starting point for this endeavor, it is worthwhile to draw on McQuail (1992) and 
Voltmer (2000: 5) and again distinguish between the two different levels of analysis which 
have already been introduced with regard to the discussion of previous comparative media 
studies in chapter 2. Accordingly, both structural features of media systems and content fea-
tures of media coverage are crucial for democracy.
14
 This means that on the micro level, as 
the term was used in the previous chapter, every media outlet is responsible for designing its 
news coverage or content in such a way as to account for the two normative functions. Addi-
tionally, on the macro level, media outlets act within specific media systems or structures, 
which can be more or less apt to satisfy the normative standards demanded from the media. 
This distinction between structure and content provides a helpful analytical tool to derive var-
iables for the assessment of media performance. However, previous studies have rarely exam-
ined both levels (see chapter 2). 
                                                 
14
 Voltmer actually uses the terms “structural and performance diversity” because she conceives of diversity as 
the single key element of the media’s contribution to democracy (Voltmer 2000: 5). Similarly, Trappel and 
Maniglio (2011) differentiate between “structural conditions” and “performance criteria”. While the former refer 
to characteristics on the country level, the latter focus on the company level. These two concepts are combined 
with their three democratic media functions “freedom / information”, “equality / interest mediation” and “control 
/ watchdog” (Trappel and Maniglio 2011: 91).  
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With the two democratic functions of the media and the two levels of analysis in mind, the 
crucial factors to evaluate how well media fulfill their democratic duties can be deduced from 
the relevant literature. Starting with the vertical function (section 3.3) and then moving on to 
the horizontal function (section 3.4), I am subsequently going to describe the functions and 
their components in more detail and propose how they can be measured.  
3.3 The vertical media function 
In order to understand the vertical function of the media for democracy better, it is helpful to 
embed it into a broader context. In this sense, the vertical function can be regarded as related 
to the fundamental principle of freedom of the press. In other words, a good media perfor-
mance in terms of the vertical function could be considered as resulting from and reflecting 
the ideal of a free and independent press. This is because according to the vertical function, 
media should provide all citizens with easy access to the information they need to make 
meaningful choices in elections and maybe direct votes (Norris 2000: 29f.). Furthermore, to 
borrow from Kriesi et al. (2007) and Powell’s (2004a) concept of the “chain of responsive-
ness”, it could be argued that the vertical function’s purpose is to enable accountability. Other 
scholars similarly claim that publicity is an essential prerequisite for accountability, which 
can be defined as the mechanism of sanctions being imposed for misconduct (see e.g. Adserà 
et al. 2003; Lindstedt and Naurin 2005). Thus, accountability not only presupposes transpar-
ency in terms of available information but also that „the information is actually spread to and 
taken in by a broader audience” (Lindstedt and Naurin 2005: 8). This is in line with studies 
that have shown in different contexts that the distribution of media (such as newspaper circu-
lation) is related to public spending (see section 2.3 in chapter 2). They reason that out of fear 
of being held accountable and voted out of office, politicians will direct more resources to 
areas where they expect to find a larger share of informed citizens (Besley and Burgess 2002; 
Strömberg 2004). 
Chapter 3  
  
 
 54 
Hence, the vertical function requires that mass media should be available to as many citizens 
as possible. No segments of the society should be systematically excluded from participating 
in elections and other forms of political involvement because they do not have the possibility 
to catch up on the performance of their representatives, political alternatives or the issues at 
stake (Dahl 1998: 37). In general, the information that media distribute should help individu-
als to learn about politics and public affairs. By supplying citizens with political information, 
media also control the activities of the political elites and „expose official corruption, corpo-
rate scandals, and government failures” (Norris 2000: 28f.). Accordingly, media have often 
been referred to as a watchdog, a fourth power or a fourth estate (Sparks 1995). For all these 
reasons, disseminating information, especially critical information, is the central concept or 
objective of the vertical media function. 
However, as already noted, how much and what citizens really need to know in order to par-
ticipate properly is highly debated (see chapter 1). In any case, it is neither possible for the 
media to cover all the news that exists, nor for individual media consumers to absorb all the 
news that is actually being covered (Graber 2004: 552). It is therefore not reasonable to define 
too rigid benchmarks already from a theoretical point of view. In addition, given the partially 
poor availability of data, limiting the assessment to rather broad standards will considerably 
facilitate the comparative analysis of media’s democratic performance. Designing such stand-
ards is the aim of the subsequent section.  
3.3.1 Conceptualizing the vertical media function 
Table 3.1 shows a conceptualization of the vertical media function. It illustrates how for both 
levels of analysis – structure and content – the function is broken down into components and 
variables which will guide the empirical analyses. Of course, this list is not necessarily ex-
haustive. However, based on the literature, the aspects to be highlighted shortly seem the most 
pivotal ones.  
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On the structural level, all variables are derived from a single component whereas the vertical 
function is divided into two components on the content level. They are now discussed in more 
detail, beginning with the structural level and then proceeding to the content level. 
Table 3.1 Conceptualization of the vertical media function 
 Components Variables 
Structural level 
 
Access to information  High overall levels of media penetration in terms of print, 
electronic and new media 
 Even geographical distribution of media access  
 Low prices for media services 
Content level A. Amount of critical 
political information 
 High amount of politically relevant news 
 High amount of news about malpractice of office-holders 
B. Balance of political 
information 
 Well-balanced coverage of constitutional branches  
 
Structural level 
With regard to the structural level one of the most important requirements of the vertical func-
tion is that media need to guarantee the equal and easy access for the whole electorate to nec-
essary information. Media systems should therefore be structured in such a way as to account 
for an extensive and even distribution of information across the population (McQuail 1992: 
175). This can first of all be enhanced by generally high media penetration rates, ideally for 
different types of mass media. This might be assessed by factors such as newspaper circula-
tion per capita, the number of TV and radio sets per household or the number of internet users 
(see e.g. Adserà et al. 2003; Norris 2004).  
In addition, there should not only be a high overall access to information. Media should also 
be available everywhere in a country. In other words, there should be an even geographical 
distribution of media access and no local or even regional disruptions of supply. For this rea-
son, media penetration should also be studied and compared for different subnational units. 
Similarly, political information should be equally accessible for different socio-economic 
groups within the society. In this sense, a citizen’s income should not determine whether he or 
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she can receive mass media. Hence, low prices for media services are important. In other 
words, as many people as possible should be able to afford to buy or subscribe to mass media 
(McQuail 1992: 175). This pertains to both press and broadcast products as well as internet 
services. 
On the structural level, the vertical function is thus mainly concerned with guaranteeing a 
good media infrastructure which allows for a broad diffusion of information. This, however, 
leaves aside whether relevant information is transported at all. It is therefore crucial for the 
vertical function to also consider media content. 
Content level 
In terms of the content level of the vertical function, media need to actually provide citizens 
with information about political processes, decisions and institutions. This has two somewhat 
different implications, which is reflected by the two components on the content level in table 
3.1. The first component requires that media cover and scrutinize political office-holders as 
often as possible, regardless of which ones. The second asks for a well-balanced coverage of 
the different constitutional branches. This is mainly inspired by worries that media, due to 
their news value orientation, focus more and more on executive actors at the expense of other 
political institutions (Graber 1997; Van Dalen 2012). In some sense, therefore, one could dis-
tinguish the two components as capturing the amount and balance of political information. 
A. The amount of critical political information 
As its name suggests, the first component primarily commits media to deliver a high amount 
of politically relevant news. Bearing in mind that the vertical function mainly derives from the 
liberal model of democracy and therefore focuses on citizens’ capacity to hold officials ac-
countable, politically relevant news might here be defined as reports about the actions of the 
parliament and the executive as well as of the judiciary and even the public administration. 
Hence, news coverage of these institutions and their representatives within a country should 
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be extensive according to the vertical function. More specifically, it can be argued that cover-
age of national politics is supposed to dominate over other news categories, such as for exam-
ple the economy, sports or human interest. Similarly, national incumbents should appear more 
frequently in the news than their counterparts from other countries. Despite growing suprana-
tional integration, national institutions remain the legitimate and most important powers of 
policy making in established democracies. 
In addition to the simple amount of political news coverage, a further variable with respect to 
the first component is the frequency of critical reports about political affairs. This relates to 
the idea of media acting as public watchdogs that constantly monitor power holders and ex-
pose misconduct and mismanagement, which is inherent to the vertical media function. This 
might be guaranteed by a high amount of news reports about official malpractice, such as of 
scandals, corruption or fraud cases and similar misdeeds. A high number of such lapses asso-
ciated with state actors and institutions would indicate that the media perform their role well 
and that citizens can better evaluate the performance of those in power.  
At least in the case of scandals, however, this is of course controversial. After all, mass media 
have been widely blamed for eroding public confidence in democratic institutions, precisely 
as a consequence of too much scandalizing (Cappella and Jamieson 1997; see Norris 2000: 
6f.). But watchdog journalism is essentially exposure journalism, in which „the ethical stand-
ards of the journalist or the quality of reporting may be high or low” (Coronel 2010: 113). So 
even if one agrees that mass media tend to overplay their duty and behave more like attack 
dogs than watchdogs, political scandals have no doubt often enough proven to be important 
mechanisms to improve the transparency of the political system and to reduce corruption. The 
Watergate case is just the most prominent example (see Curran 2011). Similarly, referring to 
the Lewinsky scandal, Strömbäck (2005: 342) holds that at least from the perspective of the 
liberal model of democracy „news journalism in this case did exactly what it is supposed to 
do: it acted as a Burglar Alarm and exposed wrong-doings”. Drawing on Zaller’s (2003) idea 
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of a “Burglar Alarm news standard”, this also points to the fact that political scandals usually 
attract broad public attention and may thus lead to enhanced and especially more equal 
knowledge about politics (see also Kriesi et al. 2012: 240). This should especially apply to 
those political institutions which can and should be directly held accountable by the citizens. 
Although it is certainly also desirable that media expose official misconduct within the judici-
ary and the public administration, it is more crucial for voters to know how their incumbent 
governments and parliaments behaved, in order to make meaningful election choices. In this 
sense, critical or negative media coverage, especially about the executive and the legislative 
branches, is fully in line with the vertical function, even if it takes the form of “confrontain-
ment” (Kriesi et al. 2012: 212). 
A further – but possibly related – objection to the idea of regarding disclosing and accusatory 
media coverage as a sign of good vertical function media performance on the content level, is 
that it does not account for the fact that media might not report about official misconduct be-
cause none actually takes place. In terms of democratic quality such a situation should be 
preferable to one where strong watchdog media have to cover extensive malpractice going on 
in the halls of government. While this is a solid point, the second variable for the amount of 
information in table 3.1 might be defended on the grounds that a critical and vigilant stance of 
the media towards those in power is generally desirable. In other words, much like a healthy 
democracy requires critical citizens who do not blindly trust their leaders (Norris 1999, 2012), 
mass media should always maintain a skeptical tenor towards political incumbents. This is of 
course not to say that media should receive praise for (falsely) accusing everything and eve-
ryone. To the contrary, this might actually backfire and damage their own credibility (Kriesi 
et al. 2012: 237). But media should not hesitate to ask uncomfortable questions and raise sus-
picions if they sense that something is going wrong, provided that they clarify their mistakes 
if these suspicions do not turn out to be true. The dividing line between watchdog and plain 
sensationalist journalism is obviously thin here. However, this study prefers to err on the side 
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of optimism – if you will – in arguing that no critical media coverage equals a lack of vertical 
function media performance. 
B. The balance of political information 
The second component of the vertical function makes assumptions about the ratio of news 
coverage about political institutions. More specifically, it requires a good balance of constitu-
tional actors in the news, and especially between the parliament and the executive. As already 
mentioned, the government and the parliament are the two powers which are legitimized by 
democratic elections. They are therefore most important from the perspective of voters. 
Moreover, the shift of media attention from other political institutions to the executive is most 
often deplored with regard to the legislative (Van Dalen 2012). This raises the question of 
what constitutes a ‘good’ balance. Given that the relative importance or power of parliaments 
and governments varies across different political systems (Lijphart 1999), one could argue 
that a well-balanced media coverage of these two branches depends on the specific context. 
While this thought surely has some merit, it would probably be difficult to determine the ex-
act ratio in every case. Thus, to adopt a more pragmatic approach, it might be reasonable to 
simply assume that the legislative and executive powers should receive equal amounts of me-
dia attention. 
3.4 The horizontal media function 
According to the horizontal function, media contribute to a vibrant democracy if they provide 
a public forum where all groups within the society can freely articulate and exchange their 
interests and where public opinion is formed. So while the vertical function was linked to the 
freedom of the press, the horizontal function might be associated with the fundamental princi-
ple of freedom of expression. In other words, if mass media fulfill the horizontal function well 
this could be considered an indication of an effective guarantee of the free articulation of 
opinions. Moreover, it could be asserted that the horizontal media function’s main purpose is 
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to promote responsiveness, which is one of the two mechanisms at work in representative 
democracies according to Kriesi et al. (2007). This connection between the horizontal func-
tion and responsiveness has already been elaborated above (see section 3.1). While Beierwal-
tes (2000) considers responsiveness and discursiveness to be separate dimensions of demo-
cratic communication, I argue that responsiveness would rather be a consequence of a plural-
istic and diverse public discourse. This has two reasons. On the one hand, if media give all 
competitors a voice in election and – if existing – direct democratic campaigns they enhance 
the public visibility of political alternatives and opposing viewpoints. This, in turn, is sup-
posed to lead to “enlightened understanding” (Dahl 1998: 37), i.e., increase the chances of 
citizens to form coherent preferences and select the best matching political options according-
ly. In the end, this should lead to a better representation of the will of the people (Norris 2000: 
26; Voltmer 2000: 4). On the other hand, a culturally and socially diverse public sphere that 
reflects a country’s cultural and societal diversity allows political representatives to learn 
about public opinion and their constituents’ demands (Norris 2000: 26). This idea is aptly 
captured in McQuail’s (1992: 144f.) definition of media diversity as reflecting differences in 
society, giving access to various points of view and offering a wide range of choice. Hence, 
the main concern of the horizontal media function is to guarantee diversity.
15
  
In the following section, the horizontal function will be specified and characterized in more 
detail. The aim is to derive standards which will allow for an evaluation of how well media 
comply with the horizontal function’s key concept of diversity. Like in the case of the vertical 
media function, however, the specific requirements should be designed in such a way as to 
permit comparative media assessments in the face of limited data availability.  
                                                 
15
 Instead of diversity, the notion of an open public sphere is sometimes also discussed in terms of “pluralism” or 
“impartiality” (Gunther and Mughan 2000; Woods 2007) or referred to as a marketplace of ideas (Napoli 1999). 
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3.4.1 Conceptualizing the horizontal media function 
Table 3.2 gives an overview of the suggested conceptualization of the horizontal media func-
tion. As with the vertical media function, it is dissected into components and variables for 
both levels of analysis. This will provide the framework for the operationalization of the hori-
zontal function in chapter 4. Again, it needs to be emphasized that this list represents the re-
sult of the author’s theoretical reasoning and literature review and that it is certainly possible 
to deduce other models. 
Table 3.2 Conceptualization of the horizontal media function 
 Components Variables 
Structural level  A. Quantitative diversity  High number of different media outlets in both the print and 
electronic sector 
 Plurality of media channels on the regional and local level 
 Existence and number of minority media / media in different 
languages 
B. Qualitative diversity  Internal diversity of opinions: high share of politically neu-
tral media outlets 
 External diversity of opinions: ideological balance of politi-
cally aligned media outlets 
Content level Platform for diverse 
interests 
 Well-balanced coverage of political organizations 
 Dialogic structure of news reports 
 Opportunities for direct voice of political actors and citizens 
 
Contrary to the vertical function, the structural level is subdivided into two components in the 
case of the horizontal function while the content level is only composed of variables from one 
component. The components and variables are listed and discussed separately for each level 
of analysis. 
Structural level 
Structurally, the horizontal function requires media systems to be organized in a manner that 
all political actors who want to publicly articulate their preferences are actually able to find a 
platform which gives them a voice. Following McQuail (1992), this is, on the one hand, en-
hanced by the existence of a large amount of different channels of communication, or what 
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Voltmer (2000) calls “quantitative diversity”. Quantitative diversity therefore represents the 
first component of the horizontal function on the structural level. On the other hand, not only 
the simple number but also the types of communication channels are important. Media sys-
tems should be open to provide a forum for everyone without a priori excluding or disad-
vantaging certain groups. This is more likely if media actors already represent the diversity of 
opinions and ideologies collectively, either by endorsing different political orientations or by 
strict impartiality (McQuail 1992). In contrast to ‘quantitative diversity’, this second compo-
nent can be termed ‘qualitative diversity’. 
A. Quantitative diversity 
With respect to the first component, „diversity is assumed to be the higher, the more sources 
of information are available in the media system” (Voltmer 2000: 9). Thus, the horizontal 
function can be better guaranteed if there is a high number of different media outlets that pro-
vide multiple venues for public debate and for political and social actors to gain public atten-
tion (Norris 2000: 26). A multitude of communication channels should exist in the print as 
well as the electronic media sector. In her study of quantitative media diversity, Voltmer 
(2000) therefore considers a range of factors, such as the number of daily newspapers titles 
per capita or the number of television and radio stations. She also looks at different types of 
broadcasters, i.e., the existence of a dual broadcasting system with both public and commer-
cial or private channels. Similarly, this study will focus on the press and broadcast media. So 
contrary to the vertical function, new media will not be considered with respect to the hori-
zontal function. This has conceptual and pragmatic reasons. Unlike traditional mass media, 
the Internet has neither clear institutional nor constitutional bases. Therefore, the structural 
features of the cross-border and vast communication networks of the Internet are hard to 
grasp. For example, it is difficult to imagine how to count the supply of politically relevant 
websites, not to mention for different countries. I am not aware of any study that has made 
such an attempt. Furthermore, it is still unclear really how influential the Internet is for demo-
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cratic processes. It obviously provides great opportunities for political organizations to mobi-
lize supporters, especially considering the growing impact of social media and other transna-
tional platforms. However, it is still rather a tool for entertainment or business purposes than 
political ones and (Aalberg et al. 2010: 257; Curran 2011: 77; Zillien and Hargittai 2009: 
284). In addition, there is evidence that traditional print and broadcast media are still more 
important sources of information for most citizens (Gibson and McAllister 2011: 233). Final-
ly, even more importantly, people looking for political information on the Internet mostly 
resort to the online editions of mainstream media companies (Curran 2011: 115; Curtis 2004: 
415; Gibson et al. 2005: 571; Gibson and McAllister 2011: 234). Accordingly, most alterna-
tive and citizen news websites do not attract large audiences (Curran 2011: 118; Graber 2003: 
153). 
Quantitative diversity is not only crucial at the overall national level. A plurality of media 
outlets at the regional and local level is of equal significance, both in terms of broadcasters 
and print media (McQuail 1992: 151, 161). While local television news still have many view-
ers, growing commercial pressures have markedly reduced the supply of print media on the 
subnational levels (Curran 2011: 56, 111f.). This trend is especially notable in the United 
States, which once had a lively local press but where there is now hardly any city with more 
than one daily newspaper (Curran 2011: 49). But similar developments are also observed 
elsewhere, such as in Switzerland, for example, which traditionally had a strong local and 
regional press as well (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 25; Kradolfer 2007). 
Finally, media systems should also cater to the needs of linguistic and other cultural and so-
cial minorities. Minorities and the organizations that represent them are often marginalized in 
the mainstream public sphere due to economic reasons (McQuail 1992: 152, 175; Schudson 
2008: 53f.). Thus, the existence of minority media as well as a high number thereof, such as 
media outlets in different languages, helps disadvantaged groups to make themselves heard 
and to reach out to their communities. 
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B. Qualitative diversity 
Another form of structural media diversity, which I have termed ‘qualitative diversity’, refers 
to the plurality of opinions within the media system. This second component of the horizontal 
media function does not necessarily correspond to the immediate coverage of different view-
points but rather the ideological orientation or policy of editorial offices (Voltmer 2000: 10). 
The larger the range of ideological positions represented within a media system, the more 
likely it is that all social and political views and demands are represented in the public sphere 
(Hellman 2001: 184). There are two distinct ways to reach a high diversity of opinions within 
media systems, one focusing on internal features of media outlets and the other on external or 
overall characteristics of the media system (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 29f.; McQuail 1992: 
145f.; Norris 2000: 28; Voltmer 2000: 10f., 2010: 144). First, internal opinion diversity or 
pluralism requires that a media system exhibits a high share of politically neutral or inde-
pendent media outlets which are committed to incorporating the full range of different politi-
cal opinions into their news coverage. Such independent media are characterized by the fact 
that „they either support various standpoints or are generally reluctant to express own prefer-
ences” (Voltmer 2000: 11). Internal diversity thus preserves pluralism, even with a restricted 
choice of newspapers within a particular media market (Norris 2000: 27). Second, external 
opinion diversity means that there is an ideological balance of politically aligned media or-
ganizations on the aggregate system level. In other words, external opinion diversity „permits 
individual media to be systematically imbalanced” as long as „diversity emerges from the 
interaction of these actors on the aggregate level of the entire media system” (Voltmer 2000: 
10). Some scholars clearly condemn external opinion diversity as a threat to the quality of 
democracy and prefer internal opinion diversity because it allows individuals to receive a bal-
anced supply of viewpoints by using just one channel of information (Gunther and Mughan 
2000: 423). Voltmer (2010: 144) further points out that partisan media may endanger the so-
cial cohesion in countries with sharp social, cultural or political cleavages. Other authors, 
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however, acknowledge that biased media organizations in a system of external opinion diver-
sity might provide citizens with helpful guidance for opinion formation and decision making 
and also better mobilize them (Curran 2011: 79; Norris 2000: 28; Norris and Odugbemi 2010: 
13; Schudson 2008: 21; Voltmer 2000: 11, 45, 2010: 144). According to Schudson (2008: 21), 
„partisan journalism enlists the heart as well as the mind of the audience” and „gives readers 
and viewers not only information but a cause”. Moreover, Curran (2011) argues that the dem-
ocratic role of the media has too often been conceptualized from the perspective of individual 
voters who require objective and factual journalism. But since democracy is also about inter-
mediate organizations which need to be supported by media systems, „media which are the 
mouthpieces of collective organisations and solidary groups should be viewed as having as 
much legitimacy as impartial media informing individual citizens” (Curran 2011: 79). Be-
cause of this debate about which form of diversity of opinions is preferable, it seems appro-
priate to consider both as relevant for the horizontal media function. Again, I will focus on 
traditional mass media and not new media here for the reasons already stated above. 
Another factor that is often deemed important for media diversity are media ownership struc-
tures. As already noted in chapter 1, it has been argued by many scholars that the concentra-
tion of media outlets within the same corporate entity might impair both opinion diversity and 
quantitative diversity (see e.g. Baker 2007; Street 2011: 164f.). However, this view is contest-
ed as well, and research findings are inconclusive (McQuail 1992: 116). Other studies main-
tain that ownership concentration is not necessarily related to a decreasing diversity of opin-
ions in the public sphere. They point out that it is actually unreasonable for media owners to 
harmonize the content of their news products since this would have them compete against 
each other for the same audience (Graber 2003: 144; Gunther and Mughan 2000: 422; Woods 
2007: 216). In addition, large media companies have more resources to invest in high-quality 
journalism (Dragomir 2010: 270; McQuail 1992: 116). Because both positions are plausible,  
and because I would not feel confident to prefer one over the other, I will exclude the question 
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of media ownership altogether. Moreover, if media concentration really does have the sug-
gested consequences for the media system as a whole then this should become manifest 
through the other variables of the horizontal media function.  
In sum, the structural level of the horizontal function focuses on the number of media chan-
nels (quantitative diversity) as well as the plurality and balance of ideologies that the media 
systems represents (qualitative diversity). But this tells us nothing about which political actors 
actually get a chance to speak in the media as well as to what extents and in what forms. To 
gain insights into these questions, we need to move to the media content level. 
Content level 
With regard to the content level, media are required to cover all political and social actors in 
a balanced, unbiased way so that they have a voice in the public sphere (McQuail 1992: 157). 
However, notions about the desired participants in public debates differ considerably between 
theoretical traditions. For the liberal model of democracy the public sphere should be domi-
nated by political elites, i.e., office-holders, political parties and experts (Ferree et al. 2002: 
207f.). More specifically, parties – incumbent and competitors – need space and time to make 
their political positions publicly known at election time, and experts are required to explain 
the complex problems facing the society that the wider public is unfamiliar with. The partici-
patory model of democracy, by contrast, envisions a public sphere that includes a wide range 
of intermediary organizations. Hence, civil society actors and grassroots movements should 
continuously participate in public discourses alongside the political elites (Ferree et al. 2002: 
211f.). Thus, in order to accommodate both normative perspectives, the prevalence of various 
types of organizations in the news should be assessed. These might include the following: 
political parties, trade unions, economic, trade or industry associations, professional organiza-
tions, national and transnational public interest groups and religious organizations.  
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At least equally as important as the question of which actors should be covered is how often 
they should be covered relative to each other (McQuail 1992: 147f.). The two ideal type mod-
els of democracy disagree in this respect as well. According to the liberal model, the public 
space should not be allocated evenly to all political parties but rather proportional to their 
electoral or organizational strengths (Ferree et al. 2002: 207f.). Representatives of the partici-
patory model, although somewhat unspecific regarding the matter of balance, would probably 
plead for an even balance between elites and actors from the civil society instead (Ferree et al. 
2002: 230). Ramsden (1996) also deals with the issue of the right balance of media attention 
with regard to candidates in elections campaigns and thinks about both perspectives. He 
comes to the conclusion that „early on in political campaigns, all candidates deserve to be 
treated equally; as the race progresses, the media should then look to the process for clues 
about how to allocate coverage” (Ramsden 1996: 70). The reasoning behind this is that citi-
zens’ preferences are still unclear at an early stage in the democratic process. Thus, media 
need to level the playing field and give all candidates equal chances to compete for the con-
stituents’ support (Ramsden 1996: 96). Once preferences start building, however, media 
should consider the distribution of these preferences when allocating coverage. In other 
words, coverage of competitors should be proportional to their strength in the electoral race. 
There would be no sense in covering candidates of which it has eventually become clear that 
they do not stand a chance of winning. This discussion reveals that both positions – equal and 
proportional allocation – are essential for the conceptualization of the content level of the hor-
izontal function. 
In addition to the balance of political organizations in the news coverage, it also seems to be 
relevant for the horizontal function whether the media encourage debate between these actors. 
This is of course primarily a concern for the participatory model of democracy and its deliber-
ative branch in particular (Ferree et al. 2002: 230). Thus, not only should the diversity of in-
terests be represented in the public sphere somehow and somewhere, but opposing viewpoints 
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should also be directly contrasted with each other. This might be achieved if many news re-
ports take a dialogic form, which basically refers to the inclusion of different actors within the 
same article or news item. According to Ferree et al. (2002: 20), this can be considered a valid 
proxy for the confrontation of opposing stances and thus potential dialogue. 
Finally, a diverse public sphere should give speakers the opportunity to directly voice their 
positions and demands. The frequency of direct quotations of political actors or the amount of 
interviews could therefore be seen as an indication for how well they are able to get their un-
altered messages out to the public. Likewise, large space for the publication of letters to the 
editor could be taken as a sign of media organizations’ committment to directly include the 
views of regular citizens. 
3.5 Summary 
The aim of this chapter was to gain a comprehensive understanding of mass media’s role in a 
democracy. The discussion of different normative theories and conceptions in section 3.1 has 
shown that from the perspective of the liberal model of democracy, media mainly need to 
provide citizens with information about the actions and decisions of their elected representa-
tives and act as guardians of the public interest. In this sense, they are assumed to guarantee 
accountability. For the participatory model of democracy, by contrast, media should first and 
foremost provide a public forum which represents the plurality of different opinions and de-
mands. This, in turn, might facilitate responsiveness. 
Based on these two broad ideas, a two-dimensional model of democratic media performance 
was developed and applied to two levels of analysis. Accordingly, media are supposed to ful-
fill a vertical and a horizontal function, both of which were specified in more detail in the 
sections 3.3 and 3.4. In a nutshell, the vertical media function is interested in the distribution 
of information. While its structural level therefore emphasizes the broad access to media, its 
content level deals with the amount of political affairs, especially with regard to the malprac-
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tice of incumbents, and the balance of democratic institutions in the news. The horizontal me-
dia function, on the other hand, is concerned with reflecting the diversity of interests that exist 
within the society. On the structural level, this requires a large quantitative and qualitative 
variety of media channels. On the content level, media coverage should balance and contrast 
different viewpoints and give them a direct voice. 
A final important note as to the content level is in order. Ferree et al. (2002) do not only look 
at which actors should appear in the news and how often. They also consider what democracy 
theory has to say with regard to how and about what actors should communicate in a public 
discourse as well as which debate outcomes are desirable. However, as should have become 
clear from the discussion of the content level of both functions, this study generally focuses 
more on the simple quantity of media coverage about different political actors and institutions 
rather than its quality, style or direction. This might appear to be a quite limited view, espe-
cially given that the contemporary media’s style of reporting is depicted as harmful for de-
mocracy by much of the literature in this field (see chapter 1; Kriesi et al. 2012; Norris 2000). 
However, from a normative view, the amount of information and diversity is most essential 
because „it is impossible to make summary judgments about the quality of the political infor-
mation supply” (Graber 2004: 553). So what counts, especially with regard to the horizontal 
function, is if and not what kind of media coverage political processes and actors receive. Fol-
lowing Ramsden (1996), I argue that actors who manage to gain public attention have good 
chances of getting their messages across regardless of whether the media reports are actually 
favorable to them or not. Thus, „the tone of a candidate’s coverage does not matter in part 
because unless a candidate does something especially egregious, all coverage is good cover-
age, since it gets the candidate in the public eye” (Ramsden 1996: 68).16 
                                                 
16
 The Swiss People’s Party (SVP) is actually a good example for that. Despite the repeated claim – most vehe-
mently from the party itself – that the SVP receives predominantly hostile media coverage, it had continually 
increased its vote share from 1987 up to 2007 and remains the strongest parliamentary party in Switzerland to 
date (see Statistical Encyclopedia of the Federal Statistical Office of Switzerland: 
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3.6 Preconditions of democratic media performance 
Before I move on to the operationalization of the vertical and the horizontal media function in 
chapter 4, a few additional remarks are necessary. They concern two interrelated bundles of 
factors associated with media systems which are often considered in comparative media stud-
ies but which are not included into the conceptualization of the vertical and the horizontal 
function: media freedom and media regulation. This deliberate omission has one main reason. 
I argue that these aspects should not be counted as elements of the media’s own contribution 
to democracy. Instead, media freedom and media regulation may be regarded as preconditions 
that – if in place – can promote the media’s fulfillment of their democratic functions. In this 
sense, they are exogenous or independent variables which might help to explain different de-
grees and patterns of democratic media performance. I will elaborate on this point to conclude 
chapter 3. 
3.6.1 Media freedom 
There is no doubt that in order for media to serve democracy, they need circumstances that 
allow them to do so. Thus, effective freedom of the media and of speech are fundamental 
concepts linked to the vertical and the horizontal media function, respectively. They are im-
portant prerequisites for media businesses to be able to operate at all and to contribute to en-
hancing a country’s democratic quality. If media owners, editors and journalists suffer state 
repression and constraints, such as illegal censorship, denied access to media licenses or 
threats, prosecutions and killings, media are not capable of accomplishing the normative de-
mands imposed on them by democracy theory (Norris and Inglehart 2010: 196). Violations of 
press freedom thus limit investigative journalism and the media’s ability to publish and dis-
seminate compromising news about state actors and politics in general. Breaches and a weak 
enforcement of the freedom of expression further inhibit diversity, for example if mass media 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/17/22/lexi.Document.21769.xls (08/28/2012)). 
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are not allowed to cover the political opposition. However, these are all external constraints 
that media organizations cannot actively and directly influence. And since – as already men-
tioned – I am purely interested in the media’s contribution to the quality of democracy such 
external constraints are beyond the scope of the present study.  
Moreover, all analyses focus on relatively established democracies in which we would expect 
media freedom to be highly guaranteed. Thus, although there obviously are more or less sub-
tle forms of state intrusion into the media sphere even in these countries (Curran 2011: 15), a 
basic level of press freedom can safely be taken for granted.  
3.6.2 Media regulation 
A second aspect which can determine the media’s compliance with their democratic role is 
media regulation or media governance. The assumed influence of media regulation might ac-
tually work both ways since depending on its design and implementation, it may inhibit or 
promote media performance. Hence, it can be considered a double-edged sword. 
First, a country’s legal framework is supposed to limit government control over the media and 
create an enabling opportunity structure. For example, it is significantly easier for the media 
to fulfill the obligations of the vertical function properly if there are legal disclosure rules 
which require politicians and parties to reveal their sources and levels of income and expendi-
tures. Similarly, an effective freedom of information legislation considerably enhances the 
media’s access to political information and fosters transparent and independent news cover-
age (Florini 2007; Islam 2006; Relly and Sabharwal 2009). 
Furthermore, „media policy should not be confined to securing media freedom from govern-
ment control” (Curran 2011: 9). Since the media have a duty to serve the public good, they 
cannot be left to act freely according to market imperatives alone. This widely held opinion is 
exemplified by Gunther and Mughan’s (2004: 444) claim that the de-regulation of the media 
sector, driven by legislators, is responsible for the decay of the media’s democratic perfor-
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mance. This perceived need to prevent market failure mostly plays out in terms of the hori-
zontal function’s concern of diversity. Hence, on the structural level, formal media regulation 
often aims at limiting media and media ownership concentration as well as at directly funding 
or subsidizing media organizations, especially in the print sector (Djankov et al. 2003: 353f.). 
On the content level, media governance focuses on guaranteeing impartiality and a balance of 
viewpoints, foremost in the broadcast sector and especially public service media (Street 2011: 
316). Examples are the former ‘fairness doctrine’ by the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) in the United States requiring broadcasters to present contrasting positions on all 
issues (Curran 2011: 23), legal obligations to give political candidates and parties free airtime 
in electoral campaigns or the laws regulating the composition of broadcast supervisory bodies 
(Hallin and Mancini 2004: 30-33). Generally, the electronic media sector is more strongly 
regulated than the press. This has historical and technical reasons. Initially, the availability of 
radio frequencies was limited so that „systems of regulation and licensing were needed to 
distribute and control this access” (Street 2011: 312f.). Further limitations of media content in 
the name of democracy and social cohesion are enforced by so-called hate speech or libel 
laws which are supposed to prevent defamation, such as openly communicated racist or other 
forms of public discrimination. 
But while all these different rules might be in the public interest they also constitute potential-
ly harmful intrusions of the state into the media sector and can therefore be regarded as re-
strictions of the media’s independence. This illustrates why and how media regulation and 
media freedom are interrelated. Media regulation may easily be and actually is abused by state 
actors to increase their power and control over the media (Curran 2011: 15; Djankov et al. 
2003: 353f.). For example, and as mentioned in the previous section, public authorities can 
deny licenses to media outlets which seem to compromise them in their news reports. Accord-
ing to Djankov et al. (2003: 354), such pressures have, for example, been observed in Malay-
sia. Moreover, governments may sanction unfavorable media coverage on the basis of hate 
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speech legislation or alleged national security concerns (Djankov et al. 2003: 354; Graber 
2003: 142; Norris and Inglehart 2010: 196). Incidents of such practices have even been re-
ported for established democracies like Germany, Ireland or the Czech Republic (Dragomir 
2010: 269). Furthermore, executive and legislative actors may also influence the selection of 
broadcast supervisors or public broadcast executives according to their preferences (Hanretty 
2009). Hence, the line between media regulation which clearly benefits democracy and too 
much interference by state officials to increase their power is blurred.  
So on the one hand, media regulation acts as an external constraint or catalyzer which shapes 
the configuration of media systems and media content. It should therefore be considered an 
independent variable which can explain the observed outcomes in terms of media perfor-
mance. On the other hand, the discussed ambiguity of media regulation further speaks against 
including it into the conceptualization of the two democratic functions of the media. Since 
scholars and politicians alike differ greatly with regard to this issue, it seems that the extent 
and nature of media governance appropriate for democracy is too difficult to determine objec-
tively in the context of this study. 
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Chapter 4:  
Measuring the vertical and the horizontal media 
function
Chapter 3 argued that the two media functions, the vertical and the horizontal function, can be 
conceptualized and assessed on two different levels of analysis. Accordingly, I will conduct a 
structural and a content analysis to evaluate the media’s democratic performance, measuring 
as many of the variables listed in tables 3.1 and 3.2 (see chapter 3) as possible. This chapter 
serves to explain in detail the designs of the two types of analyses. For each type, I will pre-
sent the country and media samples used, the methodological approach applied as well as the 
actual indicators derived, starting with the structural level (section 4.1) and then moving to the 
content level (section 4.2). 
4.1 Structural analysis 
4.1.1 Country samples 
From a comparative point of view it is of course desirable to examine the democratic perfor-
mance of mass media for as many countries as possible, in order to get a broad and systematic 
picture and to conduct causal analyses. However, as emphasized repeatedly, the present study 
focuses on the media and their impact on the democratic quality within so-called established 
democracies. What does that mean? Following the logic of Bühlmann (2011) as well as 
Bühlmann et al. (2011a, 2012), we can define those countries as established democracies 
which score high on the Freedom House
17
, Polity
18
 and Vanhanen (2003) index over a certain 
period of time. These three indices are probably the most widely used measures of democracy 
(Coppedge et al.: 2008; Munck and Verkuilen 2002). More specifically, using data from 
                                                 
17
 http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world (08/28/2012). 
18
 http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (08/28/2012). 
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1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010, a country has to be rated ‘democratic’19 in at least three of 
these years (two years in the case of Vanhanen (2003), which only provides data up to 2000) 
by at least two of the three indices in order to qualify. Following these selection criteria, 77 
countries can be considered (more or less) established democracies.
20
 In the sense that only 
more mature democracies are studied, this book arguably follows a most similar systems de-
sign (Przeworski and Teune: 1970) even though one cannot neglect that there is quite a large 
variety of economic and social contexts among the countries considered. But the prospect of 
being able to assess and compare the media’s democratic performance on a large scale justi-
fies this rather broad definition of what an established democracy is. 
There are two main reasons for this limitation to established democracies. The first one is 
motivated by theoretical and analytical interest. In chapter 1 it was posited that the notion of 
positive effects of mass media for democratization processes is largely unchallenged (Gunther 
and Mughan 2000). At the same time, the contribution of media to the functioning of more 
stable democracies is hotly debated although there is a lack of systematic empirical and com-
parative research. Thus, it seems more fruitful to take a closer look at this specific group of 
political regimes. The second reason is of pragmatic nature. As mentioned in the introductory 
chapter, the availability of reliable data covering both a large range of countries and years is 
generally not abundant. It is, however, still easier to find data for industrialized than develop-
ing countries. 
                                                 
19
 Freedom House: status ‘free’; Polity: Polity score of 7 or more; Vanhanen: ID score of 5 or more. 
20
 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Can-
ada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Repub-
lic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, 
India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, 
South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, Turkey, United Kingdom, 
United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
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With respect to the structural analysis, the period of examination covers the years 1990 to 
2008. Again, this has both theoretical and pragmatic reasons. As for the former, in order to 
avoid a Western bias in the country sample, I wanted to be sure to include democracies from 
different regions even if some of them are still relatively young. In many parts of the world, 
however, countries only became democratic in the late 1980s or early 1990s in the course of 
the so-called “third wave of democratization” (Huntington 1991). The most prominent exam-
ple is of course the democratic transition of Eastern European countries after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. From the perspective of mass media studies, it is also reasonable to choose 
1990 as a starting point. Especially Western European countries experienced a phase of media 
deregulation and commercialization, mainly through the dualization of their broadcast sectors, 
in the 1980s (Dragomir 2010: 247). Hence, media systems looked much different in the 1990s 
compared to a decade before. The pragmatic reason again relates to data availability. Unsur-
prisingly, access to the kind of data used for the structural analysis (see section 4.1.2) increas-
es significantly in more recent years. In addition, many data sources are hardly available be-
fore the 1990s. Examples are various annual handbooks, such as the World Press Trends or 
the statistical yearbooks of the European Audiovisual Observatory (see below). 
 
Despite these pragmatic considerations, not all of the indicators to be specified in section 
4.1.2 are available for all of the 77 countries identified as established democracies. Moreover, 
for some countries too many data points are missing. Thus, it is necessary to work with differ-
ent subsets of indicators and established democracies. More precisely, two different samples 
were defined. 
The first includes the maximum number of countries that provide a fairly good data availabil-
ity for many indicators across the years 1990 to 2008. For the sake of convenience we might 
call it sample 1 or large country sample. It consists of the following 47 countries: Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, 
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the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Ice-
land, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, the Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States 
and Uruguay. This includes all OECD countries except Estonia, as well as 14 additional coun-
tries from Latin America, Asia and Eastern and Southern Europe. Unfortunately, not all of the 
indicators derived to measure the horizontal and vertical media function on the structural level 
(see section 4.1.2 below) are available for all of these 47 countries. Instead, analyses with this 
large country sample 1 will have to rely on a core set of nine indicators. 
The second country sample – sample 2 – is considerably smaller but has data for all of the 
indicators of interest with significantly fewer missing country-year pairs. Hence, it allows for 
more differentiated analyses of the media’s fulfillment of the horizontal and vertical media 
function on the structural level. Sample 2 equals a subset of sample 1 and includes the follow-
ing 24 countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. These are all 
the European countries from sample 1, with the exception of Turkey and the small states Ice-
land, Luxembourg and Malta, which are missing in many social science datasets. 
4.1.2 Data and indicators 
The structural analysis of media systems is based on secondary data on media markets and 
landscapes from statistics, evaluations, handbooks and databases from a variety of scholars 
and organizations. Most of these sources provide data for multiple years. However, the select-
ed time period is not always fully covered so that missing country-years had to be replaced. 
Unless otherwise noted, this was done by copying the values from other years back and/or 
forth or by arithmetic means for missing values in between two observations. Since the time 
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series for many of the indicators are far from complete, especially when it comes to the early 
1990s, developments over time have to be interpreted very cautiously. The subsequent discus-
sion of the indicators will explain in more detail which sources were used and which time 
frame is available for each specific item. A summary of this as well as the descriptive statis-
tics of all the indicators can also be found in tables A4.1 and A4.2 in the appendix. 
The factors defined to measure the vertical and the horizontal media function for democracy 
in terms of media structures are listed in table 4.1. All of them are scaled in such a way that 
higher values indicate higher democratic performance. 
Table 4.1 Overview of media function indicators – structural level 
 Components Indicators 
Vertical 
function 
 
Access to information  Daily newspaper circulation per 1’000 inhabitants 
 Number of radio sets per capita 
 Number of TV sets per capita 
 Number of computers in % population 
 Number of Internet users in % population 
Horizontal 
function  
A. Quantitative diversity  Number of daily newspaper titles per 1 million people 
 Newspaper import in % GDP 
 Number of TV stations received 
 Percentage of TV households receiving foreign/international 
TV news channels 
B. Qualitative diversity  Ideological balance of politically aligned newspapers 
 Share of politically neutral newspapers’ circulation 
 Strength of the public broadcast sector 
 
Table 4.1 basically corresponds to the upper halves of tables 3.1 and 3.2, but the last column 
now lists the indicators for those variables for which data is actually available. Hence, some 
of the variables defined in chapter 3 could not be operationalized. This mainly concerns the 
geographical distribution of media access and low prices for media services in the case of the 
vertical function. In terms of the horizontal function, this applies to the regional diversity of 
media outlets as well as the existence and availability of channels of communication for lin-
guistic and other minorities. Two of the indicators described below, however, can at least be 
regarded as proxy measures for minority media. 
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The vertical function 
As discussed in chapter 3, for the vertical media function, media structures should guarantee 
the equal and easy access for the whole electorate to necessary information. Thus, media pen-
etration should be high. This is assessed by five indicators which are all available for the 47 
countries of the large country sample 1. 
For print media, the circulation of daily newspapers per 1’000 inhabitants (paid and free dai-
lies) is measured. I focus on daily newspapers because they are the dominant entities within 
the print media sector and the „primary objects of choice for the ordinary citizens” (Voltmer 
2000: 13). Circulation data is taken from the “World Press Trends” handbooks, published 
annually by the World Association of Newspapers (WAN), and population data from the 
World Bank.
21
 I had access to the WAN editions 1996 to 2008, which provide data for the 
years 1993 to 2007. The remaining years (1990 to 1992 and 2008) were replaced by the near-
est values whereas single missing country-years were replaced by linear interpolation, i.e., the 
arithmetic means of the adjacent values.  
The distribution of the communication infrastructure within the society is further assessed by 
the number of radio as well as television sets per capita. Both indicators combine data from 
the “Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive” (BCNTS; Banks 2011) and the International 
Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) “World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database”.22 
For every country, the database which offered the longer time series was used. Unfortunately, 
in the case of the radio indicators data is largely missing for the 2000s in many countries. As 
for television sets, data for all but five countries comes from the ITU. This indicator also ex-
hibits a considerable amount of missing values in the second half of the 2000s (on average the 
                                                 
21
 World Bank database: http://databank.worldbank.org (08/28/2012). 
22
 ITU: http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/publications/world/world.html (08/28/2012). In addition, population figures 
from the World Bank were used to calculate per capita rates of radio sets. 
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last three years of observation). All missings were replaced by linear inter- and extrapola-
tion
23
, which seemed appropriate in these two cases. 
Finally, the diffusion of new media is measured by two indicators, namely the number of per-
sonal computers and the number of Internet users as a share of the population. The two 
measures are likely to be closely associated because individuals with a personal computer are 
more likely to have access to the Internet. The figures for the number of personal computers 
are again taken from the ITU. The percentage of Internet users, by contrast, comes from the 
World Bank database (see footnote 21) and is only complemented by ITU data for three miss-
ing country-years (Australia 2002-2004). Thus, for this indicator virtually no missing years 
had to be replaced by linear inter- and extrapolation. If any, mostly the early 1990s were con-
cerned. For the number of personal computers per 100 inhabitants, however, mostly the last 
three years of observation were missing and replaced, again, by linear extrapolation. 
The horizontal function 
According to the horizontal media function, media should guarantee a diverse public forum so 
that all groups and interests within the society can find a platform to express themselves and 
be heard. On the one hand, this requires quantitative diversity, i.e., a multiplicity of communi-
cation channels. On the other hand, there should also be qualitative diversity in the sense that 
the media system represents a variety of viewpoints. 
A. Quantitative diversity 
With regard to the print sector, the first component – quantitative diversity – is measured by 
the number of daily newspapers per one million inhabitants (paid and free dailies). Just like 
the press indicator for the vertical media function, the respective newspaper data originates 
from the WAN (World Press Trends) and it is weighted by population figures from the World 
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 Essentially: XProg = Xt + (Xt – Xt-1) 
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Bank. And again, missing years (primarily 1990 to 1992 and 2008) were replaced by the 
nearest data points or linear interpolation.  
A second indicator captures the total dollar value of newspapers, periodicals and journals 
imported from abroad as a share of a country’s gross domestic product (GDP, in current 
USD). The influx of foreign newspapers directly contributes to quantitative and possibly even 
qualitative media diversity. Foreign newspapers do not only enlarge the offer of available 
press titles, they might also provide quite different perspectives on domestic issues than do-
mestic media suppliers. Moreover, newspaper import can be considered a proxy measure for 
the existence and plurality of communication channels representing immigrant minorities. To 
some extent it therefore represents the third variable for quantitative diversity defined in chap-
ter 3 as well (see table 3.2). Data for a country’s volume of newspaper import comes from the 
United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN COMTRADE)
24
 and GDP figures 
from the World Bank (see footnote 21). For most countries, data is only missing for the year 
2008 and maybe some of the early 1990s. These values were replaced by the nearest existing 
value. 
Moving to the electronic media sector, quantitative diversity is further assessed by the number 
of all television stations received in a country. Getting data for the number of TV channels 
turned out to be surprisingly challenging since respective data sources are not only rare but 
also unreliable, at least if one wants to compare countries. As the relevant handbooks and 
publications explicitly warn, the information provided by the responsible national authorities 
differs largely from country to country because there is no agreement on which channels to 
count and how to classify them.
25
 This makes country comparisons rather tricky. Neverthe-
                                                 
24
 http://comtrade.un.org/db/ (08/28/2012). Settings: Commodity = ‘4902’; Partner = ‘World’. 
25
 Should broadcast statistics for example count a) all channels which can potentially be received in a country, 
only those received by certain share of the population or only those produced within the country for the domestic 
market; b) national, regional and/or local channels; c) terrestrial, cable, satellite and/or digital channels; etc.. 
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less, in order to maximize cross-national coverage, the indicator reflects the number of all 
television stations received in a country, irrespective of their financial form or means of 
transmission and mostly also of their origin or genre. Thus, this indicator only gives a very 
rough picture and it also consists of a combination of four data sources with slightly different 
criteria for counting the number of TV channels. First, the annual publication “Television: 
International Key Facts”, edited by the IP International Marketing Committee (IP) was used. 
The respective figures equal the total number of channels received by at least 70% of a coun-
try’s population and they were available for the years 2000 to 2005.26 Second, Eurostat (2003: 
157) lists the „total number of TV programme services of national origin […] located on the 
economic territory and which are primarily intended for targeting national audience (whatever 
distribution coverage)”. The report includes data for 1990 and 1995 to 2002, in the best case. 
Third, from the 2008 statistical yearbook of the European Audiovisual Observatory (EAO) I 
derived the number of national television channels with a focus on information, i.e., whose 
main programming is generalist or includes business, culture, education, documentaries, news 
or parliamentary affairs. Finally, information about the plurality of television stations can also 
be found in the statistical database of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO).
27
 While this source provides data for 84 countries, it is also least 
specific about its measurement. Thus, the values vary considerably both across and within 
countries.
28
 Moreover, only one or two data points per country between 2004 and 2006 are 
available. These four data sources were cross-checked and assembled in such a way as to con-
struct the longest time series with the most reasonable data possible for each country. Howev-
                                                 
26
 Only the IP handbooks from 2004 to 2009 are at my disposal, and the editions after 2005 do not include this 
indicator anymore. I therefore thank Christine Benesch (Department of Economics, University of St.Gallen) for 
providing me with her data for the years 2000 to 2003 (see Benesch et al. 2010; Frey et al. 2007). 
27
 http://www.uis.unesco.org/Pages/default.aspx (08/28/2012). 
28
 For example, the database lists 352 TV stations in the Czech Republic in 2005 but only 5 in 2006. 
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er, on average still over half of the 19 years were missing for the countries in samples 1 and 2 
and therefore had to be filled up by the nearest values. 
Similar to newspaper import, quantitative media diversity should also be measured by the 
availability of foreign news sources in the electronic media sector. This might be especially 
important for language minorities who would otherwise be excluded from a country’s public 
sphere. For this reason, I constructed an indicator reflecting the percentage of television 
households receiving foreign and/or international TV news channels. More specifically, the 
IP handbook 2009 contains information on the share of households which are equipped with a 
television set and can receive the following 24-hour news channels: BBC World News, CNN, 
Euronews, France 24, Sky News and TV5 Monde. The mean of these six reception rates was 
calculated for every country included in IP (2009) and then copied to all other years. Hence, 
there unfortunately is no longitudinal data available for this indicator. 
The broadcasting sector does of course not only consist of television. Radio still plays an im-
portant though somewhat less pivotal role as a source of information too. Thus, it would also 
be relevant to capture the quantitative diversity of different radio stations. However, the un-
certainties with regard to the availability of data and the measurement of the electronic media 
landscape are even larger in this area so that no reliable data could be found.  
In sum, only two of the four indicators described for the quantitative diversity component of 
the horizontal media function are available for the larger sample with 47 countries. This ap-
plies to the two press indicators, which measure the relative number of daily newspaper titles 
and the relative amount of imported newspapers. The other two indicators assessing the elec-
tronic media system in terms of the number of television stations and the reception of foreign 
news channels can only be used for analyses with the smaller sample of 24 countries. Moreo-
ver, they only cover the television but not the radio sector. 
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B. Qualitative diversity 
Contrary to quantitative media diversity, qualitative diversity is not about the sheer number of 
communication channels but rather the variety of different forms of channels and programs 
or, in other words, the plurality of opinions within the media system. In this respect, the two 
concepts of external and internal opinion diversity were discussed in chapter 3 (see 3.4.1). 
Both of them were directly operationalized with regard to the press system, closely following 
Voltmer (2000). Hence, external opinion diversity is measured by the ideological balance of 
politically aligned newspapers, i.e., the extent to which the different political orientations of 
newspapers balance each other out on the aggregate. Internal opinion diversity, by contrast, 
reflects the extent to which the press system is characterized by neutral or politically unaffili-
ated newspapers, or more specifically, the share of politically neutral newspapers’ circula-
tion. For both purposes, one first of all needs information about the political orientations of 
newspapers. While previous research relied on survey data and the party preferences of an 
outlet’s audience (e.g. Van Kempen 2007) or simply respondents’ ratings of media outlets 
(e.g. Schmitt-Beck 2003, 2004) this was not an option for the present study. The necessary 
data would neither be available for all countries nor over time. So instead, newspapers were 
coded on the basis of expert ratings. In general, the yearly editions of the “Political Handbook 
of the World” (Banks et al., various years) served as a starting point for the coding procedure. 
They provide a list of what they consider the most important regional and national, daily and 
weekly newspapers for every country, including their circulation and ideological leaning as 
rated by experts. It does not become clear on what grounds exactly the newspapers are chosen 
and rated (e.g. by their endorsements of political parties or the partisanship of their readers), 
but a comparison with the top ten circulation newspapers according to the World Press Trends 
(WAN) revealed that the largest newspapers were represented in almost all countries. On the 
basis of the indicated political affiliations, each newspaper was assigned a code between 1 
and 6 as used by Voltmer (2000: 22). 1 to 3 roughly represent the left side of the political 
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spectrum, 4 to 6 the right side.
29
 Newspapers listed as ‘independent’ were considered neutral 
and therefore received the middle value of 3.5. Similarly, newspapers without indication of 
their ideological position were pragmatically coded as 3.5. In order to get a more accurate 
picture and to reduce the problem of lacking information as far as possible, additional sources 
were used to complement and crosscheck the political ratings in Banks et al. (various years). 
These were in particular Blum (2005b: 124), Hans-Bredow-Institut (various years), Kelly et 
al. (2004), Popescu et al. (2010)
30
 and Østergaard (1992) as well as several websites
31
.  
Using these newspaper codes, two indicators were created. The first reflects external opinion 
diversity. It is calculated by the absolute deviance of the weighted average of all newspaper 
codes (weighted by newspapers’ circulation) from the center position 3.5, multiplied by -1.32 
This measure equals 0 if the political orientations of all newspapers of a country average to 
3.5, i.e., if they completely balance each other out. By contrast, the variable reaches its mini-
                                                 
29
 1 = “far left” = Parties: Communists; general ideology: extremely leftist, communist. 2 = Parties: Socialists, 
Social Democrats, Labor Parties; general ideology: leftist, liberal (USA). 3 = Parties: Liberals; general ideology: 
liberal, moderate. 4 = Parties: religious parties, Christian Democrats; general ideology: center, religious. 5 = 
Parties: Conservatives; general ideology: conservative, rightist, monarchist. 6 = “far right” = Parties: National-
ists; general ideology: extremely rightist, nationalist. (See Voltmer 2000: 22). A clarification with regard to code 
3 is necessary since the political label ‘liberal’ has very different meanings in different contexts. Whereas it 
mostly denotes social liberalism and thus center-left parties on the American continent it stands for economic or 
neoliberalism and thus conservative ideologies in many European countries. Clearly, code 3 would only be ap-
propriate in the former case. Hence, efforts were made to establish what kind of ideology and/or political party is 
associated with the term ‘liberal’ in a country before coding newspapers rated as such. As a result, while for 
instance the “El Tiempo” in Honduras received the code 3, the “Neue Zürcher Zeitung” from Switzerland was 
coded as 5 even though both are rated as ‘liberal’ or ‘independent liberal’ by Banks et al. (various years). 
30
 Popescu et al. (2010) conducted a survey of a total of 659 experts in 34 European countries. Among other 
things, experts had to indicate for a number of newspaper and television stations in their countries which politi-
cal parties they are close to as well as to what degree on a scale from 0 to 10 they advocate specific political 
viewpoints. This information provided valuable input for the coding of newspapers. 
31
 Wikipedia (http://www.wikipedia.org/), Worldpress.org (http://www.worldpress.org/gateway.htm) and Mondo 
Times (http://www.mondotimes.com/newspapers/). (08/28/2012). 
32
 The following formula illustrates this: PAi is a newspaper’s political affiliation, Ci its circulation and Fi its 
frequency of appearance per week. Accounting for Ci and Fi ensures that smaller newspapers and non-dailies 
receive less weight in the calculation of external opinion diversity. 
 
 
15.3 
 
 

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iFiCiPADiversity  
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mum value of -2.5 if all newspapers within a country can be characterized by the extreme 
code 1, or 6 respectively. The second indicator refers to internal opinion diversity and it cor-
responds to the circulation of neutral or politically independent newspapers, i.e., those with 
the code 3.5, relative to the total circulation of all newspapers in the list of the respective 
country. Since the “Political Handbook of the World” appears annually since 1989 (except 
1999, 2003 and 2004) and covers the whole world, it was possible to construct a solid time 
series for nearly all countries in my sample even though on average about seven missing years 
had to be replaced by running means in between available data points. However, since press 
markets do not often change drastically and since newspaper affiliations usually have a long 
history and are therefore rather stable, the indicators do not vary greatly over time in most 
countries. 
 
Qualitative diversity is more difficult to measure with regard to the electronic media sector 
and no direct operationalization of internal and external opinion diversity was found. Instead, 
as a proxy for internal diversity, the only broadcast indicator for this component of the hori-
zontal media function focuses on the strength of public broadcasters. Public service channels 
can be defined as having a public service obligation and being fully or partially financed by 
license fees, public subsidies or any other form of state funding (Eurostat 2003: 157). This 
public service obligation requires them to inform and educate as well as represent all citizens. 
Accordingly, the BBC – which is traditionally considered to be the role model of public 
broadcasting and is the largest, best-resourced public broadcaster in the world (Curran 2011: 
48) – states the following six public purposes: 1) sustaining citizenship and society, 2) pro-
moting education and learning, 3) stimulating creativity and cultural excellence, 4) represent-
ing the UK, its nations, regions and communities, 5) bringing the UK to the world and the 
world to the UK, and 6) delivering to the public the benefit of emerging communication tech-
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nologies and services.
33
 Especially in light of the fourth point, it becomes clear that public 
broadcasters play a crucial role in guaranteeing the plurality of opinions and interests in the 
public sphere as demanded by the horizontal media function. Private channels, by contrast, 
have no or only few programming guidelines, and they are financed by advertising, sponsor-
ship or subscription fees, but not public resources (Eurostat 2003: 157). Hence, given that 
internal opinion diversity is expected from public but not necessarily private broadcasters, a 
strong public broadcast sector seems desirable in terms of the horizontal media function.  
The strength of public television is assessed by the multiplication of three indicators. Hence, 
a) the percentage of public TV channels as a share of all domestic TV channels, b) the market 
share for public broadcasters and c) the independence of public broadcast systems were mul-
tiplied. The primary sources for the first indicator are the IP handbooks (Television: Interna-
tional Key Facts) 2004 to 2009. For every country, they give a full list of television channels, 
indicating their origin, founding year, form of finance and their genre or focus. From these 
lists, I compiled figures for the number of (mainly) publicly financed channels from and for 
the domestic market with a generalist or news focus, and likewise for privately or commer-
cially financed channels. Next, I calculated the share of public stations from the sum of public 
and private stations. Although only the IP handbooks from 2004 to 2009 are at my disposal I 
was able to reconstruct the full time series of the indicator because the handbooks provide the 
founding year for each channel. This, however, disregards any television channels that 
stopped operating between 1990 and 2003. Since this should apply to rather few stations, this 
problem seems negligible though. 
Similarly to weighting newspapers by their circulation for the measures of opinion diversity, 
weighting the number of public channels by their market share is necessary in order to capture 
their actual importance in the media system. Thus, the second item of the public broadcast 
                                                 
33
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/insidethebbc/whoweare/publicpurposes (08/28/2012). 
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index equals the average share of TV viewers watching public channels throughout the day. 
This data originates from three sources: the IP and EAO yearbooks as well as statistics from 
Nordicom
34
 and Leckner and Facht (2010). Where they overlap, the three sources are very 
congruent but they were mostly used to complement each other in order to achieve the best 
possible cross-country and longitudinal coverage. The combination allowed for an almost 
complete time-series for at least the smaller country sample. Again, missing country-years 
were replaced by copying the nearest values or, in the case of missings in between existing 
data points, running means. 
However, a large and dominant public broadcast sector should only be counted as contrib-
uting to the plurality of opinions represented in the public sphere if it is not biased in favor of 
particular political interests and actors, particularly the state. The problem that public service 
television is largely controlled by the government for example still persists in many Eastern 
European countries (Dragomir 2010). For this reason, the two previous indicators are further 
weighted, i.e., multiplied, by a measure for the independence of public service broadcast sys-
tems (PSB), which ranges on a scale from 0 to 1 with higher values indicating higher inde-
pendence. The respective data is taken from Hanretty (2009) who has developed a rough PSB 
de facto independence index for 34 countries, including 20 of my sample 2 countries. The 
index equals the average of the turnover rate of PSB’s chief executives and a so-called “polit-
ical vulnerability” measure (Hanretty 2009: 77). The turnover rate reflects the idea that chief 
executives who have been in office longer and are more experienced are better able to with-
stand political pressures. The political vulnerability measure reports how closely connected 
changes of the government and changes of PSB chief executives are, i.e., whether the former 
is usually followed by the latter or not. The mean values of these two indicators are subtracted 
from 1 so that larger scores indicate higher independence. Moreover, the index is calculated 
over a period of 20 to 50 years up to 2006 or 2007. Thus, the period of interest in the present 
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 http://www.nordicom.gu.se/eng.php (08/28/2012) 
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study is mostly covered, but the indicator is constant over time. For four countries of my 
smaller country sample, namely Croatia, Cyprus, Greece and the Netherlands, Hanretty’s 
(2009) index is not available. Thus, the scores for these four countries were imputed by means 
of a simple OLS regression
35
 on the basis of the survey data conducted by Popescu et al. 
(2010; see footnote 30). Experts had to assess whether the journalistic content of public tele-
vision in their country is entirely free from governmental political interference on a scale from 
0 (not at all) to 10 (very much) and theirs answers were averaged per country.  
 
Just like for the quantitative diversity component, only the two press indicators for qualitative 
diversity, i.e., internal and external opinion diversity are complete for the large 47-country 
sample (sample 1). The item that looks at the strength of public television, however, is only 
available for analyses with the smaller country sample (sample 2). This means that global 
conclusions about media performance in terms of the horizontal function will unfortunately 
have to be limited to the print sector. Moreover, it needs to be noted that the second compo-
nent of the horizontal function, qualitative diversity, does not include any measures related to 
the radio either. A further major limitation is that one increasingly important public forum and 
source of information – the Internet – will not be considered systematically. Reasons und jus-
tifications for this neglect have already been discussed in chapter 3 (see 3.4.1). Nevertheless, 
the amount and quality of the indicators should be sufficient to gain substantive insights into 
the democratic performance of media systems in a wide range of countries.  
                                                 
35
 Correlation between the two different indicators: Pearson’s r = 0.659. Regression coefficients: α = 0.395, β = 
0.714. 
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4.2 Content analysis 
4.2.1 Country sample 
Data for the content level is generated by means of a semi-automated content analysis of the 
news coverage of important media outlets in various countries.
36
 Such a computer-assisted 
approach, which will be outlined in detail subsequently, is necessary in order to analyze news 
coverage from a relatively large sample of countries and days as well as in different lan-
guages. However, due to the large effort and time a content analysis requires and because of 
limitations imposed by language barriers and the availability of media coverage, even fewer 
countries are available for analysis than in sample 2 for the structural level. More specifically, 
data for media performance on the content level was only collected for the following ten 
countries: Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, New Zealand, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom and the United States. These were mainly chosen for practical reasons 
since they correspond to those cases among established democracies with access to enough 
news material and for which I possess good language skills.  
But even though the country selection primarily followed pragmatic considerations, with re-
gard to cross-national media studies, they still constitute an interesting and diverse set of cas-
es. For example, all of Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) already much-discussed types of media 
systems are represented. First, Canada, Ireland, the United Kingdom and the United States 
belong to Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) liberal or North Atlantic model. Second, Austria, Ger-
many and Switzerland are part of the democratic corporatist or North/Central European mod-
el. The polarized pluralist or Mediterranean model, finally, is covered by France. Thus, unfor-
tunately, this last model is somewhat underrepresented, which is even aggravated by the fact 
that France is not considered a clear manifestation of this media system type by the authors. 
                                                 
36
 I thank Bruno Wueest (Department for Political Science, University of Zurich) for his important contribution 
to the content analysis of this study, ranging from general expertise and assistance in the conceptualization 
phase, the compilation of keyword lists as well as the technical implementation of the semi-automated data col-
lection. 
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Moreover, Australia and New Zealand are not studied by Hallin and Mancini (2004). But giv-
en that both are former British colonies, one may assume that they would share the media 
culture of other Anglo-Saxon countries and can thus be classified as liberal models as well 
(also see Blum 2005a: 9) This of course further skews the balance of the country sample in 
favor of this particular type of media systems. However, it is worth noting that Hallin and 
Mancini’s (2004) omission of Australia and New Zealand is no singular case. To the best of 
my knowledge, these countries are rarely ever included in comparative studies of media con-
tent. Hence, even though their consideration might give the liberal type of media systems an 
extraordinary weight in my country sample, enlarging the scope of analysis beyond Europe 
and North America should be of value in its own right.  
The time frame investigated spans the year 2008. It was important to select the same period of 
examination in every country in order to ensure that media coverage would be equally affect-
ed by exceptional events or incidents of international attention in all countries.
37
 2008 was an 
election year in four of the ten countries (Austria, Canada, New Zealand and the United 
States), a factor which will have to be considered in the later analyses. 
4.2.2 Methodological approach 
In what follows, I will first discuss the selection of media outlets and articles for the content 
analysis and then turn to the description of the semi-automated coding procedure. 
The media and article sample 
A computer-assisted analysis requires media content which is available in electronic full text 
and largely standardized form. While this is fairly easy to obtain for a large variety of print 
outlets, I could not find transcripts of news broadcasts from all countries. Hence, for the sake 
of comparability and also due to time constraints, the content analysis was limited to press 
                                                 
37
 In addition, the original idea was to study five years, namely 2004 to 2008, so that a full electoral cycle or 
legislative period would be covered in all the countries analyzed. However, this again proved to be too time-
consuming. 
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titles. It will therefore not be possible to formulate assumptions about the quality of the demo-
cratic performance of mass media in general on the content level.  
The relative importance of the print sector compared to other types of media varies from 
country to country. Whereas television is for example the dominant medium in Southern Eu-
ropean countries because a strong commercial mass press has never really evolved there, the 
print sector traditionally plays a significant role in Northern and Central Europe (Hallin and 
Mancini 2004; Norris 2000: 89). Gunther and Mughan (2000) generally attribute the greatest 
influence on the formation of individual political attitudes to television. They estimate the 
impact of the press to be more modest because individuals tend to only read those newspapers 
that are in line with their political preferences, at least under conditions of external opinion 
diversity. Evidence of the effects of radio news is less clear-cut but suggests that they resem-
ble those of the print media (Gunther and Mughan 2000: 419). In a similar vein, Norris (2000) 
states that television news have a larger audience than newspapers. Nevertheless, electronic 
media have not replaced but rather supplemented the print media. Accordingly, people com-
bine different of the more varied and more readily available news sources, and thus, „news 
consumption has increased, and the audience has broadened” in general (Norris 2000: 118). 
Hence, newspapers are still influential channels of information everywhere. 
Finally, Internet news sources will not be included in the media sample for the content analy-
sis either because it would be very hard to decide on what grounds the relevant websites for 
analysis should be chosen. In addition, citizens looking for political information on the World 
Wide Web often turn to the online editions of traditional news sources (Curran 2011: 115; 
Curtis 2004: 415; Gibson et al. 2005: 571; Gibson and McAllister 2011: 234).  
 
The newspapers selected for the content analysis are listed in table A4.3 in the appendix. 
They represent five titles out of the ten paid daily newspapers with the largest circulations and 
which appear at least five times a week (according to the World Press Trends 2008 edition) in 
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each of the ten countries under study. As already mentioned, daily newspapers are the most 
visible actors and most important sources of information for citizens within the press market. 
Furthermore, the ten largest newspapers are those with the broadest reach. Therefore, they are 
the major players in the print sector and play a decisive role for the media’s contribution to 
the quality of democracy. Again due to difficult availability, free newspapers were not con-
sidered, even though they undoubtedly play a crucial role in in media systems.
38
 Hence, for 
every country, if news material from the top five of the daily paid newspapers in terms of cir-
culation could be obtained, they were selected. If not, I moved further down the top ten list 
until five titles were sampled. Two exceptions to this rule need to be mentioned however. In 
Germany, six instead of five newspapers were selected. This is because the “Kölner Stadt-
Anzeiger” and the “Kölnische Rundschau” are two separate newspapers from the same pub-
lishing house, but only their joint circulation is reported by the publisher. Together, they had 
the third highest daily circulation among German paid daily newspapers in 2008. Thus, both 
titles were analyzed. By contrast, only four newspapers were available for analysis in Ireland. 
This was accepted since the World Press Trends only list eight top paid daily newspapers in 
Ireland anyway. For this reason, it can be argued that the media sample still represents half of 
the Irish top-selling daily newspapers.  
Table A4.3 shows that the resulting selection of the 50 newspapers represents a good sample 
of cases in most countries. In nine of the ten countries, the top circulation newspaper within 
the daily paid print sector is part of the analysis. The only exception is Germany, where the 
highest selling “Bild” was not available in any of the newspaper databases I had access to. For 
the very same reason, Germany is one of two countries where no tabloid-style newspaper was 
included in the sample, the other one being New Zealand. In all of the other countries, the 
sample is composed of both tabloid and broadsheet print outlets. Furthermore, in seven of ten 
countries, both newspapers from the left and the right side of the political spectrum are repre-
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 In Switzerland, for example, the free newspaper “20 Minuten” has the highest circulation (WEMF 2008). 
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sented in the sample although the latter mostly outweigh the former. Finally, a newspaper 
considered ‘independent’, i.e., neutral or unbiased, can be found among the newspapers from 
most countries as well. 
 
The sampling of articles followed a so-called “artificial week” approach (Bauer 2000), modi-
fied in that I left out every other week and weekday. Hence, for every of the 50 newspapers I 
selected the Monday of the first week in 2008 (January 7), the Wednesday of the third week, 
the Friday of the fifth week, the Tuesday of the seventh week and so on until the end of the 
year.
39
 Saturdays and Sundays were not considered. On the 26 days chosen, all articles con-
tained in a newspaper were sampled. This technique guarantees that a representative sample 
of the press coverage in 2008 was selected. First, the sample is not biased by specific periods 
of the year or any major events taking place during specific weeks. This is crucial for my re-
search questions. I do explicitly not want to base my research on a predefined set of issues. 
Quite to the contrary, I am interested in the general democratic performance of the media, 
regardless of the topic or the stage of the political process that is being covered. Nevertheless, 
it will be interesting to see to what extent the media’s performance varies around and between 
elections. Second, the selection of different days of the week helps controlling for different 
styles of news coverage as well as the timing of political events within the week. For exam-
ple, print news coverage on Mondays usually differs considerably from that on Fridays in 
terms of volume. Similarly, while press conferences by political actors are typically rather 
held on workdays, elections predominantly take place on weekends (which are then covered 
by the media on Monday). Third and again, sampling the same days for all countries ensures 
that news coverage is equally affected by incidents with an international impact, such as EU 
summits for the European cases. 
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 Table A4.4 in the appendix lists the dates of the days sampled including possible deviations from this schedule 
for individual newspapers. 
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Column 4 in table A4.3 displays the total number of articles extracted per newspaper over the 
full 26 days analyzed. Looking at the figures, we can observe large variation both within and 
across countries. It is difficult to say whether this primarily reflects actual differences in the 
volume of newspapers or whether this is simply an artifact caused by what kind of news mate-
rial the newspaper databases receive from the different print sources and how they store it. 
Especially regional newspapers seem to return a large number of articles. This suggests that 
newspaper databases include all of a regional newspaper’s local editions, which usually share 
substantial parts of their news coverage, causing identical or almost identical articles to ap-
pear multiple times in the databases. And while I have taken care to eliminate duplicate arti-
cles from my raw data, this was only possible if they were exactly identical. But either way, 
the large differences between newspapers should not be a great concern, considering that all 
the indicators compiled from the content analysis data are based on relative and not absolute 
numbers. 
The coding procedure 
The relevant information to be extracted from the selected print material by means of the 
computer-assisted approach was the simple appearance of various concepts in the newspaper 
articles. Thus, while the ultimate unit of analysis is the newspaper or country, the actual data 
collection took place on the level of individual newspaper articles. This raw data was then 
subsequently aggregated, first to the 1’300 newspaper-days (50 newspapers x 26 days) and 
then to the 50 newspaper-years (50 newspapers x 1 year).
40
  
The concepts of interest consist of politics in general, political institutions, political parties, 
and malpractice. All of these four concepts were specified by extensive keyword lists in order 
to perform comprehensive searches, and most can be further divided into subcategories. The 
                                                 
40
 However, the data is flexible so that instead of just aggregating the articles of one newspaper for the full year, 
certain periods within a year could be defined as well. This would allow for the comparison of the media’s dem-
ocratic performance across different stages of the political process, such as during, before, after and between 
elections. Alternatively, the newspapers can also be even further aggregated to the country level. 
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exact number of keywords varies across concepts and also across languages. An overview 
thereof as well as some examples can be found in table A4.5 in the appendix.
41
 
Keywords referring to politics in general were used to identify newspaper articles which re-
late to political affairs but do not already contain any references to political actors or institu-
tions. 
The analysis of political institutions revolves around the press coverage of the three constitu-
tional democratic powers, i.e., the legislative, executive and judicial branches, as well as the 
public administration. While the judiciary and the public administration only comprise one 
large category each, more fine-grained distinctions were made for the legislative and execu-
tive branches. As for the former, I differentiated between the legislative in general and the two 
chambers of parliament, if applicable. As for the executive, keyword groups representing the 
government in general, the head of state, the head of government and the cabinet ministers 
were defined. I classified the most powerful office in a country as the head of government, 
and the second leading government office as head of state. Hence, the label ‘head of govern-
ment’ applies to the Prime Minister in Australia as well the French President even though the 
latter formally is the head of state. By contrast the French Prime Minister was coded as head 
of state whereas in Australia, this label refers to Queen Elizabeth II as well as Australia’s 
Governor-General. For all of the four types of political institutions, the lists include keywords 
referring to the organization as a whole as well as the denomination of individual offices 
within these institutions. Hence, for the legislative branch in English-speaking countries, for 
example, both the keywords ‘parliament’ and ‘MP’ were used. The names of specific office-
holders, however, were only considered in the case of the executive branch. With regard to 
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 The full keyword lists are available on request. 
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this category, the names of the heads of government, the heads of state as well as all cabinet-
level ministers in office in 2008 were compiled.
42
 
According to the horizontal media function and especially the participatory model of democ-
racy, the media should provide a platform for and balance a variety of different civil society 
actors and intermediary organizations in their news coverage. However, because of the diffi-
culties of compiling valid keyword lists for all of the different types of interest groups men-
tioned in chapter 3 (see section 3.4.1, p. 67) for all countries, I only focused on political par-
ties. So one might argue that horizontal function performance assessments on the content lev-
el are more closely in line with the minimal requirements of the liberal model of democracy.  
As for political parties, I defined those parties as relevant which had gained at least 1 percent 
of all the votes in the previous national election or were represented in the national parliament 
at any point during the respective legislative period (e.g. by means of representatives switch-
ing between or forming new political parties).
43
 Since the elections took place in the second 
half of 2008 in all of the four election year countries, the old compositions of parliament were 
used as points of reference. Table A4.6 in the appendix lists all the political parties considered 
in the content analysis. For every party, the keyword list includes the full name as well as – if 
applicable and available – abbreviations, deviating names of specific party sections44 and the 
names of the incumbent party presidents or leaders. 
Finally, the keyword lists for malpractice were compiled to analyze various forms of miscon-
duct that political actors are associated with in the news. They were classified into five sub-
categories which might of course overlap or co-occur: 1) corruption, 2) lying, 3) fraud, 4) 
                                                 
42
 The official online services of the respective countries’ governments, parliaments and parties as well as Wik-
ipedia provided all information on the relevant politicians. 
43
 I relied on information provided by the Social Science Research Center in Berlin, the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union (IPU; www.ipu.org (08/28/2012)) as well as the official websites of the ten national parliaments. 
44
 For example, region-specific names like the Christian Social Union (CSU) in Germany, which only exists in 
the state of Bavaria but forms a union with the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) on the national level. 
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scandal and 5) negative coverage in general. The first subcategory refers to acts of corruption 
and bribery. The second subcategory comprises keywords indicating lying, cheating as well as 
various other forms of possibly immoral behavior. The third subcategory goes one step further 
in that it actually denotes illegal acts such as fraud, serious misconduct and criminal behavior. 
The fourth subcategory is rather small in terms of the number of keywords and simply refers 
to scandals or incidents deemed scandalous. The fifth subcategory, by contrast, is very broad 
and includes a large variety of keywords with a negative connotation. These range from 
words expressing insults to words expressing disgust or outrage. 
 
The keyword lists for politics in general, political institutions and malpractice were obtained 
in multiple steps. Initially, I compiled a list of English keywords from my general knowledge 
for each of the different concepts of interest. These original lists were extended by synonyms 
using WordNet (Fellbaum 1998)
45
 and translated into French and German with the help of 
various online translation dictionaries and tools.
46
 Furthermore, country-specific keywords 
were added to the lists for political institutions, especially the legislative and executive 
branches. More specifically, it was crucial to include the exact names of the respective institu-
tions in the various countries, such as e.g. the ‘House of Commons’ for the lower house of 
parliament in the United Kingdom or the ‘Bundeskanzlerin’ for the head of government in 
Germany. Country-specific keywords were somewhat less important with regard to the judici-
ary and the public administration but efforts were made to cover the most important organiza-
tions per country with corresponding keywords. No country-specific keywords were required 
for concepts politics in general and malpractice.  
                                                 
45 
WordNet is a large lexical database of nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs which are grouped into sets of 
synonyms. These sets are interlinked by means of conceptual-semantic and lexical relations. The result is a net-
work of meaningfully related words, which can be searched to find semantic synonyms. 
46
 I employed Leo (http://dict.leo.org), Babelfish (http://de.babelfish.yahoo.com/) and Google Translate 
(http://translate.google.ch/). Since these services sometimes perform very badly, all results were crosschecked 
using at least two different translation tools, in order to minimize the risk of translation errors. 
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Having assembled the keyword lists for all the categories discussed above in the three lan-
guages required, they were collapsed by stemming. This means that keywords with a common 
word stem were summarized to one keyword. Stemmed keywords have the advantage that 
they find similar words and their various inflections. The stem ‘legislat’, for instance, matches 
‘legislative’, ‘legislating’, ‘legislator’, ‘legislature’, as well as the respective plural forms. 
 
The stemmed keyword lists constituted the input for the computational procedure, which rec-
ords the newspaper articles that contain any of the keywords specified. However, when per-
forming a list-based automatic annotation of texts, the problem of false positives often occurs. 
False positives are keyword hits which do not match the concept that was supposed to be 
found.
47
 To resolve such ambiguities as far as possible, I pretested every keyword extensively 
and additionally implemented heuristic rules. An example of such a rule is that a politician 
was only identified if both his/ her first and last name were found within an article (Müller 
and Wueest 2011a). Another example not referring to actual persons would be the keyword 
‘court’ for the judiciary. Since ‘court’ has many other meanings, the keyword was modified to 
‘(court OR courts) NOT tennis NOT basketball NOT N.B.A. NOT NBA NOT food court’ for 
the United States in order to exclude any mentions of the word ‘court’ actually denoting a 
sports ground. Furthermore, keywords often had to be put into a national context. This means 
that, for instance, references to a ‘Kabinett’ in the Austrian press was only counted as hits for 
the Austrian government if the word ‘Oesterreich’ appeared in the same article as well. Of 
course, these additional rules and extensions could not completely eliminate but at least great-
ly minimize false positives. Thus, it can be expected that the target concepts are captured with 
sufficient precision. This has also been shown in other studies which applied a similar content 
analysis approach and conducted reliability tests (Müller and Wueest 2011a: 14). 
                                                 
47
 A good example is the widespread English name ‘Brown’. On the one hand, such a frequent name can refer to 
many other persons than the targeted Mr. or Ms. ‘Brown’. On the other hand, ‘brown’ also indicates a color. 
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Using the revised keyword lists, I performed one keyword search across all newspaper articles 
sampled for each country and for each concept (sub)category separately (rows in table A4.5 
and for every political party). This finally resulted in a list of articles which comprise any of 
the keywords assigned to the respective concept or – if applicable – subcategory thereof per 
country, including information about the articles’ titles, dates, lengths and sources, i.e., news-
papers they originate from. This raw data was then used to construct the indicators defined to 
measure the newspapers’ compliance with the vertical and the horizontal media function on 
the content level. These indicators will be discussed in the next section. 
4.2.3 Indicators 
As already mentioned, the advantage of applying an automated content analysis approach is 
that a large amount of news material can be processed with fairly little effort once the key-
word lists are ready. But the downside is that indicators based on data about the simple occur-
rence of keywords within newspaper articles inevitably are quite crude. Of course, more dif-
ferentiated measures would be desirable even though, as discussed in chapter 3, I am more 
interested in the amount of news coverage about political affairs than its tone or character. 
Table 4.2 gives an overview of the nine factors used to assess the vertical and the horizontal 
media function for democracy in terms of media content. Descriptive statistics of all the indi-
cators can be found in table A4.7 in the appendix. Again, all indicators were scaled in such a 
way that higher values indicate higher democratic performance. And similarly to the structur-
al level, not all of the variables discussed for the content level in chapter 3 (see the lower 
halves of tables 3.1 and 3.2) could actually be operationalized. This is especially the case for 
the variables supposed to measure the degree to which citizens and interest groups have a di-
rect voice in the public sphere by means of direct quotations, interviews and letters to the edi-
tor. Moreover and as noted before, the analysis of the balance of intermediary actors in the 
media is limited to political parties, thus disregarding interest groups (e.g. trade unions and 
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professional associations) and civil society actors (e.g. NGOs and churches) for pragmatic 
reasons. 
Table 4.2 Overview of media function indicators – content level 
 Components Indicators 
Vertical 
media 
function 
A. Amount of critical politi-
cal information 
 Share of newspaper articles mentioning politics in general or 
political institutions relative to all articles 
 Watchdog 1: high share of articles about the government 
mentioning malpractice (corruption, fraud, lying or scandals)  
 Watchdog 2: high share of articles about the parliament men-
tioning malpractice (corruption, fraud, lying or scandals)  
B. Balance of political in-
formation 
 Well-balanced coverage of constitutional branches 1: gov-
ernment vs. parliament vs. judiciary vs. public administration 
 Well-balanced coverage of constitutional branches 2: gov-
ernment vs. parliament 
Horizontal 
media 
function 
Platform for diverse interests  Equal frequency of mentions of political parties in news 
media coverage 
 Proportional frequency of mentions of political parties in 
news media coverage (according to vote shares) 
 Share of articles mentioning more than one political party in 
the same article 
 Average number of parties mentioned per article  
 
The vertical function 
On the content level, the vertical media function revolves around the question of how exten-
sively newspapers provide critical and balanced information about political decision-making 
processes as well as the democratic institutions involved in it. This was subdivided into two 
separate components which follow a somewhat different logic (see chapter 3).  
 
A. The amount of critical political information 
The first indicator of the first component measures the share of articles indicating politically 
relevant news as a share of all articles. More specifically, for every of the 1’300 newspaper-
days I calculated the number of articles which include any keyword for politics in general or 
political institutions, i.e., the government (in general, head of government, head of state and 
ministers), the parliament (in general and both chambers), the judiciary or the public admin-
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istration, relative to the total number of articles from the same newspaper-day. These shares 
were then averaged across all 26 days and thereby aggregated to the newspaper-year level. 
With respect to the amount of political news coverage, the vertical function is also concerned 
with how well mass media fulfill their role as public watchdogs that scrutinize political deci-
sion makers. Thus, two further indicators reflect the share of articles about the government 
and the parliament as well as their sub-categories which also contain keywords indicating 
malpractice. This means that the amount of critical news coverage was assessed separately for 
those two political institutions which are directly accountable to the people. Thus, as argued 
in chapter 3, even though all constitutional branches need to be monitored by the media, citi-
zens foremost depend on critical evaluations of their incumbent governments and parliaments. 
As for malpractice, however, only four of the five subcategories were used. This is because 
the fifth subcategory – negative coverage – simply appeared to be too broad and vague. 
Hence, malpractice as defined for the two respective indicators only incorporates corruption, 
lying, fraud and scandal. Again, the calculations were carried out on the level of newspaper-
days and then aggregated to newspaper-years by arithmetic means. 
It is especially these two ‘watchdog’ indicators, as they are labeled in table 4.2, which might 
raise doubts about the validity of the data generated by the content analysis. In other words, it 
is not entirely clear how accurately they are able to measure what they are supposed to meas-
ure, namely the degree to which media bring to light malpractice within political institutions. 
After all, the fact that two keywords appear in the same newspaper article does not necessarily 
say much about their relationship. If the Canadian Prime Minister is mentioned in the same 
news unit as the word ‘corruption’ this could mean that he was condemning corruption – be it 
in his own or another country – or announcing anti-corruption measures just as likely as that 
he was associated with corruption himself. This is a problem of false positives which cannot 
be solved with the present content analysis approach without having to double-check every 
malpractice keyword hit. However, since this problem should equally apply to the data from 
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all newspapers and countries, we can at least conclude that this is a systematic error which 
should therefore not distort the results in a certain way. Moreover, other studies confirm that 
the approach of connecting different concepts in newspaper articles by the simple co-
occurrence of keywords is a good approximation of data that is manually coded for the same 
purpose (Ruigrok and Van Atteveldt 2007; Wueest et al. 2011). 
B. The balance of political information 
The second component of the vertical function consists of two indicators which both measure 
the degree to which newspapers cover political institutions to equal extents. While the first 
compares the relative frequencies with which the three branches of democratic government 
and the public administration appear in the press, the second only looks at the executive ver-
sus the legislative branch. The idea behind the latter is again that the government and the par-
liament require most attention from the voters since their legitimacy is directly based on pub-
lic support. 
To calculate the balance of political institutions in the news, I applied the “index of qualitative 
variation (IQV)” used by Woods (2007: 220), which is calculated by the following formula:  
 
Pi = the proportion of observations for institution i. 
K = the number of institutions. 
The values Pi equal the amount of newspaper articles referring to an institution relative to all 
newspaper articles referring to any of the four (indicator 1) or two political institutions (indi-
cator 2), respectively. This was necessary so that the values of Pi add up to 1. Moreover, for 
the executive and legislative branch, the numbers of articles with keyword hits were summed 
up for their respective three subcategories before calculating Pi. To give an example, if on a 
given day in a given newspaper, 5 articles contained keywords for the government in general, 
the head of state, the head government and/or the cabinet-level ministers and 10 articles con-
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tained keywords for the parliament in general and/or either of its chambers, then the IQV 
measuring the balance between the executive and legislative branch would yield:  
IQVExe. vs. Leg. = (1- ((5/(5+10))
2
 + (10/(5+10))
2
)) / ((2-1)/2) = 0.89 
The IQV ranges from 0 to 1. A value of 1 indicates perfect balance which applies if the insti-
tutions are equally frequently mentioned in the news. A value of 0, by contrast, would mean 
that only one institution is covered at all. Just like the previous indicators, the IQV was com-
puted on the newspaper-day level and then averaged across the 26 days for each newspaper. 
The horizontal function 
Balance is also the main matter of the horizontal media function. In other words, newspapers 
are supposed to reflect the different interests within the society, which are represented by the 
different political parties and their ideologies, and to allow public discourses. As already dis-
cussed in chapter 3, what constitutes the right balance between political parties is a normative 
question. According to the liberal model of democracy, attention should be devoted to politi-
cal parties proportionally to their electoral strengths. The participatory model, by contrast, 
would probably plead for an even balance between parties in the press (Ferree et al. 2002: 
207f., 230). Both positions can be operationalized and, therefore, two indicators measuring 
the balance of political parties in the news coverage were calculated. 
The first represents the position of the participatory model of democracy and thus reflects the 
degree to which parties are equally frequently mentioned in the news. Just like the balance 
between democratic institutions, this is calculated by applying the IQV (see above). 
In order to measure the liberal model of democracy’s proposition of proportional party repre-
sentation, it makes sense to use one of the various disproportionality indices that exist to 
compare the aggregated gaps between parties’ vote shares and their relative frequencies in the 
news. Probably the most common of such measures is the Gallagher index of disproportion-
ality, named after its creator (Gallagher 1991). The index ranges from 0 to 100, with higher 
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values indicating higher disproportionality. Thus, in order for the index to have higher values 
for higher levels of proportionality, the original Gallagher index was reversed by subtracting 
it from 100. Thus, the calculation was carried out according to the following formula: 
Proportionality index = 100 − √
∑ (𝑉𝑖−𝑃𝑖)
2𝑛
𝑖=1
2
  
Vi = the vote share of party i. 
Pi = the proportion of observations for party i. 
The vote shares used to compute the reversed Gallagher index were taken from a country’s 
previous national election results, also for countries in election years, as reported by data from 
the Social Science Research Center Berlin and IPU (see footnote 43). Both of the party bal-
ance indicators were implemented on the level of newspaper-days and further aggregated 
from there by averaging the values across the 26 days. 
In addition to measuring the ratio of political parties within newspapers, I was interested in 
how often newspapers report about different political parties within the same news unit. More 
specifically, two further indicators assess the share of newspaper articles exhibiting a dialogic 
structure in the sense that they convey multiple viewpoints within the same article, not just the 
newspaper as a whole. This resembles the two concepts of internal and external diversity of 
opinions, which were introduced in the discussion of variables for the structural analysis. But 
while the concepts there referred to the diversity or balance of opinions on the level of the 
whole press system (external) versus individual news outlets (internal), they are narrowed 
down to a much smaller scale here. Whereas the two party balance indicators measure diversi-
ty of opinions on the level of the whole newspaper (external), the dialogic structure indicators 
focus on diversity of opinions within individual newspaper articles (internal). The first of 
these reflects the share of all articles with party references which in fact include more than 
only one political party. Again, this percentage was calculated on the level of newspaper-days 
and further aggregated to newspaper-years by taking the average of these percentages. The 
second indicator for the dialogic structure simply counts the number of political parties men-
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tioned per article, in those articles where parties are mentioned at all. This is the only measure 
already created on the level of single articles and then subsequently aggregated to the news-
paper-day and newspaper-year level by averaging the respective scores. On the highest level, 
however, the indicator was additionally weighted, i.e., divided by the number of parties that 
actually exist in a country to control for the party system. This is necessary because an aver-
age number of two parties mentioned per article would of course be very high for the United 
States but not so much for Switzerland. 
4.3 Summary 
This chapter presented the research designs applied to analyze the democratic performance of 
mass media in terms of the vertical and the horizontal function on both the structural and the 
content level. More specifically, the country samples, periods of investigation, methods of 
data collection and the operationalization of the theoretical model developed in chapter 3 were 
presented for both levels of analysis in detail. 
On the structural level, media system performance will be evaluated by means of secondary 
data on the communication infrastructure and the composition of media markets for a broad 
range of countries and over almost two decades from 1990 to 2008 (see section 4.1). Initially, 
much more data was collected than discussed in section 4.1.2 (in fact, for about 40 indica-
tors). But after a careful examination of the assembled data, I decided against working with a 
large variety of parameters with miscellaneous geographic and temporal coverages as well as 
considerable differences in terms of quality and reliability. Instead, focusing on only few but 
valid and (more or less) reliable indicators, which are available for a reasonable time series 
and a sufficiently high number of countries to allow for multivariate analysis, was deemed to 
be the better approach. Nevertheless, it was not possible to find data for all of the 77 estab-
lished democracies identified on the basis of existing indices of democracies in section 4.1.1. 
The structural analysis therefore operates with a subset of 47 democracies worldwide and a 
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core set of nine indicators, which capture the access to information on the one hand, and the 
quantitative and qualitative diversity of media channels on the other. Since this core set does 
not include any indicators for the electronic media sector with respect to the horizontal func-
tion, however, a second sample consisting of 24 European countries was defined. This smaller 
country sample has the advantage that three additional indicators are available which measure 
quantitative and qualitative media diversity in the television market. 
On the content level, a semi-automated content analysis of 50 newspapers on 26 representa-
tive days in the year 2008 was conducted to compare the degree to which news coverage ful-
fills the normative standards of the vertical and horizontal media function across ten different 
countries (Austria, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, New Zealand, Switzerland, 
Great Britain and the United States). Section 4.2 discussed the sampling and data collection 
procedures as well the construction of the final media performance measures. Like on the 
structural level, the evaluation is based on nine indicators on the content level. They reflect 
the degree to which mass media provide critical and well-balanced information about political 
institutions on the one hand, and a balanced coverage of political parties on the other. 
Because of the very different nature and scopes of the data for the structural and the content 
level, media performance will be analyzed separately for each of the two levels. Hence, the 
following chapter 5 will exclusively look at the structural or media system level. Chapter 6 
then turns to the content level and examines the democratic performance of mass media with 
respect to their news coverage. 
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Chapter 5:  
Comparing the democratic performance of media 
systems
Having derived the role that the media are supposed to play in a democracy according to nor-
mative theory and having specified the two respective media functions in the two previous 
chapters, this chapter proceeds to the empirical analyses. While the content level is covered in 
chapter 6, chapter 5 entirely focuses on the structural level. In a first step, its aim is to explore 
how the theoretically derived media system indicators relate to each other and whether this 
corresponds to the concept of the vertical and the horizontal media function. The main in-
strument employed to do so is factor analysis. In a second step, how media systems perform 
across countries with regard to the two functions is studied in more detail. By means of de-
scriptive and cluster analyses, I examine whether different types or patterns of media systems 
in terms of their democratic performance can be identified. Finally, I test what determinants 
possibly account for differences in media systems’ fulfillment of the vertical and the horizon-
tal function on the structural level.  
5.1 The dimensions of structural media performance 
As described in chapter 4, multiple indicators were defined in order to measure the vertical 
and the horizontal media function. All of them are based on theoretical reasoning and are con-
sidered to characterize different aspects of the two media functions. So far, it was only hy-
pothesized which indicators belong to which function and it needs to be tested whether this 
classification holds. On top of this, no explicit assumptions were made with regard to whether 
and how the indicators of the same function covary. In other words, it was not argued that the 
indicators of one function necessarily have to be one-dimensional. This might in fact be espe-
cially unlikely for the horizontal media function, which was defined to consist of two compo-
nents in chapter 3. However, if there is evidence that the indicators from the same function do 
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coexist on a single dimension, this would provide an even stronger argument for my theoreti-
cal model. 
Hence, it is first of all important to gain a better understanding of the relationships between 
the indicators and to examine whether they can be grouped according to the theoretical media 
functions. For this purpose, I conduct exploratory factor analyses, starting with the larger 
sample of 47 countries and the nine indicators that are available for this sample. The follow-
ing section then tests how the results change when the number of indicators is increased by 
three additional items, while the number of cases is reduced to the smaller sample of 24 Euro-
pean countries. 
5.1.1 Large country sample 
Table 5.1 presents the results of a principal components factor analysis with the nine indica-
tors available for the larger country sample. The table is divided into two sections. The left-
hand side represents the results from a factor analysis across the full time series 1990 to 2008. 
However, instead of using the 893 country-years (47 countries x 19 years), the data was split 
into four periods by averaging the data across mostly five years (1990-1994; 1995-1999; 
2000-2004; 2005-2008). This approach helps to reduce the impact of short-term fluctuations 
in the data and is also more appropriate in light of the often incomplete time series for some 
indicators (see chapter 4).
48
 It therefore seems reasonable to work with five-year averages 
instead. Hence, the left-hand side of table 5.1 is based on 188 cases (47 x four five-year peri-
ods) and thereby disregards the panel structure of the dataset. But since factor analysis relies 
on covariance matrices, time dependencies and trends might affect the factor results. And 
even though this problem should be less serious with the five-year averages compared to sin-
gle country-years, in order to completely rule it out, the analyses were also conducted sepa-
rately for every five-year period. The results are actually very consistent with the ones given 
                                                 
48
 Missing years had to be replaced for most indicators. This results in a yearly dataset which purports a level of 
precision it cannot actually deliver. 
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in table 5.1.
49
 However, presenting and discussing the factor composition for every single 
period would go beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, the right-hand section of table 5.1 
also shows a factor analysis based on the overall means of the variables across the 19 years in 
the time series. 
Table 5.1 The latent dimensions of structural media performance (large country sample) 
 
 
5-year average panel Overall means 
 
 
1 2  3 1 2 3 
V
er
ti
ca
l 
Daily newspaper circulation per 1’000 people .667 .384 .070 .804 .243 .152 
Radio sets per capita .840 .054 -.055 .910 -.056 -.023 
TV sets per capita .898 .110 -.039 .917 .059 -.048 
Computers in % population .907 .102 .102 .909 .241 .065 
Internet users in % population .841 -.015 .117 .929 .240 .050 
H
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l Daily newspaper titles per 1 million people .282 .810 .184 .381 .747 .245 
Newspaper import in % GDP -.038 .841 -.122 .028 .887 -.161 
Ideological balance of the press system .168 .089 .657 .215 -.004 .591 
Circulation share of neutral newspapers -.119 -.074 .827 -.195 .002 .814 
Eigenvalues 3.61 1.55 1.20 4.23 1.53 1.13 
Explained variance in % 40.12 17.23 13.32 47.04 16.95 12.57 
Number of cases 188 47 
Notes: rotated factor loadings using principal component analysis and Varimax rotation; factors with Eigenvalue 
> 1 were extracted; explained total variance: 74.62% (panel) and 76.56% (overall means); bold: loadings ≥ .400 
or ≤ -.400; grey: highest loading per item. 
 
Most importantly, the results are almost identical across the two different types of datasets, 
the five-year average panel and the total averages. In both cases three factors have been ex-
tracted from the data. Hence, we can already see that the indicators measuring the democratic 
performance of media systems do not covary according to just two latent dimensions as one 
might assume from the theoretical framework. A closer look, however, reveals that the three 
dimensions are highly plausible in light of the theoretical model. 
In both sections of the table, the first factor unambiguously represents the vertical media func-
tion. All of the indicators which were discussed with regard to this function in chapter 4 load 
                                                 
49
 In addition separate factor analyses were conducted for every single year as well as for the whole 893 country-
years. Three latent dimensions were extracted in every instance. Thus, the results can be considered as very ro-
bust. 
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onto this single dimension. Especially the four indicators capturing the access to electronic 
media within the population are very strongly related to the latent factor. For this reason, it is 
not very surprising that the only press indicator, measuring the penetration of newspapers in 
the society, exhibits the lowest though still reasonably high factor loading (0.667 and 0.804, 
respectively). Moreover, none of the indicators of the vertical function load onto the other two 
factors.  
Hence, the second and the third factor are purely determined by indicators of the horizontal 
function. This means that, contrary to the vertical function, the horizontal function is not one- 
but two-dimensional. Nevertheless, the two factors show a distinct pattern that is fully in line 
with the theoretical conceptualization developed in chapter 3. Each of them clearly represents 
one component of the horizontal media function, i.e., either quantitative or qualitative media 
diversity. Factor 2 is only characterized by the two indicators for quantitative diversity, name-
ly the number of newspaper titles per capita and newspaper import as a share of a country’s 
GDP. Factor 3, by contrast, is exclusively defined by the indicators for qualitative diversity or 
– in other words – diversity of opinions. Both the ideological balance of the press system and 
the share of neutral newspapers’ circulation show high factor loadings here. In sum, although 
three instead of two latent dimensions were extracted from the data, the resulting factor struc-
ture fits the theoretical model very well. 
5.1.2 Small country sample 
In a next step, the analysis is restricted to fewer countries, which allows taking into account 
more indicators. More precisely, three indicators are added to the analysis so that the horizon-
tal function does not only consist of press but also broadcast indicators. Accordingly, table 5.2 
presents the results of a principal components factor analysis on the basis of the small country 
sample and twelve indicators. Analogous to table 5.1, the left-hand side of table 5.2 contains 
the factor solution of an analysis across all 19 years, divided into five-year averages. Conse-
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quently, it is based on 96 cases (24 countries x four five-year periods).
50
 As mentioned before, 
ignoring the panel structure of the dataset when performing factor analyses might lead to bi-
ased results. The right-hand side therefore again shows the factor solution and loadings from 
an analysis of the overall averages across the 19 years.
51
 This, however, raises some concern 
regarding the sample size, since conducting factor analysis with twelve items on the basis of 
only 24 cases might be problematic. 
Table 5.2 The latent dimensions of structural media performance (small country sample) 
 
 
5-year average panel Overall means 
 
 
1 2  3 4 1 2 3 4 
V
er
ti
ca
l 
Daily newspaper circulation per 1’000 people .751 .445 -.131 -.223 .930 .213 -.035 .034 
Radio sets per capita .823 .119 -.079 -.080 .876 -.098 -.008 .038 
TV sets per capita .875 -.163 -.013 .114 .852 -.290 -.038 -.035 
Computers in % population .838 .088 .336 .209 .874 .153 .354 -.018 
Internet users in % population .756 -.022 .249 .375 .925 .149 .203 .002 
H
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
Daily newspaper titles per 1 million people .247 .857 -.093 .052 .428 .731 -.120 .214 
Newspaper import in % GDP -.348 .590 .562 -.060 -.275 .680 .490 -.165 
TV stations received .429 -.151 .636 .266 .252 -.136 .775 .192 
% TV HH receiving foreign TV news  .027 -.031 .852 -.080 .027 -.007 .903 .003 
Ideological balance of the press system .122 .063 -.037 .662 .179 -.072 .123 .846 
Neutral newspapers’ circulation share -.040 .584 -.033 .442 .008 .720 -.130 .087 
Strength of the public broadcast sector -.015 -.064 -.073 -.862 .230 -.295 -.008 -.719 
Eigenvalues 3.66 1.70 1.66 1.71 4.39 1.81 1.87 1.35 
Explained variance in % 30.54 14.19 13.84 14.28 36.54 15.10 15.59 11.27 
Number of cases 96 24 
Notes: rotated factor loadings using principal component analysis and Varimax rotation; factors with Eigenvalue 
> 1 were extracted; explained total variance: 72.84% (panel) and 78.51% (overall means); bold: loadings ≥ .400 
or ≤ -.400; grey: highest loading per item. 
 
As table 5.2 illustrates, adding more indicators to the analysis also leads to a higher number of 
factors. Instead of the previous three latent dimensions, four factors are now identified, i.e., 
have Eigenvalues higher than 1 in both the panel and the purely cross-sectional analysis. The 
                                                 
50
 An analysis across all individual 456 country-years (24 countries x 19 years) yields almost the same results. 
51
 Another approach to cope with this problem would be to analyze each period separately. In this scenario, four 
factors emerge in most cases as well. The only exception to this pattern is the most recent period 2005 to 2008, 
where five latent dimensions are extracted on the basis of their Eigenvalues. 
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factor loadings, however, reveal that basically the same dimensions as in table 5.1 are still 
evident. They are simply complemented by an additional factor which is mainly characterized 
by two of the three new indicators. Moreover, like in table 5.1, the two factor solutions from 
the different datasets (five-year average panel vs. overall means) are very similar in table 5.2. 
Hence, the first factors in both the left- and the right-hand section of table 5.2 still clearly rep-
resent the vertical media function. The respective five indicators correlate strongly and, with 
one exception in the five-year average panel version, do not load onto any other dimension. 
The exception is the first item, which measures the circulation of the daily press per 1’000 
inhabitants. This indicator also loads onto the second factor in the left section of the table, 
albeit only rather weakly so (0.445). Furthermore, one indicator of the horizontal function 
loads onto the first dimension in each of the two factor solutions. While this concerns one of 
the three new items, the number of television channels received, in the panel data version it 
applies to the number of daily newspapers in the overall means version. However, in both 
cases the factor loadings are below 0.5, and the two indicators are much more important for 
other latent dimensions. Finally, the obvious association between the relative circulation and 
the relative number of daily newspapers is not very surprising, given that a large relative press 
circulation can result from either a few but very large newspapers
52
 or a high number of print 
outlets.  
Again very much in line with the analyses of the large country sample, factors 2 in the left- 
and right-hand sections of table 5.2 capture the quantitative diversity of the press system. The 
two respective indicators – number of newspapers and newspaper import – exhibit their high-
est factor loadings here. Yet, internal press diversity, i.e., the share of politically independent 
newspapers’ circulation, also loads most strongly onto this dimension in both versions of the 
small country sample.  
                                                 
52
 Such as in Japan, which has had the largest circulated newspapers in the world for years. The “Yomiuri 
Shimbun”, for example, had a daily circulation of about 14 million copies in 2005 (WAN 2006). 
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The third factors in table 5.2 are the parallels of factors 2 in terms of the broadcast media. 
They are mainly characterized by the two new indicators added to the analysis which are sup-
posed to measure the quantitative diversity of the television sector. So interestingly, quantita-
tive press and TV diversity do not form a joint latent dimension but rather follow different 
patterns. This means that they may, but do not necessarily have to coexist within the same 
media system. However, quantitative press and television diversity do not seem to be entirely 
independent of each other because newspaper import in percent GDP also loads onto factors 3 
(0.562 and 0.490, respectively) even though not as highly as on factors 2. The reason for this 
is that newspaper import is somewhat related to the share of TV households receiving foreign 
news channels (average of BBC World News, CNN, Euronews, TV5 Monde, Sky News and 
France 24). Hence, it appears that some media systems are generally more open to foreign 
sources of information, both in terms of print and broadcast media.  
The fourth factors, finally, are concerned with qualitative media diversity. Contrary to the 
large country sample (see table 5.1), only the indicator for external diversity of opinions with-
in the print sector, i.e., the ideological balance within the press system, loads exclusively and 
quite strongly onto this last latent dimension in both data versions. Internal opinion diversity, 
by contrast, is only weakly related to factor 4 in the left-hand section of table 5.2. In addition, 
the only other item with high loadings with regard to factors 4 is one of the three new indica-
tors, namely the proxy measure for the internal diversity of opinions within the electronic me-
dia sector, which assesses the strength and independence of the public broadcast system. 
More specifically, it indicates the share of public channels relative to all domestic television 
channels, weighted by the market share and the political independence of public broadcasters. 
The factor loadings of this item, however, are negative. Thus, an inverse relationship between 
qualitative press and TV diversity can be observed. This configuration reveals an interesting 
trade-off between the two concepts. Apparently, media systems with dominant and independ-
ent public broadcasting tend to have a politically more distorted press system and vice versa. 
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This is plausible considering that a strong public service media sector is traditionally found in 
countries where the major newspapers have clear political orientations, which date back to 
their emergence from the party press. A case in point is the United Kingdom where the BBC, 
the paragon of public broadcasting, is leading the television market and pitted against a highly 
politicized print landscape. In Great Britain, however, it is not only the traditional political 
alignments of newspapers but also the entry and consolidation of Rupert Murdoch’s News 
International in the British press market, which has led to a shift to the right and thus a deteri-
oration of external opinion diversity (McQuail 1992: 161; Street 2011).  
 
In sum, comparing the results in table 5.2 to the factor solutions with the larger country sam-
ple but fewer indicators (see table 5.1), some conclusions can be drawn. First, the same five 
indicators were used for the vertical function and they still constitute a single, strong and 
mostly exclusive latent dimension. Second, the horizontal function is characterized by three 
instead of just two factors when the analysis is conducted for the small country sample and 
seven instead of four indicators for the horizontal function. However, these three factors still 
distinguish the function’s components, i.e., quantitative and qualitative media diversity, even 
though one of the indicators for qualitative press diversity is associated with quantitative press 
diversity in the factor analysis with the reduced country sample. In addition, a distinction be-
tween the press and the electronic media emerges. Obviously, both types of media are im-
portant for the horizontal function but they do not necessarily coexist. Instead, their democrat-
ic performances are rather independent from or even in conflict with one another, as observed 
with respect to qualitative media diversity. 
5.1.3 Summary 
The factor analyses were useful to analyze the dimensionality of the structural data and to see 
whether the indicators are jointly determined by meaningful latent constructs. Indeed, it was 
found that the manifest indicators form latent variables more or less in line with my theoreti-
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cal model of media performance. Thus, while the vertical media function is clearly mirrored 
in the covariance structure of the data as a one-dimensional concept in both country samples, 
the horizontal function is divided into two dimensions, corresponding to its components quan-
titative and qualitative media diversity in the large sample with 47 countries. In the case of the 
smaller sample with 24 countries and more indicators, a further distinction according to the 
type of medium, i.e. the print vs. the electronic media sector, is evident. Therefore, the hori-
zontal function consists of two instead of just one dimension for quantitative media diversity 
in this case. Furthermore, the comparison of the results for the five-year time series and the 
overall mean values suggest that the factor solutions are quite robust and do not seem to be 
strongly affected by time effects, neither in the case of the large nor the small country sample.  
5.2 Finding country patterns of structural media performance 
While the factor analyses were performed to find patterns among the nine or twelve indica-
tors, the resulting factors will now be used to study patterns among countries. As the previous 
analyses have shown, the two media functions and their indicators denote different aspects of 
media systems’ democratic performance. I assume that countries differ in the degrees to 
which their media systems fulfill the requirements of the two functions. In other words, some 
countries might simply perform better than others in general. But at the same time, country 
differences are also expected to reflect different patterns or types of structural media perfor-
mance. Thus, in cross-national comparison, some countries might perform better on specific 
aspects only and worse on others. The results of the factor analyses can actually be taken as a 
first indication for this. If every country always scored equally high or low on all variables, 
the factor analyses would not have produced different but just one dimension. 
The examination of country patterns proceeds in two steps. First, a descriptive analysis will 
provide an overview of differences in structural performance across countries. Second, I will 
try to identify distinct patterns of media systems or rather different groups of countries with 
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specific configurations of the two media functions. For this purpose, cluster analyses on the 
basis of the factor scores as derived from the latent dimensions described in section 5.1 will 
be conducted. 
5.2.1 Cross-national differences in structural media performance 
Table 5.3 presents the scores of the three factors in the right-hand section of table 5.1 (large 
country sample) and the four factors in the right-hand section of table 5.2 (small country sam-
ple) for each country. Thus, for the sake of simplicity, only the scores from the factor analyses 
of the overall mean values are shown. Moreover, they are arranged by media function or 
component, so that the corresponding scores of the two country samples can be directly com-
pared. The countries are sorted in descending order by the values in the columns entitled I, 
which stand for the large country sample version.  
As for the vertical media function shown in the first three columns, the United States rank 
highest, followed with quite some distance by the United Kingdom, Finland, Denmark, and 
Japan. Further Anglo-Saxon and Northern European countries like Sweden, Australia, Nor-
way, the Netherlands, Iceland and Canada also perform very well with scale points higher 
than or almost 1. At the bottom of the list, by contrast, we find Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, 
Mongolia and India. Clearly, a distinction can be drawn between economically highly devel-
oped countries on the positive side and less wealthy countries on the negative side of the 
scale.  
A further observation is that despite somewhat different factor loadings, the factor scores es-
timated on the basis of the 24-country sample (column II) do not differ substantially from the 
corresponding scores in column I. Exceptions are the values for Greece and – to a lesser de-
gree – France, Italy, Belgium, Ireland and Portugal. All of these countries perform worse 
when compared only to the other 18 European countries of the small sample. 
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Table 5.3 Country scores for the latent dimensions of structural media performance 
VERTICAL FUNCTION HORIZONTAL FUNCTION 
 Quantitative diversity Qualitative diversity 
 I II  I II (press) II (TV)  I II 
United States 2.152 - Malta 3.147 - - Israel 2.423 - 
UK 1.672 1.515 Cyprus 2.968 2.831 0.298 Paraguay 1.738 - 
Finland 1.536 1.696 Luxembourg 2.306 - - Norway 1.652 0.367 
Denmark 1.509 1.541 Switzerland 1.934 1.165 1.766 Finland 1.641 0.838 
Japan 1.475 - Norway 1.251 1.667 -1.051 India 1.246 - 
Sweden 1.455 1.404 New Zealand 0.957 - - Mexico 1.179 - 
Australia 1.345 - Iceland 0.936 - - France 1.003 1.587 
Norway 1.268 1.607 Belgium 0.721 0.076 1.703 United States 0.968 - 
Netherlands 1.152 0.790 Ireland 0.611 0.213 1.211 Cyprus 0.781 -0.188 
Iceland 1.032 - Sweden 0.435 -0.047 -0.832 Switzerland 0.753 0.873 
Canada 0.975 - Slovenia 0.428 1.071 0.182 Slovenia 0.739 -0.115 
Switzerland 0.960 0.949 Canada 0.425 - - Iceland 0.719 - 
Germany 0.659 0.497 Austria 0.366 0.011 1.054 South Korea 0.611 - 
South Korea 0.651 - Panama 0.297 - - Turkey 0.587 - 
Luxembourg 0.558 - Slovakia 0.254 0.663 -0.713 Hungary 0.574 0.292 
France 0.506 0.081 Portugal 0.200 0.256 0.141 Slovakia 0.546 0.236 
Austria 0.496 0.364 Czech Rep. 0.092 0.195 -1.323 Germany 0.493 -0.051 
New Zealand 0.471 - Finland 0.030 0.281 -0.499 Bulgaria 0.305 0.653 
Italy 0.165 -0.441 Croatia -0.130 -0.836 -0.259 Austria 0.264 -1.114 
Belgium 0.072 -0.342 Hungary -0.227 0.196 -1.006 Portugal 0.131 -0.113 
Ireland 0.016 -0.487 Bulgaria -0.227 -0.070 -1.764 Brazil 0.099 - 
Czech Rep. -0.063 -0.285 Costa Rica -0.256 - - Sweden 0.052 0.763 
Spain -0.173 -0.520 Denmark -0.298 -0.073 -0.833 Mongolia -0.100 - 
Greece -0.355 -1.070 Peru -0.302 - - Denmark -0.141 -1.075 
Slovakia -0.363 -0.700 Poland -0.303 -0.582 -0.548 Panama -0.152 - 
Hungary -0.375 -0.686 Chile -0.342 - - Poland -0.198 -0.892 
Uruguay -0.454 - Spain -0.363 -1.015 -0.371 Costa Rica -0.279 - 
Slovenia -0.474 -0.824 Germany -0.376 -0.544 1.599 Greece -0.290 2.063 
Malta -0.475 - Mongolia -0.382 - - Czech Rep. -0.322 -0.572 
Israel -0.487 - Mexico -0.414 - - Italy -0.337 0.981 
Poland -0.520 -0.847 Honduras -0.526 - - Spain -0.370 0.169 
Bulgaria -0.543 -0.873 Netherlands -0.602 -0.728 1.311 Netherlands -0.425 -0.092 
Croatia -0.601 -0.972 Greece -0.605 -1.482 0.233 Belgium -0.440 0.373 
Chile -0.704 - Brazil -0.645 - - New Zealand -0.483 - 
Portugal -0.784 -1.253 Paraguay -0.646 - - Honduras -0.497 - 
Colombia -0.799 - India -0.655 - - Japan -0.549 - 
Brazil -0.805 - Australia -0.673 - - Luxembourg -0.589 - 
Turkey -0.882 - Uruguay -0.704 - - Uruguay -0.720 - 
Peru -0.967 - South Korea -0.731 - - Canada -0.753 - 
Costa Rica -0.977 - Israel -0.780 - - Colombia -0.910 - 
Cyprus -1.058 -1.145 Turkey -0.855 - - Malta -1.090 - 
Mexico -1.067 - France -0.866 -0.591 -0.109 UK -1.129 -1.477 
Honduras -1.230 - Colombia -0.868 - - Ireland -1.208 -1.295 
Panama -1.332 - Italy -0.948 -1.321 0.276 Croatia -1.483 -2.213 
Paraguay -1.496 - UK -1.127 -1.338 -0.463 Peru -1.560 - 
Mongolia -1.558 - Japan -1.174 - - Australia -1.948 - 
India -1.583 - United States -1.335 - - Chile -2.531 - 
Notes: scores are based on factor analyses of overall mean values (see right sections of tables 5.1 and 5.2); I = 
large country sample versions; II = small country sample versions. 
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Moving on to the horizontal function and its first component in table 5.3, we can observe that 
mainly small European countries are leading the field in terms of quantitative diversity. Thus, 
the five top-scoring countries in column I are Malta, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Switzerland and 
Norway, although the difference in scale points between Malta and Norway is already consid-
erable (about 1.9 points). Furthermore, except for Denmark, Scandinavian countries seem to 
perform rather well with regard to quantitative diversity too. The five worst performing cases 
according to the factor analysis are Colombia, Italy, the UK, Japan, and the United States. But 
only the latter three score below -1, i.e., more than one standard deviation lower than the av-
erage of all countries. Some of the negative country scores might be puzzling at first sight. In 
light of the fact that the press landscapes in Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and possibly 
also the United States are usually considered rather pluralistic, one might have assumed high-
er and positive values for these cases. It seems, however, that this is weakened by a lower 
degree of newspaper import in these countries. 
Again, the scores for quantitative press diversity from the smaller country sample (column II 
(press)) do not deviate greatly from those of the large country sample. Nevertheless, some 
substantial shifts can be observed. Thus, whereas Slovenia’s value increases remarkably, 
Switzerland, Belgium, Croatia, Spain and Greece score considerably lower. These changes are 
possibly caused by the indicator measuring the share of politically neutral newspapers, which 
is related to the quantitative press diversity factor in the analysis of the small country set and 
which does not exhibit the best values for the latter five countries. 
Some of the countries performing quite well with regard to press diversity also do so in terms 
of quantitative television diversity (column II (TV)). This for example applies to Switzerland, 
Belgium or Ireland. Others score more or less equally poorly for both types of quantitative 
media diversity, such as Bulgaria, Denmark or Poland. In some cases, however, the two types 
also seem to compensate for each other since several countries are found on different ends of 
the respective scales. This is especially evident for Cyprus, Norway, Slovenia or Slovakia, 
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where press diversity prevails, as well as Germany or the Netherlands, where press diversity 
is outweighed by television diversity. 
 
Finally, with respect to qualitative media diversity, the following five countries have the 
highest factor scores in column I: Israel, Paraguay, Norway, Finland and India. Moreover, 
Mexico and France also reach values above 1. The high ratings of Israel, India, Paraguay and 
Mexico might come as a surprise. However, in the former two cases, the data really suggest 
that the major dailies within these countries do not have clear political ties and/or that the 
smaller newspapers balance each other out (as in Israel). As for Paraguay and Mexico, how-
ever, the high scores are somewhat of an artifact caused by comparatively little information 
concerning the politicization of the two press systems. The five lowest-ranked countries in 
terms of qualitative diversity, by contrast, are Ireland, Croatia, Peru, Australia and Chile. In 
addition, Malta and the United Kingdom also score slightly below -1. 
Compared to column I, the values for qualitative media diversity in column II are quite differ-
ent. This is because in the version calculated for the small country sample, internal opinion 
diversity of the press system does not load onto this latent dimension anymore. Instead, it is 
composed of external opinion diversity and an additional indicator for diversity in the broad-
cast sector. It is important to remember, however, that its factor loading was negative. The 
factor therefore showed a trade-off between the dominance and independence of the public 
service broadcast sector and the balance of ideologies represented within the press system. 
Thus, high factor scores indicate high qualitative diversity within the press but not the broad-
cast system, whereas low scores suggest the opposite. In that sense, the scale in column II is 
not really linear and values around 0, i.e., close to the average, might be regarded as optimum. 
This will have to be kept in mind in later analyses. 
In this extended or alternative conceptualization of qualitative media diversity, Finland still 
performs quite well. But it is now topped by France, Switzerland, Greece and Italy, which all 
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exhibit considerable positive shifts compared to column I. On the one hand, this is due to the 
fact that press diversity is just measured by external opinion diversity in the factor analysis 
based on the small country sample and on mean values (see right-hand section of table 5.2). 
All of the countries mentioned are stronger with regard to external than internal diversity, 
which therefore causes them to move up the scale. On the other hand, low values on the pub-
lic broadcast indicator, particularly due to its weighting by market share and political inde-
pendence, is responsible for some of the positive shifts, especially in the case of France, 
Greece and Italy. This is of course somewhat misleading and suggests that high scores on this 
factor have to put into perspective. 
Most other countries have substantially lower degrees of qualitative diversity according to 
column II than according to column I. For example, the values of Norway, Cyprus and Aus-
tria drop by about one scale point. In the case of Cyprus, this is mostly caused by a compara-
tively poor performance of external press pluralism, which now receives more weight. Aus-
tria’s and Norway’s setbacks, by contrast, are purely related to the strength of their public 
broadcast sectors. Similarly, while the United Kingdom, Ireland and Croatia are found at the 
bottom of the list in both columns I and II, their scores are even ‘worse’ in column II due to 
the strong dominance of public broadcasting in these countries. 
 
Overall, the discussion of the factor scores for each media function provided interesting in-
sights. However, it did not give a comprehensive picture of different patterns of structural 
media performance. In order to do so, how media systems vary in their fulfillment of both the 
vertical and horizontal media function must be examined simultaneously. This is the subject 
of the next section. 
5.2.2 Patterns of structural media performance 
A useful tool to study such patterns of structural media performance is cluster analysis. This 
procedure groups countries into different classes according to their similarities on a set of 
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variables of interest. Hence, I performed hierarchical cluster analysis to classify countries on 
the basis of the scores derived from the factors in tables 5.1 and 5.2.
53
 
In a first step, the cluster analyses were conducted using the factor scores based on the mean 
values of the indicators across all years 1990 to 2008. The results should provide general in-
sight into whether the countries can in fact be assigned to different types of media systems 
with regard to how well they comply with the vertical and the horizontal media function. In a 
subsequent step, cluster analyses were also conducted on the basis of the panel data, divided 
into five-year averages, in order to see how media systems and country patterns change over 
time. However, these analyses indicate that the country classifications are very stable and do 
not vary greatly over the years for most countries under study. The panel data analyses will 
therefore not be discussed, but their results are presented in tables A5.1 and A5.2 in the ap-
pendix. 
 
The findings of the cluster analysis for the mean value factors of the large country sample are 
shown below (see table 5.4). A respective scree test suggests a five-cluster solution. For each 
of these five clusters, the table displays the average score for each factor as well as the num-
ber and the names of the countries it is composed of. Thanks to the standardized factor scores, 
the clusters can be easily interpreted and compared. For each item, a score above 0 means that 
the countries belonging to the respective cluster on average perform higher on this item than 
all other countries (since the average across all countries is 0). Negative scores obviously im-
ply the opposite. 
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 I used the Ward linkage function and the squared Euclidean distance measure as suggested by Backhaus et al. 
(2000: 366-368). In order to find out how many classes should be distinguished, I looked at scree plots of the 
distance coefficients. However, even when these are rather clear-cut, i.e. a distinct ‘elbow’ can be identified, 
various cluster solutions were tested and compared. The results presented equal the most reasonable solution 
based on both the scree plots and theoretical plausibility.  
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Table 5.4 Characteristics and composition of the large country sample clusters (overall 
means factors) 
 
Cluster 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Vertical  1.029 1.369 -0.325 -1.158 -0.552 
Horizontal – quantitative 0.134 -0.431 2.807 -0.624 -0.172 
Horizontal – qualitative 0.900 -0.699 -0.299 1.646 -0.371 
Number of countries 9 7 3 4 24 
Cluster composition  Austria, Fin-
land, France, 
Germany, 
Iceland, Nor-
way, South 
Korea, Swit-
zerland, United 
States 
Australia, 
Canada, 
Denmark, 
Japan,  
Netherlands, 
Sweden,  
UK 
Cyprus,  
Luxembourg, 
Malta 
India, Israel, 
Mexico, Para-
guay 
Belgium, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Croatia, 
Czech Rep., 
Greece, Hondu-
ras, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, 
Mongolia, New 
Zealand, Pana-
ma, Peru, Po-
land, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slove-
nia, Spain, Tur-
key, Uruguay 
Notes: cluster analysis of the factor scores based on the analysis of the indicator values from the large country 
sample, averaged across all years (see right section of table 5.1); figures: average factor scores per cluster; bold 
figures: score > 0; grey cells: highest score per item. 
 
First of all, it is interesting to see that there is no group of media systems in which both demo-
cratic functions are fulfilled to very high degrees. It rather seems to be the case that only one 
function at a time can be maximized. Accordingly, while clusters 2 to 4 each show peak val-
ues for one of the three factors but below average scores for the others, cluster 1 scores mod-
erately high with regard to both the vertical and the horizontal function. 
Thus, none of the three items has the highest average in the first cluster and the value for 
quantitative diversity is only slightly larger than 0. But since this is the only cluster with 
above average scores on all three factors, the nine media systems within this class can be at-
tributed the best overall democratic performance compared to the other 38 cases. These nine 
cases are Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Norway, South Korea, Switzerland and 
the United States. With the exception of South Korea, all of them are old democracies and 
primarily from Central and Northern Europe. While the rather high level of the vertical func-
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tion is mostly driven by the Nordic cases and especially the United States, the moderately 
high level of the horizontal function is probably owed to the seven European cases. They are 
known for a lively and pluralistic press, either because of their federalist structure (Austria, 
Switzerland) or high press subsidies (Finland, Norway).  
Cluster 2 is composed of Australia, Canada, Denmark, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom. As observed before, all of these perform exceptionally well with regard 
to the vertical media function, which most likely points to the broad diffusion of information 
and communications technology (ICT) in these highly industrialized countries. 
Three very small European states constitute the third cluster, which excels in terms of quanti-
tative media diversity: Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta. As already discussed in the previous 
section, this is mainly an effect of their particularly high newspaper import, even though they 
exhibit a high number of newspapers per capita as well. 
Cluster 4 is characterized by a high qualitative diversity, and it consists of India, Israel, Mexi-
co and Paraguay. These somewhat counterintuitive associations have already been observed 
and discussed with respect to table 5.3. To recapitulate, the diversity of opinions in the press 
of India and Israel really seems to be high, possibly because the large newspapers in these 
comparatively young democracies did not emerge from the party press as traditionally the 
case in older democracies. As for Mexico and Paraguay, however, their high scores for quali-
tative diversity are somewhat of a data artifact. 
The fifth cluster, finally, is very large and combines most of the younger democracies in the 
sample from all over the world, i.e., Eastern and Southern Europe as well as Latin America 
and Asia. Apparently, the media systems in all of these countries do not live up to the demo-
cratic standards as defined by the mean performance across the full sample, because all three 
items have mean values that are smaller than 0. It might be noted, however, that with a value 
of -0.172, cluster 5 does not score very far below average at least with respect to quantitative 
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media diversity. This is probably due to the somewhat surprising fact that we also find Bel-
gium, Ireland and New Zealand within this cluster. 
 
The cluster analysis with the large country sample produced rather rough and somewhat in-
conclusive distinctions, especially regarding cluster 5. Hence, it will be interesting to see 
whether more subtle differences between the countries’ media systems become visible when 
the cluster analysis is repeated with the overall means factors which were estimated on the 
basis of the small 24-country sample and which included more indicators. Table 5.5 displays 
the respective results. Interestingly, a four-cluster solution seemed most appropriate in this 
case. Note that the values cannot necessarily be compared to the ones in table 5.4 because the 
benchmarks are different. The value 0 in table 5.5 does not have the same meaning as a 0 in 
table 5.4.  
Table 5.5 Characteristics and composition of the small country sample clusters (overall 
means factors) 
 
Cluster 
 
1 2 3 4 
Vertical  0.295 1.553 -0.488 -0.843 
Horizontal – quantitative press 0.032 0.098 -1.102 0.414 
Horizontal – quantitative TV 1.441 -0.736 0.007 -0.555 
Horizontal – qualitative  -0.217 -0.117 1.200 -0.323 
Number of countries 6 5 4 9 
Cluster composition Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Ireland, 
Netherlands, 
Switzerland 
Denmark, Fin-
land, Norway, 
Sweden,  
UK 
France, Greece, 
Italy, Spain 
Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech 
Rep., Hungary, 
Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia,  
Slovenia 
Notes: cluster analysis of the factor scores based on the analysis of the indicator values from the small country 
sample, averaged across all years (see right section of table 5.2); figures: average factor scores per cluster; bold 
figures: score > 0; grey cells: highest score per item. 
 
Nevertheless, some similarities between the two different cluster analyses can be observed. 
Like in the large 47-country sample solution, the peak values for the vertical media function 
and the horizontal function components are found in different clusters in table 5.5. Hence, 
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different country groups seem to prioritize different aspects of structural media performance. 
Additionally, the country compositions reveal that when the focus only rests on Europe, 
which is the case for the small country sample in this study, quite distinct regional patterns 
become visible. 
The first group, which includes the six Central and Western European countries Austria, Bel-
gium, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and Switzerland, distinguishes itself by the highest 
level of quantitative diversity in the broadcast sector compared to all other countries. Given 
that it scores above average with regard to the vertical media function and quantitative press 
diversity as well, this group of countries might be attributed the best overall structural media 
performance. It also somewhat reminds us of the similar cluster 1 in the large country analy-
sis, to which Austria, Germany and Switzerland belonged too. Yet, contrary to cluster 1 in 
table 5.4, cluster 1 in table 5.5 exhibits a negative average value in terms of qualitative diver-
sity, the second component of the horizontal media function (-0.217). This indicates that in 
the trade-off between external pluralism in the press sector and the strength of public broad-
casting, the latter outweighs the former. But since the respective value is not far below 0 we 
could conclude that both indicators reach rather moderate levels in the six countries from 
cluster 1. This, as discussed above, might actually be preferable to having extreme values on 
both indicators but on opposite ends. However, a closer inspection reveals that the centrist 
figure for qualitative media diversity in cluster 1 is more the product of a large variation of 
factor scores among the six countries from highly negative to highly positive than of balanced 
scores for all of them. Clearly, the six countries do not cluster together because of their simi-
larity on this particular dimension of media performance. On that note, it might also be men-
tioned that the rather low mean value for quantitative press diversity in cluster 1 is somewhat 
misleading for Switzerland and the Netherlands, which score at the opposite extremes with 
regard to this dimension (1.165 and -0.728, respectively; see table 5.3).  
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Cluster 2 is composed of all the Scandinavian countries in the sample and the United King-
dom. It shares many similarities with cluster 2 from table 5.4 and also includes three countries 
which were already present there (Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom). Accordingly, 
the respective five media systems significantly outperform the 19 countries not belonging to 
this group in terms of the vertical media function. The horizontal function, by contrast, seems 
to be insufficiently developed in cluster 2 even though a positive level can at least be ob-
served with respect to the quantitative press diversity component. But its rather small value 
might seem puzzling given that the Nordic countries are known for a diverse press and high 
newspaper readership. However, on the one hand, quantitative press diversity is not only de-
termined by the relative number of daily newspapers, which is actually high in these coun-
tries, but also newspaper import and the neutrality of the press. Apparently, these indicators 
are relatively deficient in the Nordic region, especially Denmark and Sweden. On the other 
hand, the UK is responsible for a lower average score for quantitative press diversity in this 
cluster. Finally, despite its negative sign, the score for the fourth dimension is in fact not 
much below 0 (-0.117). However, much like in cluster 1, this does not mean that cluster 2 
achieves an equilibrium between the conflictive indicators measuring qualitative media diver-
sity. Instead, it is more a reflection of the fact that the five countries in cluster 2 are spread 
across the whole scale of the second component of the horizontal media function (see table 
5.3). So again, this dimension was not decisive in grouping countries into cluster 2. 
The very high scores for qualitative media diversity in cluster 3, by contrast, can be interpret-
ed in a straightforward way. They illustrate that the four Southern European media systems in 
this group exhibit a good balance between newspapers with different political orientations but 
have a fairly weak and dependent public broadcast system. This combination – as already 
mentioned – leads to high values on the factor for qualitative diversity of the small country 
sample. As for the other factors of media performance, France, Greece, Italy and Spain fea-
ture more or less serious deficiencies, but they at least achieve a slightly above average level 
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of quantitative television diversity. Considering its profile, cluster 3 resembles cluster 4 in the 
large country sample analysis even though none of the four countries were classified into 
cluster 4 in table 5.4.  
The last cluster in table 5.5 might also be characterized by a generally rather poor structural 
media performance, especially compared to the countries from cluster 1 and 2. Hence, it is not 
surprising that the young democracies from Eastern Europe within the small country sample 
all belong to this group. Having had totalitarian regimes until only a little more than 20 years 
ago, these media systems did not have enough time to develop as democratically desirable 
structures as older democracies. Similarly, Cyprus and Portugal are found in cluster 4 as well. 
Probably due to the fact that their democratic inception also took place in the more recent 
history, these two countries seem to lag behind the level of structural media performance in 
Western Europe too. However, cluster 4 actually shows the highest score for quantitative di-
versity within the press system. This is particularly owed to Cyprus, which was already identi-
fied to have a high quantitative press diversity above, due to its relatively large number of 
dailies and comparatively high newspaper import. In this sense, the fourth cluster might be 
considered a combination of clusters 3 and 5 from table 5.4. Slovenia and Slovakia also reach 
high degrees of quantitative press diversity, but mainly because of the high share of politically 
neutral newspapers in these countries, i.e., internal opinion diversity.
54
 
5.2.3 Summary 
To briefly summarize the main findings of this section, the results of the descriptive and clus-
ter analyses have shown that there is no group of countries with an exceptional performance 
with respect to both the vertical and the horizontal function. Instead, while some media sys-
tems fulfill the vertical function to very high degrees, others score higher on the horizontal 
function or components thereof. There is, however, a group of countries with at least moder-
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 However, with regard to Slovakia many newspapers were coded as ‘neutral’ because no information on their 
political positions could be found. 
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ately high values on both functions. This especially applies to Central and Western European 
states like Austria, Germany and Switzerland. The Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon countries 
as well as Japan, by contrast, perform very well with regard to the vertical media function, 
whereas small European countries like Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg, but also Switzerland, 
are leading in terms of quantitative media diversity, the first component of the horizontal 
function. As for the second component, qualitative media diversity, some European countries 
like Finland, France and Norway show a good performance, and so do India and Israel. Gen-
erally, this component turned out to be a little bit more difficult to interpret. This is especially 
true in the case of the respective latent dimension discovered on the basis of the small country 
sample, because it is characterized by a trade-off between its two constitutive elements. 
Hence, while extreme values on the resulting scale in both directions point to an imbalance 
between diversity of opinions in the press on one side and the broadcast sector on the other, 
values around the mean, i.e., around 0, indicate an equilibrium between the two, which might 
be considered the optimal outcome. 
By and large, the country classifications according to the cluster analyses in the large and the 
small country sample are rather congruent. The first clusters in both analyses are character-
ized by the best simultaneous fulfillment of different dimensions of media performance and 
they are partly composed of the same, mostly Central European countries. Clusters 2 strongly 
focus on the vertical media function and they include most Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon 
countries in both the small and the large sample versions. Moreover, a similar profile can also 
be observed for cluster 4 in the large country sample and cluster 3 in the small sample analy-
sis even though the country compositions do not match. Finally, the last type in both cluster 
analyses exhibits a rather low media performance in general which is mostly found in younger 
democracies and less developed countries worldwide, but particularly Eastern Europe.  
Nevertheless, the two cluster analyses also produced divergent classifications for some coun-
tries. This is because cluster analysis is an inductive and only approximate procedure. Such 
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deviations are most evident for Belgium, France and Ireland, which belong to completely dif-
ferent types in the analyses with the two different country samples. I therefore briefly discuss 
these three cases.  
Belgium and Ireland both belong to the ‘worst’ performing cluster 5 in the large country sam-
ple but the ‘best’ performing cluster 1 in the small country sample. At the same time, France 
moves from the ‘best’ performing cluster 1 in the large sample to what might be called the 
‘second worst’ performing cluster 3 in the small sample. All of these shifts can mainly be ex-
plained by the dimension of quantitative television diversity, which only exists in the small 
country sample and which is very dominant for cluster 1 in table 5.5. Belgium and Ireland 
both have very high scores with respect to that dimension. Moreover, because in the small 
country sample the factor for quantitative press diversity is additionally composed of the indi-
cator for internal opinion diversity in the press system, the values for this dimension for Bel-
gium and Ireland as well as the other, already previous cluster 1 countries resemble each other 
more closely. This is why the Belgium and Ireland switch groups even though their values on 
the remaining two dimensions in the small country sample do not change considerably. 
By contrast, France does not perform very well with regard to the quantitative diversity within 
the broadcast sector. Thus, it can no longer belong to cluster 1 in the small sample analysis. 
At the same time, in the small country sample version, France scores lower on the factor for 
the vertical media function but higher on the factor for qualitative media diversity. This brings 
it in line with the other three cases in cluster 3.  
But overall, the congruencies largely outweigh these deviant cases. Comparing the cluster 
analysis results of the two different country samples suggests that the patterns of media per-
formance are quite robust. Moreover, some interesting similarities can be observed between 
the types of media systems identified in this book and the famous three models of media sys-
tems by Hallin and Mancini (2004; see chapter 2). Although the dimensions assessed differ in 
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the two studies (only the strength of the newspaper industry as well as the diversity of opin-
ions in media systems is important in both typologies) the compositions of the country groups 
are partly consistent with each other. This applies to both cluster analyses but is especially 
evident with respect to the small country sample studied here, which is more in line with the 
18 cases analyzed by Hallin and Mancini (2004). In particular, it is striking that with the ex-
ception of Portugal, all of Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) polarized pluralist countries jointly 
form a distinct type (cluster 3 in table 5.5 above). These, according to the authors, are charac-
terized by a stronger broadcast than print sector and a rather high degree of political parallel-
ism, which is exactly what cluster 3 in table 5.5 shows. The differentiation between Hallin 
and Mancini’s (2004) other two models, the liberal and the democratic corporatist type, is less 
clear-cut in the patterns presented in this book. On the one hand, cluster 2 in table 5.5 com-
bines the countries which for the authors constitute ideal types of the democratic corporatist 
model, namely the four Scandinavian countries. On the other hand, the United Kingdom as a 
representative of the liberal model is also assigned to this group. Similarly, cluster 1 includes 
four democratic corporatist countries – Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland – 
along with one liberal case – Ireland. It should be noted, however, that Ireland and especially 
Great Britain are actually considered mixed types of the liberal and democratic corporatist 
models (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 69). Hence, it is not implausible that these countries are 
classified together with Northern and Central European countries. Finally, it may be added 
that cluster 3 was attributed a rather poor general media performance compared to clusters 1 
and 2. In a similar vein, the polarized pluralist model can be regarded as inferior to the other 
two models even though this is only implied but not actually stated by Hallin and Mancini 
(2004). However, the verdict of the worst performing media systems actually falls on cluster 4 
in table 5.5, to which the Eastern European cases Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hunga-
ry, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia as well as Cyprus and Portugal belong. Apart from Portu-
gal, none of these countries are part of Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) country sample. This 
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suggests that when expanding media system assessments beyond Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) 
18 cases, a more differentiated typology than theirs may be needed (also see Blum 2005a). 
5.3 Explaining structural media performance 
In a final step, the focus of chapter 5 turns to the search for the determinants of structural me-
dia performance. In other words, under what circumstances do media systems perform well 
with regard to the vertical and the horizontal function? To find answers to this question, the 
factor scores from the analyses in tables 5.1 and 5.2 are used as dependent variables in multi-
variate regression analyses.  
5.3.1 Defining the explanatory variables 
Three types of parameters might serve as explanatory variables. First, at the end of chapter 3 
it was argued that media freedom and media regulation should be considered preconditions of 
democratic media performance rather than integral elements thereof. It can now be tested 
whether this expectation holds. For media freedom, I employ the widely used press freedom 
index by Freedom House (also see chapter 2), which is available for all 47 countries of the 
larger sample and all 19 years of the time series.
55
 The index ranges from 0 to 100, with high-
er values indicating higher media freedom, and it is based on expert ratings of a variety of 
aspects. These include political repression of and economic constraints for the media as well 
as restrictive media regulation (see footnote 55). So in some sense, the index for media free-
dom already considers media regulation, though in a negative sense. A further indicator for 
media regulation can be derived from Voltmer (2000). Her paper provides data for the pres-
ence of four different forms of press ownership regulation in various countries. Added up, this 
gives an index from 0 (no ownership regulation) to 4 (strong ownership regulation). This is of 
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 Available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-press (08/28/2012). The index is actually the 
sum of three components: 1) the laws and regulation that influence media content; 2) political pressures and 
controls on media content as well as repressive actions; 3) economic influences over media content. However, 
the three components are so strongly correlated to each other and the overall press freedom index that working 
with the three component indices instead of the aggregate score does not add anything to the analysis. 
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course only a rough proxy for media regulation since it exclusively focuses on the press and 
ownership and because no time series is available. Moreover, it only covers 21 of the 47 
countries of the large sample. But I am not aware of another study that provides better quanti-
tative and ready-made measures for media regulation. 
A second set of independent variables refers to a country’s socio-economic context. On the 
one hand, the size of a country might affect the configuration of its media system. The discus-
sion in section 5.2 suggested that small countries perform better in terms quantitative diversi-
ty. Thus, population figures (in millions) are included. On the other hand, the wealth of a 
country is measured by its GDP per capita in thousand U.S. dollars. This should be an espe-
cially important predictor of the vertical media function. Both economic prosperity and media 
penetration have long been regarded as key characteristics of modernization (see e.g. Lipset 
1959; Neubauer 1976). The figures for population size and GDP per capita are taken from the 
World Bank database.
56
 
Finally, the political-institutional setting is likely to influence media system performance as 
well. After all, the interplay and joint evolution of political institutions and media systems is 
Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) central assumption. The institutional context should therefore be 
accounted for among the explanatory factors as well. However, one has to be careful to not 
run into a circular argument here. As outlined in chapter 1, the second part of this book will 
deal with how media performance affects different aspects of the quality of democracy. 
Hence, the causal arrow will then point the other way, from media performance to democracy. 
It is therefore very important to distinguish what I mean by political context here from what is 
being studied in chapters 7 and 8. To explain the cross-country variation in structural media 
performance, I rely on the two dimensions of democracy as proposed by Lijphart (1999). 
These two dimensions can be considered to reflect long-term political traditions and histori-
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 World Bank database: http://databank.worldbank.org (08/28/2012). 
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cally developed institutional configurations, which broadly differentiate between two general 
types of democracy: majoritarian versus consensus democracies. By contrast, the democracy 
measures applied later in this study assess rather subtle and short-term variations in countries’ 
quality of democracy, i.e., immediate manifestations of constitutional reality. Just like media 
performance, these might in fact depend on the larger institutional context too.  
The two dimensions of Lijphart (1999) are the “executives-parties dimension” and the “feder-
al-unitary dimension”. The former captures the electoral system and the party system and ba-
sically measures whether single parties can and do control the whole government. The latter 
indicates to what extent the government concentrates political power or is held in check by 
other players (such as subnational units, the parliament, the judiciary or the central bank). The 
factor values for both dimensions are available for 29 of my 47-country sample and they are 
calculated over a period of almost 30 years (1982 to 2010). Thus, they are constant over time. 
On both dimensions, higher values denote more consensual democracies, i.e., democratic sys-
tems where political power is shared among different parties (executives-parties dimension) 
and more diversified across different institutions (federal-unitary dimension).  
But how can Lijphart’s (1999) two dimensions be expected to relate to media performance? 
Generally, they are assumed to rather correlate with the horizontal media function. For exam-
ple, quantitative media diversity – the first component of the horizontal function – should be 
higher in consensus democracies. This is because, on the one hand, federal systems are likely 
to exhibit a larger regional variety of media outlets. On the other hand, many newspapers 
originate from party organs or were launched to advocate certain political forces within the 
society. And since more of these political forces are formally organized in multi-party sys-
tems, media systems might be more pluralistic in the respective countries. As for qualitative 
media diversity, different expectations are possible. Especially internal opinion diversity 
could be better fulfilled in democracies that score low on the executives-parties dimension. 
Mass media in two-party systems, in line with the political logic, are likely to adopt a more 
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mainstream, catch-all approach and political neutrality. Accordingly, Hallin and Mancini 
(2004) argue that majoritarian democracy coincides with low political parallelism. And even 
if mass media do support a specific political party, achieving a balance on the system level is 
easier when there are just two similarly strong political camps. By contrast, there is also rea-
son to assume that opinion diversity is higher in countries that score high on the executives-
parties dimension. This is because a system of power sharing is associated with a culture of 
compromise and the coordination of different interests. As a consequence, different political 
ideologies should be better represented and balanced in the public sphere. 
5.3.2 Predicting media system’s fulfillment of the vertical function 
Since several of the independent variables do not vary over time, the regression analyses are 
performed for the averages of all the data across 1990 to 2008. Tables 5.6 to 5.8 show the 
results of various OLS regression models, using the factor scores of the three overall means 
factors from the analysis with the large country sample as dependent variables (see right-hand 
section of table 5.1). Due to the rather low number of and partly missing cases, four different 
models were tested for each dependent variable, respectively.  
Table 5.6 Explaining vertical media function performance 
 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 
Coef. (S.E.) 
 
Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  
Media freedom 0.057 (0.009) *** 0.016 (0.010) 
 
0.154 (0.048) ** - -  
Press regulation - -  - -  0.399 (0.167) * - -  
Population - -  0.000 (0.001) 
 
- -  - -  
GDP p.c. - -  0.047 (0.009) *** - -  - -  
Executives-parties - -  - -  - -  0.062 (0.195) 
 Federal-unitary - -  - -  - -  0.115 (0.165) 
 Constant -4.364 (0.679) *** -2.068 (0.686) ** -13.027 (4.286) ** 0.493 (0.180) * 
Model Properties 
      
   
   
R
2
 0.484 
  
0.693 
  
0.366   0.021 
  
Adjusted R
2
 0.473 
  
0.672 
  
0.296   -0.054 
  N  47 
  
47 
  
21   29 
  Notes: unstandardized OLS estimators; *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05, + p ≤ 0.10; dependent variable: 
overall mean values factor scores of the large country sample. 
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In table 5.6 the dependent variable is the vertical media function (factor 1 in the right section 
of table 5.1). Looking at the first model, the coefficient for media freedom is positive and 
highly significant. Thus, as expected, higher media freedom is indeed associated with a better 
performance of media systems with respect to the vertical function. Moreover, the effect 
seems to be quite substantial. 10 additional points on the press freedom index (which theoreti-
cally ranges from 0 to 100) raise the vertical function by about 0.6 points. This equals about 
one sixth of its full scale (see table 5.3). If the two socio-economic variables are added to the 
estimation, however, the impact of media freedom is entirely absorbed by GDP per capita, 
which exhibits the only significant coefficient in model II. Again, this effect is considerably 
strong. This is also reflected in the model properties. Model II explains a large proportion of 
the variation in the vertical media function (adjusted R
2
 = 0.672), especially in comparison to 
model I (adjusted R
2
 = 0.473). If model II is estimated without the press freedom index, the 
model properties change negligibly. Hence, media performance with regard to the vertical 
function is largely driven by economic prosperity and modernization. 
Model III introduces the two variables related to media policy. Adding the press regulation 
indicator reduces the number of cases to only 21 OECD countries. Interestingly, even within 
this smaller set of countries, media freedom has a significant and positive coefficient. Com-
pared to model I, the effect is in fact more than twice as strong. In addition, the press owner-
ship regulation index also has a positive impact. If a country adopts one more regulation pro-
vision, its predicted level of fulfillment of the vertical media function increases by about 0.4 
scale points. However, due to the low number of cases, these results have to be taken with a 
pinch of salt. Moreover, model III has a poor goodness-of-fit. The low number of cases is also 
why I refrained from estimating a model with all six independent variables together.
57
 If only 
                                                 
57
 When all variables are combined, significant coefficients are found for the press freedom index, press owner-
ship regulation, population and the federal-unitary dimension (negative effect). GDP per capita, by contrast, is no 
longer significant. Interesting is the negative effect of the second Lijphart (1999) dimension. It appears that in 
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GDP was added to model III, however, the results for media freedom and regulation would 
remain essentially the same although the coefficients would be less statistically significant 
(results not shown in table 5.6). GDP, by contrast, would no longer have a significant effect, 
which suggests that wealth does not vary as greatly in the 21 countries remaining in model III 
compared to the full set of 47 countries.  
As for model IV, none of the Lijphart (1999) dimensions has a significant relationship with 
the dependent variable. Accordingly, it has very poor overall properties.  
In order to corroborate the findings, the same types of regressions were also estimated for the 
smaller sample of 24 countries and the scores of the corresponding factor for the vertical func-
tion (factor 1 in the right section of table 5.2). The results are found in table A5.3 in the ap-
pendix, and they are practically identical to the ones for the larger country sample. 
5.3.3 Predicting media systems’ fulfillment of quantitative diversity 
Table 5.7 presents regression models with the same independent variables but with the first 
component of the horizontal media function – quantitative diversity – used as dependent vari-
able (factor 2 in the right section of table 5.1). 
Generally, and in contrast to table 5.6, there are almost no significant effects and the four 
models have a very low goodness-of-fit. The only exception is the press freedom index, which 
is again positively related to media performance. However, as indicated in model I, the pre-
dicted influence of media freedom on quantitative media diversity is considerably weaker 
than on the vertical media function. Although the range of the scale for quantitative diversity 
is larger than for the vertical function, the press freedom estimate in table 5.7 is only half the 
size of its counterpart in table 5.6. Correspondingly, it explains very little of the dependent 
variable’s variation (adjusted R2 = 0.125). If press ownership regulation is included as in 
                                                                                                                                                        
the respective 21 countries, the vertical function is better fulfilled in unitary than federal countries. The adjusted 
R
2
 of 0.556 for this model is quite high. 
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model III and the sample thus reduced to 21 countries, media freedom barely reaches statisti-
cal significance, though the effect now again appears to be substantially stronger. Finally, 
press freedom turns insignificant when combined with the socio-economic variables in model 
II.  
Table 5.7 Explaining horizontal media function performance: quantitative diversity 
 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 
Coef. (S.E.) 
 
Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  
Media freedom 0.031 (0.011) ** 0.025 (0.017) 
 
0.120 (0.063) 
+
 - -  
Press regulation - -  - -  -0.076 (0.219)  - -  
Population - -  -0.001 (0.001) 
 
- -  - -  
GDP p.c. - -  0.005 (0.014) 
 
- -  - -  
Executives-parties - -  - -  - -  0.187 (0.229) 
 Federal-unitary - -  - -  - -  -0.170 (0.194) 
 Constant -2.380 (0.875) ** -1.927 (1.117) 
+
 -10.002 (5.619) 
+
 0.022 (0.212) 
 
Model Properties 
      
   
   
R
2
 0.144 
  
0.186 
  
0.347   0.055 
  
Adjusted R
2
 0.125 
  
0.130 
  
0.274   -0.017 
  N  47 
  
47 
  
21   29 
  Notes: unstandardized OLS estimators; *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05, + p ≤ 0.10; dependent variable: 
overall mean values factor scores of the large country sample. 
 
Interestingly, GDP per capita, which is a very strong predictor of media systems’ compliance 
with the vertical function, has no impact on the first component of the horizontal function.
58
 
Neither do any of the other four independent variables. This is somewhat surprising with re-
spect to press regulation. After all, the most common argument in favor of strong regulation 
of media ownership is the fear that unhindered media concentration results in a loss of media 
diversity and a dwindling supply of different sources of information. The evidence presented 
here does not support this claim. On the contrary, the fact that the coefficient for press regula-
                                                 
58
 However, GDP per capita is significant on the 5-percent level when model II is estimated without media free-
dom. Furthermore, in a model with all six variables, GDP per capita (positive) and population (negative) are the 
only variables that yield significant coefficients. For the respective estimation on the basis of 21 countries, the 
adjusted R
2
 is remarkably high (0.673). 
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tion is even negative actually suggests the opposite. However, as noted above, solid results 
would require a higher number of cases. 
Again, the institutional context produces no significant effects. Thus, the theoretical assump-
tions discussed above regarding the relationship between the two Lijphart (1999) dimensions 
and quantitative media diversity have to be rejected. However, the estimate for the executives-
parties dimension at least has the anticipated sign. 
 
As described in section 5.1.2, quantitative media diversity actually splits into two dimensions 
when media performance is measured by more indicators, but on the basis of fewer countries. 
The first relates to quantitative press diversity, the second to quantitative television diversity 
(see table 5.2). Thus, when the same types of regressions are estimated for the smaller sample 
of 24 countries and the scores for these two dimensions of quantitative diversity as dependent 
variables (factors 2 and 3 in the right-hand section of table 5.2, respectively), some of the 
findings deviate from the ones just discussed. In the following I briefly outline the main dif-
ferences. The precise results for the reduced sample of 24 European cases are found in the 
appendix (see tables A5.4 and A5.5). 
The regression models for quantitative press diversity in table A5.4 should be more or less 
comparable to the ones in table 5.7 since quantitative diversity is only measured by the press 
variables in the case of the larger country sample. But since quantitative press diversity is 
further determined by the indicator for internal opinion diversity in the small country sample 
factors, the findings are quite different. Contrary to the large country sample, the press free-
dom index has no significant impact on quantitative press diversity in model I anymore. Only 
in combination with press regulation does press freedom still exhibit a significant positive 
estimate. Furthermore, in line with the expectations following from the discussion of table 
5.3, a significant and negative effect is found for the size of the population in model II. Ac-
cordingly, quantitative press diversity seems to be higher in the smaller countries among the 
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24 included in the estimation. This is plausible if we consider that small countries probably 
import more foreign print media than large countries, where minority groups are large enough 
to produce their own outlets. But since this mostly seems to apply to small European coun-
tries, the effect disappeared in the large country sample. 
In addition, the quantitative press diversity models with the small sample show a significant 
impact of Lijphart’s (1999) executives-parties dimension, which was not present in table 5.7. 
Hence, this effect is most likely owed to the political neutrality of the press system (internal 
opinion diversity) which only loads onto the dimension for quantitative press diversity in the 
factors of the small country sample. Interestingly, there is also a significant and positive rela-
tionship between a Lijphart (1999) dimension and the quantitative diversity of the television 
sector, the latent dimension that is only present in the small country sample (see table A5.5). 
Yet in this case, the federal-unitary dimension is concerned. Both of these effects are in line 
with the theoretical expectations postulated with respect to the influence of the institutional 
context above (see section 5.3.1). Since the respective estimations are only based on 16 cases, 
however, the findings should not be overinterpreted. 
5.3.4 Predicting media systems’ fulfillment of qualitative diversity 
Finally, table 5.8 shows the regression models estimated to explain the second component of 
the horizontal media function: qualitative diversity (factor 3 in the right section of table 5.1). 
Quite obviously, virtually none of the independent variables is related to the dependent varia-
ble. With one exception, all coefficients are insignificant, and all four models fit the data very 
badly. The only significant impact is found for Lijphart’s (1999) executives-parties dimen-
sion. Accordingly, in countries where power is shared more broadly among many parties, the 
diversity of opinions in the press system is larger and more balanced. This provides evidence 
in support of the second assumption outlined above concerning the relationship between the 
executives-parties dimension and qualitative media diversity. A tradition of political com-
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promise and collaboration also induces media systems to represent different political view-
points more equally.   
Table 5.8 Explaining horizontal media function performance: qualitative diversity 
 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 
Coef. (S.E.) 
 
Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  
Media freedom 0.000 (0.012) 
 
-0.011 (0.018) 
 
0.022 (0.069)  - -  
Press regulation - -  - -  -0.141 (0.240)  - -  
Population - -  0.002 (0.001) 
 
- -  - -  
GDP p.c. - -  0.016 (0.015) 
 
- -  - -  
Executives-parties - -  - -  - -  0.444 (0.194) * 
Federal-unitary - -  - -  - -  0.029 (0.164) 
 Constant -0.022 (0.946)  0.492 (1.194)  -1.608 (6.157)  -0.067 (0.179) 
 
Model Properties 
      
   
   
R
2
 0.000 
  
0.070 
  
0.074   0.168 
  
Adjusted R
2
 -0.022 
  
0.005 
  
-0.029   0.104 
  N  47 
  
47 
  
21   29 
  Notes: unstandardized OLS estimators; *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05, + p ≤ 0.10; dependent variable: 
overall mean values factor scores of the large country sample. 
 
The predicted effect, however, is not very strong. If the executives-parties dimension is in-
creased by 1, i.e., one standard deviation, this only enhances media performance of qualitative 
diversity by 0.444 scale points. The poor model fit supports this observation (adjusted R
2
 = 
0.104). Furthermore, it is somewhat surprising that media freedom has no influence on quali-
tative diversity. After all, it seems intuitive to assume that if mass media face political repres-
sion and legal content restrictions, this should lead to less neutral and less ideologically bal-
anced press systems. However, with an average of 76 scale points, media freedom is generally 
rather high in the 47 countries studied here, which probably diminishes its effect. As for press 
ownership regulation, finally, a similar conclusion as for the previous analysis of quantitative 
media diversity can be drawn here. While proponents of stronger media regulation generally 
argue that the liberalization of media markets endangers the diversity of opinions in the public 
sphere, the results presented here suggest otherwise. The press regulation index is not signifi-
cant in model III and neither if estimated without media freedom. And again, if anything, the 
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relationship between qualitative media diversity and ownership regulation would be negative, 
as the respective estimate shows. 
 
Just like for the vertical media function and quantitative media diversity, regression models 
predicting qualitative media diversity were also run for the smaller sample of 24 countries. 
Accordingly, the scores of factor 4 in the right section of table 5.2 were regressed on the same 
independent variables. Table A5.6 in the appendix presents the respective results.  
Similar to its counterpart in the large country sample, no significant effects can be observed. 
But while at least the executives-parties dimension showed a positive impact in table 5.8, this 
association also disappears when the same estimation is performed on the basis of only 16 
countries. This again illustrates that the positive relationship between qualitative media diver-
sity and the executives-parties dimension observed in table 5.8 is due to the indicator for in-
ternal opinion diversity, which no longer loads onto the factor for qualitative media diversity 
in the small country sample. Thus, no explanation for the variation of this factor could be 
found. However, due to the discussed non-linearity of the respective scale, resulting from the 
contradictory factor loadings of the items for print and broadcast media, this is a difficult task 
anyway. It is possible that there would be significant relationships between the independent 
variables and the individual indicators for this latent dimension, which cancel each other out 
when the indicator values are combined to the factor scores. 
5.3.5 Summary 
The analyses performed to find explanations for the differences in media systems’ fulfillment 
of the vertical and the horizontal function can be summarized very briefly. The multivariate 
OLS regressions showed that the vertical function is largely driven by a country’s economic 
prosperity, as measured by GDP per capita, and media freedom, which itself mainly seems to 
be function of GDP as well.  
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The findings for the horizontal function are generally less convincing because they vary more 
across the two different country samples and because the models usually fit the data rather 
poorly. However, while a combination of press freedom and GDP per capita seems to account 
for some of the variation in quantitative press diversity in the large country sample as well, it 
is rather related to the size of a country in terms of its population and to Lijphart’s (1999) ex-
ecutives-parties dimension in the small country sample. In contrast, quantitative diversity with 
regard to the broadcast media sector, which can only be assessed for the small country sam-
ple, is positively influenced by Lijphart’s (1999) federal-unitary dimension. 
Qualitative diversity, the second component of the horizontal media function, turned out to be 
the most difficult to explain. Only one significant effect was found, and it only applies to the 
estimation with the larger country sample. Accordingly, qualitative media diversity is higher 
in more consensual democracies in terms of the executives-parties dimension. 
Finally, it has to be noted that although the results found with regard to the institutional con-
text are interesting and mostly conform to the theoretical assumptions, they have to be taken 
with great caution because of the very low number of cases upon which the respective estima-
tions rest. 
5.4 Conclusion 
The aim of this first empirical chapter was to study media performance on the structural, i.e., 
media system level. In section 5.1, I tested whether the indicators for structural media perfor-
mance, which were purely derived on theoretical grounds, correlate according to the two me-
dia functions conceptualized in chapter 3. Although exploratory factor analyses found more 
than two dimensions for both the large and the small country sample as well as both types of 
datasets (overall indicator means versus panel data based on five-year averages), the results 
nevertheless correspond to the theoretical framework. The vertical function was reproduced 
like expected in every case while the horizontal function split into its two components, quanti-
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tative and qualitative media diversity. Moreover, in the analyses with the small country sam-
ple and three additional indicators, quantitative media diversity was further subdivided ac-
cording to different types of media, the print and the television sector. Hence, these two media 
sectors do not seem to work the same way but rather follow their own and sometimes com-
pensatory logics. This has also become clear with regard to qualitative diversity in the re-
duced 24-country sample, which showed a trade-off between the press and broadcasting with-
in the same latent dimension. 
Section 5.2 used the factor scores from section 5.1 to study country patterns in terms of their 
media systems’ democratic performance by means of descriptive and cluster analyses. The 
findings revealed, on the one hand, substantially varying degrees to which the two media 
functions are fulfilled across the cases examined. On the other hand, groups of countries with 
similar patterns of media system performance could be identified. Most importantly, none of 
them appears to score very high on both media functions and their components. Some coun-
tries perform particularly well in terms of the vertical function only (such as Japan as well as 
most Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon countries). Others are much stronger with regard to the 
horizontal function, either quantitative diversity (such as Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg) or 
qualitative diversity (such as France, India and Israel). However, there are also countries that 
achieve at least a fairly good balance of both functions and components and therefore perform 
moderately well throughout (mostly Central European countries like Austria, Germany and 
Switzerland). Finally, media systems with a comparatively poor performance of both media 
functions are found in the younger democracies and less developed countries of Southern and 
Eastern Europe as well as Latin America and Asia. These patterns proved to be largely con-
sistent across the large and the small country sample analyses, and they also share some simi-
larities with the typology of media systems by Hallin and Mancini (2004). 
The last part of the chapter, section 5.3, looked for explanations of the different levels of 
structural media performance across countries. Three different sets of independent variables 
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were tested against the factor scores from section 5.1 in a multivariate regression framework. 
The first related to media freedom and media regulation, the second to a country’s socio-
economic conditions and the third to its political-institutional context. The vertical function 
was clearly found to be related to a country’s level of prosperity, both directly and indirectly 
via press freedom. The horizontal function, by contrast, was more difficult to explain. While 
the impact of the independent variables differed across the two country samples for quantita-
tive media diversity, no significant effects were observed for qualitative media diversity (see 
5.3.5). 
After this detailed examination of the democratic performance of media systems across 47 
and 24 countries, respectively, the next chapter shifts its focus to the content level. Hence, 
chapter 6 will provide analyses similar to the ones in chapter 5 but use data from the content 
analysis of 50 newspapers from 10 countries instead. 
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Chapter 6:  
Comparing the democratic performance of media 
content
While the previous chapter was concerned with the structural performance of mass media, i.e., 
how well media systems are designed to comply with democratic goals, chapter 6 focuses on 
media content. Again, by means of a mostly inductive research strategy, I will explore how 
the newspapers examined within ten countries perform with regard to the measures defined in 
chapter 4. The empirical approach chosen in this chapter is very similar to the study of struc-
tural media performance in chapter 5 although the order of the analyses is somewhat reversed. 
First, as in the previous chapter, factor analysis will be used to find out whether the nine indi-
cators for democratic media performance on the content level relate to each other as proposed 
in the conceptualization of the vertical and the horizontal media function. Because of the low 
number of countries, the units of analysis in chapter 6 are always the 50 newspapers. For this 
reason, the second step is to test whether these newspapers’ fulfillment of the vertical and the 
horizontal function with regard to their news coverage significantly varies between countries 
or whether it merely depends on their outlet-specific characteristics. Both descriptive and re-
gression analysis can help finding answers to this question. Finally, I study more comprehen-
sively whether and what kind of patterns can be identified in terms of newspapers’ democratic 
performance on the content level. Scatter plots and cluster analysis will give insight as to how 
the media functions interact and which configurations of the two can be observed across 
newspapers and especially across countries.  
6.1 The dimensions of media performance on the content level 
As described in chapter 4, multiple indicators were defined to measure the vertical and the 
horizontal media function on the content level. And like for the structural level, all of these 
were derived and assigned to either one of the two functions purely on theoretical grounds. 
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Hence, the aim of this section is to test whether an exploratory factor analysis reproduces the 
assumed dimensions from the underlying content analysis data. On the one hand, it is of inter-
est whether the theoretical classification of indicators as either ‘vertical’ or ‘horizontal’ holds 
in reality. On the other hand, it needs to be examined whether the model is in fact two-
dimensional or whether the media functions divide into different components. In chapter 5, 
this turned out to be the case with regard to the horizontal but not the vertical function. In 
terms of media content, by contrast, a partition into various components would be in line with 
the theoretical conceptualization of the vertical but not the horizontal media function. As dis-
cussed in chapter 3, the vertical function consists of the two components on the content level, 
namely the amount of critical political information and the balance of political information. 
Data about media content is only available for ten countries, which is not enough to perform 
factor analysis. Thus, the following calculations are based on individual newspapers. This 
leaves us with 50 and thus a number of cases that allows for a robust analysis with sufficient 
confidence. In addition, this approach provides the opportunity to examine whether the per-
formance of these newspapers indeed varies across countries or more between different types 
of newspapers, for instance between tabloids and broadsheet papers.  
 
Table 6.1 below presents the results of a principal components factor analysis with the nine 
indicators listed in table 4.2 in chapter 4. Three components emerged from the exploratory 
analysis, all of which display quite high factor loadings for their respective items and do not 
differ greatly in terms of their explained variance. Furthermore, seven of the nine indicators 
load exclusively onto one of the three dimensions.  
Hence, just like in the previous analyses of the structural indicators, the factor analysis of the 
content indicators does not exactly reproduce the two dimensions outlined in the theoretical 
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model, but rather suggests a three-dimensional concept of democratic media performance.
59
 
But again, the three factors are nevertheless in line with the conceptualization of the vertical 
and the horizontal media function. 
Table 6.1 The latent dimensions of media performance on the content level 
 
 
Factor 
 
 
1 2 3 
V
er
ti
ca
l 
Share of articles covering political news .744 .265 .081 
Share of government articles mentioning malpractice .862 -.018 .173 
Share of parliament articles mentioning malpractice .842 -.167 .163 
Balance of powers: government vs. parliament vs.  
judiciary vs. public administration 
.035 .946 .050 
Balance of powers: government vs. parliament -.043 .919 .014 
H
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l Balance of parties: equitable allocation -.454 .220 .760 
Balance of parties: proportional allocation -.802 .055 .180 
Share of party articles mentioning at least two parties .204 -.030 .881 
Mean number of political parties mentioned per article .493 -.040 .598 
Eigenvalues 3.14 1.89 1.81 
Explained variance in % 34.91 21.02 20.11 
Number of cases 50 
Notes: rotated factor loadings using principal component analysis and Varimax rotation; factors with Eigenvalue 
> 1 were extracted; explained total variance: 76.03%; bold: loadings ≥ .400 or ≤ -.400; grey: highest loading per 
item. 
 
A closer look at table 6.1 shows that the indicators which were assigned to different media 
functions on theoretical grounds indeed do not load together, with one exception to be dis-
cussed shortly. Instead, some of the indicators from the same function split into two latent 
dimensions. Contrary to chapter 5, however, it is the vertical function which divides into two 
components here. This largely corresponds to the theoretical assumptions.  
Factor 1 can be regarded as the first component of the vertical media function, which assesses 
the amount of critical political information. All of the three respective items load strongly 
here, namely the share of articles containing keywords referring to political processes or insti-
tutions as well as the shares of articles about governments and parliaments containing key-
                                                 
59
 In the structural case, this only applied to the model with the larger country sample and the reduced set of 
indicators though. 
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words pointing to corruption, scandals or various forms of fraud or lying. Thus, as argued in 
chapter 3, this component seems to reflect the degree to which political decision-makers are 
being covered and scrutinized by the press. In that sense, it allows for assessments of the 
amount of political news or information conveyed by newspapers. In addition to the three 
vertical function indicators, three of the indicators of the horizontal function also load above 
0.4 or below -0.4 onto this factor, respectively. I will come back to this later. 
The second factor adds a further distinctive aspect to the vertical media function. The two 
items which belong to its second component display very high factor loadings here. The first 
one captures the degree to which newspapers cover the three branches of democratic govern-
ment as well as the public administration to equal extents. The second does the same but con-
siders only government versus parliament because these are the two powers which are chosen 
and legitimized by democratic elections. Moreover, it is often bemoaned that media increas-
ingly shift their attention to the more newsworthy executive actors at the expense of legisla-
tives (Van Dalen 2012). In short, instead of the simple amount of information, factor 2 
measures the balance of information about political institutions and their representatives. One 
could thus also argue that this latent concept takes somewhat of a middle position between the 
vertical and the horizontal media function, i.e., between their respective key goals of infor-
mation and diversity. However, since factor 2 still exclusively deals with constitutional pow-
ers which require public surveillance, it is justified to consider it a component of the vertical 
media function. 
Finally, factor 3 clearly represents the horizontal media function. Three of the four respective 
indicators load highest onto this single dimension. The balance of political parties in media 
news coverage according to the principle of equality (the idea that the news space should be 
allocated equitably
60
), the share of articles about political parties mentioning at least two par-
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 The two measures for the balance of political parties in the press coverage (items 1 and 2 of the horizontal 
function) represent different normative ideals about what the appropriate amount of media attention devoted to 
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ties as well as the relative average number of parties mentioned per article can therefore be 
taken as good parameters of the media’s democratic performance in terms of the horizontal 
function. The balance and the mean number of parties, however, are also weakly related to 
factor 1. Moreover, the alternative conception of the diversity or balance of political parties 
does not belong to factor 3 at all. This indicator measures how well parties are proportionally 
considered in the press coverage, by comparing their vote shares in the previous election with 
the relative frequency with which they are mentioned in the newspapers under study (essen-
tially a reversed Gallagher index). So while the index does have a positive correlation with the 
other three indicators of the horizontal media function, the respective factor loading is only 
0.180. Instead, this element has a very high and negative factor loading with the first compo-
nent of the vertical function. Apparently, a high amount of political information and critical 
press coverage is associated with a low degree of proportional media attention for political 
parties.
61
 Given that the first party balance variable has a non-negligible and negative correla-
tion of -0.454 with factor 1 as well, this suggests that there is indeed a trade-off between 
newspapers’ capacity to provide a high amount of critical political information and their abil-
ity to establish a good diversity of and dialogue between political parties. 
In sum, the measures gathered from a content analysis of 50 newspapers in ten countries rep-
resent the theoretical media functions quite well. In line with the theoretical framework for the 
content level, the horizontal function is one-dimensional whereas the vertical function divides 
into two components, namely the amount of critical political news and the balance of infor-
mation about political institutions. 
                                                                                                                                                        
single parties should look like (see the respective discussion in chapter 3). While some democratic models would 
rather plead for an equitable allocation of news space for political parties, others would argue for a proportional 
distribution according to the parties’ importance, e.g. in terms of their electoral strengths (Ferree et al. 2002; 
Ramsden 1996). 
61
 To test the robustness of these findings, the factor analysis was also conducted including only one of the two 
party balance measures at a time. The results do not change. 
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6.2 The variance of media content performance within and across 
countries 
The aim of this book is to make assumptions about media performance across countries. In 
the previous section, however, the dimensions of media’s fulfillment of the vertical and hori-
zontal function with regard to media content were measured on the basis of individual news-
papers. This raises the question of whether newspapers from the same country are similar in 
their level of media performance or whether the variance within countries is just as large as 
across countries. In order to find answers for this, section 6.2 proceeds in the following two 
steps. First, a comparison of factor scores from the previous analysis provides insight about 
the differences of media performance both within and between countries. Second, I will con-
duct regression analyses to explain newspapers’ level of the vertical and the horizontal func-
tion by both outlet and country characteristics. 
6.2.1 Comparing the variance of media content performance within countries 
Table 6.2 presents the average scores and standard deviations of the three factors in table 6.1 
per country.  
Table 6.2 Average media performance per country – means and standard deviations 
 Vertical function Horizontal function 
 
Amount of information Balance of information 
 
 
Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. 
Australia 0.816 0.364 -0.983 0.380 -1.217 0.701 
Austria -0.879 0.098 -1.115 0.515 0.954 0.405 
Canada 0.394 0.221 -0.651 0.240 1.351 0.278 
Germany -0.735 0.907 0.286 0.574 0.378 1.152 
France -0.254 0.850 0.840 0.685 -0.564 0.335 
Ireland -0.035 0.048 -0.001 0.558 -0.377 0.724 
New Zealand 0.197 0.292 -1.277 0.723 -0.729 1.056 
Switzerland -1.303 0.239 0.962 0.468 0.342 0.409 
United Kingdom 0.007 0.510 0.913 0.302 -0.678 0.314 
United States 1.932 0.429 0.968 0.367 0.390 0.612 
Notes: figures based on factor scores from table 6.1. 
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As the mean values show, most countries clearly score below or above the overall mean value 
of 0 (note that factor values are standard scores). Exceptions in terms of the first component 
of the vertical function are Canada, France, Ireland, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, 
which all exhibit mean factor values that do not differ greatly from 0. With respect to the sec-
ond component, rather small absolute mean values can be observed for Germany and Ireland. 
As for the horizontal function, finally, the same holds for Switzerland, the United States and – 
again – Germany and Ireland. 
Likewise, looking at the standard deviations reveals that the newspapers from a country most-
ly score similarly above or below 0 on the vertical and the horizontal media function. Apart 
from most of the cases just mentioned, the newspapers between two standard deviations lie in 
the same value range (positive vs. negative) in every country. This is actually even true for 
Canada’s scores on the first component of the vertical function. Although its mean value of 
0.394 is not that high, subtracting the standard deviation (0.221) still results in a positive 
score. Finally, it is also worth noting that at least in terms of the first component of the verti-
cal function the standard deviation of Ireland is very small. This indicates that Ireland’s mean 
is not close to 0 because its cases are widely dispersed but because they all exhibit a similarly 
moderate performance of the vertical function’s first component. 
Hence, the results suggest that countries are quite homogenous in terms of the democratic 
performance of their press, as represented by five of the ten largest newspapers. It seems that 
media performance on the content level is more or just as likely a function of a country’s spe-
cific “news culture” (Esser 2008) than of individual editorial policy. 
6.2.2 Explaining media content performance 
However, further analyses are required to test whether the values from the factor analysis in 
table 6.1 are indeed determined by country characteristics or rather by specific features of 
individual media outlets, which are not necessarily equally distributed within the country 
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samples. The remainder of this section 6.2 will therefore discuss various OLS regression 
models, using the horizontal function as well as the two components of the vertical function 
as dependent variables. The results generally seem to confirm the conclusion drawn above. It 
is not only the outlets’ characteristics but also the country context which determines how well 
a newspaper conforms to democratic standards. But before these results are presented in more 
detail, the independent variables need to be introduced. 
Defining the explanatory variables 
The independent variables include, on the one hand, newspaper characteristics. All of the re-
spective information is presented in the appendix of chapter 4 (see table A4.3). Three dummy 
variables measure whether a newspaper is a tabloid, a regional/local newspaper or a broad-
sheet newspaper. Generally, broadsheets can be expected to perform better than the other two 
types, especially regarding the vertical function, because this category incorporates a coun-
try’s large quality newspapers and thus the more established and traditional news sources. 
Regional newspapers, by contrast, often focus on all kinds of local events but not necessarily 
politics. Similarly, tabloids tend to cover more crime and human interest stories than political 
news. However, given that the first component of the vertical function also reflects the degree 
to which media coverage fulfills its watchdog role and reports about official misconduct, it is 
possible that tabloids might not fall (far) behind broadsheet newspapers. Tabloid newspapers 
are of course typically at the forefront when it comes to exposing and reporting about political 
scandals. Moreover, broadsheets often have traditional political ties which might lower the 
degree to which they provide a good balance of political parties as required by the horizontal 
media function. Thus, three further dummy variables assess whether a newspaper is rather 
leftist, rightist or independent. Finally, a newspaper’s circulation is considered as well. The 
reasoning behind this is that larger news organizations are supposed to have more capacity 
and resources to provide high-quality media coverage in line with normative standards. 
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On the other hand, a set of nine indicators captures country characteristics. First, the factor 
values for structural media performance as established in the previous chapter are included. 
These can be considered as reflecting different media cultures which might affect the output 
of individual outlets. More precisely, the factor scores from the analysis based on the overall 
means of the structural data for the ten countries under study here are used (right-hand section 
in table 5.1). It will be interesting to see how the structural level links to the content level. 
This connection has rarely been tested so far (see chapter 2). Obviously, only the relationships 
between the media function scores of the structural level and their counterparts on the content 
level are estimated, i.e. between the vertical function on both levels and the horizontal func-
tion on both levels, respectively. Since the horizontal level is composed of two factors on the 
structural level, the mean of the two scores is used. Generally, I expect positive effects of the 
structural on the content level. 
Second, media or news cultures more broadly are also identified by Hallin and Mancini 
(2004). As described in chapter 2, they develop three models of media systems: the liberal 
model, the democratic corporatist model and the polarized pluralist model. Most of the ten 
countries examined here are included in Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) classification and they 
represent all of the three models, which is partly why they were selected in the first place (see 
chapter 4). Hence, it makes sense to use the three models as dummy variables in order to ana-
lyze whether they can explain differences in media content performance in addition to outlet-
specific parameters.  
It is difficult to formulate clear-cut theoretical assumptions about the impact of the three mod-
els on media performance on the content level. Nevertheless, it might be argued that the verti-
cal function should be better fulfilled in liberal countries, especially in terms of the amount of 
information. Liberal models are known for a strong tradition of investigative journalism 
which should benefit the media watchdog function inherent in this first component of the ver-
tical function. Moreover, liberal models tend to have majoritarian electoral systems, which are 
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usually associated with fierce electoral campaigns and thus probably a higher share of politi-
cally relevant news in general. Further, because of the related confrontational two-party logic 
of this political system, both the government and the strong opposition it faces have incen-
tives to discredit each other and disclose malpractice within the other camp. This might again 
help the media to provide citizens with critical information.  
As for the horizontal function, two hypotheses are possible. On the one hand, democratic cor-
poratist countries are likely to fare better. Due to their proportional electoral system and con-
sociational character they have a strong culture of power sharing. This might spill over into 
the media sphere and lead to a higher diversity of political parties in the news. On the other 
hand, alongside investigative journalism, the norm of journalistic objectivity is an early acqui-
sition of the liberal model countries. Thus, while the other two models are still characterized 
by rather high political parallelism according to Hallin and Mancini (2004), the widespread 
neutrality of media outlets in the liberal model could result in a less biased, i.e., more diverse 
and balanced coverage of public discourses. Moreover, it might be easier to strike a balance in 
the two-party systems usually found in majoritarian democracies, and thus liberal countries, 
than in multi-party systems. 
Third, like in chapter 5, the two Lijphart (1999) dimensions – the executives-parties dimen-
sion and the federal-unitary dimension – are also used as explanatory variables in this chapter. 
Media content performance should not only be influenced by media systems and news cul-
tures but also the political-institutional context. Media systems and the institutional setting are 
of course not unrelated, as both the previous chapter and the previous paragraph have demon-
strated. Hence, the theoretical expectations for the executives-parties dimension closely corre-
spond to the ones just discussed with respect to the Hallin and Mancini (2004) models. To 
remember, higher values on the executives-parties dimension are associated with more con-
sensus democracy. The effect of the executives-parties dimension on the two components of 
the vertical function is therefore supposed to be negative, whereas it could be either negative 
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or positive for the horizontal function. As for the federal-unitary dimension, higher values 
stand for a more extensive division of power as well. For this reason, we might assume a posi-
tive impact on all three factors shown in table 6.1. The vertical function should be better ful-
filled in countries with strong checks and balances between the constitutional branches as 
well as other veto players. On the one hand, this should make it more difficult for office-
holder to hide their abuses of power. On the other hand, public attention should be distributed 
more evenly across different political institutions if the executive is less dominant. In addi-
tion, a higher degree of power sharing in terms of the federal-unitary dimension might again 
translate into a more diverse representation of interests in the press coverage, i.e., a better ful-
fillment of the horizontal media function. 
Finally, two further country-specific indicators are used as control variables. The first is a 
dummy variable reporting whether a country has held a national election during the year un-
der study. This applies to Austria, Canada, New Zealand and the United States. It is necessary 
to control for elections since media coverage during electoral campaigns probably differs 
markedly from media coverage in other phases of the political process. More specifically, the 
scores for the first component of the vertical function can be expected to be higher during 
election campaigns. Political news coverage is likely to be both richer and more critical since 
political candidates and parties have to be presented and evaluated. Similarly, the balance 
among political parties as required by the horizontal function should be better because smaller 
parties and their campaign efforts receive more space in the media than they would otherwise, 
in order to provide voters with an overview of all electoral alternatives. The second compo-
nent of the vertical function, however, is supposed to suffer during election campaigns, as 
media attention shifts to the parliament and the government at the expense of the judiciary 
and the public administration.  
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The second control variable measures a country’s level of corruption by the Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) on a scale from 0 to 10.62 The original 
scale was reversed so that higher values indicate more corruption. This indicator will only be 
used in the analyses predicting the amount of critical political information, the first compo-
nent of the vertical media function. This is because the extent of critical media coverage ac-
cusing political incumbents of malpractice could be related to the actual prevalence of corrup-
tion in the respective country. The effect, however, might go both ways. On the one hand, 
critical media coverage should be more frequent in contexts where more corruption takes 
place. This would of course be in line with the idea of media acting as watchdogs as required 
by the vertical media function, but it could also simply reveal that experts, having to rate how 
corrupt their country is, turn to media coverage about the issue. On the other hand, it could 
also be argued that media coverage about official misconduct is rare precisely because corrup-
tion is high and journalists are part of the scheme. This mechanism, however, is less likely to 
be at work in the ten established democracies studied here. 
The country-specific, i.e., macro-level variables were ‘individualized’ in the sense that all 
newspapers from a country received the same values of the macro-level variables. I am aware 
that this is not an entirely appropriate approach since it does not account for the multilevel 
structure of the data. However, estimating multilevel models with only four to six cases on the 
lower level nested into only ten cases on the higher level would be even less adequate.  
Predicting media performance with regard to the amount of political information  
Having discussed the independent variables and their expected impacts, the following tables 
6.3 to 6.5 show the regression results predicting the scores of each of the three factors in table 
6.1. Every table is composed of four models. The first three present the results of the individ-
ual-level and different sets of the country-specific variables. This was necessary because of 
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Comparing the democratic performance of media content 
  
 
 159 
the rather high correlations between some of these independent variables and because the ap-
propriateness of specifying models with all independent variables on the basis of 50 cases is 
questionable. Nevertheless, the fourth model always estimates the influence of all independ-
ent variables jointly. 
Table 6.3 Explaining vertical media function performance: amount of information 
 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 
Coef. (S.E.) 
 
Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  
Tabloid newspaper -0.406 (0.295) 
 
-0.348 (0.222) 
 
-0.326 (0.256)  -0.427 (0.188) * 
Regional newspaper -1.038 (0.263) *** -0.687 (0.240) ** -1.028 (0.263) *** -0.592 (0.203) ** 
Leftist newspaper -0.031 (0.269)  0.415 (0.234) 
+
 0.170 (0.270)  0.232 (0.199)  
Independent newspaper -0.065 (0.253)  0.079  (0.222)  0.147 (0.261)  0.104 (0.191)  
Circulation in 10’000 -0.003 (0.002)  0.000 (0.002)  0.001 (0.002)  -0.001 (0.002)  
Vert. function (struct.) 0.886 (0.230) *** - -  - -  0.514 (0.221) * 
Democratic corporatist - -  -1.275 (0.219) *** - -  -1.595 (0.320) *** 
Polarized pluralist - -  -1.047 (0.395) * - -  -0.609 (0.347) 
+
 
Executives-parties - -  - -  -0.547 (0.138) *** 0.164 (0.142) 
 
Federal-unitary - -  - -  0.152 (0.079) 
+
 0.137 (0.077) 
+
 
Election year 0.647 (0.218) ** 0.529 (0.193) ** 0.515 (0.226) * 0.457 (0.167) ** 
Corruption 0.387 (0.155) * 0.461 (0.166) ** 0.089 (0.165)  0.370 (0.147) * 
Constant 2.550 (1.299) 
+
 4.189 (1.433) ** 0.527 (1.397)  3.076 (1.263) ** 
Model Properties   
 
      
   
R
2
 0.610 
  
0.714 
  
0.621   0.817 
  
Adjusted R
2
 0.534 
  
0.650 
  
0.536   0.758 
  
N  50 
  
50 
  
50   50 
  
Notes: unstandardized OLS estimators; *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05, + p ≤ 0.10. Reference categories: 
broadsheet newspaper; rightist newspaper; liberal model. 
 
Table 6.3 displays the models estimated to explain newspapers’ performance with regard to 
the first component of the vertical function – the amount of critical political information. Just 
looking at the effects of the first five variables, which reflect newspaper characteristics, it 
becomes clear that only the regional newspaper dummy has a significant coefficient across all 
four models. And since it is negative, this means that regional or local newspapers score con-
siderably worse on the first component of the vertical function than broadsheet newspapers. 
Interestingly, tabloids do not differ in their performance of the vertical function compared to 
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broadsheet newspapers, which – as argued above – might indicate that tabloids may play an 
important role as public watchdogs in contemporary democracies. However, in model IV tab-
loid newspapers have a significant negative coefficient, which suggests that they do perform 
somewhat worse than broadsheets after all. In addition, according to model II, leftist newspa-
pers apparently provide a higher amount of critical political information than their rightist 
counterparts although the statistical significance is very weak and the variable has no signifi-
cant coefficient in any of the other three models.  
Moving to the country-specific variables, model I shows that the scores for the vertical func-
tion on the structural level have a strong positive impact on the vertical function on the media 
content level. This result is quite remarkable. It supports the theoretical assumption that there 
is a positive link between the vertical function on the two different levels of analysis. Hence, 
when the access to different channels of information is more widespread within the popula-
tion, newspapers also provide more and especially critical information about political affairs. 
Moreover, in substantive terms, the effect is larger than the effect of regional newspapers. All 
else equal, regional newspapers are estimated to score 1.038 or about 24 percent lower on the 
first component of the vertical function. To compare, the predicted difference in newspapers’ 
fulfillment of the first vertical function component between the worst and best performing 
countries in terms of the structural vertical function is about 44 percent.
63
 
The other two macro-level variables in model I also have significant relationships with the 
dependent variable. As expected, press coverage is more in line with the normative require-
ments of the vertical media function during election years, suggesting that citizens receive 
more information about political affairs and the behavior of incumbents during election cam-
paigns. This effect is highly significant in all four models and considerably large. But its 
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 1.038 equals about a fourth of the dependent variable’s scale, which has a range of 4.369. The range of the 
structural performance of the vertical function is 2.170. Multiplied by the variable’s coefficient (0.886), this 
gives 1.923, which is about 44 percent of 4.369. 
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magnitude varies somewhat and never reaches the size of regional newspapers. In this case, 
the coefficients are directly comparable because both are dummy variables. Corruption also 
has a significant impact on the amount of critical information provided by newspapers in three 
out of four regression models. The positive coefficients indicate that higher corruption is in-
deed associated with higher scores of the first component of the vertical media function. It 
remains unclear whether this means that media have more critical news to report in countries 
that are more prone to corruption or that experts rate countries as more corrupt when the press 
is more critical of office-holders. Either way, the results point to the validity of the content 
analysis data. As discussed in chapter 4, the content analysis approach adopted in this study 
only registers the co-occurrence of keywords for malpractice and political actors in a news 
unit, but not their relationship. These indicators therefore capture media coverage of malprac-
tice by political actors only approximately. The results just presented with respect to the cor-
ruption index, however, suggest that the indicators are valid and measure what they are sup-
posed to measure.  
Model II includes the variables for the Hallin and Mancini (2004) models instead of the verti-
cal function from the structural level. The figures show that both have a significant impact. 
And since they are negative, this means that the press from liberal countries performs better 
with regard to the first component of the vertical function than the press from democratic cor-
poratist and polarized pluralist countries. This finding is very much in line with the expecta-
tions formulated above. Furthermore, the democratic corporatist variable does not only have 
the most significant but also the largest effect in the model. Compared to regional newspa-
pers, the effect is almost twice as strong and the predicted difference in vertical function per-
formance between the liberal and the democratic corporatist model is about 29 percent.  
Model III introduces the two Lijphart (1999) dimensions and compares their influence on the 
first component of the vertical media function to the influence of the newspaper variables. 
Interestingly, the estimates for both dimensions are significant, although only marginally so in 
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the case of the federal-unitary dimension. And as argued above, the executives-parties dimen-
sion has a negative effect on the dependent variable whereas the federal-unitary dimension is 
positive. Hence, the press conveys more political information in general and more critical 
news of political incumbents in particular in majoritarian democracies, where single parties 
dominate the executive and are challenged by a strong opposition camp. Likewise, more offi-
cial misconduct is exposed and publicized in political systems with strong checks and balanc-
es. The executives-parties effect, however, is not only more significant but also seems to be 
much more substantial. In fact, it is much larger than the impact of regional newspapers as 
well. While the latter only accounts for 24 percent of the dependent variable’s range, the pre-
dicted maximum effect of the executives-parties dimension is 39 percent.
64
  
The executives-parties dimension is no longer statistically significant when all country-level 
variables are combined (see model IV). The vertical function from the structural level and 
both Hallin and Mancini (2004) models, by contrast, are still significant and largely outweigh 
the effect of regional newspapers. 
In sum, the country-specific variables have larger effects than the newspaper-specific varia-
bles in all four models. This supports the assumption that the variance of media performance 
on the content level is higher between than within countries, at least with regard to the norma-
tive requirement of providing a high amount of critical political information. Finally, briefly 
considering the properties of the regression models in table 6.3, it can be observed that all 
have satisfying model fits. Especially when controlling for the democratic corporatist and the 
polarized pluralist models, the variance of the dependent variable is explained to high de-
grees. 
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 The range of the executives-parties dimension is 3.150. Multiplied by the variable’s coefficient (-0.547), this 
gives 1.723, which equals 39 percent of 4.369 (the dependent variable’s total range). 
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Predicting media performance with regard to the balance of political information  
Table 6.4 presents the OLS regression results for the second component of the vertical media 
function – the balance of political information. 
Table 6.4 Explaining vertical media function performance: balance of information 
 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 
Coef. (S.E.) 
 
Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  
Tabloid newspaper -0.314 (0.317) 
 
-0.166 (0.306) 
 
-0.210 (0.317)  -0.251 (0.280)  
Regional newspaper -0.104 (0.321)  -0.394 (0.332)  -0.228 (0.325)  -0.242 (0.304)  
Leftist newspaper -0.005 (0.329)  -0.027 (0.323)  -0.020 (0.335)  -0.205 (0.298)  
Independent newspaper 0.116 (0.304)  -0.085 (0.304)   0.060 (0.305)  -0.211 (0.281)  
Circulation in 10’000 0.005 (0.003) + 0.008 (0.002) ***  0.008 (0.002) ** 0.005 (0.003) * 
Vert. function (struct.) 0.440 (0.280)  - -  - -  0.888 (0.325) ** 
Democratic corporatist - -  0.498 (0.301)  - -  -0.119 (0.478)  
Polarized pluralist - -  0.970 (0.445) * - -  1.634 (0.448) *** 
Executives-parties - -  - -   0.120 (0.160)  0.589 (0.249) * 
Federal-unitary - -  - -   0.105 (0.095)  -0.028 (0.109)  
Election year -0.961 (0.258) *** -0.643 (0.265) * -0.863 (0.260) ** -0.585 (0.246) * 
Constant -0.187 (0.283)  -0.228 (0.264)  -0.023 (0.246)  -0.680 (0.313) * 
Model Properties   
 
      
   
R
2
 0.401 
  
0.441 
  
0.402   0.580 
  
Adjusted R
2
 0.301 
  
0.332 
  
0.286   0.458 
  
N  50 
  
50 
  
50   50 
  
Notes: unstandardized OLS estimators; *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05, + p ≤ 0.10. Reference categories: 
broadsheet newspaper; rightist newspaper; liberal model. 
 
Quite obviously, the scores of this second factor (see table 6.1) are more difficult to explain. 
On the one hand, this is reflected by the fact that the proportions of explained variance are 
considerably smaller in table 6.4 compared to the previous regression models (the highest 
adjusted R
2
 is 0.458). On the other hand, fewer variables exhibit significant coefficients. 
As for the outlet-specific variables, only newspaper circulation significantly affects media 
performance in all four models. Accordingly, the larger and supposedly more resourceful a 
newspaper is, the better it is able to establish a balanced coverage of different political institu-
tions and to cover all stages of and actors involved in political processes with greater regulari-
ty. Ceteris paribus, the predicted difference between the newspaper with the lowest (41’000) 
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and the highest circulation (2’986’000) in the sample is 2.422 in models II and III, which cor-
responds to over two thirds of the dependent variable’s scale (70 percent). 65 In model I, how-
ever, circulation is only marginally significant and also has a smaller estimate. 
Almost none of the country-level variables of interest explain the variation in the second 
component of the vertical media function in the regression models I to III. No effects are 
found for structural media performance or the Lijphart (1999) dimensions. Thus, the respec-
tive theoretical expectations have to be rejected. Only the polarized pluralist dummy turns out 
to be statistically different from its reference category, the liberal model. Hence, newspapers 
from the polarized pluralist country France perform, on average, better in terms of the balance 
of political institutions in the news than papers from all the other countries. The magnitude of 
this effect is nowhere nearly as high as newspaper circulation though.  
In addition to the polarized pluralist model, elections again have a significant impact on verti-
cal function performance in all four models. But contrary to the first component, the relation-
ship is now negative. Quite plausibly, media focus more on political incumbents in legislative 
and executive offices and neglect the judiciary and the public administration during election 
campaigns. Nevertheless, the relative impact of elections is also not as substantial as the im-
pact of newspaper circulation. 
Finally, when all the macro-level variables are combined in model IV, their cross-
combinations seem to lead to a much larger impact of the polarized pluralist models as well as 
significant effects for the structural-level vertical media function and Lijphart’s (1999) execu-
tives-parties dimension. Contrary to the separate models I to III, each of these three determi-
nants is predicted to affect the dependent variable more strongly than newspaper circulation in 
model IV. Both of the findings contradicting those from models I and III can be explained by 
the polarized pluralist variable in model IV, which is essentially a dummy variable for the 
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French cases. While these score high on the dependent variable, the second component of the 
vertical media function on the content level, France also happens to have rather low values for 
the vertical media function on the structural level as well as the executives-parties dimension. 
For this reason, the French cases neutralize the otherwise positive effects of these two predic-
tors in their respective separate models I and III. But if they are combined with the polarized 
pluralist variable and France is thereby controlled for, like in model IV, the positive relation-
ships emerge. 
In a nutshell, differences in newspapers’ performance of the second component of the vertical 
function seem to be more determined by individual features, namely their size in terms of 
circulation, than the news culture of their country of origin. However, the rather low model 
fits raise the suspicion that there must be other factors not considered here which might ex-
plain how newspapers perform with regard to the balance of information about political insti-
tutions in their news coverage. 
Predicting media performance of the horizontal function  
Finally, table 6.5 below shows the regression results for the third factor in table 6.1, which 
measures newspapers’ fulfillment of the horizontal media function in their press coverage. 
Just as observed for the first component of the vertical function, regional newspapers have 
significantly lower values on the horizontal function than the broadsheet or quality press in all 
four regression models. However, the effect is somewhat weaker here compared to table 6.3 
and only marginally significant in models I and III. The percentage of the horizontal func-
tion’s value range that is explained by the type of newspaper (regional vs. broadsheet) varies 
between a minimum of 14 percent in model III and a maximum of 22 percent in model II.
66
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 The coefficient of regional newspaper is -0.571 in model III and -0.869 in model II, which equals about the 
mentioned percentages relative to the dependent variable’s full scale range (3.989). 
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Apart from this characteristic, it does not matter if and what kind of political orientation a 
newspaper has or how big it is in terms of circulation.  
Table 6.5 Explaining horizontal media function performance 
 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 
Coef. (S.E.) 
 
Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  
Tabloid newspaper -0.320 (0.322) 
 
-0.327 (0.293) 
 
-0.380 (0.300)  -0.367 (0.273)  
Regional newspaper -0.581 (0.331) 
+
 -0.869 (0.317) ** -0.571 (0.308) 
+
 -0.861 (0.299) ** 
Leftist newspaper 0.479 (0.338)  0.385 (0.308) 
 
0.379 (0.317)  0.200 (0.293)  
Independent newspaper 0.173 (0.316)  0.159 (0.291)  0.284 (0.294)  0.333 (0.278)  
Circulation in 10’000 0.001 (0.002)  0.001 (0.002)  0.002 (0.002)  -0.001 (0.002)  
Horiz. function (struct.) 0.495 (0.199) * - -  - -  0.754 (0.365) * 
Democratic corporatist - -  1.170 (0.288) *** - -  1.268 (0.464) ** 
Polarized pluralist - -  0.349 (0.425)  - -  -0.602 (0.308)  
Executives-parties - -  - -  0.225 (0.152)  -0.834 (0.376) * 
Federal-unitary - -  - -  0.258 (0.090) ** 0.196 (0.089) * 
Election year 0.694 (0.262) * 0.992 (0.253) *** 0.818 (0.246) ** 0.373 (0.345) 
 
Constant -0.213 (0.245)  -0.693 (0.252) ** -0.479 (0.233) * -0.489 (0.280) 
+
 
Model Properties   
 
      
   
R
2
 0.369 
  
0.490 
  
0.464   0.593 
  
Adjusted R
2
 0.264 
  
0.391 
  
0.359   0.475 
  
N  50 
  
50 
  
50   50 
  
Notes: unstandardized OLS estimators; *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05, + p ≤ 0.10. Reference categories: 
broadsheet newspaper; rightist newspaper; liberal model. 
 
Turning to the macro-level variables, model I indicates that a country’s score on the horizon-
tal function from the structural level has a significant and positive impact on how well its 
press complies with the horizontal function on the content level. Again, the finding that this 
relationship between the two levels of analysis exists is quite striking. A high diversity within 
media systems, both in quantitative and in qualitative terms, is indeed associated with a higher 
diversity and balance of political parties in the media coverage, as expected. To recapitulate, 
quantitative media diversity is composed of the number and import of newspapers while qual-
itative media diversity consists of the measures for internal and external diversity of opinions 
within the print sector. The independent variable used in the regression models in table 6.5 is 
the mean of the respective two factor scores.  
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Furthermore, the magnitude of this variable’s effect is substantial. Moving from the lowest to 
the highest structural media performance of the horizontal function among the ten countries 
examined here leads to a predicted increase of 1.312 scale points in the horizontal function on 
the content level. This equals about a third of its value range (33 percent) and thus a much 
stronger impact than the one of regional newspapers. It is also stronger than the effect of elec-
tion years, which again significantly affects the dependent variable in all models except model 
IV. Hence, print media cover political parties more equally and contrast their positions more 
directly (by citing various parties within the same article) during election campaigns. This 
corresponds to the theoretical assumption discussed above and might even give reason to op-
timism. With the exception of model IV, elections have a larger impact than regional newspa-
pers as well. 
The media system also has a statistically significant effect on the horizontal function in model 
II. Media systems or cultures are here measured by the Hallin and Mancini (2004) models. 
The results suggest that print outlets from democratic corporatist countries perform better than 
their counterparts from liberal countries. By contrast, polarized pluralist models, i.e., France 
as its only representative in this study, do not significantly differ from liberal models. Fur-
thermore, the impact of the democratic corporatist variable is in fact the strongest and most 
significant in the model. Accordingly, on average, press coverage from democratic corporatist 
countries scores about 29 percent higher on the horizontal function than press coverage from 
liberal countries. This finding supports the first hypothesis posited above with regard to the 
link between the media content performance of the horizontal function and the Hallin and 
Mancini (2004) models. The power sharing culture of democratic corporatist countries indeed 
seems to rub off onto the press.  
As for the two Lijphart (1999) dimensions, model III shows that the federal-unitary dimension 
exhibits a significant positive relationship with the horizontal function on the content level 
which is more substantial than the impact of regional newspapers. Again, this is in line with 
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the theoretical expectations and further points to the fact that dividing political power among 
various actors enhances the performance of the press with regard to the horizontal function. 
However, given both this finding and the results and interpretation of model II in the previous 
paragraph, it is somewhat surprising that no effect for the executives-parties dimension can be 
observed in model III. 
The positive effects of the structural-level horizontal function, the democratic corporatist 
model and the federal-unitary dimension also persist when all country-specific indicators are 
combined in model IV. Moreover, the former two are still larger in substantive terms than any 
of the newspaper-specific predictors. Interestingly, and contrary to model III, the executives-
parties dimension has a significant and negative coefficient in model IV with a magnitude 
larger than the horizontal function of the structural level or the democratic corporatist model. 
And although it is possible that a good balance between and confrontation of parties is easier 
to establish in majoritarian democracies with two-party systems, this result totally contradicts 
the effect of the democratic corporatist model. A closer inspection reveals that this seemingly 
puzzling result is mainly due to Austria, Germany and especially Switzerland. These countries 
score high on the executives-parties dimension and also generally on the dependent variable, 
the horizontal media function on the content level. Hence, these countries cancel out the nega-
tive relationship between the Lijphart (1999) dimension and the dependent variable of the 
remaining cases in model III. But when controlling for the democratic corporatist variable, 
which consists of exactly these three countries, in model IV, the negative effect of the execu-
tive-parties dimension surfaces. 
 
Before concluding, it needs to be pointed out that none of the model fits in table 6.5 is particu-
larly high. This could mean that important explanatory factors have been left out of the equa-
tions. Nevertheless, the discussion of the four regression models has made it clear that media 
content performance with regard to the horizontal function differs more strongly across coun-
Comparing the democratic performance of media content 
  
 
 169 
tries than across newspaper types. Hence, print media from the same country are quite ho-
mogenous in their capacity or willingness to provide a high diversity of political viewpoints 
within public discourses. The same conclusion applies to the predictions of the first, but not 
the second component of the vertical function. The latter is mainly determined by a newspa-
per’s circulation. The other two dimensions of media performance on the content level, how-
ever, are more strongly related to country-specific characteristics, namely the Hallin and 
Mancini (2004) models, the Lijphart (1999) dimensions and/or – most remarkably – media 
performance on the structural level. This is in line with the interpretation of the descriptive 
statistics in section 6.2.1 which also pointed to the importance of the country context. 
6.3 Finding country patterns of media content performance 
So far, the variance of media performance across newspapers and countries was only analyzed 
for one media function or latent dimension at a time. In a next step, the factor scores from 
table 6.1 will be combined to look at the interactions of the vertical and the horizontal func-
tion in the ten countries under study. Again, it will be of interest to see whether newspapers 
within the same country display similar configurations and whether specific country patterns 
can thus be identified. This section therefore also focuses on evaluating which countries per-
form well and which do not. For these purposes, I first present a bivariate graphical analysis 
to give a general overview of different country patterns. Second, I will try to find country 
types by means of a cluster analysis. 
6.3.1 Graphical analysis 
Plotting the newspapers into a two-dimensional space according to their factor values allows 
for a graphical examination of whether certain country patterns regarding the media’s fulfill-
ment of the vertical and the horizontal function can be found. Since two sub-dimensions 
emerged for the vertical function, figure 6.1 below presents two graphs. In the first the hori-
zontal function (factor 3 in table 6.1) is pitched against the first vertical function component 
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(factor 1). The second graph, by contrast, plots the second component (factor 2) onto the y-
axis. In order to enhance readability, the newspapers are represented by letters instead of data 
points in the graphs. These indicate the first letter(s) or abbreviations of their country of 
origin. Furthermore, the means of the four to six newspapers in every country are displayed as 
larger and bold letters. This gives an indication of a country’s aggregate position. In addition, 
country-specific plots can be found in the appendix (see figure A6.1). 
First of all, the scatter plots illustrate that there is quite some variation among newspapers 
with regard to how well they score on the different dimensions. This shows in a straightfor-
ward way that there are substantial differences in the degree of fulfillment of the democratic 
media functions between newspapers. Moreover, the four-fold charts suggest that newspapers 
from the same country often cluster in the same or similar quadrants, indicating that specific 
country patterns or varieties of democratic media performance exist. 
For example, looking at the first plot, the cases from Australia are clearly located in the upper 
left quadrant. It therefore seems that the Australian press performs quite well with regard to 
the first component of the vertical function, i.e., the amount of critical political information 
provided to citizens, but scores rather low on the horizontal dimension. In fact, Australia’s 
“Sydney Morning Herald” (-2.166/1.166) displays the lowest factor score on the horizontal 
function of all the newspapers in the sample. The aggregate values of New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom can be found in the same part of the scatter plot even though very close to its 
borders. This is because their respective individual cases are a little more spread out and part-
ly also fall into the bottom left or upper right quadrant. This is especially true for New Zea-
land where the “Otago Daily Times” (-2.026/-0.308) performs significantly worse on both 
dimensions than the “Dominion Post” (0.521/0.405).  
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Figure 6.1 Newspapers’ positions on the vertical and the horizontal function 
 
 
Notes: plots based on factor scores from table 6.1; larger and bold letters represent the mean of the newspapers 
from the respective country.  
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Moving to the upper right, we also find a very clear-cut case there. All newspapers from Can-
ada are situated quite closely to each other and seem to have an above average degree of ful-
fillment of both the vertical and the horizontal function. This also applies to three of the five 
U.S. newspapers, while the other two exhibit slight deficits with respect to the horizontal 
function. So although on the aggregate the United States fall into the same quadrant as Cana-
da, we might argue that press coverage in the United States is a mix of the Australian and Ca-
nadian type. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that – with one exception – the American press 
seems to perform exceptionally well on the vertical media function, or at least its first compo-
nent. All U.S. newspapers score high above the print media from the nine other countries. In 
particular, the “New York Times” (0.622/2.406) reaches the highest value of all 50 newspa-
pers in the sample on this latent variable. But even the ‘outlier’ case in the American sample, 
which turns out to be the tabloid “New York Post” (-0.365/1.246), scores higher than any 
newspaper from another country on the y-axis.  
The bottom right part of the scatter plot represents media organizations which comply with 
the horizontal but not with the vertical function in their news coverage. It is most notably oc-
cupied by the Austrian and Swiss cases, which all perform quite similarly. At least with re-
spect to Switzerland, this configuration of the two media functions is very much in line with 
previous research which has shown that Swiss newspapers convey little criticism of the gov-
ernment but tend to provide a good balance of and dialogue between different political camps, 
especially in direct-democratic campaigns (Kriesi et al. 2012: 226, 229f.). Interestingly, the 
only paper from Switzerland that scores below 0 on both functions in the first chart of figure 
6.1 is the tabloid “Blick” (-0.178/-1.284). Similarly, the Austrian case which falls somewhat 
behind the rest of its group regarding the horizontal function is the tabloid in this country 
sample, the “Kronen Zeitung” (0.356/-0.910). In addition to Austria and Switzerland, the ag-
gregate score of Germany is located in the bottom right as well. Thus, Germany’s press could 
also be considered as belonging to this category. However, a closer look at the six individual 
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German cases reveals that they are more dispersed than those of any other country and that 
only two of them are actually placed close to their country mean. The German newspapers 
span across three quadrants and cover extremes such as the “Rheinische Post” (-1.239/-1.963) 
or the “F.A.Z. – Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” (1.715/0.451). The former has the worst 
score on the first component of the vertical function and does not exactly succeed with respect 
of the horizontal function either. The latter, by contrast, comes in second on the horizontal 
dimension, after the Canadian “Toronto Star” (1.823/0.364), and reaches positive values for 
the vertical function as well. Obviously, there are large differences between different types of 
newspapers in Germany, which have already surfaced in the regression analyses in the previ-
ous section. While regional newspapers show deficiencies on the vertical or both functions, 
the broadsheets or quality press performs well (the second German case falling into the upper 
right part is the “Süddeutsche Zeitung” (1.292/0.209)). 
The newspapers from France also vary quite considerably over the scatter plot. The two more 
high-profile news outlets can be found in the top left quadrant of the graph, representing cases 
with scores above average on the first component of the vertical function but below average 
on the horizontal function (“Le Monde” (-0.650/0.958) and “Le Figaro” (-0.032/0.217)). Just 
like in Germany, the regional press lies at the lower end of the distribution, however. Overall 
and although not a clear-cut case either, the French press system represents the bottom left 
quadrant and should therefore be characterized by a comparatively low media content perfor-
mance in general. France receives company from Ireland in this area. Two of the four Irish 
newspapers indeed have negative values on both axes, while this applies only for either one of 
the functions for the other two. Moreover, the vertical function scores are very close to 0 in all 
four Irish cases even, which has already been discussed in section 6.2.1. On the aggregate, 
despite being located in the bottom left, Ireland is a borderline type that is also very close to 
its British neighbor as well as New Zealand. 
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The country patterns just discussed are interesting and they also reveal some congruence with 
the classification of the ten countries according to Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) models of 
media systems, which partially already emerged in the regression analyses in section 6.2.2. 
First of all, it can be noted that all of the liberal media systems – also referred to as the North 
Atlantic model by Hallin and Mancini (2004) – fare comparatively well on the first compo-
nent of the vertical function (y-axis) and are therefore found in or close to the upper half of 
the scatter plot. Remembering that this component stands for the amount of critical media 
coverage about political decision-makers, this finding makes good sense. As already men-
tioned, the tradition of investigative journalism emerged from and remains strong in the An-
glo-Saxon world, which is why a better fulfillment of the media’s watchdog role in these 
countries is hardly surprising.  
Liberal countries are more divided when it comes to the horizontal dimension (x-axis). While 
Canada and the United States also perform quite well in this respect, most newspapers from 
the other liberal media systems score below average here. This division might be explained by 
the fact that while the principle of political neutrality and balance is an important credo of 
North American journalism, this applies less to liberal systems in Europe and Oceania be-
cause of their strong partisan press. This is exactly why Hallin and Mancini (2004) did not 
consider the United Kingdom to conform to the liberal ideal type. Moreover, the graph seems 
to support the assumption that Australia and New Zealand, which were not included in Hallin 
and Mancini’s (2004) study, could be classified as liberal media systems. However, they have 
more in common with the British press than its counterparts across the Atlantic. Somewhat of 
an exception among the liberal countries is Ireland. Hallin and Mancini (2004) suggested this 
country to deviate less from Canada and the United States than the United Kingdom. This is 
not evident in my data, however. In the graph, Ireland is closely situated to Great Britain, the 
mother country of its institutions, but also seems to be related to France and represents the 
same broad type. 
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Looking at Austria, Germany and Switzerland, i.e., the countries which belong to the demo-
cratic corporatist or North/Central European model, it is striking that they are all located in 
the same quadrant and very closely to each other.
67
 This indicates that the democratic corpo-
ratist model can be characterized, on the one hand, by a good performance regarding the hori-
zontal media function. This was already shown in the regression models and explained by the 
respective countries’ tradition of consensus and power sharing (Lijphart 1999), leading the 
media to more broadly and more equally integrate various political forces. On the other hand, 
democratic corporatist systems seem to score rather low on the vertical component 1. This 
could be due to the greater role played by the state and thus the closer ties between journalism 
and the political sphere in these countries, causing the media to serve more as lapdogs rather 
than watchdogs. 
Coming back to France, the only representative of the polarized pluralist or Mediterranean 
media system, we can see that it occupies the fourth quadrant and can therefore be distin-
guished from all the other cases too. Hence, polarized pluralist media systems differ from the 
other models in that they apparently fulfill neither the horizontal nor the vertical function very 
well. However, as mentioned before, the French newspapers examined show quite some vari-
ation in their factor scores and, on the aggregate, France lies not too far from 0 on both di-
mensions. This might be taken as evidence that France is not a clear-cut case of the polarized 
pluralist model, as expected by Hallin and Mancini (2004). Moreover, given that Ireland also 
falls into this part of the scatter plot, we could put into question whether the Mediterranean 
model does indeed display a distinct pattern of democratic performance or, by contrast, 
whether Ireland should really be considered an example of the liberal model instead the polar-
ized pluralist type of media system. 
                                                 
67
 However, as discussed above, in Germany this is mainly true for the aggregate value because its newspapers 
are very dispersed.  
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Hallin and Mancini (2004) refrained from qualitative judgments about their three models. 
This means that they did not explicitly highlight a specific hierarchical order or ranking. Im-
plicitly, however, they argue that media systems tend to move from the polarized pluralist to 
the liberal type, which might be read as a suggestion that the liberal model is the ‘best’ sys-
tem. Such an interpretation is partly confirmed by the data at hand. The polarized pluralist 
country France can be found at the lower end, i.e., the bottom left quadrant. Countries with 
deficiencies in either of the two functions occupy the middle field. This applies to the demo-
cratic corporatist countries as well as the liberal borderline cases from Europe and Oceania. 
The best democratic media performance, i.e., the best balance of scores from both dimen-
sions, finally, seems to be achieved in the pure liberal countries, Canada and the United 
States. 
 
As already mentioned, the second plot in figure 6.1 pitches the horizontal media function (x-
axis), as measured by factor 3 in table 6.1, against the second component of the vertical media 
function, using the scores from factor 2 (y-axis). The second component assesses the balance 
of information about political institutions. This graph gives quite a different picture than the 
first scatter plot. First of all, it is visible that the newspapers seem to be less dispersed on the 
y-axis, especially on its upper end. Most notably, the French and German cases vary less with 
respect to component 2 than component 1 of the vertical function. Second, while some coun-
tries remain where they were in the first graph of the four-fold matrix, most change their posi-
tion by moving to the other side of 0 on the vertical axis. Still in the same or similar location 
as before are the newspapers from the United Kingdom, the United States, Austria and Ire-
land. Those from the other six countries shift rather significantly.  
Thus, France can now be found in the upper left quadrant, which is characterized by a good 
performance of the vertical function’s second component but a below average score on the 
horizontal function. Germany and Switzerland switch places with Canada. While they move 
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to the upper right due to their high values on both dimensions, Canada falls into the bottom 
right category, according to which only the horizontal function is fulfilled to comparatively 
satisfying degrees. In fact, Switzerland and the United States now occupy almost the exact 
same aggregate position. Finally, Australia and New Zealand represent the bottom left quad-
rant, which means that they score below average on both media functions. Contrary to the 
first graph, these two countries therefore clearly diverge from the other Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries in the sample in the second graph of figure 6.1. 
Hence, with the exception of Ireland, where the individual newspapers are now somewhat 
widely distributed, there are still distinct patterns in the sense that newspapers from the same 
country group in the same quadrant. However, these country differences in the second plot 
seem much more difficult to explain, especially in light of Hallin and Mancini (2004) and 
their three models. This has already been observed in the regression analyses, where few of 
the country-specific variables had a significant effect on the second component of the vertical 
function and where the model fits were rather poor. The highest performance on both func-
tions can now be ascribed to the democratic corporatist countries except Austria as well as – 
again – to the United States. France and the United Kingdom score high on the second com-
ponent of the vertical media function but rather low on the horizontal dimension. As for the 
other three liberal countries, Ireland is really found in the middle. Canada joins Austria in the 
bottom right quadrant whereas Australia and New Zealand fall below average on both dimen-
sions. These results are not necessarily intuitive. It is for example surprising that the two pres-
idential systems France and the United States fare well with respect to the balance of media 
coverage about the different branches of government. One would have expected the media 
attention in these countries to be more directed towards the government than the other consti-
tutional powers. At least in the case of the United States, this might be explained by the strong 
checks and balances which are also an important feature of the U.S. political system. But as 
for France, it seems unclear why it is the “Le Monde” (-0.650/1.390) which reaches the high-
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est value of all the 50 newspapers in the sample on the vertical axis. The optimum of the two 
functions, however, seems to be achieved in slightly different constellations by the Swiss 
“Neue Zürcher Zeitung” (0.912/1.138) and the German “F.A.Z. – Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung” (1.715/0.658). The lowest value on the vertical component is represented by “The 
Waikato Times” (-1.609/-2.063) from New Zealand, and this newspaper also displays the 
worst combination of scores overall. 
 
In sum, as the scatter plots have shown, there seem to be significant differences between the 
ten countries examined when it comes to the question of how well their press complies with 
the democratic standards in their news coverage, as defined by the horizontal and the vertical 
media functions. Again, it has been found that countries tend to be homogenous in terms of 
the democratic quality of news coverage that major print news organizations provide their 
citizens. 
6.3.2 Cluster analysis 
An equally inductive but less qualitative approach to identify groups of similar cases or coun-
try patterns is to conduct a cluster analysis. Still relying on newspapers as the unit of analysis, 
the 50 cases will be classified on the basis of the factor scores from table 6.1 for the vertical 
and the horizontal media function.
68
 A scree plot of the distance coefficients as well as the 
interpretability of the cluster solutions guided the choice of the adequate number of clusters. 
Both clearly suggested a solution with four clusters. Table 6.6 displays the mean values of the 
three factor scales for each of these four clusters as well as the number of newspapers that the 
cluster is composed of overall and per country. Comparing the averages across clusters allows 
determining the particular characteristics or strengths of the respective newspaper groups. 
Thanks to the standardized factor scores, the clusters can be easily interpreted and compared.  
                                                 
68
 Like in chapter 5, hierarchical cluster analysis was performed, using the Ward linkage function and the 
squared Euclidean distance measure. 
Comparing the democratic performance of media content 
  
 
 179 
Table 6.6 Characteristics and composition of the clusters 
 
Cluster 
 
1 2 3 4 
Vertical function – amount of information 1.325 -0.147 -0.944 0.381 
Vertical function – balance of information 1.077 -0.743 0.698 -0.919 
Horizontal function 0.028 1.211 -0.189 -0.905 
Number of newspapers 9 12 16 13 
Cluster compositions:     
United States 5 - - - 
Austria - 5 - - 
Canada - 5 - - 
Switzerland - - 5 - 
Germany - 2 4 - 
France 2 - 3 - 
United Kingdom 2 - 3 - 
Australia - - - 5 
New Zealand - - - 5 
Ireland - - 1 3 
Notes: cluster analysis based on the factor scores from the analysis shown in table 6.1; figures: average factor 
scores per cluster; bold figures: score > 0; grey cells: highest score per item. 
 
Focusing on the first two clusters, we can observe one group of newspapers with peak values 
on the vertical but not the horizontal function, and vice versa. In addition, the smallest group, 
the first cluster, also exhibits an average performance of the horizontal function. The respec-
tive mean is slightly above 0 (0.028). Clusters 1 and 2 therefore seem to have a very clear 
profile. As for the other two clusters, the largest cluster 3 is characterized by a quite high per-
formance of just the second component of the vertical function, whereas cluster 4 displays 
positive values for the first component only.  
Looking at the cluster compositions, two general conclusions can be drawn from table 6.6. 
First, the majority of countries have a consistent pattern, i.e., their newspapers all fall into the 
same cluster. And even when they do not, they only divide across two of the four clusters. In 
addition, in Germany and Ireland, two of the four cases where newspapers are divided, there 
is still a clear tendency towards one cluster. This is an important finding and again provides 
evidence that the country context predominates over characteristics of single newspapers in 
determining how the press performs with regard to the theoretical functions imposed on it by 
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democracy theory.
69
 Second, the classification of countries to the four clusters is highly con-
gruent with the scatter plots in figure 6.1. To examine this more easily, the countries are or-
dered according to their most frequent cluster membership.  
The first cluster accommodates the American newspapers with their very high degrees of ful-
fillment of the vertical media function. This could be expected, considering that the United 
States are the only country belonging to the upper right quadrant in both scatter plots. In addi-
tion, these five dailies are joined by two French and two British press outlets, namely the “Le 
Figaro” and the “Le Monde” as well as the “Daily Telegraph” and the “Daily Mail”, respec-
tively (all quality newspapers, except the last). Given that, on average, this group does not 
score below 0 on the horizontal function either, the respective newspapers and the United 
States as a whole in particular might be ascribed the best media performance in terms of the 
content level. It also most closely corresponds to Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) liberal model, 
including the respective ideal case, the United States.  
Cluster 2 can be characterized by a good performance of the horizontal function only and it 
combines the Canadian and the Austrian press, along with the two German quality newspa-
pers “Süddeutsche Zeitung” und “F.A.Z. – Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung”. It might come as 
a surprise that Canada and Austria cluster together, given that they scored on different ends of 
the scale for the first component of the vertical function (see figure 6.1). Obviously, their sim-
ilarity with respect to the horizontal function and the second vertical component weighed 
more heavily in the cluster analysis. The fact that the cluster average of the first component is 
not that far off 0 (-0.147) is owed to the Canadian but also the two German cases. In that 
sense, the second group of newspapers jointly only displays serious deficiencies in terms of 
the second component of the vertical function. It could therefore be regarded as the second 
best performing group after cluster 1. Overall, cluster 2 also relates most to the democratic 
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 It is, however, a little surprising that the British cases do not fall into the same cluster since they seem to be 
located quite closely to each other in figure 6.1. 
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corporatist model by Hallin and Mancini (2004) even though Canada was classified as a liber-
al country by the authors. 
The third cluster constitutes the largest and most heterogeneous group. It mainly includes 
Switzerland as well as most of the German, French and British cases. What all these newspa-
pers seem to have in common are rather high scores on the second component of the vertical 
function, but not on the other two latent dimensions. The fact that Switzerland clusters with 
all the lower-quality, i.e., the regional and tabloid papers from Germany, France and the Unit-
ed Kingdom is somewhat puzzling. Because of its mostly positive values on the horizontal 
function, Switzerland seemed to more strongly resemble the pattern of the United States or of 
Austria (see figure 6.1). However, the Swiss cases do not score as high on the horizontal func-
tion as Austria and especially Canada, and they share a rather low level of the first component 
of the vertical function with some of the French and German papers. Nevertheless, thanks to 
Switzerland, the average value for the horizontal function in cluster 3 of -0.189 is not excep-
tionally low. For that reason, the third group of countries can be attributed the third rank of 
overall media content performance. As for the Hallin and Mancini (2004) models, cluster 3 
can be considered as most in line with the democratic corporatist type like cluster 2. This is 
due to the stronger presence of newspapers from both Switzerland and Germany, which ac-
count for 9 of the 16 cases from this cluster. 
Lastly, the fourth cluster consists of all newspapers from Australia and New Zealand as well 
as most of the Irish cases. It is interesting that the two countries from Oceania have very simi-
lar patterns. Thus, they seem to share a common press coverage culture which reflects a mod-
erately high fulfillment of the vertical function’s component 1 only and quite low scores on 
the other two factors. Hence, these two countries are clearly set apart from other liberal model 
representatives, which was already visible in figure 6.1, at least in the second graph. This 
might suggest that they should not be counted to this type of media system after all but rather 
constitute a new, distinct regional model. However, since most newspapers from Ireland are 
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also found in this cluster, the ties to the Anglo-Saxon world are still evident. If we aggregated 
the mean values of the three factors in table 6.6 for each cluster by again taking their average, 
cluster 4 would receive the lowest score. Thus, it can be considered the worst performing 
group of newspapers with regard to the normative standards of the vertical and the horizontal 
media function. At least one of the Irish broadsheets, however, fares somewhat better and 
falls into cluster 3.  
6.4 Conclusion 
While the previous chapter 5 focused on the structural level, the aim of this chapter was to 
study media performance on the content level, i.e., in terms of the press coverage of 50 daily 
newspapers from ten different countries. In a first step, it was tested whether the nine indica-
tors, which were deduced from normative theory, actually measure the vertical and the hori-
zontal media function according to the conceptual framework defined in chapter 3. In a simi-
lar vein as in chapter 5, the exploratory factor analysis in section 6.1 returned three rather than 
two latent dimensions. Nevertheless, this three-dimensional structure is still very much in line 
with the theoretical model of media content performance. While one of the factors represents 
the horizontal function, the vertical function divides into its two components (see table 3.1). 
Hence, one factor corresponds to the amount of critical information about political affairs, and 
the other reproduces the balance of information about the different constitutional branches as 
well as the public administration. In sum, both the indicators defined on the structural and the 
content level largely validate the theoretical conceptualization of mass media’s normative role 
in a democracy developed in chapter 3.  
The factor analysis was conducted on the basis of individual newspapers. The aim of the pre-
sent study, however, is to make assumptions about differences of democratic media perfor-
mance across countries. The rest of the chapter therefore dealt with the question of whether 
media performance on the content level is rather determined by outlet- or country-specific 
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characteristics and what kind of country patterns can be identified. Perhaps the most im-
portant conclusion to draw from the respective analyses is that although all of them were per-
formed at the level of individual newspapers, not countries, the macro context does indeed 
always matter. Hence, countries are more or less consistent and homogenous regarding the 
quality of their press coverage. This has been shown in the descriptive and regression anal-
yses of section 6.2 as well as the scatter plots and the cluster analysis in section 6.3. 
At the same time, the findings also indicate that the role of specific newspaper characteristics 
cannot be neglected either (see section 6.2.2). Especially the distinction between regional 
newspapers on the one hand and broadsheet or quality papers on the other, as well as a news-
paper’s size in terms of circulation seems to explain some of the variation among media or-
ganizations with regard to their different scores on the two media functions.  
However, country differences appear to be more important in general. Overall, country-
specific variables were found to have a stronger impact on the factor scores for the horizontal 
and the vertical media function. A particularly striking result of this chapter is that the media 
performance of the horizontal function on the structural level has a significant and positive 
relationship with media performance of the horizontal function on the content level. The same 
also holds for the first component of the vertical function. In addition, the three models of 
media systems by Hallin and Mancini (2004) as well as Lijphart’s (1999) two dimensions of 
democracy also exhibited significant and mostly the expected effects on some of the factor 
scores for media content performance. Finally, whether a country is in an election year as well 
as its level of corruption also seems to be decisive for newspapers’ degree of fulfillment of the 
two normative functions. It must also be noted, however, that while the horizontal function 
and the vertical function’s first component could be predicted reasonably well, the second 
component of the vertical function was largely left unexplained. 
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Studying and interpreting the different patterns and constellations of the dimensions of media 
performance in each of the ten countries was the focus of section 6.3. The typology by Hallin 
and Mancini (2004) proved to be a helpful frame of reference for this. A comparison of my 
findings from the graphical and the cluster analysis with the authors’ classification suggests 
some congruencies. Hence, it seems that liberal countries, especially the ideal case United 
States, tend to fare better when it comes to the vertical media function, which requires the 
media to provide much and critical political information about all constitutional branches to 
equal degrees. This might be explained by the strong traditions of investigative journalism 
and checks and balances within this type. Democratic corporatist countries, by contrast, ex-
hibit a higher performance with regard to the horizontal function but, in some cases and to 
lower degrees, also the vertical function’s second component, which asks for a well-balanced 
coverage of all institutions of democratic decision-making and implementation. This might be 
attributed to a long-established culture of power sharing in the respective countries. As for 
polarized pluralist countries, no clear-cut conclusion is possible. This is mainly because only 
one country within my sample, namely France, represents this model. France, however, could 
not be clearly located within my framework, and its cases are thus distributed across two dif-
ferent groups in the cluster analysis. This may not come as a surprise given that France is not 
considered to be an ideal example of this third model by Hallin and Mancini (2004) them-
selves. The same holds true for the United Kingdom, which splits into two clusters and is also 
not regarded as a clear representative of the liberal model by the authors. 
The cluster analysis revealed further deviations from the authors’ famous classification. Ire-
land, for example, does not cluster with other liberal model states but rather constitutes a new 
type together with Australia and New Zealand. Moreover, Canada does not fall into the same 
newspaper group as its fellow liberal countries. Instead, it forms a group with cases from the 
democratic corporatist countries Austria and Germany. Hence, there is also no purely demo-
cratic corporatist cluster according to the content analysis data provided in this study.  
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To conclude, according to the findings from the cluster analysis, the following summary – and 
tentative – statements about the level of media content performance of the ten countries can 
be made. The best performance seems to be achieved by the American press, along with the 
two more quality newspapers from France and Britain. Austria and Canada as well as the two 
German quality dailies come in second. The second lowest level of media performance on the 
content level may be attributed to Switzerland, the regional and tabloid papers from France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom as well as the “Irish Times”. Finally, Australia, New Zea-
land and three of the four Irish outlets perform worst overall. It should be borne in mind that 
this is a rough and simplified synopsis and does not say anything about the variance of news-
papers within the same cluster though. As discussed above, especially Switzerland’s position 
in the typology is somewhat misleading since the cluster analysis disregarded its positive per-
formance of the horizontal media function. 
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Chapter 7:  
The impact of mass media on the quality of estab-
lished democracies
The first part of this book focused on defining, measuring and analyzing democratic media 
performance both in terms of the structural and the content level. Building on those findings, 
the second part of the present study moves on to the question whether and to what extent dif-
ferences in the countries’ fulfillment of the vertical and the horizontal media function actually 
matter for the well-functioning of democratic processes. 
Quite obviously, the normative requirements which are imposed on mass media and which 
were discussed in chapter 3 originate from the assumption that democracies rely on systems 
of mass communication to work properly. Similarly, most of the concerns expressed with re-
spect to the democratic performance of mass media systems are based on the idea that when 
media fail to comply with their democratic role this has serious negative ramifications for 
democratic governance. And even though media scholars do not agree on really how bad 
things are (see chapter 1), they all seem to agree that the relationship between the two con-
cepts is of substantial importance. However, as described in chapter 2, if and how media per-
formance is empirically associated with the quality of democracy has rarely been examined in 
a comparative and comprehensive framework. Few of the existing cross-national studies ex-
plicitly refer to media performance on the basis of normative standards and think more broad-
ly about its complex interaction with democratic processes. In other words, most of the com-
parative media research only focuses on one specific aspect of relevance to democracy like 
electoral participation or corruption. Part II of this book, which is composed of this and the 
subsequent chapter, therefore makes an attempt to explore the manifold links between media 
performance and various elements of democracy in a more systematic fashion. Chapter 7 de-
rives the respective theoretical expectations and explains the data and methods used. Chapter 
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8 then presents the empirical analyses which are estimated to test these hypotheses. This will 
hopefully shed more light onto whether democratic media performance – at least as conceptu-
alized and measured here – is something to care and worry about at all.  
The present chapter is structured as follows. First, we need to define what conditions democ-
racies have to meet in order to have a high quality. For this purpose, I draw heavily on the 
concept of the Democracy Barometer (see Bühlmann et al. 2011a, 2012). Second, based on 
this multifaceted concept of democratic systems and processes as well as on the theoretical 
model developed in chapter 3, hypotheses about the influence of media performance on four 
different elements of democracy are deduced. More specifically, it shall argue that a high ful-
fillment of the vertical media function should be especially beneficial for political participa-
tion and transparency. Horizontal media function performance, by contrast, is considered to 
mainly promote the strength of the civil society and the adequacy of political representation 
within a democracy. Finally, section 7.3 covers the data and methods used in chapter 8 to test 
the hypotheses. 
7.1 Defining the quality of democracy 
Following Scharpf (1970, 1999), the democratic process can be divided into an input and an 
output side. The former focuses on the constitution of representative governments while the 
latter focuses on policy making (Kriesi et al. 2007: 5). On the input side, the preferences and 
opinions of citizens are picked up, aggregated and articulated by intermediary actors such as 
interest groups, social movements and political parties. Parties further transform them into 
political programs with which they enter the electoral contest. Powell (2004a: 92, 97) calls 
this process “structuring choices”. From this offer of choices, voters elect the political repre-
sentatives according to their preferences. On the output side, the elected representatives are – 
sometimes in consultation with experts and other intermediary actors – responsible for decid-
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ing on collectively binding laws on behalf of their constituents (Kriesi et al. 2007). This pro-
cess can be illustrated by a simple model of representative democracy (see figure 1).  
Figure 7.1 Model of representative democracy (Kriesi et al. 2007: 7) 
 
 
The input and output sides are linked by the mechanisms of responsiveness and accountabil-
ity. First, the political elites are supposed to consider the preferences of their voters (respon-
siveness). Second, if the political representatives do not act responsively and their policies are 
not in line with the citizens’ demands, the latter have the possibility to throw the former out of 
office and replace them with better suitable candidates at the next election (accountability). 
However, in order for these processes to work as they should, certain requirements have to be 
fulfilled in democratic regimes. Accordingly, Bühlmann et al. (2011a, 2012) define nine as-
pects which need to be optimized to guarantee a high quality of democracy.
70
  
First, to actually act as citizens and to be able to form preferences independently, people need 
basic and effective individual liberties protecting them from interference by the state and by 
fellow citizens. In a similar vein, the rule of law is supposed to defend citizens from arbitrary 
governance in that it guarantees the equality before the law and an efficient and professional 
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 The authors actually speak of nine “functions” but in order to avoid confusion with the vertical and the hori-
zontal media function, they will mostly be referred to as ‘aspects’ or ‘elements’ here. Moreover, these nine ele-
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(see Bühlmann et al. 2011a).  
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legal system (Bühlmann et al. 2011a: 6). Third, the articulation and aggregation of citizens’ 
wants requires a strong public sphere function or in other words, effective freedom of associa-
tion and opinion. This means that there should be a vibrant civil society and the possibility for 
an open public discourse (Beetham 2004: 62). Fourth, the adequate representation of as many 
people as possible in the political arena is crucial for a high responsiveness of policy making. 
All members of a political community should be represented in the political system both in a 
substantive and descriptive sense (Mansbridge 1999; Powell 2004b; Urbinati and Warren 
2008). Moreover, citizens should actually use their political rights so that effective political 
participation, in conventional as well as unconventional forms, is not only generally high but 
also equal across different social classes (Lijphart 1997; Rueschemeyer 2004; Teorell 2006). 
This should contribute to form a truly representative and responsive government. Sixth, an-
other prerequisite for the well-functioning of democratic processes, especially for accountabil-
ity, is the transparency of the political system. „The essence of representative democracy is 
informed consent, which requires that information about government practices and policies be 
disclosed” (Florini 2007: 3). The most important condition for accountability, however, is the 
effective competition in elections. This is because voters who are dissatisfied with those in 
power need to be able to replace them in elections. But this is only possible if alternative party 
options actually exist and if electoral contests are open to new interests and competitors (Bar-
tolini 1999, 2000). Eighth, while the representatives in parliament are in charge of policy 
making, it is the executive’s turn to implement these policies. In order to do so efficiently, it 
should have effective governmental capability in terms of resources and capacity (Bühlmann 
et al. 2011a: 7). Finally, to make sure that those in power abide by the democratic rules, the 
main constitutional powers should be divided and constantly check each other. Thus, parallel 
to the vertical control by the people, they should impose horizontal control or mutual con-
straints on each other (Bühlmann et al. 2011a: 7). 
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Media performance might have an influence on several if not all of these nine democratic el-
ements and hence also foster the overall quality of a democracy. In the following section, 
however, I explain why I only focus on four of the nine dimensions. Furthermore, I will de-
rive hypotheses about how those four are expected to be related to the vertical or the horizon-
tal media function. 
7.2 Hypotheses 
One could assume that in order to gauge the relationship between media and democracy, it 
may be reasonable to simply estimate the effect of media performance on an overall index of 
democracy. However, this would fall short because democracy is a complex, multidimension-
al concept. Hence, neither the vertical nor the horizontal media function is likely to affect all 
of the nine elements of democratic quality to equal extents. And even if one assumes that a 
good media performance generally contributes to democracy, due to their different logics, the 
two media functions might not have the same or equally strong impacts on the various ele-
ments of democracy. Instead, this section argues that media performance in terms of the verti-
cal function mainly benefits democracy with respect to political participation and transparen-
cy whereas media performance in terms of the horizontal function promotes the quality of 
democracy particularly by strengthening the civil society – the first component of what was 
labeled ‘public sphere’ in section 7.1 above – and political representation. These assumptions 
follow directly from the considerations and justifications for the two media functions dis-
cussed in chapter 3. They are subsequently outlined in more detail. It already needs to be 
pointed out, however, that testing the suggested hypotheses may pose some difficulties since 
establishing cause and effect is not always clear-cut in the field of media and democracy. 
These difficulties will be discussed in section 7.3.2 below. 
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7.2.1 The impact of the vertical media function 
As described in chapter 3, the vertical media function’s goal is disseminating information. On 
the one hand, this should help all citizens gain the knowledge and incentives they need to par-
ticipate in the political process. On the other hand, disclosing and spreading information about 
political affairs makes the activities of the incumbents transparent to citizens, which ultimate-
ly stimulates accountability. For these reasons, the vertical media function is assumed to in-
crease participation and transparency in a democracy.  
Political participation 
According to Bühlmann et al. (2011a, 2012), political participation has a dual meaning for the 
quality of democracy. Conventional and unconventional participation does not only need to 
be high in general but also equal in terms of personal resources and characteristics. The level 
and equality of participation are of course related to each other, because if a lot of people par-
ticipate in politics, socio-economic gaps in political engagement are less likely. Consequently, 
a turnout of 100 percent would correspond to full equality of participation across different 
societal groups (assuming universal suffrage is given). Nevertheless, the two concepts are not 
the same thing. Especially at lower levels, an increase in participation does not necessarily go 
hand in hand with more equality. Similarly, growing equality may but does not automatically 
mean that more people participate. It is therefore appropriate to treat these two aspects of par-
ticipation separately. 
As for the level of participation, a widespread access to channels of communication that are 
rich in political content, as required by the vertical media function, reduces the information 
and consequently the opportunity costs for citizens to cast a vote (Baek 2009: 377f.). Moreo-
ver, media are not only assumed to influence individuals’ behavior directly but also indirectly 
via interpersonal communication, i.e., by providing information for citizens’ social networks 
(Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955; Schmitt-Beck and Mackenrodt, 2010: 392). By surveying the 
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elected elite and by making the results of this scrutiny easily available to everyone, media 
allow and motivate citizens to retrospectively hold representatives accountable in elections 
and recognize whether they consider their preferences even between elections (Kriesi et al. 
2007: 6). Hence, if media perform well in terms of the vertical function they should raise po-
litical interest, people’s awareness of what is at stake as well as their ability to choose their 
preferred representatives and vote inapt officials out of office. This is essentially what the so-
called mobilization theory holds (see chapter 1; Baek 2009: 376). In short, a high diffusion 
and amount of political information is supposed to enable and mobilize more citizens to take 
part in politics (Norris 2000: 29f.): 
H1a: The higher the extent to which media fulfill the vertical function, the higher is political 
participation. 
 
Furthermore, it is expected that media enhance the level of participation mainly because they 
increase the equality of participation. In other words, especially those segments of the popula-
tion that are traditionally less inclined to take part in politics are mobilized by a high media 
performance in terms of the vertical function. It has long been suggested that those with fewer 
resources, e.g. in terms of education and income, and less motivation to participate, such as 
low political interest, actually tend to be most affected by public communication (Van Kemp-
en 2007; Zaller 1992). Hence, when mass media disseminate relevant and critical information 
about political affairs widely among the population, they should operate as an equalizing in-
stitution which lowers socio-economic gaps in political participation (Shehata 2010: 298). 
Thus, while highly sophisticated citizens are likely to engage in politics regardless of the in-
formation environment, citizens who are usually underrepresented among voters and partici-
pants have more incentives to take to the polls or to the streets if media perform their infor-
mation and watchdog function well. 
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H1b: The higher the extent to which media fulfill the vertical function, the more equal is 
political participation. 
In sum, media can enhance both the level and equality of participation, provided that the ac-
cess to mass media is widespread and media actually cover the political process. 
Transparency 
Media are also considered to be important for the transparency of the political system if they 
make the political process and especially policy making visible in the public sphere. „Trans-
parency can be regarded as the openness of institutions, that is, the degree to which outsiders 
(such as citizens or stockholders) can monitor and evaluate the actions of insiders (such as 
government officials or corporate managers)” (Kaufmann and Bellver 2005: 5). This requires 
open communication on the part of decisions makers, both proactively and in response to re-
quests, as well as the absence of secrecy (Florini 2007: 5f.). Secrecy is motivated by the fear 
of being accused of mistakes but also the pursuit of vested interests, and often leads to corrup-
tion (Florini 2007: 6f.; Stiglitz 1999). The absence of corruption can therefore be taken as 
evidence for a transparent democratic regime. Lindstedt and Naurin (2005) argue that in order 
to reduce corruption, information first of all needs to be openly available. This is what they 
call “transparency”. However, according to the authors, transparency is ineffective without 
“publicity”. Hence, transparent information does not only need to exist but also be distributed 
to and absorbed by a broader public (Lindstedt and Naurin 2005: 8). Only this induces offi-
cials to worry about being held accountable and/or actually leads to sanctions by the elec-
torate. Lindstedt and Naurin (2005) conceptualize transparency and publicity by a country’s 
degree of media freedom and education. But this neglects that publicity closely depends on 
the dissemination of information as measured by the vertical media function in the present 
study (see also Adserà et al. 2003). Hence, rather than assessing publicity by citizens’ levels 
of education – as a proxy of their competence to process information – vertical media func-
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tion performance should be taken into account as a determinant of the prevalence of transpar-
ency and corruption. 
In short, by reporting on the actions of office-holders and by providing the infrastructure for 
the broad diffusion of such information across the society, mass media are assumed to exert 
pressure on the political system that leads to a reduction of corruption and more transparent 
government communication (Brunetti and Weder 2003: 1804f.; Chowdhury 2004: 93f.; Gra-
ber 2003: 147; Stiglitz 1999).  
H2:  The higher the extent to which media fulfill the vertical function, the higher is trans-
parency. 
7.2.2 The impact of the horizontal media function 
As discussed in chapter 3, the goal of the horizontal media function is to establish diversity. 
This means that mass media should provide a public forum that allows all political actors to 
express their interests through a multitude of different channels. Applied to the model of the 
democratic process sketched above, this might be important for the articulation of preferences 
by citizens and intermediary actors as well as the inclusion of those preferences into the arena 
of political decision making. Accordingly, the horizontal media function is assumed to 
strengthen the civil society and improve political representation. 
Civil society organization 
According to the Democracy Barometer, a strong civil society in terms of a high degree of 
collective organization is important for the quality of democracy with respect to the public 
sphere function.
71
 A vibrant civil society should not only help political parties to form pro-
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 In fact, the civil society – or “freedom of association” as it is called by Bühlmann et al. (2011a: 6) – only co-
vers one component of the public sphere function within the concept of the Democracy Barometer. However, the 
second component – the “freedom of opinion” – is largely congruent with media performance in terms of the 
horizontal media function in this study. For this reason, chapters 7 and 8 are obviously confined to the aspect of 
civil society. Nevertheless, the fact that civil society and media diversity are subsumed under the same larger 
concept in the Democracy Barometer points to the appropriateness of hypothesis 3. 
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grams that are in line with public opinion, it may also foster the responsiveness of incum-
bents. But what or what kind of collective organizations exactly constitute the civil society 
seems to be debated in the literature (Chambers and Kymlicka 2002: 2f.; Foley and Edwards 
1996: 38). In this book the concept is used to refer to the „density of associations with politi-
cal and public interests” (Bühlmann et al. 2011a: 6). This includes the frequency of member-
ships in all kinds of intermediary organizations, namely associations representing vested in-
terests, such as professional organizations or trade unions, as well as non-profit organizations 
like for example environmental or human rights groups.  
The power and capacity of public and special interest groups to influence the political elites 
relies to a high degree on “outside lobbying” (Kollman 1998). This means that they need pub-
lic attention in order to make themselves heard by political decision makers and, more im-
portantly, in order to mobilize supporters. The larger their base of supporters, the more legit-
imate it is for intermediary associations to assert political claims (Vliegenthart et al. 2005: 
367), and the more costly it becomes for politicians not to respond to those. Thus, media can 
empower the civil society by providing a diverse forum which grants all intermediary organi-
zations room to publicly articulate their preferences and interests. 
However, not all civil society organizations rely on public attention to an equal extent. As 
Binderkrantz (2008) shows, “groups with corporative resources” such as trade unions or busi-
ness associations are better able to directly influence the bureaucracy and political office-
holders than public interest groups. Nevertheless, even these organizations need to regularly 
recruit new members, and at least for this purpose, public visibility is still important to them. 
Hence, it can be expected that if a country’s media system as well as its media coverage is 
characterized by a high degree of diversity, i.e., media performance in terms of the horizontal 
function is high, the number of supporters for various intermediary organizations should grow 
and civil society thereby become stronger. 
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H3:  The higher the extent to which media fulfill the horizontal function, the stronger is the 
civil society. 
This hypothesis may in fact be the most difficult to test because a major problem of reverse 
causality can be suspected. I will come back to this issue later in this chapter (see 7.3.2). 
Political representation 
Media diversity should not only lead to more interest group organization but is also assumed 
to foster political representation. Adequate representation requires the inclusion of as many 
citizen preferences as possible into the political decision-making arena so that representatives 
act on behalf of the represented (Powell 2004b: 273). Different forms of representation are 
discussed in the literature. Most important is the distinction between descriptive and substan-
tive representation. Descriptive representation means that the socio-demographic composition 
of the legislative and maybe the executive branch of government reflects the socio-
demographic composition of the population at large (Mansbridge 1999: 629). This is most 
often called for with respect to women and ethnic minorities (Urbinati and Warren 2008: 
388). Substantive representation, by contrast, „means that citizens’ issue preferences should 
correspond to the positions or behavior of their representatives” (Powell 2004b: 274). 
I argue that effective representation, according to both meanings, hinges on whether the varie-
ty as well as the distinctions of political alternatives become evident to constituents. In other 
words, the probability of adequate representation increases if citizens can actually identify – 
and elect – the political parties and candidates who are likely to represent them best, both in 
descriptive and substantive terms. This is where media diversity is supposed to make a differ-
ence. Media can clarify the supply of political choices by giving all of them a platform to pre-
sent and contrast their different positions (Boomgarden and Vliegenthart 2007: 407; Kriesi et 
al. 2007: 6). This is especially important for agents of discriminated minorities, who might be 
able to escape marginalization by publicly voicing their grievances and mobilizing supporters. 
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Obviously, a well-balanced public visibility of all political competitors can be expected in 
particular from mass media that are dedicated to diversity in their news coverage and of media 
systems that are composed of a large variety of different news outlets. Hence, a high fulfill-
ment of the horizontal media function might help voters to select those alternatives which are 
in fact most compatible with themselves and their preferences and, consequently, lead to a 
better congruence of political positions and of socio-demographic characteristics between the 
representatives and the represented.  
H4:  The higher the extent to which media fulfill the horizontal function, the more adequate 
is political representation. 
 
As the discussion in this section has shown, four main hypotheses (H1 to H4) will be tested in 
chapter 8, with the first of these divided into the two sub-hypotheses H1a and H1b. But before 
we move on to the empirical analyses, the following section describes the data and methods 
used in part II of this book and also discusses potential endogeneity concerns. 
7.3 Data and methods 
Since part II of the present study is interested in the influence of democratic media perfor-
mance, as developed in chapters 3 through 6, the scores from the latent factors for the vertical 
and the horizontal media function serve as the main independent variables in chapter 8. Alt-
hough the hypotheses specified in section 7.2 only expect one of the two media functions to 
contribute to political participation, transparency, the civil society and political representation, 
I will always control for the impact of the respective other media function at the same time. 
Thereby, we can test whether the two media functions really have different impacts and study 
how overall democratic media performance affects the four aspects of democracy. If norma-
tive theories are right, we might assume generally positive effects of media performance, even 
though to their strengths should differ for the two media functions according to H1 to H4. 
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Unfortunately, data for media performance on the content level is only available for ten coun-
tries. This is certainly not enough to perform multivariate analysis. The empirical analyses in 
the next chapter will therefore have to be confined to media performance on the structural 
level or more precisely, the factor values derived from the results shown in tables 5.1 and 5.2.  
The data used for the dependent and the control variables for every of the five hypotheses is 
described in the following section 7.3.1. Thereafter, I will specify the methods applied as well 
as discuss possible challenges involved in testing the assumed causal relationships in section 
7.3.2. 
7.3.1 Data 
The dependent variables for H1 to H4 are taken from the Democracy Barometer dataset 
(Bühlmann et al. 2011a, 2012).
72
 The control variables, by contrast, come from different 
sources and are collected by the author. The Democracy Barometer is a relatively new instru-
ment designed to overcome the deficiencies of previous indices of democracy (see Munck and 
Verkuilen 2002; Müller and Pickel 2007) and to measure the subtle differences in the quality 
of established democracies. Based on a comprehensive theoretical concept, the quality of de-
mocracy is systematically and stepwise disaggregated to more concrete levels: from three 
fundamental principles to nine functions, 18 components, 51 sub-components and finally, 100 
indicators, mostly from secondary data sources. Every component includes indicators that 
assess the existence of institutions or legal foundations (rules in law) as well as the constitu-
tional reality (rules in practice). Since media performance is unlikely to affect the former in a 
straightforward way, only ‘rules in practice’ are considered in this study.  
The Democracy Barometer dataset currently contains data for 30 democracies and the years 
1990 to 2007. The full dataset as well as the codebook and a documentation of the methodol-
ogy can be downloaded from the project website (see footnote 72). Data has already been 
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 See also http://www.democracybarometer.org/ (08/28/2012). 
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collected for additional countries as well as up to 2008 by the research team. This extended 
dataset has not yet been published but was available to the author. Hence, the data is almost 
complete for all of the 47 cases from the large sample and the full time series from 1990 to 
2008.  
The specific indicators used to construct the dependent variables are now discussed separately 
for every hypothesis. Whenever the dependent variable is a composite index of various indi-
cators, all indicators were first standardized to a scale ranging from 0 to 100 according to best 
practice within the 47-country sample, following the approach of Bühlmann et al. (2011a: 
9).
73
 An overview of the raw indicators and their sources can also be found in table A7.1 in 
the appendix, and they are all described in detail in Bühlmann et al. (2011b).  
Political participation 
The participation function from the Democracy Barometer is composed of eleven indicators. 
Only seven of them are used for the present study because the other three measure rules in 
law.  
The level of participation, as required by H1a, is measured by an index that consists of three 
indicators. The first equals the average of a country’s turnout rates in parliamentary and pres-
idential elections as well as national referenda, if the latter two exist. Referenda are only 
counted in the years in which they take place, but electoral turnout rates are copied to the fol-
lowing years up to the next election. The main data sources are the voter turnout database 
from IDEA and the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU).
74
 The other two indicators for the level 
of participation measure involvement in alternative forms of participation, namely petitions 
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 Hence, in every indicator, the lowest value within in the 893 country-years (47 countries x 19 years) was re-
coded into 0 and the highest into 100. All values in between were adjusted accordingly. 
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 IDEA: http://www.idea.int/vt/ (07/11/2012); IPU Parline Database: http://www.ipu.org/parline/ (08/28/2012). 
Further data sources are listed in Bühlmann et al. (2011b). 
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and demonstrations. This is operationalized by data from various cross-national surveys.
75
 
More specifically, the values of the indicators equal the shares of respondents who indicate 
that they have signed petitions and attended lawful demonstrations, respectively. These two 
indicators for alternative participation were first standardized (see above) and averaged. The 
resulting means were then again averaged with the standardized turnout indicator, in order to 
get an overall variable for the level of political participation.  
The dependent variable for H1b, reflecting the equality of participation, is a composite index 
of four indicators which are all constructed from survey data as well (see footnote 75 for 
sources). Again, both conventional and unconventional forms of participation are considered. 
The first two indicators measure socio-economic (income and education) and demographic 
(age and gender) gaps in electoral participation. More specifically, they compare the distribu-
tions of different income and education as well as gender and age groups among all respond-
ents in a survey and only those who said they voted in the last national election, in order to 
assess the over- and underrepresentation of these groups among voters. The exact calculation 
procedure is described in Bühlmann et al. (2011b). The two indicators for the equality of un-
conventional participation in socio-economic and demographic terms follow the same ap-
proach for respondents’ engagement in petitions and lawful demonstrations. For the overall 
index of equality of participation, the four indicators were standardized (see footnote 73) and 
averaged. Hence, with regard to both the level and the equality of participation, operating 
with combined measures for conventional and unconventional participation is preferred over 
testing H1a and H1b separately for the two forms of participation. This is because, on the one 
hand, this study is interested in the general amount and equality of political participation. On 
                                                 
75
 All waves of the following surveys were considered and used if they included the required items: Asia Barom-
eter, Asian Barometer, Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Eurobarometer, European Election Study, Eu-
ropean Social Survey, International Social Survey, Latin American Public Opinion Project, Latinobarómetro and 
World Values Survey. 
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the other hand, having four instead of two dependent variables would make the analyses in 
chapter 8 rather difficult to manage. 
The media performance factor scores, and especially the ones for the vertical media function, 
obviously constitute the independent variables of interest. In addition, four control variables 
are included into the set of explanatory variables. First, the access to mass media might be 
widespread because political interest is generally high. After all, demand determines supply at 
least to some extent and, the structural indicators for the vertical media function might be 
considered as reflecting media consumption patterns within a society. At the same time, polit-
ical interest should have a positive effect on political participation. However, media do not 
only carry political information but also economic, sports and general human interest news or 
– at least in the case of electronic media – fiction and music. Their diffusion might thus be 
rather driven by the people’s desire for entertainment than their thirst for political knowledge. 
Nevertheless, controlling for the average level of political interest in a country seems reason-
able. Like most of the dependent variables for H1a and H1b, political interest is measured by 
survey data from the Asian Barometer (AsnB), Eurobarometer (EB), European Social Survey 
(ESS), International Social Survey (ISS), Latinobarómetro (LB) and World Values Survey 
(WVS). The indicator counts the average share of respondents who indicated to be “very” or 
“somewhat interested in politics”.76 
Of course, there are many more possible determinants for the equality and especially the level 
of political participation, as the literature in this field suggests (Blais 2006; Franklin 2004; 
Teorell 2006). On the macro level, the effects of political institutions (such as the type of elec-
toral system or compulsory voting), the party system (the number of parties and the degree of 
electoral competition) and socio-economic conditions (e.g. a country’s economic perfor-
mance) on participation have been studied extensively, even if with very mixed results (see 
                                                 
76
 The question wording differs somewhat across surveys, but the answer scales always range from 1 to 4. 
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Blais 2006). I therefore further control for whether countries have a proportional representa-
tion (PR) electoral system and compulsory voting to account for political institutions as well 
as at least partially the party system (PR usually coincides with a multi-party system). Addi-
tionally, two country dummy variables are included. Switzerland and the United States have 
generally low turnout rates for institutional reasons (voter registration and direct democracy), 
and comparative electoral researchers thus often include dummies for these two countries into 
their regression models. 
PR is simply measured by a dummy variable which takes the value 1 in countries where par-
liamentary seats are predominantly assigned according to proportional representation. The 
respective information comes from Beck et al. (2001) as well as IDEA’s Electoral Systems 
Design Database
77
. It is constant over time for all countries except New Zealand, which 
switched from plurality to proportional voting in the early 1990s. 
Compulsory voting also consists of a time-constant dummy variable which adopts the value 1 
in countries where citizens are legally obligated to participate in elections, regardless of 
whether and how strictly noncompliance is sanctioned.
78
 The sources for this variable are the 
ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, IDEA and the IPU.
79
 
Finally, a country’s level of prosperity might have been important to include in order to con-
sider socio-economic conditions. Yet, tests have shown that GDP per capita has no effect on 
participation when controlling for political interest in the country sample studied here. For 
this reason, rather than as a control variable, GDP per capita will be used as an instrumental 
variable in the analyses of H1 (see sections 7.3.2 and 8.1). 
                                                 
77
 http://www.idea.int/esd/search.cfm (08/28/2008). 
78
 However, the models were also estimated with variables where compulsory voting was only counted when it is 
1) enforced and 2) strictly enforced. The results are essentially the same. 
79
 ACE: http://aceproject.org/epic-en/CDTable?question=LF004&set_language=en (08/28/2012); IDEA: 
http://www.idea.int/vt/compulsory_voting.cfm (08/28/2012). 
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Transparency 
The function ‘transparency’ is measured by nine indicators in the Democracy Barometer. 
However, most of them cannot be used in this context because they capture the existence and 
design of laws (e.g. concerning freedom of information legislation or the financing of political 
parties) or should rather be used as control variables than as dependent variables (media free-
dom). 
Hence, transparency is simply operationalized as the absence of corruption. As outlined 
above, the two concepts are closely related, and corruption can be considered a result of failed 
or insufficient transparency. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency In-
ternational, which was already used in chapter 6, will therefore serve as dependent variable 
for H2.
80
 The CPI is constructed from corruption ratings of about ten different institutes, 
which are based on either assessments of country analysts or surveys of businesspeople. Of 
course, every CPI source uses its own conceptualization of corruption, but overall, the CPI 
claims to capture the extent of „the misuse of public power for private benefit, for example 
bribing of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, or embezzlement of public 
funds” (Graf Lambsdorff 2008: 4). The CPI scale ranges from 0 to 10, whereby higher values 
mean less corruption. 
In addition to the media performance variables, two control variables are included in the 
models testing H2. Both of them are consistently used in studies of corruption (Treisman 
2007). The first is an index for media freedom as provided by Freedom House and as already 
used in chapter 5.
81
 According to Lindstedt and Naurin (2005), free and independent media 
are crucial to deter public officials from being corrupt, especially in combination with “pub-
licity”. Moreover, media can only effectively promote transparency if they are able to operate 
freely. Like in chapter 5, chapter 8 uses Freedom House’s overall press freedom score, which 
                                                 
80
 Transparency International: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi (08/28/2012) 
81
 Freedom House: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-press (08/28/2012). 
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consists of three sub-indices for legal, political and economic restrictions of media’s free op-
eration. The index ranges from 0 to 100 and was reversed so that higher values indicate more 
media freedom. The second control variable is GDP per capita since corruption is more likely 
to take place in poorer countries. As in previous chapters, GDP per capita figures are taken 
from the World Bank.
82
  
Civil society 
The strength of the civil society is part of the public sphere function of the Democracy Ba-
rometer. The average values of two indicators reflecting the degree of collective organization 
of both special and public interests are used as dependent variable for hypothesis 3. 
The first indicator measures a country’s trade union density. More specifically, it indicates the 
share of salary earners who are members in a trade or labor union. The main data sources are 
the databases of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the OECD as well as Golden 
et al. (2009) and Visser (2011).
83
 
The second indicator measures the degree of membership in a specific category of public in-
terest organizations. For this purpose, it once again relies on data from cross-national opinion 
surveys. Hence, the indicator records the share of respondents who indicate that they are 
member in and/or active for an environmental or animal rights organization. Since this is not 
regularly asked in representative surveys, data only comes from the following sources: EB, 
ESS, LB and WVS. No data for this item is available for Mongolia in the WVS, which means 
that the sample only consists of 46 countries in the analyses for H3. 
Four control variables are added to the explanatory variables for civil society organization. 
The first is the aggregate level of generalized or interpersonal trust. According to the relevant 
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 World Bank database: http://databank.worldbank.org (08/28/2012). 
83
 ILO LABORSTA database: http://laborsta.ilo.org/xls_data_E.html (08/28/2012). OECD database: 
http://stats.oecd.org/ (08/28/2012). Further data sources are listed in the Democracy Barometer codebook 
(Bühlmann et al. 2011b). 
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literature (e.g. Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993), generalized trust and membership in associa-
tions are closely related and form two components of the same concept – social capital. This 
indicator is composed of the share of respondents indicating to generally trust other people in 
various international surveys.
84
  
Second, GDP per capita once again seems to be a necessary control variable. This is because 
in more favorable economic environments, people probably have more resources to support – 
especially public – interest associations. Finally, just like media structures, the civil society 
and especially the organizational strength of labor unions are determined by a country’s his-
torical context and its political culture. Hence, country-specific or regional factors should be 
taken into account. This is especially crucial for two groups of countries. On the one hand, 
Scandinavian countries traditionally have very high degrees of union density. In addition, they 
are also well-known for their strong press sector. Thus, a Nordic dummy (which takes the 
value 1 for Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) is included into the models for 
civil society in chapter 8, to make sure that any association between the horizontal function 
and civil society is not inflated by these rather extreme cases. On the other hand, the former 
socialist or communist countries in the sample might actually distort the analyses of H3 in the 
opposite direction. While they are also characterized by a quite high degree of union member-
ship – at least in the earlier years of the period of investigation – they score rather low in 
terms of structural media performance. The fourth control variable therefore consists of a 
dummy for the former socialist countries Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
                                                 
84
 In the AsnB, the LB and the WVS, this is just a binary variable contrasting “most people can be trusted” with 
“you can’t be too careful”, whereas the ESS measures this question on a scale ranging from 0 (“can’t be too 
careful”) to 10 (“most people can be trusted”). Values 6 and higher were coded as being trustful. In the ISS, 
finally, the trust question has four response categories, and the percentages of the two categories on the trusting 
side were added (“people can always be trusted” and “people can usually be trusted”). 
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Representation 
Finally, the function ‘representation’ consists of ten indicators in the Democracy Barometer, 
two of which are considered to be most susceptible to media effects. One is a measure for 
substantive representation, the other stands for descriptive representation. Both were standard-
ized to a range from 0 to 100 and averaged in order to have a single index for political repre-
sentation as the dependent variable in H4. 
The indicator for substantive representation assesses the issue-congruence of voters and rep-
resentatives. To be more precise, it measures the congruence between the electorate and na-
tional assemblies in terms of the distribution of left and right positions among their members. 
To simplify the measurement and comparison, positions of both voters and members of par-
liament were classified into the three broad categories “left”, “middle” and “right”. Ideologi-
cal positions within the electorate were determined by individuals’ self-placement on the left-
right scale in various international surveys.
85
 Positions within the parliament correspond to 
the positions of the parties represented in parliament. The distribution of these positions is 
simply based on parties’ seat shares. Party positions were mainly taken from the Comparative 
Manifestos Project.
86
 The possible range of the final issue-congruence indicator is 0 to 100, 
and higher values indicate higher issue-congruence (for the exact calculation, see Bühlmann 
et al. 2011b). Because there is again no data for Mongolia, the country sample is reduced to 
46 cases in the test of H4. 
The variable for descriptive representation measures the degree of political discrimination and 
inequality of minority groups. It is provided by the Minorities at Risk Project (MAR) and 
ranges from 0 to 4, whereby 0 stands for the complete exclusion of a minority group from the 
political process and the denial of basic political rights and civil liberties for a group, and 4 
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 Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, EB, EES, ESS, ISS, Latin American Public Opinion Project, LB and 
WVS. 
86
 Comparative Manifestos Project: https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/ (08/28/2012). Further sources are listed in 
the Democracy Barometer codebook (see Bühlmann et al. 2011b). 
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means that there is no political discrimination.
87
 The categories in between additionally con-
sider how well a minority is represented in public offices. The variable is coded for every 
substantial minority group at risk according to the MAR project team and then averaged 
across all groups from the same country. The final score therefore corresponds to the mean 
level of equality and representation of minorities. When MAR did not identify a minority at 
risk in a country, the indicator equals the maximum value.  
On top of the main independent variables, the media function factor scores, two control varia-
bles will be added to the set of explanatory variables. First, a country’s level of political inter-
est, i.e., the share of citizens indicating to be interested in politics, will already be used as a 
determinant for political participation. However, it could also be important in explaining the 
quality of representation. People who care more about politics are probably also better capa-
ble of electing the parties closest in line with their preferences, regardless of how media sys-
tems are configured. At the same time and as already discussed, the higher the aggregate level 
of political interest in a country the better structural media performance can be expected to be. 
Second, political representation is likely to be more adequate in PR electoral systems. On the 
one hand, where more and smaller parties have a chance of winning seats, the political inclu-
sion of minorities should be better guaranteed. On the other hand, issue-congruence has been 
found to be higher in systems with proportional representation too (Powell 2004b: 288). 
7.3.2 Methods 
Every hypothesis will be tested by different multivariate regression approaches. These are 
shortly outlined below. Moreover, challenges which might arise when examining H1 to H4 
and which partly explain the need for different estimation techniques are discussed. Establish-
ing causal relationships is challenging when one deals with such large concepts as ‘media’ 
and ‘democracy’. Because they are very much intertwined, it is hard to precisely predict 
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 MAR: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/ (08/28/2012). The original scale was reversed so that larger values 
indicate less political discrimination. 
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which causes what, whether there is a unidirectional causality at all or whether both the de-
pendent and the independent constructs are jointly caused by some third phenomenon which 
cannot be controlled for. Thus, the empirical analyses in part II of this book might be plagued 
by problems of endogeneity. 
 
In a first step, all hypotheses are tested on the basis of cross-sectional data by simple OLS 
regression. For this purpose, the dependent and control variables are averaged across 1990 to 
2008. As for the independent variables of interest, structural media performance, the data cor-
responds to the scores from the factor analyses presented in the right-hand sections of tables 
5.1 and 5.2. These are also based on the overall means of the constituent media indicators 
across all 19 years under study.  
As for H1, the assumed causality should not be very problematic. The assumption that the 
diffusion of access to mass media across the population affects political participation – and 
not vice versa – is pretty straightforward. Moreover, the underlying factor expected to deter-
mine both phenomena, political interest, is included as control variable along with compulso-
ry voting and proportional representation, so that no omitted variable bias should occur. 
Estimating the impact of structural media performance on transparency should not pose diffi-
culties either. First, reverse causality is not obvious. Given that only more or less established 
democracies are analyzed, it is hard to image that nontransparent and corrupt governments 
could restrict the people’s access to mass media. Second, even though one could suggest that 
country analysts or surveyed business people, respectively, rate corruption to be lower on the 
grounds that the mere availability of mass media for citizens is widespread, this assumption 
seems rather unlikely. Moreover, none of the sources for the transparency indicator lists any 
factors related to media systems as indicative of their ratings. Finally, possible co-
determinants of the dependent and independent variable are included as controls (media free-
dom and GDP per capita). 
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Testing H3 might pose the biggest challenge because the structural indicators of the horizon-
tal media function are probably not exogenous explanatory variables of the degree of mem-
bership in associations. Both the latter and structural media diversity might have joint causes, 
as discussed in section 7.3.1. Yet by introducing different control variables and especially 
regional dummies, I hope to account for this problem and avoid omitted variable bias.
88
 
Finally, similar considerations as for H1 apply to H4. It is not likely that there is an issue of 
reverse causality, because it is not at all obvious how media diversity on the structural or sys-
tem level could be a function of political representation. Political interest and the electoral 
system, however, might again influence the variables on both sides of the equation and thus 
confound their relationship. This is why both are defined as control variables for the analysis 
of H4 as well. 
 
To further exclude any possible bias, the models will be tested for endogeneity according to a 
procedure proposed by Wooldridge (2006: 532f.) and – if necessary – re-estimated by a two 
state least squares (2SLS) approach.
89
 Both the tests and 2SLS estimation, however, require 
finding one or more instrumental variables which are correlated with the endogenous inde-
pendent variables but uncorrelated with the error term, i.e., unobserved factors that affect the 
dependent variable (Wooldridge 2006: 512). Finding such variables is very difficult. For ex-
ample, no suitable instrument was found that could be used in the models predicting transpar-
ency. By contrast, possibly appropriate instrumental variables regarding the analyses for hy-
potheses 1, 3 and 4 were identified. They are discussed in the respective sections of chapter 8. 
 
                                                 
88
 Testing H3 on the content level would be even more problematic because of the major difficulty of identifying 
cause and effect. It would be unclear whether civil society is strong due to a balanced reflection of all interests in 
the public sphere, or whether mass media represent all different interests in their news coverage precisely be-
cause the civil society is strong. As for the structural level, however, such a problem of reverse causality should 
be less of an issue. 
89
 All models are also tested for heteroskedasticity by a Breusch-Pagan test (see Wooldridge 2006: 280f.). 
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Another useful tool to study causal relationships between phenomena which seem closely 
interconnected and where it is therefore difficult to argue with certainty which precedes 
which, is time series or panel analysis (see Finkel 2008: 476). For this reason, the cross-
sectional analysis is followed by a panel analysis with the same dependent, independent and 
control variables for every hypothesis. The respective longitudinal data consists of four ob-
servations for each country, whereby one observation equals a five- or four-year period in 
which the dependent and control variables are averaged (1990-1994; 1995-1999; 2000-2004; 
2005-2008). Accordingly, the media performance scores used as independent variables are 
taken from the left-hand sections in tables 5.1 and 5.2, which are based on the same five-year 
averages.  
As for the specific method applied, all longitudinal models are based on generalized estimat-
ing equation (GEE) regression. GEE is an extension of generalized linear models and a very 
suitable technique to study and correctly model correlated data, which is most often the case 
when it consists of repeated measures over time (Hilbe and Hardin 2008; Zorn 2001). Since it 
is a population-averaged approach, a GEE coefficient can be interpreted as the average effect 
of x on y (Zorn 2001: 474). GEE allows defining the nature of the correlation between the 
data. Because the dataset consists of longitudinal data, it is likely to be serially correlated. 
Thus, the GEE models are specified to account for first-order serial correlation (AR(1)). Fur-
thermore, panel-specific heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are estimated. A drawback 
of GEE, however, is that the usual model goodness-of-fit measures cannot be computed (Zorn 
2001: 476). For this reason, and because results from GEE models are often presented along-
side other panel estimation procedures in the empirical literature (e.g. Mainwaring and Zoco 
2007; Souva et al. 2008), the robustness of the GEE estimates is checked by comparing them 
Chapter 7 
  
 
 214 
with estimates from random effects models, based on generalized least squares estimation 
(GLS).
90
 
Panel analysis is attractive to clarify issues of causality, because not only static but also dy-
namic effects can be modeled. So-called static models test contemporaneous relationships 
between independent and dependent variables from the same time period. Dynamic panel 
models, by contrast, exploit the time series character of the data to make sure that the (as-
sumed) cause precedes the consequence. Dynamic models use lagged independent variables, 
i.e., independent variables from a previous time period, and test how they impact the depend-
ent variables. Thus, since the direction of causality might be unclear and delayed effects are 
likely for at least some of the five hypotheses, both static and dynamic panel models will be 
estimated in chapter 8. 
7.4 Summary 
Chapter 7 made the transition from the first to the second part of this book. While part I was 
concerned with conceptualizing and studying media performance with respect to democratic 
standards, part II is interested in its effects on different elements of the quality of democratic 
regimes. The aim of this chapter was to derive theoretical assumptions about the nature of 
such effects and to clarify technical questions, so that the expected relationships can be empir-
ically explored in the next chapter. 
Hence, section 7.1 outlined a model of the democratic process and the quality of democracy, 
mostly based on the concept of the Democracy Barometer (Bühlmann et al. 2011a, 2012). 
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 Random effects models are preferred over fixed effects models in this study because fixed effects estimation 
has a number of disadvantages. First, it does not allow including variables that are constant over time, which is 
true for some of the control variables. It is also not ideal if the predictor variables change little over time, which 
might apply in the present study as well. Moreover, estimating a different intercept for every country means that 
many degrees of freedom are lost, especially when the cross-section is large compared to the number of time 
periods, which is the case here. Finally, fixed effects models may suffer from multicollinearity and, since they 
only focus on intraunit variation over time, they „ignore the possibility that unit-to-unit variation sheds light on 
the relationship between x and y” (Worrall 2008: 235). 
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Accordingly, nine basic conditions which are required for high-quality democracy have been 
discussed. In section 7.2 it was argued in more detail that four of these are supposed to have a 
positive relationship with democratic media performance. More specifically, a fulfillment of 
the vertical media function is expected to promote the level (H1a) and equality of political 
participation (H1b) as well as transparency (H2). A high fulfillment of the horizontal media 
function, by contrast, is hypothesized to enhance the strength of the civil society (H3) and the 
accuracy of political representation (H4).  
Finally, section 7.3 presented the data to be used as dependent and control variables in the 
following chapter. The media function factor scores from the first part of this book will serve 
as independent variables for hypotheses H1 to H4. In addition, the methods applied to test the 
theoretical expectations were explained, while considering potential problems of endogeneity 
at the same time. All hypotheses will be examined in both a cross-sectional and a panel 
framework, implementing OLS and GEE estimation. However, due to the limited number of 
countries for which content analysis data is available, the following analyses are only based 
on structural media performance, i.e., the democratic performance of media systems. 
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Chapter 8:  
Testing the relationship between media systems and 
the quality of democracy
Having derived theoretical expectations with regard to the impact of media performance in 
terms of the vertical and horizontal function on four aspects of democratic quality in chapter 
7, this chapter moves on to examine whether multivariate regressions provide empirical evi-
dence to support these assumptions. This will hopefully give some insight into how important 
mass media are for the well-functioning of democracy and thus whether the debate about the 
state of democracy in today’s media societies between ‘pessimists’ and ‘optimists’, as briefly 
outlined in the introductory chapter 1, is actually relevant at all. While the former argue that 
today’s mass media generally harm democracy, the latter hold the opposite position. 
As already mentioned, because content analysis data is only available for a few countries, the 
relationships between functions of democracy and media performance cannot be tested at the 
content level. The following analyses are therefore exclusively based on structural media per-
formance. Hence, only the latent factors shown and discussed in chapter 5 are used as inde-
pendent variables. Furthermore, the analyses are limited to the media performance measures 
from the larger sample consisting of 47 countries. This means that only the factor scores re-
sulting from table 5.1 are considered while those resulting from the smaller 24-country sam-
ple (see table 5.2 in chapter 5) are left aside. This has two reasons. On the one hand, the rather 
low number of 24 cases would again cause problems in at least some of the following anal-
yses where several explanatory variables are used. On the other hand, it was found that the 
results do not differ much between the two country samples.
91
 Thus, rather than needlessly 
overburdening the chapter with analyses, I focus on just the large sample. 
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 There are a few differences in terms of statistical significance, but the effects still point in the same direction. 
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Keeping these restrictions in mind, the following analyses will proceed in a similar fashion 
for all five hypotheses from chapter 7. First, the results from OLS regressions on the basis of 
the cross-sectional data are presented. Second, the same analyses are repeated for the longitu-
dinal data, whereby the four time periods correspond to five-year averages of the underlying 
data. As described in chapter 7 (section 7.3.2), a GEE approach with an AR(1) specification 
and panel-specific heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors is chosen for all panel models. 
Moreover, the static models are complemented by dynamic models with lagged independent 
variables in the cases of H2 to H4. Dynamic models are not estimated for H1 because unlike 
transparency, civil society organization and representation, media performance is expected to 
primarily have an immediate effect on political participation.
92
 
8.1 Structural media performance and political participation 
The first two hypotheses discussed in chapter 7 (H1a and H1b) assume a positive relationship 
between media performance in terms of the vertical function and both the level and equality 
of political participation. This section aims at examining these theoretical assumptions.  
Accordingly, the first dependent variable captures the mean level of political participation in 
elections, referendums (if existing), demonstrations and petitions. The second measures the 
equality of participation in terms of gender, age, income and education, again in elections, 
demonstrations and petitions. Although predominantly the vertical function is expected to 
affect participation, the impact of the horizontal function factors is tested as well. In addition, 
I control for a country’s aggregate level of political interest, the electoral system, compulsory 
voting as well as Switzerland and the United States. 
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 Moreover, section 8.1 already includes twice as many regression models as the other sections due to the two 
sub-hypotheses H1a and H1b and two dependent variables, respectively. Finally, the assumed causality seems to 
be less problematic than for example compared to H3 (see chapter 7, section 7.3.2), and endogeneity could be 
tested for, unlike in the models for H2 (see below). 
Testing the relationship between media systems and the quality of democracy 
  
 
219 
Table 8.1 shows the results of four different OLS regression models predicting the two de-
pendent variables. Due to high multicollinearity between the vertical function factors scores 
and the political interest variable
93
, two separate models for each dependent variable are pre-
sented: model I with and model II without political interest.  
Table 8.1 Explaining political participation by media performance (cross-sectional analysis) 
 Level of participation Equality of participation 
 
Model I Model II Model I Model II 
 
Coef.   (S.E.) 
 
Coef.   (S.E.)  Coef.   (S.E.)  Coef.   (S.E.)  
VF 5.326 (2.202) * 7.587 (1.904) *** 2.876 (2.322)  4.232 (1.949) * 
HF: QND 3.112 (1.793) 
+
 3.219 (1.850) 
+
 -3.455 (1.891) 
+
 -3.390 (1.894) 
+ 
HF: QLD -0.854 (1.728)  0.019 (1.717) 
 
0.969 (1.822)  1.493 (1.758)  
Interest 0.349 (0.186) 
+
 - -  0.209 (0.196)  - -  
PR system -2.001 (4.437)  -3.870 (4.463)  -1.624 (4.679)  -2.744 (4.568)  
Compulsory 15.858 (3.994) *** 13.187 (3.852) ** 3.447 (4.212)  1.845 (3.944)  
Switzerland -25.562 (11.559) * -25.204 (11.927) * -4.077 (12.189)  -3.863 (12.210) 
 United States -15.749 (12.070)  -17.118 (12.434)  -9.942 (12.728)  -10.763 (12.728) 
 Constant 30.176 (10.362) ** 48.229 (4.026) *** 56.909 (10.927) *** 66.956 (1.489) *** 
Model Properties 
     
   
   R
2
 0.467 
  
0.417 
  
0.244   0.221 
  Adjusted R
2
 0.354 
  
0.312 
  
0.085   0.081 
  N  47 
  
47 
  
47   47 
  Notes: unstandardized OLS estimators; *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05, + p ≤ 0.10; VF = vertical media 
function; HF = horizontal media function; QND = quantitative media diversity; QLD = qualitative media diversi-
ty; PR system = proportional representation system. 
 
As for the first dependent variable – the level of participation in conventional and unconven-
tional forms – a positive and significant effect of the vertical media function can be observed 
in both models. Thus, as expected in H1a, a higher degree of fulfillment of the vertical media 
function in a country is associated with higher turnout and other participation rates. In line 
with mobilization theory, the results suggest that a better availability of information induces 
people to express their opinions at the polls and on the streets. Because of the strong correla-
tion of the vertical function factor with political interest, the effect is more significant and 
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 The correlation between the two variables is highly significant, almost 0.70 in the averaged data and almost 
0.50 in the longitudinal data. 
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larger in model II than model I. Yet both coefficients are in fact quite substantial. Ceteris pa-
ribus, moving from the lowest to the highest vertical media function performance raises the 
predicted level of participation by 34 percent (model I) or 48 percent (model II), respective-
ly.
94
 
Looking at the horizontal media function, quantitative media diversity is weakly but positive-
ly related to political participation as well. This suggests that in order to empower and mobi-
lize people to participate, it not only matters whether information is available and accessible 
but also whether it comes from a multitude of different channels. It could be that in more di-
verse media systems, voters are more likely to learn about all electoral alternatives, which in 
turn, makes it easier for them to choose and cast votes. That said, however, qualitative media 
diversity – the second component of the horizontal function – has no significant impact on the 
dependent variable in table 8.1. 
Like expected, political interest is positively associated with the level of political participa-
tion. The estimate is only marginally significant, however. This is again at least partly due to 
this variable’s high correlation with the vertical media function. If the impact of political in-
terest was estimated without the media variables, it would have a highly significant and also 
larger positive effect. As for the remaining control variables, participation is significantly 
higher in countries where voting is compulsory and lower in Switzerland than in other coun-
tries, as anticipated. It also seems to be lower in the United States and in countries with pro-
portional representation as the signs of the respective estimates illustrate, but they are not sta-
tistically different from 0. 
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 The range of the vertical media function factor scores is 3.734. Multiplied by 7.587, its coefficient in model II, 
this amounts to 28.330, which equals 48 percent of the dependent variable’s total range in the 47-country sample 
(= 59.002). With the coefficient from model I, the maximum effect of the vertical function is just 19.887 or 34 
percent from 59.002. 
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Moving to the equality or, in other words, representativeness of both traditional and alterna-
tive political participation, the figures show that it is not affected by vertical media function 
performance when controlling for political interest (model I). A positive influence can be ob-
served when the interest variable is excluded from the estimation (model II), but it is weaker 
than with respect to the level of participation. To compare, the maximum effect of the vertical 
function factor now only accounts for about 32 percent of the range in the equality of partici-
pation measure. 
Contrary to the level of participation, a larger quantitative diversity of print outlets, the first 
component of the horizontal media function, seems to decrease the equality of participation. 
A greater supply of information channels might thus overburden some segments of the elec-
torate and prevent them from participating in politics. However, a closer inspection of this 
rather puzzling result reveals that the significant relationship can be explained by one outlier 
case: Cyprus. According to the data, participation in Cyprus is very unequal. But at the same 
time, the country has the highest value for quantitative media diversity. Hence, when control-
ling for Cyprus in the models in the right-hand section of table 8.1, the effect of quantitative 
diversity disappears. 
None of the remaining variables in the models have a statistically significant association with 
the equality of participation. But at least political interest would have a significant positive 
effect without the vertical media function.  
Finally, it must be noted that all the models in table 8.1 have a quite poor goodness-of-fit, and 
in particular the ones for the equality of participation. This suggests that further explanatory 
variables should be considered to fully explain the dependent variables. This is of course not 
very surprising, considering the wealth of further determinants for turnout and political partic-
ipation in general that the corresponding research tradition has put forward (see Blais 2006; 
Franklin 2004; Teorell 2006). Additional control variables, however, are not necessarily of 
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interest here as long as they are not suspected to be correlated with the explanatory variables 
in the model, which would cause those to be endogenous. In order to check whether this 
might be the case, I additionally performed a test for endogeneity according to Wooldridge 
(2006: 532f.). I mainly tested whether the vertical media function variable is exogenous or not 
by using GDP per capita as an instrumental variable (IV) for it.
95
 The test results indicate that 
endogeneity does not seem to be a problem in any of the models in table 8.1. 
 
Compared to the simple cross-sectional OLS estimations, the panel data models produce part-
ly similar and partly deviant results. Table 8.2 presents the respective GEE coefficients. Be-
side the five control variables, time period dummies are included in all models. These are 
necessary because at least the vertical media function factor scores are trending over time. 
Since the results for the media variables do not change substantially when political interest is 
excluded, the respective results are not presented.  
The first model for the level of political participation shows that, in line with the cross-
sectional analysis, the vertical media function has a positive effect in the panel analysis as 
well. While the coefficient is smaller in the panel model, it is more significant than in the 
OLS regression. Likewise, the first component of the horizontal media function – quantitative 
diversity – exhibits the positive significant relationship with the extent of participation already 
observed in the cross-sectional analysis. By contrast and again, the second component – quali-
tative diversity – does not seem to affect the extent of political participation. 
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 GDP per capita was deemed a suitable IV for the vertical media function because the two are positively relat-
ed, which fulfills the first requirement for a good IV. In wealthier countries more people read newspapers and 
more people can afford TV and radio sets as well as internet access. The second requirement for a good IV pre-
sumes that the IV is not correlated with unobserved factors affecting the dependent variable. Contrary to the first 
requirement, this second requirement cannot be empirically tested but must be established by theoretical reason-
ing (Wooldridge 2006: 512). In that sense, it does not seem to be obvious how GDP could be related to some-
thing influencing the level and equality of participation as measured here in a sample of more or less established 
democracies. Nevertheless, there are some doubts as to whether GDP per capita really is an adequate instrumen-
tal variable for the vertical media function in the models predicting the level of participation. Estimated without 
political interest or the media performance variables, GDP has a significant effect on the dependent variable. 
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Table 8.2 Explaining political participation by media performance (panel GEE analysis) 
 
Level of participation Equality of participation 
 
Coef.     (S.E.) 
 
Coef.   (S.E.)  
VF 4.236 (1.348) ** -0.332 (1.954)  
HF: QND 2.264 (0.806) ** 1.649 (1.186)  
HF: QLD -1.074 (0.686)  -0.562 (0.843)  
Political interest 0.257 (0.079) ** 0.102 (0.070)  
PR system -4.171 (1.726) * -2.279 (3.253)  
Compulsory voting 14.276 (3.453) *** 0.005 (4.520)  
Switzerland -21.380 (2.598) *** -10.326 (3.351) ** 
United States -13.871 (3.099) *** 2.238 (3.963)  
Period 1995-99 -2.423 (0.682) *** 1.198 (1.062)  
Period 2000-04 -8.579 (1.566) *** -0.146 (2.571)  
Period 2005-08 -14.097 (2.268) *** -3.844 (3.388)  
Constant 42.349 (4.408) *** 63.688 (4.907) *** 
N  188   188   
Notes: unstandardized GEE estimators; *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05, + p ≤ 0.10; AR(1) correlation 
structure and robust standard errors; VF = vertical media function; HF = horizontal media function; QND = 
quantitative media diversity; QLD = qualitative media diversity; PR system = proportional representation sys-
tem; reference category time periods: period 1990-94. 
 
Aggregate political interest has a similarly positive impact on the extent of participation as in 
the cross-sectional model, but it is much more significant in the panel data model. The effect 
is also quite substantial, considering that participation is predicted to be on average about 23 
percent higher in countries with the highest aggregate political interest compared to those 
with the lowest aggregate interest, all else equal. In addition to compulsory voting and Swit-
zerland, we can also observe significant coefficients for the electoral system and the United 
States dummy now. The negative effect of the PR system seems to confirm the point of Blais 
(2006: 114) that once analyses move beyond only the most advanced democracies, the often 
assumed positive influence of PR on participation does not necessarily hold. Finally, it is in-
teresting to see that the time period dummies all have highly significant and increasingly neg-
ative estimates. This means that the extent of political participation has been continually de-
creasing over time which is consistent with most of electoral research (DeBardeleben and 
Pammett 2009).  
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Comparing the GEE estimates with those from random effects models (see table A8.1 in the 
appendix) shows that the results are very similar. The only noteworthy differences are that the 
PR and U.S. dummies are no longer statistically significant whereas the negative effect of 
qualitative media diversity reaches statistical significance in the random effects model. This 
would mean that a more diverse climate of opinion actually keeps citizens from casting votes, 
demonstrating and signing petitions. As for voting, this relationship has also been found on 
the basis of individual-level survey data (Müller and Wueest 2011b). Accordingly, by provid-
ing them with a well-balanced array of opinions and ideologies, media seem to make it more 
difficult for citizens to obtain easy cues about how to cast their votes rather than enabling 
them to find their preferred choice among the range of electoral alternatives. As for alternative 
forms of participation, it is possible that in a media environment with a high diversity of opin-
ions and therefore many opportunities for all voices to be expressed in the public sphere, citi-
zens have less need to take to the streets. Hence, although qualitative media diversity is desir-
able from a normative perspective, the result in table A8.1 at least casts doubt on this demand. 
Of course, some scholars might object that what matters is less the quantity then the quality of 
political participation (in addition to the equality). Hence, if those fewer citizens who partici-
pate in a media environment with a high qualitative diversity do so in a more informed way 
while the rather unsophisticated citizens stay away from politics then democracy is still well 
served. Another more optimistic interpretation for the negative association between the level 
of participation and qualitative media diversity would be that when citizens already feel them-
selves represented in the public sphere due to high opinion diversity they have lower incen-
tives to participate. Unfortunately, which of these explanations is more likely cannot be an-
swered with the data at hand and has to remain an open question for now.  
 
Contrary to the level of participation, there is not very much to say about the equality of par-
ticipation, the results for which are shown in the last column of table 8.2 since only one of the 
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two country dummies is significantly related to the dependent variable. Apparently, the equal-
ity of participation is lower than average in Switzerland, which did not surface in the cross-
sectional analysis. As opposed to the OLS regressions from table 8.1, none of the media vari-
ables have a significant influence on the equality of participation, and this would not change if 
political interest was dropped from the estimation. The fact that the outlier Cyprus does not 
lead to a negative significant coefficient for quantitative media diversity in the panel analysis 
can be explained by Cyprus’s particularly low equality of participation in only the first of the 
four time periods. Finally, the three period dummy estimates are neither unidirectional nor 
significant, which indicates that unlike the level of participation, the equality of participation 
does not follow a clear trend over time. The random effects GLS model (see table A8.1 in the 
appendix) largely confirms these results.  
 
Overall, we can draw the following conclusion as to the influence of structural media perfor-
mance on political participation: there is evidence for a positive association between media 
systems’ compliance with the vertical function and the level of participation in elections, pop-
ular votes, demonstrations and petitions among citizens. H1a can therefore be confirmed. The 
second hypothesis for participation (H1b), however, has to be rejected. The expected positive 
effect of the vertical media function on the equality of participation is only reflected in one of 
the two cross-sectional models above. Similar findings apply to quantitative media diversity, 
the first component of the horizontal function. While a larger variety of newspaper outlets 
seems to enhance the amount of political participation, it does not affect the equality of partic-
ipation. Hence, it appears that structural media performance has a positive influence on the 
level but not the representativeness of political participation. For this reason, we might infer 
that a better access to multiple channels of information seems to benefit those segments of the 
population which are already more inclined to take part in politics. In addition, no effects on 
Chapter 8 
  
 
226 
participation have been found for qualitative media diversity, the second component of the 
horizontal media function.  
8.2 Structural media performance and transparency 
As argued in chapter 7, media performance is not only supposed to enhance participation but 
also the transparency of the political system. I expect a positive relationship with transparency 
predominantly in terms of the vertical function. The underlying assumption is that the more 
citizens demand and have access to information about political affairs, the more difficult and 
costly it is for politicians to hide their actions and be corrupt. The present section focuses on 
testing whether this hypothesis can be supported with the data available. Transparency is 
simply measured by an index in which higher values indicate lower levels of corruption in the 
public sector. In addition to the main independent variables, i.e., the media function factors, I 
control for GDP per capita and media freedom.  
The left-hand side of table 8.3 (columns 2 and 3) presents the OLS regression results for the 
purely cross-sectional data, whereby the dependent and control variables are averaged across 
the 19 years under study. Because of the high correlations between some of the explanatory 
variables and therefore multicollinearity in the models, the effects of the media variables are 
again estimated both with and without the control variables (model I and II, respectively).
96
 
As expected in H2, a better fulfillment of the vertical media function, i.e., a higher diffusion 
of access to the mass media is associated with more transparency – in terms of less corruption 
– within the political system in both models I and II. Only one of the control variables exhib-
its a significant estimate as well (see model I). Accordingly, media freedom also has a posi-
tive impact on transparency which confirms what many corruption studies have found before 
(see Brunetti and Weder 2003; Chowdhury 2004; Treisman 2007). 
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 The bivariate correlations between the scores for the vertical function, the media freedom index and GDP per 
capita are all highly significant and range between 0.70 and 0.80.  
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Table 8.3 Explaining transparency by media performance 
 Cross-sectional analysis (OLS) 
a
 Panel analysis (GEE) 
b
 
 Model I Model II Static model Dynamic model 
 Coef. (S.E.) 
 
Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  
VF 0.949 (0.321) ** 1.870 (0.165) *** 0.886 (0.160) *** - -  
HF: QND 0.313 (0.192)  0.763 (0.165) *** 0.621 (0.223) ** - -  
HF: QLD -0.171 (0.147)  -0.129 (0.165)  -0.037 (0.074)  - -  
VF (t-1) - -  - -  - -  1.101 (0.182) *** 
HF: QND (t-1) - -  - -  - -  0.847 (0.200) *** 
HF: QLD (t-1) - -  - -  - -  -0.071 (0.094)  
Media freedom 0.068 (0.020) ** - -  0.010 (0.008)  0.030 (0.015) * 
GDP p.c. 0.030 (0.022)  - -  -0.007 (0.006)  -0.001 (0.009)  
Period 1995-99 - -  - -  -0.109 (0.088)  - -  
Period 2000-04 - -  - -  -0.375 (0.208) 
+ 
-0.176 (0.124)  
Period 2005-08 - -  - -  -0.576 (0.267) * -0.325 (0.210)  
Constant 0.380 (1.500)  6.073 (0.163) *** 5.569 (0.601) *** 4.147 (1.076) *** 
Model Properties  
  
         
R
2
 0.838 
  
0.777   -   -   
Adjusted R
2
 0.818 
  
0.762   -   -   
N  47 
  
47   188   141   
Notes: a) unstandardized OLS estimators; b) unstandardized GEE estimators with AR(1) correlation structure 
and robust standard errors; *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05, + p ≤ 0.10; VF = vertical media function; HF = 
horizontal media function; QND = quantitative media diversity; QLD = qualitative media diversity; reference 
category time periods: period 1990-94 (static model) / period 1995-1999 (dynamic model). 
 
These findings seem to lend support to Lindstedt and Naurin’s (2005) theory. They reason 
that in order to fight corruption, information does not only need to be dug up by free and in-
dependent media but also publicized, i.e., „spread to and taken in by a broader audience” 
(Lindstedt and Naurin 2005: 8). They conceptualize this two-stage mechanism by media free-
dom
97
 on the one hand and education as a proxy for citizens’ capacity to absorb information 
on the other. However, it might actually be more reasonable to assess this latter aspect, which 
Lindstedt and Naurin (2005) refer to as “publicity”, by media penetration. This is exactly 
what the vertical media function measures. When we compare the sizes of the two significant 
effects in table 8.3, the vertical function variable turns out to have a slightly larger impact on 
corruption than the press freedom index. Ceteris paribus, the predicted maximum effect of the 
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vertical media function is 3.54, which amounts to 44 percent of the corruption measure’s 
scale.
98
 The respective figure for the media freedom variable, although still quite substantial, 
is only 37 percent. Thus, the very high R
2 
of over 0.80 in table 8.3’s model I must be mostly 
attributed to these two parameters. Media freedom and vertical function media performance 
together seem to explain most of the variance in the corruption index. None of the other three 
variables included in this model have a significant influence on corruption.  
However, looking at model II, the estimate of one of the horizontal function variables also 
reaches statistical significance when no control variables are included into the equation. Ap-
parently, it is not only the widespread access to information, but also a larger supply of differ-
ent sources of information (which in turn seems to be partly a function of media freedom) that 
leads to more transparency. But compared to the vertical function, the effect of this first hori-
zontal function variable is not nearly as large. At a maximum, it is only associated with a pre-
dicted increase in transparency of 9.5 percent. Meanwhile, the vertical function estimate al-
most doubles its size between model I and model II because it now also absorbs the indirect 
effect of media freedom. It is therefore not very surprising that model II still has a very good 
fit. Its R
2
 is not considerably lower than the one in model I. 
Hence, omitted variable bias does not seem to be of great concern. Nevertheless, the vertical 
media function variable could be endogenous in the model because of a reverse causality 
problem. This, at least, is what Adserà et al. (2003) suggest in their analysis of the effect of 
newspaper circulation on corruption (see chapter 2). Among other things, they try to tackle 
this problem by an instrumental variable (IV) approach, instrumenting newspaper circulation 
by education, i.e., the percentage of people who completed secondary schooling. Two differ-
ent measures for a country’s level of education did not prove to be suitable IVs in this study, 
however, because they do not only correlate with the vertical media function but also with the 
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 The corruption index ranges from 2 to 10 in the 47-country sample studied here. 
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dependent variable, the corruption index. For this reason, the only way to deal with potential 
causality issues with regard to hypothesis 2 in this book is to resort to panel data analysis.
99
 
 
The results from the longitudinal analysis are presented in the right-hand section of table 8.3 
(columns 4 and 5). In addition to the regular static model with only contemporaneous effects, 
table 8.3 also presents the results of a dynamic model in which the media function variables 
are lagged by one time period, i.e., their values from the previous time period are taken. Un-
fortunately, using lagged variables means that the first time period is lost, which reduces the 
number of observations from 188 (47 countries x 4 time periods) to 141. Nevertheless, esti-
mating the dynamic model is worthwhile, because it is reasonable to assume that changes in 
media performance do not immediately influence transparency but rather take effect with 
some delay. After all, public officials might need some time to adapt their behavior to a modi-
fied media environment.  
Focusing on the static model first, the results look much like the ones from the cross-sectional 
OLS regressions. Accordingly, the positive effect of vertical media function performance on 
transparency is also apparent in the panel analysis.
100
 Moreover, quantitative media diversity, 
the first of the two horizontal function variables, has a highly significant estimate in the panel 
models as well, even when media freedom and GDP per capita are controlled for. The control 
variables themselves are not significantly related to the outcome variable anymore. This is 
surprising, considering that media freedom is a strong factor explaining transparency in the 
cross-sectional analysis. I will come back to this shortly. As for the time period dummies, at 
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 The two education indicators considered are, on the one hand, the percentage of people over 15 who have 
completed tertiary education and, on the other hand, an education measure by the Human Development Index 
consisting of adult’s expected and mean years of schooling. If the endogeneity tests are performed with these 
two indicators as IVs anyway, the results indicate no endogeneity in the model. 
100
 If the same model was estimated without media freedom and GDP per capita (because of likely multicolline-
arity), the coefficient would have about the same size but be significant at a level of 1 percent. 
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least the last two time period dummies have significant negative estimates. This indicates that 
corruption actually increases over time. The coefficient sizes, however, are quite small. 
This time trend is also visible when the same model is estimated by a random effects ap-
proach (see table A8.2 in the appendix), and all other inferences drawn from the GEE model 
still hold in the GLS model as well. In addition, media freedom has a positive influence on 
transparency in table A8.2, which is in line with the cross-sectional analysis. 
Moving on to the dynamic model in the last column of table 8.3, the results indicate that a 
better media system performance serves democracies in terms of transparency particularly in 
the long run. Both the vertical media function and quantitative media diversity, i.e., the varie-
ty of newspapers available in a country, have a lagged positive impact on transparency. Not 
only are the estimates highly significant but also somewhat larger compared to the static mod-
el. This suggests that both media functions become more powerful determinants of transpar-
ency after some time has passed. These strong lagged effects allow us to conclude with more 
confidence that the causal link between structural media performance and transparency really 
leads from the former to the latter. As discussed before, media and democracy are very much 
intertwined which often makes it hard to identify cause and consequence. Although this prob-
lem generally seems to be less virulent in the case of the relationship between media and 
transparency (see the respective discussion in chapter 7), the findings of the lagged models 
are nevertheless comforting. In addition to the media performance variables, it is interesting 
to see that media freedom is positively and significantly associated with transparency in the 
dynamic as opposed to the static model. This might be due to the fact that the first time period 
is missing in the dynamic analysis. Indeed, a closer inspection of the association between me-
dia freedom and transparency for different time periods reveals that the two variables are not 
strongly related to each other in the first time period, which explains the insignificant estimate 
of the control variable in the static model of table 8.3. The reason for this weak relationship in 
the first time period, which covers the years 1990 to 1994, is that the press freedom index was 
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measured in a very undifferentiated way up to 1993 so that a number of countries received a 
higher score than their level of corruption would assume.
101
 Contrary to media freedom, the 
time trend observed in the static version is not evident anymore without the first five-year 
period. 
This is in fact the only difference to the dynamic random effects model for transparency 
shown in table A8.2. All the other findings are essentially the same. The impact of the first 
time period on the effect of press freedom can actually also be observed in the GLS models. 
Even though media freedom is statistically significant even in the static model of table A8.2, 
the estimate is twice as large and more significant in the dynamic model. 
 
In sum, the analyses discussed in section 8.2 clearly lend support to hypothesis 2. As ex-
pected, countries with a higher fulfillment of the vertical media function also tend to have 
lower levels of corruption, i.e. more transparency. This relationship has been found in all of 
the four regression models presented in table 8.3. Moreover, the results from the longitudinal 
analyses show that this positive effect is not only contemporaneous but actually comes to 
fuller force with a certain time delay. In addition to the vertical function, media performance 
in terms of quantitative diversity is also positively related to transparency, especially in a 
longer-term perspective. 
8.3 Structural media performance and the civil society 
The third hypothesis derived in chapter 7 postulates that the strength of a country’s civil soci-
ety, or rather its degree of political and public interest group organization, is co-determined by 
its media system’s compliance with the horizontal media function. The aim of section 8.3 is to 
test this assumption. But although mainly the horizontal function is of interest, all media vari-
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 Up to 1993, Freedom House only coded press freedom according to the three categories “not free”, “partly 
free” and “free”. These categories were transformed into scores, but all countries belonging to the same category 
had to be assigned the same score. Moreover, most of the 47 countries studied here belonged to the category 
“free” or “partly free”. 
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ables are included as further independent variables. Additionally, I control for the share of 
citizens with generalized trust, GDP per capita as well as the Scandinavian region and former 
socialist countries. 
Table 8.4 Explaining civil society strength by media performance 
 Cross-sectional analysis (OLS) 
a
 Panel analysis (GEE) 
b
 
 
Model I Model II Static model Dynamic model 
 
Coef. (S.E.) 
 
Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  
VF 2.765 (2.800) 
 
5.644 (1.372) *** 4.902 (1.241) *** - -  
HF: QND 4.343 (1.436) ** 4.898 (1.166) *** 3.182 (0.640) *** - -  
HF: QLD -1.398 (1.195)  -1.092 (1.203) 
 
-2.784 (1.133) * - -  
VF (t-1) - -  - -  - -  2.105 (1.709)  
HF: QND (t-1) - -  - -  - -  3.678 (0.896) *** 
HF: QLD (t-1) - -  - -  - -  -2.163 (0.739) *** 
Generalized trust 0.320 (0.136) * - - 
 
0.011 (0.062)  0.077 (0.060)  
GDP p.c. -0.031 (0.183)  - -  -0.027 (0.046)  -0.004 (0.047)  
Nordic countries 13.696 (4.646) ** 17.689 (4.487) *** 20.319 (4.112) *** 20.645 (4.268) *** 
Socialist past 6.954 (3.402) * 6.196 (3.245) 
+ 
6.377 (2.082) ** 1.118 (2.830)  
Period 1995-99 - -  - - 
 
-3.650 (0.736) *** - -  
Period 2000-04 - -  - - 
 
-8.241 (1.405) *** -2.957 (0.683) *** 
Period 2005-08 - -  - - 
 
-11.832 (1.825) *** -5.165 (1.237) *** 
Constant 12.122 (5.557) * 21.765 (1.341) *** 27.348 (2.336) *** 20.803 (2.837) *** 
Model Properties  
     
      
R
2
 0.729 
  
0.689 
  
-   -   
Adjusted R
2
 0.679 
  
0.650 
  
-   -   
N  46 
  
46 
  
184   138   
Notes: a) unstandardized OLS estimators; b) unstandardized GEE estimators with AR(1) correlation structure 
and robust standard errors; *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05, + p ≤ 0.10; VF = vertical media function; HF = 
horizontal media function; QND = quantitative media diversity; QLD = qualitative media diversity; Nordic 
countries = value 1 for Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, value 0 otherwise; Socialist past = 
value 1 for Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, value 0 otherwise; 
reference category time periods: period 1990-94 (static model) / period 1995-1999 (dynamic model). 
 
As always, the analyses start with simple cross-national OLS regressions on the basis of the 
averaged data as well as the latent media factors estimated from the averaged data (see left-
hand section of table 8.4 above). Because tests have indicated that multicollinearity exists 
between generalized trust, GDP per capita and especially the vertical media function variable, 
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the cross-sectional analysis comes again in two different versions.
102
 Model I in table 8.4 in-
cludes all four control variables, model II only the two regional dummies. 
Looking at the OLS estimates, the most important result is the positive significant effect of 
quantitative media diversity on civil society organization. Hence, in line with H3 a higher 
degree of horizontal media function performance, at least with respect to its first component, 
is related to a stronger civil society. This even holds in model I where all control variables are 
included into the estimation. But the coefficient is obviously more significant in model II, 
where generalized trust and GDP are dropped from the equation. 
In substantive terms, quantitative media diversity, i.e. a larger supply of different print outlets, 
increases the civil society scale by about a predicted 40 percent at a maximum, all other fac-
tors held constant. The effect has in fact roughly the same size in both models I and II. 
However, the second component of the horizontal function termed ‘qualitative media diversi-
ty’ has no significant relationship with the dependent variable and thus runs counter to theo-
retical assumptions. The diversity of opinions or, in other words, the balance of ideological 
positions in the press system does not appear to play a role for either political participation, 
transparency or the strength of the civil society. This is rather surprising. It could have been 
expected that people’s decision to join interest groups would be rather promoted by an un-
distorted public sphere (qualitative diversity) than the mere plurality of news sources (quanti-
tative diversity), because the former seems to be a better guarantee that such groups really 
have a public platform.  
In addition to quantitative media diversity, the vertical function variable also exhibits a signif-
icant and positive estimate, but only in model II. Thus, when the multicollinearity between 
this predictor and GDP per capita as well as interpersonal trust is eliminated, the indicator for 
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 Bivariate correlations between the vertical function scores, GDP per capita and generalized trust again range 
from 0.70 to 0.80. 
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the vertical media function reaches statistical significance too. Its impact is comparable to 
quantitative media diversity. 
As for the control variables, only GDP per capita does not exhibit a significant estimate. Gen-
eralized trust, by contrast, has the anticipated positive effect. In line with social capital theory, 
people’s involvement in intermediary organizations is related to the degree to which they trust 
each other. Furthermore, the two regional dummies also have quite strong impacts on the de-
pendent variable, and their coefficients are significant in both models. This applies to the 
Nordic countries dummy in particular. Ceteris paribus, the civil society index is about 14 
scale points higher in Scandinavian countries, which amounts to about 28 percent of its total 
range. Similarly, even though it is not nearly as strong in terms of significance level and actu-
al size as the Nordic dummy the one for former socialist countries is statistically significant in 
both models. Including the two regional dummies is therefore clearly very important. 
Finally, it is interesting to see that the R
2
s are not much higher in model I. This suggests that 
generalized trust and GDP do not add much in explaining the strength of a country’s civil 
society, at least not directly. They may, however, have indirect effects on civil society organi-
zation through the media performance variable.
103
 But either way, it can be noted that the 
goodness-of-fit of both models is quite satisfying. This could lead to the conclusion that omit-
ted variable bias and consequently a violation of the exogeneity assumption are rather out of 
the question in the models from table 8.4. Nevertheless, in order to assess whether this is in-
deed the case I performed a test for endogeneity of the two horizontal media function factors 
according to a procedure proposed by Wooldridge (2006: 532f.). For this purpose, the number 
of journalists in a country in percent of the total population was used as an instrument for 
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 In fact, as shown in chapter 5, GDP strongly affects the vertical media function, and so does generalized trust. 
In addition, GDP per capita seems to have a positive influence on quantitative media diversity.  
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quantitative media diversity and the size of the population as an instrument for qualitative 
media diversity.
104
 The results indicate that there is no endogeneity in table 8.4.  
 
In a second step, the relationship between structural media performance and the strength of 
the civil society in terms of interest group organization is also tested in a panel analysis 
framework. The results are presented in the last two columns of table 8.4.
 105
 In an attempt to 
clarify the direction of causality between media and civil society, I do not only estimate a stat-
ic but also a dynamic model in which the media function variables enter the equation in 
lagged form (by one time period).  
As for the first of the two media performance variables, the panel models are partly in line 
with the two OLS regressions. Like in the cross-sectional analysis, the first component of the 
horizontal media function, quantitative diversity, has a positive influence on the strength of 
the civil society in the model. Moreover, its impact is not only immediate but also longer 
term, as the dynamic model coefficient indicates. The lagged estimate of quantitative media 
diversity is actually somewhat larger than its static counterpart. We might therefore conclude 
that a higher plurality of different newspapers really increases the degree of associational 
memberships in societies, both in the short and the longer run.  
Surprisingly, qualitative media diversity has a significant negative relationship with civil so-
ciety in the panel analysis, both short- and long-term. While the coefficient is more sizeable in 
the static version, its statistical significance increases in the dynamic version. These findings 
are really quite puzzling considered that this variable has no significant impact on civil socie-
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 Both of these indicators proved to fulfill the first requirement for an IV (be correlated to the endogenous vari-
able for which it is supposed to serve as an instrument). Quite plausibly, the more media outlets exist, the more 
job opportunities there are for journalists. Why there is a statistical association between population size and 
qualitative media diversity is unclear. Both IV candidates are further expected to fulfill the second requirement 
as well (be uncorrelated to the unobserved factors included in the error term). 
105
 The control variables, generalized trust and GDP per capita, are included in both panel models since the re-
sults are almost the same whether they are excluded or not. 
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ty in the cross-sectional analysis (although already negative signs). Moreover, its negative 
direction suggests that a more diverse and balanced climate of opinion actually prevents col-
lective organization. Since this completely contradicts the theoretical expectation with regard 
to the interaction between the horizontal media function and interest group organization, these 
results are therefore difficult to interpret, and any reasonable explanation would require a 
more in-depth analysis. At this point, we can only provisionally conclude that rather than 
promoting the organization of diverse interests within the society, a high diversity of opinions 
within the media system might actually work as a compensation for low degree of civil socie-
ty organization. In other words, if the media system already reflects a variety of viewpoints, 
the formal organization of interests might be less necessary. 
Like in the cross-sectional OLS models, vertical media function performance is positively 
associated with a strong civil society. The effect, however, is only contemporaneous. Thus, in 
countries with a better access to mass media for the whole population, more people tend to 
join interest groups. Yet a better access to mass media does not lead to more interest group 
organization at a later time, i.e., in the long run. For this reason, we should probably not as-
sume causality but only association in this case, even though the lagged vertical function vari-
able would be marginally significant if the two control variables it is highly correlated with 
were excluded from the model.  
Looking briefly at the control variables, generalized trust is not significant anymore in the 
panel models. But the two regional dummy variables retain their statistical strength, with the 
exception of the dummy for the former socialist countries in the dynamic model. This can 
most likely be explained by the fact that the first time period is omitted when lagged variables 
are included in the estimation. Trade union density was of course particularly high in former 
socialist countries before and shortly after their democratic transitions in the early 1990s. Af-
terwards, it dropped to levels comparable to other countries. Thus, the positive effect of this 
variable disappears when the first five-year period is excluded. Finally, it is interesting to see 
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that all the estimates of the time period dummies have negative signs and are highly signifi-
cant. Hence, just like the level of political participation, the degree of civil society organiza-
tion seems to be constantly decreasing over time as well. 
The results from the GEE estimation can be considered quite robust since the estimates are 
almost the same in regular random effects GLS models (see table A8.3 in the appendix). A 
few differences in significance levels can be observed but these are really negligible. 
 
To summarize, the findings from the previous analyses are somewhat contradictory with re-
spect to hypothesis 3. On the one hand, media system performance in terms of the first com-
ponent of the horizontal function indeed appears to enhance the strength of the civil society. 
The respective effect was found in all regression models in table 8.4. On the other hand, me-
dia system performance in terms of the second component of the horizontal function seems to 
have a negative impact on interest group organization. This unexpected result was evident 
only in the longitudinal analysis and is difficult to explain. Thus, whether H3 can be con-
firmed or not ultimately remains inconclusive. However, the fact that the positive effect of 
quantitative media diversity outweighs the negative impact of qualitative media diversity be-
cause its coefficients are both more significant and larger, might lead us to rather confirm than 
reject hypothesis 3. 
In addition, a positive effect on civil society organization was also observed for vertical media 
function performance, but only in the cross-sectional and the static panel analysis. Therefore, 
assuming causality is not entirely warranted. Instead, we should simply state that there is a 
relationship between the two phenomena. With respect to the control variables, a dummy var-
iable for the Scandinavian countries has proven to be a very strong predictor in all four re-
gression models. This is not very surprising, given that the dependent variable consists of un-
ion density and membership in environmental organizations. Furthermore, measured by these 
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two indicators, the civil society also tends to be stronger in the former socialist countries of 
Eastern Europe and in countries with higher degrees of generalized trust among their citizens.  
8.4 Structural media performance and political representation 
Finally, the last hypothesis in chapter 7 deals with the adequacy of political representation in 
democracies, both in a substantive and descriptive sense. Hence, the dependent variable is an 
index composed of issue-congruence and the degree of political rights and access to political 
offices for minorities. Similar to the assumptions revolving around the civil society, I expect 
that mainly the horizontal function is important here. Hence, a better fulfillment of the hori-
zontal media function should help to ensure that the interests of all citizens are adequately 
represented in the arena of political decision-making. Section 8.4 seeks to provide empirical 
evidence for this supposed relationship. 
In addition to the usual three media function factor scores, two control variables are added to 
the set of explanatory variables. Once again, a country’s share of politically interested citizens 
and whether elections are based on the principle of proportional representation probably need 
to be accounted for. The first model in table 8.5 (column 2) presents the cross-sectional OLS 
models estimated to predict representation. Despite a potential problem of multicollinearity 
between political interest and the vertical function variable (see footnote 93), the results are 
pretty much the same whether the control variable is included or not.
106
 Hence, for the sake of 
simplicity, only the model with political interest is shown. 
First of all, it is evident that the model has quite a poor fit. Obviously, the regressors do not 
explain much of the variation in the dependent variable. Nevertheless, both media perfor-
mance in terms of the vertical function and the first component of the horizontal function are 
statistically associated with representation. Thus, as expected in H4, a greater quantitative 
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diversity in the press sector, i.e. more newspaper titles per capita and more newspaper import, 
have a positive influence on how adequately citizens are represented in the political system. 
Table 8.5 Explaining political representation by media performance 
 Cross-sectional analysis 
(OLS) 
a
 
Panel analysis (GEE) 
b
 
 Static model Dynamic model 
 
Coef.      (S.E.)  Coef.      (S.E.)  Coef.    (S.E.)  
VF 9.631 (3.506) ** 8.002 (1.986) *** - -  
HF: QND 5.221 (2.380) * 5.525 (1.252) *** - -  
HF: QLD 1.658 (2.386)  0.448 (1.174) 
 
- -  
VF (t-1) - -  - -  9.258 (2.247) *** 
HF: QND (t-1) - -  - -  6.316 (1.912) *** 
HF: QLD (t-1) - -  - -  4.145 (2.426) 
+ 
Political interest -0.294 (0.276)  -0.163 (0.101)  -0.164 (0.115)  
PR system 6.279 (6.346)  7.543 (3.767) * 4.996 (5.377)  
Period 1995-99 - -  1.503 (1.247)  - -  
Period 2000-04 - -  -0.959 (2.296)  -2.076 (1.574)  
Period 2005-08 - -  -5.349 (3.127) 
+ 
-7.023 (2.525) ** 
Constant 77.095 (13.618) *** 71.570 (6.049) *** 78.015 (7.551) *** 
Model Properties          
R
2
 0.297   -   -   
Adjusted R
2
 0.209   -   -   
N  46   184 
  
138 
  Notes: a) unstandardized OLS estimators; b) unstandardized GEE estimators with AR(1) correlation structure 
and robust standard errors; *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05, + p ≤ 0.10; VF = vertical media function; HF = 
horizontal media function; QND = quantitative media diversity; QLD = qualitative media diversity; reference 
category time periods: period 1990-94 (static model) / period 1995-1999 (dynamic model). 
 
The impact of vertical function performance, however, is actually stronger.
107
 Apparently, not 
just information from a diversity of news sources but generally access to information enables 
citizens to choose political parties and candidates who represent them better. Once again, no 
significant effects are found for qualitative media diversity, and neither for political interest or 
the electoral system. 
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 The predicted maximum effect of quantitative media diversity is 23.240, which amounts to 38 percent of the 
dependent variable’s total range. To compare, the respective numbers for the vertical function are 35.968 and 58 
percent. 
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Like in the cross-sectional analyses for political participation and civil society organization, I 
checked whether the OLS estimates in table 8.5 are biased because of an endogenous explana-
tory variable. Particularly quantitative media diversity could be jointly affected by an unob-
served factor together with the dependent variable. And given the very low R
2
, this suspicion 
of omitted variable bias seems even more warranted. Hence, a test for endogeneity was per-
formed, using GDP per capita as an instrument for the first of the two horizontal function var-
iables. GDP per capita was already chosen as an instrumental variable for the vertical media 
function when testing for endogeneity in the models predicting political participation, but it 
might also be applied here as an IV for quantitative media diversity.
108
 Yet once more, the test 
statistics for the cross-sectional model in table 8.5 revealed that endogeneity does not seem to 
be a cause for concern. 
 
Moving to the longitudinal analysis of political representation in table 8.5 (columns 3 and 4), 
it is interesting to see that the static model shows very similar results to the purely cross-
sectional findings. Accordingly, the first two media performance variables have a positive 
impact on representation, and the vertical function still has a larger marginal effect. The third 
media performance variable as well as political interest again has no significant relationship 
with representation, and the coefficients are also considerably smaller compared to the OLS 
model. By contrast, the dummy variable measuring whether countries have a proportional 
representation system or not exhibits a significant estimate in the panel analysis. As anticipat-
ed, the issue-congruence between electorates and their representatives as well as the access to 
political power for minorities is better in PR systems. Furthermore, only the last time period 
dummy has a marginally significant estimate in the static model which means that the degree 
of representation does not considerably deviate from the early 1990s in later periods. 
                                                 
108
 Regressing quantitative diversity on GDP gives a significant estimate for GDP which means that GDP fulfills 
at least one of the two criteria for a good IV.  
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As the last column in table 8.5 shows, media performance in terms of the vertical function and 
in terms of quantitative media diversity does not only have an immediate but also has a posi-
tive long-term impact on representation since the respective variables turn out to be statistical-
ly significant in lagged form as well. In addition, a lagged positive and weakly significant 
effect can also be observed for the second of the horizontal function indicators, measuring 
qualitative media diversity, i.e., external and internal opinion diversity within the press sys-
tem. This is quite remarkable if we consider that only insignificant or negative estimates re-
sulted for this variable so far. The fact that qualitative diversity is only significant in the dy-
namic model indicates that a higher diversity of opinions does not contemporaneously lead to 
a better substantive and descriptive representation of the electorate in the political sphere, but 
only after some time passes. This is actually quite plausible. When political viewpoints are 
more equally represented within the press system, it is more likely that citizens find the repre-
sentatives best in line with their preferences, which in turn, should promote issue-congruence. 
This process, however, does not take place immediately and overnight but rather seems to 
occur over a longer period of time. Regardless, the positive direction of the relationship can 
be taken as evidence in support of H4. 
Comparing the static to the dynamic model reveals that the coefficients are somewhat larger 
in the dynamic model, especially when it comes to qualitative media diversity. Hence, the 
lagged effects seem to be generally stronger than the static effects. However, the PR system 
dummy variable is not statistically significant anymore in the dynamic model. Interestingly, 
the time period dummies from the dynamic model in table 8.5 show that representation seems 
to deteriorate over time. Hence, in contrast to especially the late 1990s, representation is sig-
nificantly lower between 2005 and 2008. So even though representation increases between the 
first and second time period, it declines continuously thereafter. 
Finally, estimating the panel models by a random effects instead of a GEE approach gives 
almost identical results for the media performance variables (see table A8.4 in the appendix). 
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The most notable difference is that the positive lagged effect of qualitative media diversity, 
the second component of the horizontal media function, is highly instead of only marginally 
significant in the GLS model. Moreover, contrary to the static GEE model, it is political inter-
est and not the electoral system which has a significant effect. 
 
Overall, hypothesis 4 about the influence of media performance in terms of the horizontal 
function on representation is largely confirmed. The first component of the horizontal func-
tion, quantitative media diversity, exhibits a positive impact on representation in all three re-
gression models presented in table 8.5. Furthermore, the second horizontal function compo-
nent, qualitative media diversity, was found to have only a lagged effect on the dependent 
variable, but it is positive as well. In addition to the horizontal function, the vertical function 
also turns out to be positively related to representation, no matter in which regression model. 
We might therefore argue that structural media performance is generally important for the 
quality or adequacy of political representation. However, this conclusion needs to be put in 
perspective by the fact that the goodness-of-fit of the cross-sectional analysis is very low. 
8.5 Conclusion 
The aim of chapter 8 was to explore the relationship between different aspects of democracy 
and media performance, for practical reasons only with respect to the structural level and the 
larger 47-country sample. The theoretical expectations guiding the analyses were developed 
in chapter 7, while this chapter exclusively focused on providing empirical evidence in order 
to confirm or reject the assumptions. 
Democracy is a complex, multidimensional phenomenon (Bühlmann et al. 2011a). The anal-
yses in this chapter have therefore not dealt with the concept ‘democracy’ as a whole but re-
volved around four elements or so-called functions of democracy for which democratic media 
performance seemed to be most important from a theoretical point of view. These are political 
participation, transparency, civil society organization and political representation. However, 
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these four democratic functions were not assumed to be equally affected by the two media 
functions. Instead, the hypotheses in chapter 7 posit that participation and transparency should 
mainly be related to the vertical media function. Civil society and representation, in turn, were 
anticipated to be more closely associated with the horizontal media function. Nevertheless, all 
of the regression analyses presented above include both media functions, i.e., all three latent 
factors from chapter 5, as independent variables.  
Overall, most of the hypotheses from chapter 7 can at least be tentatively confirmed even 
though not every regression model produced the expected results. While different models for 
the same dependent variable did not necessarily contradict each other they did not always 
support each other either. In addition, the distinction between the two media functions with 
regard to their impact on democracy is not clear-cut since significant results for both functions 
were observed for all aspects of democracy examined in this chapter.  
The findings with regard to political participation suggest that, in line with H1a, structural 
media performance in terms of the vertical function has a positive influence on the level of 
participation, as measured by turnout in elections and direct-democratic votes as well as in 
demonstrations and petitions (see section 8.1). This effect was found in all regression models. 
Media systems’ fulfillment of their democratic functions is therefore indeed important to 
promote civic engagement.
109
 As for the equality of participation, however, a marginally sig-
nificant impact of the vertical media function could only be observed in cross-sectional model 
II without the control variables. This second indicator for political participation measures how 
representative participants in elections, demonstrations and petitions are for the population at 
large in terms of gender, age, income and education. Hypothesis 1b thus has to be rejected. 
Moreover, the first component of the horizontal media function (quantitative diversity) seems 
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2
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to be weakly but positively associated with the level of participation as well, but negatively 
with the equality of participation in the cross-sectional analysis. 
As shown in section 8.2, the vertical media function also turns out to have both a contempo-
raneous and a lagged positive effect on transparency, which was measured by the absence of 
corruption. This lends support to hypothesis 2. In addition, the quantitative component of the 
horizontal media function also seems to be a significant determinant of transparency. 
The analyses discussed in section 8.3 do neither allow for clear confirmation nor rejection of 
H3. The hypothesis expected a generally positive relationship between structural media per-
formance of the horizontal function and the strength of the civil society, in terms of union 
density and membership in environmental associations. But the two horizontal function media 
variables provide conflictive results. While quantitative diversity exhibits the anticipated ef-
fect in all of the four regression models presented in table 8.4, the estimates for qualitative 
diversity point in the opposite direction and are even statistically significant in the longitudi-
nal analysis. As discussed above, it is difficult to decide what to make of these puzzling re-
sults without further analysis. However, given that the effect sizes for quantitative diversity 
are larger, there seems to be more support for than against hypothesis 3. Beside the horizontal 
function, a positive relationship with the degree of interest organization within a country was 
also found for the vertical media function, but only in two of the four models. 
Finally, H4 argued that a stronger compliance of media systems with the requirements of the 
horizontal media function should increase the adequacy of political representation, which was 
measured by issue-congruence and the political inclusion of minorities. This hypothesis can 
be largely confirmed. Both components of the horizontal media function have positive effects 
on representation although only with some time delay in the case of the qualitative diversity 
component. Hence, this variable only exhibits a significant coefficient in the dynamic panel 
model, where it is included in lagged form (see table 8.5). Again, not only the horizontal but 
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also the vertical media function proved to be an important predictor of a better representation 
of citizens in the political decision-making arena. Hence, the relationship between media per-
formance and representation not only operates in the way anticipated in the last hypothesis, 
but is positive in general. 
 
In sum, the results presented in this chapter provide an interesting picture of the interplay be-
tween media and democracy. Since notable empirical connections were found between the 
two concepts, it seems that the public debate about whether mass media fulfill their democrat-
ic role or not is indeed important and worth holding. This is all the more true if we consider 
that mass media and their democratic performance might not only have an impact on the four 
democratic functions that this study focused on. As already mentioned in the previous chap-
ters, further aspects of democracy could be affected by media performance as well. For in-
stance, a better availability of information by a larger variety of different news sources might 
also help to safeguard individual liberties and the rule of law. But since these are generally 
better guaranteed and thus less pressing issues in established democracies, I decided to turn 
my attention to those elements of democracy which vary more in the countries under investi-
gation, namely participation, transparency, the civil society and representation. 
In concluding, it must also be noted that the present analyses only allow for a rough overview 
of the subject in question and they undoubtedly have their limitations. In order to test each of 
the hypotheses 1 to 4 in an absolutely solid way, more detailed analyses would be necessary. 
For example, estimating interaction effects between the media variables and/or the control 
variables could have added explanatory power. Moreover, although I tested for endogeneity in 
the regression models where this seemed to be possible, this problem can nevertheless not be 
ruled out entirely. Future studies will have to find better and more instrumental variables so 
that not only omitted variable but also reverse causality issues can be solved (e.g. by means of 
simultaneous equation estimation). Finally, it is unfortunate that the hypotheses could only be 
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studied with regard to media performance on the structural but not the content level, due to 
the low number of countries for which I was able to generate content analysis data. One op-
tion to countervail this limitation would have been to conduct qualitative analysis. However, 
such a strategy was not adopted because this book follows a clear quantitative approach. A 
further idea to bypass the neglect of the content level in part II of the present study would be 
to use survey data in which respondents can be nested into newspapers and then perform mul-
tilevel analysis. However, this would require that respondents are asked which newspapers 
they read, which is rarely done. By now, most international surveys like the World Values 
Survey or the European Social Survey, and national election studies have recognized the im-
portance of mass media and at least include very general questions about the type of infor-
mation sources that citizens most often turn to (e.g. electronic vs. print media). But questions 
about the use of specific news sources, such as newspaper titles or television programs, are 
the exception. This is very deplorable, since such items would be of great benefit in order to 
properly link individual behavior and media content in studies of media effects. 
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Chapter 9:  
Conclusion
This book revolved around the question of the role of mass media in modern democracies. 
Mass communication is indispensable for today’s large-scale societies, and television, news-
papers and the radio are the most important sources of information for citizens all around the 
globe. But while there seems to be great consensus about what this means for dictatorships 
and countries in transition, the contribution of mass media to the well-functioning of more 
mature and established democracies is highly debated among scholars, politicians and practi-
tioners alike. 
There is usually no doubt that mass media help maintaining the system and the power of the 
government in authoritarian regimes where they are – at least for the most part – tightly con-
trolled by the state. For example, one only has to think of the pervasive state propaganda dis-
seminated by North Korean media to keep the country’s citizens in line. Norris and Inglehart 
(2010) try to show that such propaganda not only muzzles dissent but actually influences citi-
zens’ perception of the state and its leadership. The authors find that in countries with low 
degrees of media freedom, citizens who are more highly exposed to the media express greater 
confidence in state institutions, less support for democratic principles and more pride in the 
nation, while the opposite or no effects can be observed in countries with a high degree of 
media freedom. Similarly, there is broad agreement that mass media have greatly contributed 
to promoting democratization processes in most of the “third-wave” countries (Huntington 
1991). Gunther and Mughan (2000: 412), for instance, point out that in many countries, like 
Chile, former East Germany or Spain, slowly liberalizing mass media helped eroding „the 
credibility and legitimacy of the nondemocratic regime”, developing „pluralism in political 
attitudes, preferences and partisan alternatives” and resocializing „both masses and elites to 
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the new democratic rules of the game” during their respective transitions.110 More recently, 
the importance of new social media for the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt during the so-
called Arab spring 2011 has been highlighted (Howard and Hussain 2011; Lotan et al. 
2011).
111
 
But as outlined in chapter 1 of this study, when it comes to the question of whether free and 
independent mass media serve or rather harm democracy once it is established, opinions are 
strongly divided within the scientific community. On the one hand, adherents of what is often 
referred to as the ‘media malaise’ perspective argue that because mass media in established 
democracies mostly operate according to market principles, they disregard their democratic 
duties. This is supposed to have serious repercussions for the quality of democracy, such as 
political apathy, alienation, cynicism and ignorance (e.g. Bennett 2003; Bennett and Entman 
2001; Habermas 1962, 2006; Cappella and Jamieson 1997). On the other hand, supporters of 
what rather seems to be the minority position and might be termed the ‘mobilization’ perspec-
tive hold that the normative expectations imposed on both the media and citizens by media 
malaise theorists are too high (e.g. Graber 2003, 2004; Zaller 2003). In what they perceive to 
be a more realistic assessment, mobilization theorists conclude that media provide enough 
information for citizens to recognize when their interests are in danger, and that media con-
sumption actually increases civic engagement (e.g. Norris 2000; Schudson 1998). 
This book suggested that what both sides in this ongoing debate have in common is that their 
respective accounts and claims are based on insufficient empirical evidence. Systematic anal-
yses of democratic media performance across a wide range of countries are rare if not inexist-
ent. This was the starting point of the present study. Although the value of the rather small 
number of large-scale comparative studies of media and democracy available should not be 
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disregarded, their shortcomings must not be neglected either. As elaborated in chapter 2 of 
this book, previous cross-national evaluations of democratic media performance as well as of 
its impact on various aspects of democracy have had a rather limited focus and/or suffered 
from methodological weaknesses.
112
 Hence, the basic motivation for this book was to provide 
more comprehensive empirical insights into democratic media performance and its effects for 
a broad number of countries, in order to possibly enrich the scientific discourse. 
More specifically, two main research questions guided the analyses in the preceding six chap-
ters. The first question focused on how democratic media performance can be measured sys-
tematically and in a comparative perspective, and how countries differ accordingly. Second, I 
was interested in whether these differences in media performance actually matter or, in other 
words, how mass media affect various elements which are crucial for a well-functioning dem-
ocratic process. These two questions implied a division of the book into two parts. Hence, in 
line with the first research question, part I dealt with the conceptualization and implementa-
tion of a comparative framework to assess media performance, i.e., mass media’s fulfillment 
of their democratic functions. In part II, the effects of media performance, as measured in part 
I, on aspects of the quality of democracy were studied to answer the second research question. 
In the following, I will summarize the main expectations and findings from the two parts and 
discuss their wider implications. 
9.1 Assessing democratic media performance 
The first chapter of part I developed a theoretical model of democratic media performance 
(see chapter 3). In order to measure and compare them, it was first of all necessary to clarify 
what role or functions mass media are supposed to fulfill in a democracy. Normative stand-
ards serve well as benchmarks for empirical assessments (Bennett and Entman 2001; Norris 
and Odugbemi 2010). Thus, I reviewed various normative contributions about democratic 
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media functions in light of two broad ideal-type models of democracy. I argued that according 
to the liberal tradition of democracy, media mainly need to deliver information about public 
affairs and electoral alternatives, as well as to act as public watchdogs which scrutinize politi-
cal decision makers. Most important from the perspective of the participatory theory of de-
mocracy, by contrast, is that media provide a public platform and give the plurality of inter-
ests within a society an equal voice. Based on these considerations, a two-dimensional con-
cept of mass media’s democratic requirements was derived, consisting of what I call the verti-
cal and the horizontal media function. On the one hand, media need to disseminate infor-
mation about the activities and decisions of political office-holders, especially about official 
misconduct, to as many citizens as possible. Since this suggests a top-down communication 
process, it is termed the vertical media function. On the other hand, in modern mass societies, 
media are supposed to constitute an open public sphere which reflects the diversity of the so-
ciety. In other words, media should allow all existing groups to publicly express their opin-
ions and demands and engage in discourses with others on a level playing field. Hence, media 
need to enable the communication among different sections of the society on equal terms, 
which is why this notion was coined the horizontal media function in chapter 3. 
In order to develop the conceptual model further and make it applicable for empirical anal-
yses, the two media functions were broken down into specific components and variables. To 
this aim, I further distinguished between two different levels of analysis. Following McQuail 
(1992) and Voltmer (2000), media performance can be assessed on the media system or struc-
tural level as well as on the level of media outlets’ news coverage, i.e., the content level. Pre-
vious studies have usually only included one of the two levels (see chapter 2). For this reason, 
the goal of the present study was to consider both levels so that a more comprehensive evalua-
tion of mass media’s compliance with the vertical and the horizontal media function would be 
possible. Chapter 4 presented the operationalization of the two media functions according to 
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the components and variables discussed in the preceding chapter and outlined the research 
designs and data collection procedures applied for each of the two levels of analysis. 
 
For the structural level, a large amount of secondary data on media system characteristics was 
collected. However, after a thorough revision of the data, I decided that working with only 
few but valid, reliable and largely complete indicators is preferable to having a very large but 
unmanageable and unbalanced dataset. Hence, I settled on a core set of nine indicators which 
are available for 47 established democracies worldwide and for almost two decades (1990 to 
2008). The five indicators for the vertical media function focus on the communication infra-
structure, i.e., how widely the access to information from print, broadcast and online news 
sources is distributed across a country’s population. The four indicators for the horizontal 
media function measure the diversity of different outlets in a country’s print sector, both in 
quantitative and qualitative terms. While the former simply accounts for the number of differ-
ent newspaper titles as well as the amount of foreign newspapers imported, the latter reflects 
to what degree the press system is characterized by an ideological balance (external opinion 
diversity) and a high share of politically neutral outlets (internal opinion diversity). Since the 
horizontal function only includes press indicators, three additional indicators were used in a 
reduced country sample consisting of 24 European cases. Two of them assess the number of 
television stations in a country and the share of households receiving foreign news channels, 
in order to reflect the quantitative diversity of the broadcast sector. The third indicator 
measures the strength and independence of public service broadcasting compared to private 
broadcasters, which is a proxy for qualitative television diversity, or internal opinion diversity 
to be more precise. 
On the basis of these two sets of indicators and countries, chapter 5 examined media perfor-
mance in terms of the vertical and horizontal function on the structural level. In a first step, 
factor analyses were performed to test whether the theoretically deduced media functions are 
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empirically valid or, more specifically, whether the indicators are really correlated in the ex-
pected way. Quite remarkably, the results indicated that this is to a large extent the case. As 
anticipated, the indicators derived for the two functions belong to different latent dimensions. 
Moreover, in line with the assumptions of the conceptual model, the vertical function exhibits 
a one-dimensional structure, since all of its five indicators load onto the same factor. The four 
core indicators of the horizontal function, by contrast, split into two factors. However, these 
conform to the two components of the horizontal function – quantitative and qualitative media 
diversity – which again demonstrates that the empirical reality is not far off from the theoreti-
cal model defined in chapter 3. When the factor analysis was conducted with twelve instead 
of the nine core indicators and the sample thus reduced from 47 to 24 countries, further inter-
esting observations could be made. Whereas nothing changes with respect to the vertical func-
tion, the quantitative diversity component of the horizontal media function subdivides into 
two factors, one for each of the two types of media (print vs. television). Additionally, alt-
hough qualitative media diversity still only consists of one latent dimension, the factor load-
ings of the press and the broadcast sector indicators point in opposite directions. These deviat-
ing results are very interesting. They suggest that the two media sectors operate according to 
two different logics in certain respects. Hence, at least in terms of the horizontal function, a 
good democratic performance of the press system does not mean that the same applies to the 
broadcast system, and vice versa. In fact, the contradicting factor loadings for the qualitative 
diversity dimension even indicate that there seems to be a tradeoff between public service 
broadcasting and the press with regard to the diversity of opinions
113
 or, rather, that one com-
pensates the deficiencies of the other. This can be illustrated by the extreme case of Great 
Britain where the imbalanced press system with a comparatively large conservative bias is 
outweighed by the country’s strong, independent and much praised public broadcaster, the 
BBC. 
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In a next step, based on the factor scores for the media functions and their components, media 
performance was compared by means of descriptive and cluster analyses across the 47 and 24 
countries, respectively. The main interest was to find out which countries perform well on 
which function and whether specific patterns of media performance can be observed. Most 
importantly, these analyses showed that there is a large variation of media performance across 
countries with respect to both media functions. Hence, the media systems of established de-
mocracies are not equally well or equally badly equipped to serve their democratic duties. 
This might call into question the general and sweeping assumptions that both the media ma-
laise and the mobilization perspectives make about the state of media and democracy. Moreo-
ver, ranking the countries according to their value on the different media performance dimen-
sions gives very different pictures. Countries that score high on one media function do not 
necessarily perform well with respect to the other too. Thus, different patterns of media per-
formance in terms of the vertical and horizontal function exist. This very important finding 
was also confirmed by cluster analyses. Accordingly, several types of media performance 
were identified. First of all, some countries exhibit a moderately high structural media per-
formance on both functions. This especially applies to Central European countries like Aus-
tria, Germany and Switzerland. Other groups of countries, however, perform exceptionally 
well, but only with regard to one of the media functions or its components. Hence, whereas 
most Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries as well as Japan fulfill the vertical media func-
tion to very high degrees, at least some of them perform rather poorly in terms of quantitative 
diversity and/or qualitative diversity, the two components of the horizontal media function. 
Small European countries like Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg, by contrast, have a very 
strong quantitative media diversity but score rather low on the vertical media function. Simi-
larly, while France, India and Israel rank high in terms of qualitative media diversity, the me-
dia systems in at least the latter two countries are not very well suited to fulfill the require-
ments of the vertical media function. These results suggest that a simultaneous maximization 
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of both media functions is difficult to achieve. In consequence, whether a moderate fulfill-
ment of both functions or a high fulfillment of only one function is the better outcome for the 
quality of democracy is a matter of opinion. However, considering that both media functions 
were found to have important effects for different aspects of democracy in chapter 8, as will 
be discussed below, the first strategy might be more desirable. Finally, there are also groups 
of media systems with a comparatively poor performance of both media functions. They are 
mostly found in in the younger democracies and less developed countries of Southern and 
Eastern Europe as well as Latin America and Asia. 
Finally, chapter 5 also looked for determinants of structural media performance by means of 
multivariate regression analyses. Different types of predictor variables were considered. In 
short, the vertical media function is strongly related to press freedom and especially a coun-
try’s wealth, measured by its GDP per capita. The horizontal media function proved more 
difficult to explain, and the model fits were thus rather poor. On the one hand, press freedom 
and GDP per capita also turned out to affect quantitative media diversity, the first component 
of the horizontal function. However, this only applies to the larger 47-country sample. In the 
smaller 24-country sample quantitative media diversity is rather determined by the size of the 
population and the political-institutional context in terms of Lijphart’s (1999) dimensions of 
democracy. While press diversity has a positive relationship with the executive-parties dimen-
sion, television diversity is rather influenced by the federal-unitary dimension. On the other 
hand, practically no explanations were found for qualitative media diversity. The only signifi-
cant result was that qualitative diversity seems to be higher in more consensual democracies 
as measured by Lijphart’s (1999) executive-parties dimension. Overall, although not all of the 
anticipated effects could be observed, the findings correspond to the theoretical expectations.  
 
To measure media performance on the content level, a content analysis of a total of 50 news-
papers from the following ten countries was conducted: Australia, Austria, Canada, France, 
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Germany, Ireland, New Zealand, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. For 
each of these countries, five of the ten largest circulating daily newspapers were selected, and 
their full content from 26 representative days of the year 2008 was sampled (see chapter 4).
114
 
This news material was then scanned for various keywords by a semi-automated procedure. In 
other words, the media performance measures on the content level are entirely based on the 
appearance of various keywords within newspaper articles. Nine indicators were constructed 
to assess the compliance of a country’s press with the standards of the vertical and the hori-
zontal function with respect to its news coverage. The five indicators for the vertical media 
function reflect a) the share of a newspaper’s daily volume that deals with political affairs, b) 
the share of articles about governments and parliaments, respectively, that associate them with 
malpractice, and c) the degree to which newspapers cover the three constitutional branches 
and the public administration as well as only the government and the parliament to equal ex-
tents. The four indicators for the horizontal media function, on the contrary, measure a) 
whether newspapers establish a diverse platform by covering all political parties to equal de-
grees as well as according to their electoral strengths, and b) whether newspapers contrast 
different viewpoints, which was assessed by the share of articles about political parties citing 
more than one party on the one hand, and the mean number of parties mentioned per article on 
the other. 
In Chapter 6, the resulting data was used to analyze content-level media performance, pro-
ceeding in almost the same steps as for structural media performance in chapter 5. Thus, a 
factor analysis on the basis of the 50 newspapers first tested whether the nine indicators relate 
to each other like the two-dimensional theoretical model expects. And indeed, like for the 
structural level, the results for the content level are mostly in line with the conceptualization 
of the vertical and the horizontal media function. Again, the indicators for the two media 
functions do not load onto the same latent factors but rather form separate dimensions. But 
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while the horizontal media function splits into two factors according to its two components 
quantitative and qualitative diversity on the structural level, it is the vertical function that sub-
divides into its respective two components on the content level – the amount and the balance 
of information (see chapter 3). So overall, these findings provide strong support for the validi-
ty of the theoretical conceptualization of the two media functions on the content level. 
Furthermore, since the main ambition of the present study is to compare media performance 
across countries, it was important to determine whether the factor scores for the horizontal 
and the vertical media function, which were calculated on the basis of individual newspapers, 
vary more between different types of newspapers or more between the ten countries. To this 
end, I compared the variance and mean level of media performance in every country. The 
results indicated that countries are quite homogenous in terms of the democratic performance 
of their press. Regression analyses in which both newspaper-specific and country-specific 
variables were used as determinants of the factor scores provided even stronger support for 
this conclusion. Although the characteristics of individual outlets, particularly whether they 
are a regional, a broadsheet or a tabloid newspaper as well as their circulation, play a decisive 
role for the quality of their news output with respect to the normative standards of the vertical 
and horizontal media function, the larger country context generally seems to matter more. 
Hence, media content performance varies more strongly across than within countries, i.e., 
across newspaper types. This result is very substantial and speaks to the literature pointing to 
the importance of news cultures (Esser 2008). 
In addition, the specific effects of the macro-level explanatory factors are noteworthy and 
highly plausible as well. I tested the impact of the values for structural media performance as 
measured in chapter 5, as well as a country’s media and political traditions by the three mod-
els of media systems by Hallin and Mancini (2004) and the two dimensions of democracy by 
Lijphart (1999). Moreover, I controlled for whether a country is in an election year or not and, 
in the case of the first component of the vertical media function, for its level of corruption. 
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Staying with this latent dimension, the regression analysis revealed that the amount of espe-
cially critical political information that media provide is significantly higher in liberal media 
systems (Hallin and Mancini 2004) and in majoritarian as well as more federal democracies. 
Moreover, media do a better job of informing voters in elections years, and there is also a pos-
itive relationship between the level of corruption in a country and media performance in terms 
of the first vertical function component. Considering that the indicators supposed to measure 
the degree of media coverage about official malpractice belong to this component, this is 
quite an interesting result, which can actually be taken as evidence for the validity of these 
indicators. Finally, but most strikingly, vertical function performance on the structural level 
has a positive effect on vertical function performance on the content level. This suggests that 
the structural and the content level of media performance are linked and should not be treated 
as distinct phenomena. The positive connection between the two levels of analysis is also evi-
dent with respect to the horizontal media function. Accordingly, the balance of parties in the 
news is better and a dialogic structure of newspaper articles more common in countries where 
press systems exhibit greater quantitative and qualitative diversity. Additionally, on the con-
tent level, the horizontal media function is also much better fulfilled in Hallin and Mancini’s 
(2004) democratic corporatist media systems than in liberal media systems, in countries with 
a stronger division of powers and federalism as well as in elections years. Finally, the second 
component of the vertical media function, reflecting the degree to which newspapers balance 
their coverage of different constitutional branches is the only one of the content-level media 
performance factors which is more strongly affected by newspaper characteristics than coun-
try-specific features. In fact, it is mainly determined by a newspaper’s circulation. This prob-
ably means that only large news organizations can afford to invest many resources in less 
newsworthy institutions like the judiciary and the public administration. As for the macro-
level explanatory variables, only the polarized pluralist and the election year dummy have a 
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significant and negative effect. Quite plausibly, media pay more attention to the legislative 
and executive powers than the institutions just mentioned during election campaigns. 
Following the approach from chapter 5 for the structural level, chapter 6 explored whether 
cross-national patterns of media performance can be identified on the content level as well. 
For this purpose, bivariate scatter plots were combined with, again, cluster analysis. And 
similarly to chapter 5, significant differences between the countries can be observed in terms 
of how well their press complies with the requirements of the vertical and horizontal function 
in their news coverage. Hence, different configurations of the two media functions and thus 
multiple types of media performance were also found with respect to the content level. More 
specifically, the cluster analysis classified the 50 newspapers into four different groups. These 
are largely homogenous, in the sense that newspapers from the same country mostly cluster 
within the same group. And although the overall media performance of each type might be 
interpreted as decreasing in the order in which they are described below, what seems more 
important for the perspective of this study is that no country was found to perform especially 
well on both media functions. Thus, just like in the structural analysis, a country’s press or 
news culture seems to prioritize particular aspects of media performance over others. 
The first cluster consists of the five American cases as well as the broadsheet newspapers 
from France and Great Britain in the sample. Overall, these are characterized by only a medi-
ocre fulfillment of the horizontal media function but an exceptionally high fulfillment of both 
components of the vertical media function. This was interpreted to be a result of the tradition 
of investigative journalism and the strong checks and balances with respect to the United 
States, and the high-quality professional status of the French and British cases. The second 
cluster combines newspapers which perform very well on the horizontal media function but 
below average on the vertical media function (particularly the second component). This ap-
plies to all cases from Austria and Canada as well as the two quality newspapers from Ger-
many and might be related to the power-sharing cultures within these countries. The German, 
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French and British regional and tabloid cases, by contrast, form the third cluster, together with 
all five newspapers from Switzerland and the “Irish Times”. These seem to share a moderate-
ly high performance of the second component of the vertical media function, i.e., the balance 
of information about different political institutions, and shortcomings regarding the horizontal 
and especially the first component of the vertical function. This suggests that the respective 
16 newspapers adopt a rather compliant or deferential attitude towards political office-
holders, which has been observed for the Swiss media before (Blum 2005b; Kriesi et al. 2012: 
226). Nevertheless, the classification is somewhat misleading for the Swiss cases. All of them 
except the tabloid “Blick” score above average on the horizontal function too, even though 
this is not visible in the cluster analysis. Lastly, the remaining newspapers from Ireland, along 
with the five each from Australia and New Zealand, belong to the fourth cluster. They feature 
a moderate level of fulfillment of the first vertical function component but quite serious defi-
ciencies in terms of the second component as well as the horizontal media function. This is 
interesting with respect to Hallin and Mancini (2004). On the one hand, their typology has 
some similarities with the country classification presented in chapter 6 and was useful to in-
terpret the respective findings. On the other hand, Australia and New Zealand, which should 
probably be regarded as liberal media systems, exhibit a rather distinct news culture in my 
analyses. Hence, the authors claiming that Hallin and Mancini (2004) only considered those 
countries which would fit their typology might have a point (see Blum 2005a). 
 
To summarize the most important findings from the first part of the present book, the follow-
ing conclusions can be highlighted. First of all, the conceptual model developed in this study, 
which is based on the vertical and the horizontal function as well as the structural and the con-
tent level of analysis, proved to be a useful framework to examine democratic media perfor-
mance, i.e., the compliance of media and media systems with their role in modern democra-
cies. Although the model was derived on purely theoretical grounds, following a thorough 
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review and synthesis of the normative literature, its empirical validity was tested and largely 
confirmed. As the factor analyses for both the structural- and content-level data have shown, 
the correlation structure of the indicators selected to operationalize the vertical and the hori-
zontal media function reflects these theoretical dimensions sufficiently well. To the best of 
my knowledge, none of the previous studies which defined and evaluated democratic media 
performance have made similar efforts to validate the adequacy of their conceptualizations. 
Moreover, few of them have combined media performance evaluations on both the structural 
and the content level. The present study has therefore made an attempt to fill this void and 
found that it is indeed very relevant to do so. A particularly striking result of chapter 6 is that 
media performance on the structural level is significantly and positively related to media per-
formance on the content level. Hence, comparative media research should not only focus on 
one of the two levels of analysis but rather explore their links and interactions in more detail. 
On that note, it was generally remarkable to see that media performance on the content level 
is more a function of a country’s specific news culture than of the editorial policies of indi-
vidual newspapers. 
Third, the assessment and comparison of democratic media performance on both the structur-
al and the content level, as measured in this book, revealed a considerable variation across the 
ten to 47 countries studied, and different patterns of media performance could be identified. 
Although some countries can be ascribed a higher overall degree of media performance than 
others, none really score very high on both the vertical and the horizontal function. Thus, it 
seems that a simultaneous maximization of both media functions is difficult to achieve. Coun-
tries therefore either perform badly or moderately on both functions or outstandingly on just 
one of the functions. For example, the United States, an interesting case because much of 
what has been said and written about media performance comes out of this context, were 
found to have a lot of room for progress in terms of the horizontal media function, but to ex-
cel in terms of the vertical media function on both levels of analysis. With regard to the dis-
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pute between media malaise and mobilization theory, all of these results indicate that the story 
about the state of media and democracy is more complicated than both sides in the debate 
might have us think. Neither should we claim that mass media generally – and in the United 
States in particular – fail on all accounts to fulfill their democratic duties as proponents of the 
media malaise perspective tend to do, nor should serious shortcomings in terms of media per-
formance be ignored or brushed off too easily as supporters of the mobilization perspective 
might do. The aim of this book is therefore not to take sides and make assumptions about who 
is right in this debate. Instead, it suggests that both sides could benefit from and may find 
common ground by considering more systematic and comparative empirical evidence. 
In addition, summary judgments about which theory is wrong would not be appropriate even 
if that was the intention. This is because the media performance evaluations presented in this 
book are based on relative or comparative assessments. Thus, it is important to keep in mind 
that negative factor scores do not necessarily stand for a bad media performance according to 
any absolute standards, but only a bad or below average performance relative to all other 
countries studied. Similarly, the highest factor scores indicate the best performance compared 
to all other countries in the sample, but not the best possible performance by a specific 
benchmark. Nevertheless, the theoretical and empirical conceptualization developed in this 
study might hopefully serve as a point of reference for future studies in the field. 
9.2 The effects of differences in media performance 
After having measured and compared democratic media performance in the first part of the 
book, the second part moved one step further. Its goal was to establish what kind of conse-
quences for the well-functioning of democratic regimes different degrees of media perfor-
mance actually have or, in other words, how media performance affects the quality of democ-
racy. This question is just as highly debated by media malaise and mobilization theorists as 
the media’s compliance with democratic standards as such, and just as rarely substantiated by 
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comprehensive comparative evidence. As described in chapter 2, existing studies which relate 
media performance features to democratic outcomes in a broad cross-national perspective 
usually either focus on just one specific aspect of democracy or a highly aggregated measure 
of democracy. Thereby, they disregard that different dimensions of media performance might 
have different effects on different aspects of democracy. Hence, the relationship between me-
dia and democracy should be analyzed in its full complexity, by exploring the various links 
between the two phenomena more systematically. The present study made an attempt to do so 
by testing the impact of the vertical and the horizontal media function on at least four of the 
nine integral elements of democratic quality (Bühlmann 2011a, 2012): political participation, 
transparency, civil society organization and political representation. While the vertical media 
function was primarily expected to increase the former two, the horizontal media function was 
assumed to promote the latter two. These hypotheses followed more or less directly from the 
rationales for the vertical and horizontal function derived from normative theories (see chap-
ters 3 and 7). For pragmatic reasons, they were tested on the basis of the factors scores for 
structural media performance of the large 47-country sample only, by means of both cross-
sectional as well panel data regression analysis. I will briefly outline the main results. 
First, political participation actually consisted of two constitutive parts. The first was the level 
or extent of political participation in conventional (elections and direct-democratic votes) as 
well as unconventional forms (demonstrations and petitions). As expected, vertical media 
function performance has a positive effect on the level of participation. In addition, quantita-
tive media diversity, the first component of the horizontal function also showed a weak but 
positive influence on how many people engage in politics. As for the second part of political 
participation, however, virtually no effects of structural media performance were found. The 
second part reflected the equality of participation or, in other words, the extent to which dif-
ferent education, income, gender and age groups participate to equal degrees. 
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Second, in line with the hypothesis, the vertical media function is also positively and quite 
strongly related to transparency, which is conceptualized as the absence of corruption in the 
public sector. And again, the analyses showed that quantitative diversity within the press sys-
tem also contributes to more transparency. Moreover, dynamic panel regression models re-
vealed that media performance helps to fight corruption more effectively in the longer run, 
i.e., with some time delay. 
Third, the results are mixed with regard to the impact of horizontal media function perfor-
mance on civil society organization, i.e., the shares of citizens who are members in trade un-
ions and environmental associations. On the one hand, quantitative diversity, the first compo-
nent of the horizontal media function, exhibited the anticipated positive effect on interest 
group organization. On the other hand, qualitative media diversity, the second component, 
seems to affect the civil society negatively, although the respective estimates were only sig-
nificant in the panel analysis and smaller than those for quantitative diversity. No clear expla-
nation was found for this unexpected finding. In addition, a positive influence of the vertical 
media function on civil society organization could be observed as well. But the direction of 
causality in this case seems to be more uncertain than for the other relationships tested, since 
the effect is only contemporaneous. 
Finally, the findings for political representation, which was measured by issue-congruence 
between voters and parliaments and by the political inclusion of minorities, again correspond 
to the theoretical assumptions. Thus, a higher fulfillment of the horizontal media function 
leads to a more adequate political representation. Both components, quantitative and qualita-
tive media diversity, have positive effects on representation, although only marginally so and 
only with some time delay in the case of the latter. Moreover, since a positive association with 
the dependent variable could also be observed for the vertical media function, media perfor-
mance generally seems to be important for political representation. 
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In sum, most of the hypotheses about the interaction between media performance and four 
constitutive elements of democracy could be confirmed. Hence, the expectations inherent in 
the normative literature about the media’s role for democracy seem to hold. On top of the ex-
pected relationships, additional media performance effects were found for all of the four de-
pendent variables. And even though not all of them had a positive direction, there is no doubt 
that media performance is a major determinant for the well-functioning of different dimen-
sions of a democratic regime. Thus, given its relevance for democracy, it can be concluded 
that the discussion about whether media fall short of or fulfill the normative demands imposed 
on them is not obsolete, but actually very important. However and again, whether the media 
malaise or the mobilization thesis is more accurate cannot be answered with the analyses pre-
sented in the second part of this study, and it is also not my intention to adopt a specific posi-
tion. But in the most general terms, the findings at least suggest that democracy does not seem 
to be in crisis because of their mass media and media systems. 
9.3 Limitations and outlook 
This book presented a study that is to a large extent exploratory and operates in a research 
field that is still quite patchy and underdeveloped. For this reason, various limitations could 
not be avoided, and they should not be ignored either. 
As emphasized throughout the previous chapters, finding and collecting adequate data to 
measure media performance posed the biggest challenge for the present study. With regard to 
the structural level, many comparative media scholars agree that reliable and comparable me-
dia system statistics which cover a large number of countries worldwide as well as possibly a 
larger time period are rare. The indicators available often have a limited scope or are not very 
well standardized across countries, which makes them difficult to use in cross-national anal-
yses. In addition, many of the more useful data sources are commercial and therefore not 
available free of charge. All of this applies to data about the electronic media sector in par-
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ticular, which is why the broadcast sector is not well represented in the present study, at least 
among the indicators for the horizontal media function. Instead, the horizontal media function 
mostly relies on press system data, and exclusively so for analyses with the large sample con-
sisting of 47 countries. 
As for the content level, large-scale content analyses including a broad number of countries 
are still very difficult to conduct. On the one hand, the limited availability of news material in 
electronic form is again problematic. Although a few databases provide access to a large 
number of newspapers from many different countries, coverage varies greatly across coun-
tries, and transcripts of news broadcasts are rather the exception than the norm. On the other 
hand, content analyses are very time-consuming, and language barriers pose further challeng-
es. Automated coding and analysis techniques are still in their infancy, even though they have 
a lot of potential and developments are under way. Due to these restrictions, the content anal-
ysis conducted for this study was also confined to newspapers and only ten countries. And 
because of this limited number of cases, the content-level data could unfortunately not be 
used to conduct multivariate regression analyses as envisaged in the second part of this book. 
Partly as a result of the limited data availability but also in order to allow for broad cross-
national comparisons, rather weak normative standards and rough variables were chosen for 
the conceptualization of media performance in terms of the vertical and horizontal function. 
Hence, it is of course arguable whether the specification and operationalization of the theoret-
ical model are reasonable and sufficient from a classical normative perspective. 
Future studies should thus focus on finding and employing more suitable indicators for the 
structural level, especially the horizontal function. In particular, the measures for the second 
component of the horizontal media function, which assesses qualitative media diversity, seem 
to be of little significance. Even though the indicators for internal and external diversity of 
opinions are based on established theoretical concepts and a lot of effort was put into compil-
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ing them, the corresponding factor scores could neither be explained in chapter 5 nor did they 
explain much in chapter 8. 
Of course, continued efforts should also be devoted to collecting content-level data for more 
countries, different types of media as well as a larger time span. Having data for more cases 
would then allow to jointly analyze media performance on the structural and the content level, 
and to explore their interesting links in more detail than was possible in this book. Due to the 
very different sample sizes, combined measures of structural- and content-level media per-
formance could not be calculated. As for the time frame, ideally, at least four years should be 
analyzed, in order to make sure that a full legislative period is covered in every country. News 
coverage varies between different phases of the democratic process. Simply accounting for 
this by a dummy variable that reflects where elections were held in 2008 is not sufficient. Dif-
ferences in content-level media performance during and in-between elections should be stud-
ied within each country. 
Further limitations can be identified with respect to the methods and specific analyses con-
ducted. The question of how media performance evolved and changed over time was some-
what neglected in chapter 5, even though structural-level data was collected for 19 years. 
Moreover, it might have been more appropriate to apply confirmatory rather than exploratory 
factor analysis to determine the empirical validity of the theoretical model of media perfor-
mance in chapters 5 and 6. Finally, the regression models presented in the second part of the 
book (see chapter 8) also provided only an approximate overview of the effects of media per-
formance on different aspects of democracy. More in-depth analyses would allow for more 
robust tests of the respective theoretical expectations. These might include interaction effects, 
more sophisticated methods to account for endogeneity as well as multilevel analysis to con-
nect the content-level data to individual political behavior and perceptions. Moreover, possi-
ble relationships between media performance and further dimensions of democracy – such as 
individual liberties or the rule of law – should be examined. 
Conclusion 
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To conclude, I would like to stress once again that it is important and necessary to think about 
the role of mass media in democracies, about how media actually perform with respect to 
their democratic functions and what implications this really has for the workings of the demo-
cratic process. This book aimed to contribute to respective discussions by attempting to pro-
vide more empirical insights. Hopefully, it will itself be debated and thereby inspire future 
studies to continue in the same direction, but improve the conceptualization, measurement and 
analyses of democratic media performance in terms of the vertical and the horizontal function 
as well as in terms of media structures and media content. 
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Appendix
 
Table A4.1 Characteristics of media function indicators for the structural level 
 Indicator Sample
 a
 N
 b
 Missings
 c
 Source(s)
 d
 
V
er
ti
ca
l 
Daily press circul. per 1’000 people 1 47 6.74 WAN; World Bank 
Radio sets per capita 1 47 4.30 BCNTS; ITU; World Bank 
TV sets per capita 1 47 2.36 BCNTS; ITU 
Computers in % population 1 47 3.91 ITU 
Internet users in % population 1 47 1.00 World Bank; ITU 
H
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
Daily press titles per 1 million people 1 47 5.06 WAN; World Bank 
Newspaper import in % GDP  1 47 2.19 UN COMTRADE; World Bank 
TV stations received 2 38 10.63 EAO; Eurostat (2003); IP; UNESCO 
% TV households (TV HH) receiving 
foreign TV news channels 
2 27 18.00 IP 
Ideological balance of the press system 1 47 6.77 Banks et al.; various others (see p. 86) 
Neutral newspapers’ circulation share 1 47 6.77 Banks et al.; various others (see p. 86) 
Strength of the public broadcast sector 
(index) 
2 26 2.25 EAO; Hanretty (2009); IP; Leckner 
and Facht (2010); Nordicom; Popescu 
et al. (2010) 
Notes: a) Sample 1 = large sample (47 countries), sample 2 = small sample (24 countries); b) number of sample 
1 countries for which for which indicator is available; c) average number of years between 1990 and 2008 which 
were missing per country and had to be replaced in the sample listed in the previous column ‘Sample’; d) to find 
out what the abbreviations mean see the references and footnotes in chapter 4. 
 
 
 
Table A4.2 Descriptive statistics of media function indicators for the structural level 
 Indicator Min. Max. Mean St.dev. Variance N 
V
er
ti
ca
l 
Daily press circulation per 1’000 people 11.49 751.47 191.61 150.41 22’621.88 893 
Radio sets per capita 0.02 2.23 0.72 0.44 0.19 893 
TV sets per capita 0.03 1.35 0.44 0.21 0.05 893 
Computers in % population 0.00 94.58 21.68 22.00 483.81 893 
Internet users in % population 0.00 90.77 20.86 25.47 648.79 893 
H
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
Daily press titles per 1 million people 0.36 25.74 4.60 4.58 21.01 893 
Newspaper import in % GDP  0.00 0.27 0.04 0.05 0.00 893 
TV stations received 1 144 11.85 17.37 301.76 722 
% TV HH receiving foreign TV news channels 10.08 70.01 43.26 15.83 250.57 513 
Ideological balance of the press system -2.50 0.00 -0.43 0.32 0.10 893 
Neutral newspapers’ circulation share 0.00 85.79 27.86 20.14 405.45 893 
Strength of the public broadcast sector (index) 0.01 75.00 16.67 14.35 205.93 494 
Notes: Descriptive statistics on the basis of panel data, only including countries belonging to sample 1. 
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Table A4.3 Overview of the newspaper sample of the content analysis 
Country Newspapers (rank 
a
) Circulation N articles Style 
b
 Ideology 
Australia  Herald Sun (1) 
 Daily Telegraph (2) 
 Courier-Mail (3) 
 Sydney Morning Herald (4) 
 The Age (5) 
 535’000 
 392’000 
 221’000 
 207’000 
 206’000 
 5’765 
 5’193 
 4’018 
 3’426 
 3’598 
 Tabloid 
 Tabloid 
 Rather tabloid 
 Broadsheet 
 Broadsheet 
 Center-right 
 Conservative 
 Conservative 
 (Conservative) 
c
 
 Center-left 
Austria  Kronen Zeitung (1) 
 Kleine Zeitung (3) 
 Kurier (4) 
 Oberösterreichische Na-
chrichten (5) 
 Tiroler Tageszeitung (6) 
 881’000 
 292’000 
 192’000 
 130’000 
 
 104’000 
 19’101 
 15’465 
 10’547 
 6’699 
 
 5’845 
 Tabloid 
 Regional 
 Broadsheet 
 Broadsheet/ 
Regional  
 Regional 
 Center-right 
 Center-right 
 Independent 
 Independent 
 
 Independent 
Canada  Toronto Star (1) 
 Globe and Mail (2) 
 National Post (4) 
 Toronto Sun (6) 
 Vancouver Sun (7) 
 431’000 
 329’000 
 201’000 
 195’000 
 162’000 
 3’931 
 5’542 
 4’626 
 2’813 
 3’439 
 Broadsheet 
 Broadsheet 
 Broadsheet 
 Tabloid 
 Broadsheet 
 Center-left 
 Center 
 Conservative 
 Conservative 
 Center-right 
France  Ouest-France (1) 
 Le Monde (2) 
 Le Figaro (3) 
 Le Parisien (4) 
 Sud-Ouest (5) 
 789’000 
 364’000 
 349’000 
 344’000 
 321’000 
 13’936 
 3’399 
 2’428 
 9’574 
 25’594 
 Regional 
 Broadsheet 
 Broadsheet 
 Tabloid 
 Regional 
 Center-right 
 Center-left 
 Conservative 
 Independent 
 Independent 
Germany  Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger / 
Kölnische Rundschau (3) 
 Süddeutsche Zeitung (4) 
 Rheinische Post (5) 
 F.A.Z. - Frankfurter All-
gemeine Zeitung (6) 
 Thüringer Allgemeine (7) 
 558’000 
 
 431’000 
 383’000 
 360’000 
 
 342’000 
 10’901 / 
12’874 
 8’702 
 76’658 
 6’472 
 
 18‘998 
 Regional 
 
 Broadsheet 
 Regional 
 Broadsheet 
 
 Regional 
 Center-left / 
center-right 
 Center-left 
 Conservative 
 Conservative 
 
 Independent 
Ireland  Irish Independent (1) 
 Irish Times (2) 
 Evening Herald (5) 
 Irish Examiner (7) 
 160’000 
 119’000 
 82’000 
 55’000 
 3’500 
 4’694 
 2’480 
 4’955 
 Broadsheet 
 Broadsheet 
 Tabloid 
 Broadsheet 
 Center-right 
 Independent 
 Center-right 
 Center-right 
New Zea-
land 
 New Zealand Herald (1) 
 Dominion Post (2) 
 
 The Press (3) 
 Waikato Times (4)  
 Otago Daily Times (5) 
 194’000 
 98’000 
 
 89’000 
 42’000 
 41’000 
 3’137 
 1’683 
 
 1’575 
 1’010 
 1’285 
 Broadsheet 
 Broadsheet/ 
Local 
 Broadsheet 
 Regional 
 Regional 
 Center-right 
 Independent 
 
 Conservative 
 Independent 
 Conservative 
Switzer-
land 
 Blick (1) 
 Tages-Anzeiger (2) 
 Berner Zeitung (3) 
 Nordwestschweiz (4) 
d
 
 Neue Zürcher Zeitung (5) 
 240’000 
 216’000 
 213’000 
 207’000 
 144’000 
 1’495 
 5’969 
 7’185 
 13’537 
 5’434 
 Tabloid 
 Broadsheet 
 Regional 
 Broadsheet 
 Broadsheet 
 Center-left 
 Center-left 
 Independent 
 Center-right 
 Conservative 
United 
Kingdom 
 The Sun (1) 
 Daily Mail (2) 
 Daily Mirror (3) 
 Daily Telegraph (4) 
 Daily Express (5) 
 2’986’000 
 2’311’000 
 1’494’000 
 874’000 
 745’000 
 14’329 
 8’392 
 9’342 
 4’340 
 6’862 
 Tabloid 
 Tabloid 
 Tabloid 
 Broadsheet 
 Tabloid 
 Conservative 
 Conservative 
 Leftist 
 Conservative 
 Conservative 
United 
States 
 USA Today (1) 
 Wall Street Journal (2) 
 New York Times (3) 
 Daily News (NY) (5) 
 New York Post (6) 
 2’293’000 
 2’012’000 
 1’038’000 
 681’000 
 667’000 
 2’073 
 4’043 
 5’578 
 2’619 
 2’907 
 Rather tabloid 
 Broadsheet 
 Broadsheet 
 Rather tabloid 
 Tabloid 
 Independent 
 Conservative 
 Leftist 
 Independent 
 Conservative 
Notes: a) Rank among the top ten paid daily newspapers in terms of circulation according to World Press Trends 
2008; b) The labels used here do not refer to the format of the newspaper but rather the journalistic style usually 
associated with these formats; c) Traditionally conservative, but endorsed Labor Party in 2007 and 2010 elec-
tions; d) Formerly Mittelland-Zeitung, combination of Aargauer Zeitung, Basellandschaftliche Zeitung, Solo-
thurner Zeitung, Oltner Tagblatt and Zofinger Tagblatt. 
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Table A4.4 Sample of days for the content analysis 
Date Weekday Exceptions / deviations
 a
 
01/07/2008 Monday - Tages-Anzeiger (Switzerland): 01/08/2008  
- Le Monde (France) b): 01/06/2008  
- Ouest-France (France): 01/08/2008 
01/23/2008 Wednesday 
 
02/08/2008 Friday 
 
02/19/2008 Tuesday 
 
03/06/2008 Thursday 
 
03/17/2008 Monday - Oberösterreichische Nachrichten (Austria): 03/15/2008  
- Le Monde (France) b: 03/16/2008  
04/02/2008 Wednesday - Oberösterreichische Nachrichten (Austria): 04/05/2008 
04/18/2008 Friday - Le Monde (France): 04/17/2008 
04/29/2008 Tuesday 
 
05/15/2008 Thursday 
 
05/26/2008 Monday - USA Today (United States): 05/27/2008 
- Wall Street Journal (United States): 05/27/2008 
- Le Monde (France) b: 05/25/2008 
06/11/2008 Wednesday 
 
06/27/2008 Friday 
 
07/08/2008 Tuesday 
 
07/24/2008 Thursday 
 
08/04/2008 Monday - National Post (Canada): 08/05/2008 
- Vancouver Sun (Canada): 08/05/2008 
- Le Monde (France) b: 08/03/2008 
08/20/2008 Wednesday - Sud-Ouest (France): 08/22/2008 
09/05/2008 Friday  
09/16/2008 Tuesday  
10/02/2008 Thursday 
 
10/13/2008 Monday - National Post (Canada): 10/14/2008  
- Le Monde (France) b: 10/12/2008 
10/29/2008 Wednesday - Otago Daily Times (New Zealand): 11/03/2008  
11/14/2008 Friday 
 
11/25/2008 Tuesday 
 
12/11/2008 Thursday 
 
12/22/2008 Monday - Le Monde (France) b: 12/21/2008 
Notes: a) Indicates the newspapers which were not available on the given day as well as the day chosen instead. 
If the sampled day was not available, the next or closest available day was selected. b) Le Monde (France) ap-
pears in the afternoon and always carries the next day’s date. Thus, there are no editions with Monday dates. 
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Table A4.5 Concepts of interests for the content analysis – number of keywords and examples 
Concept
 a
 Number of keywords
 b
 English examples
 c
 
English French German 
Politics in general 4.00 4.00 4.00 federal; politics; politician 
Executive in general 3.17 3.00 3.33 executive; government; cabinet 
Head of government 2.50 3.00 2.50 president; prime minister; *NAME* 
Head of state 3.60 3.00 2.00 president; prime minister; *NAME* 
Ministers 33.17 18.00 16.00 home secretary; minister; secretary of state; *NAMES* 
Legislative in general 4.83 3.00 6.33 Congress; lawmaker; legislative; MP (NZ); parliament 
Lower house 2.60 2.00 1.33 House of Commons; MP; representative 
Upper house 2.00 1.00 2.00 Senate; senator; Lord (UK) 
Judiciary 8.33 13.00 6.67 court; judge; judicia*; legal system; prosecutor  
Public administration 14.67 15.00 13.00 authorities; bureaucracy; public official; public service  
Political parties 23.17 39.00 28.67 See table A4.6 
Corruption 8.00 10.00 8.00 blackmail; bribe ; corrupt; favoritism; extortion; venal 
Lying 38.00 30.00 35.00 adultery; cheat; dishonest; hypocrite; immoral; lie; sin 
Fraud 34.00 23.00 26.00 abuse; felony; fraud; embezzle; misconduct; wrongdoing  
Scandal 2.00 2.00 2.00 scandal; éclat 
Negative coverage 23.00 30.00 37.00 disgrace; dimwitted; embarrassment; infamy; shameful 
Notes: a) Full concept or subcategory of a concept, if applicable. Corruption, Lying, Fraud, Scandal and Nega-
tive Coverage are subcategories of the concept malpractice, for instance. Concepts are delimited by solid hori-
zontal lines in the table. b) Average of countries with the same language. c) Examples of original keywords be-
fore stemming and implementation of heuristic rules. 
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Table A4.6 Political parties considered in the content analysis 
 Party Other identifiers Presidents / leaders 
A
u
st
ra
li
a 
Australian Democrats - Lyn Allison; Julia Melland 
Australian Labor Party ALP; Labor Linda Burney; Mike Rann 
a
 
Family First Party Family First Steve Fielding 
National Party of Australia Nationals John Tanner; Warren Truss 
One Nation - - 
Greens Australian Greens Bob Brown 
Liberal Party of Australia Liberals; Lib Chris McDiven; Brendan Nel-
son; Alan Stockdale 
Country Liberal Party CLP; Country Liberals Jodeen Carney; Terry Mills 
A
u
st
ri
a 
Die Grünen Grüne; Die Grüne Alternative Alexander van der Bellen;  
Eva Glawischnig 
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs Freiheitliche; FPÖ Heinz-Christian Strache 
Liberales Forum Liberale; LIF Werner Becher; Heide Schmidt; 
Alexander Zach 
Österreichische Volkspartei ÖVP - 
b
 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs Sozialdemokraten; SPÖ - 
c
 
Bündnis Zukunft Österreich BZÖ Jörg Haider 
C
an
ad
a 
Bloc Quebecois BC; Bloquist; the Bloc Gilles Duceppe 
Conservative Party of Canada Conservatives; Tories Don Plett 
Liberal Party of Canada Grits; Liberals Stéphane Dion; Doug Ferguson; 
Michael Ignatieff; Marie Poulin 
New Democratic Party NDP; New Democrats Jack Layton; Anne McGrath 
Green Party of Canada Greens Elizabeth May; Kate Storey 
F
ra
n
ce
 
Les Verts Confédération Écologiste – 
Parti Écologiste 
Cécile Duflot 
Mouvement Pour la France MPF Philippe de Villiers 
Parti Communiste Français Communistes; PCF Marie-George Buffet 
Parti Radical de Gauche PRG Jean-Michel Baylet 
Parti Socialiste PS; Socialistes Martine Aubry;  
François Hollande 
Rassemblement pour la France RPF; Rassemblement pour la 
France et l'Indépendance de 
l'Europe 
Charles Pasqua 
Union Pour un Mouvement Populaire UMP - 
d
 
Nouveau Centre N.Centre - 
e
 
Front National FN Jean-Marie Le Pen 
Mouvement Démocrate MoDem François Bayrou 
Centre National des Indépendants et 
Paysans 
CNI; CNIP Annick du Roscoät 
Forum des Républicains Sociaux  - 
f
 
Mouvement Républicain et Citoyen MRC Jean-Pierre Chevènement 
La Gauche Moderne - Jean-Marie Bockel 
Parti Radical Parti Radical Valoisien - 
G
er
m
an
y
 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen B'90/Grüne; Die Grünen; 
Grüne 
Cem Özdemir;  
Reinhard Bütikofer 
Christlich Demokratische Union 
Deutschlands 
CDU; CSU; Christlich-
Soziale Union in Bayern;  
Edmund Stoiber 
g
 
Freie Demokratische Partei FDP Guido Westerwelle 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutsch-
lands 
SPD Kurt Beck;  
Franz Müntefering 
h
 
Die Linke Linkspartei; Linke.PDS; 
Linkspartei.PDS; PDS 
Oskar Lafontaine 
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Table A4.6 Political parties considered in the content analysis (continued) 
 Party Other identifiers Presidents / leaders 
Ir
el
an
d
 
Fianna Fáil - The Republican Party FF; Fianna Fáil; Soldiers of 
Destiny; Warriors of Destiny 
- 
i
 
Fine Gael - The United Ireland Party FG; Fine Gael Enda Kenny 
Labour Party Labour Eamon Gilmore 
Progressive Democrats An Páirtí Daonlathach; PD Ciarán Cannon;  
Helen McCourt 
j
 
Sinn Féin SF Gerry Adams 
Green Party Green Alliance; Greens; 
Comhaontas Glas 
- 
k
 
N
ew
 Z
ea
la
n
d
 
Māori Party - Whatarangi Winiata l 
New Zealand National Party National Party; Nats;  
NZ National 
Judy Kirk 
m
 
New Zealand First Party NZ First George Groombridge; Dail 
Jones 
n
 
New Zealand Progressive Party Jim Anderton's Progressive 
Coalition, Progressive Party, 
Progressives 
- 
o
 
United Future New Zealand United Future Denise Krum 
p
 
ACT New Zealand ACT Garry Mallett 
q
 
Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand Green Party of Aotearoa; 
Green Party; Greens 
Morea Armstrong; Jeanette 
Fitzsimons; Russel Norman; 
Roland Sapsford 
New Zealand Labour Party Labour Party; Labour; New 
Zealand Labour 
Mike Williams 
r
 
New Zealand Pacific Party Pacific Party Taito Phillip Field 
The Kiwi Party - Gordon Copeland 
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d
 
Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei CVP Christophe Darbellay 
Eidgenössisch-Demokratische Union EDU Hans Moser 
Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei FDP; Freisinn; Freisinnige Fulvio Pelli 
Grüne Partei der Schweiz GP; GPS; Grüne Partei; Grü-
ne 
Ruth Genner; Ueli Leuenberger 
Grünliberale Partei GLP; Grünliberale Marin Bäumle 
Partei der Arbeit PdA Nelly Buntschu 
Schweizer Demokraten - Ueli Brasser 
Schweizerische Volkspartei SVP Toni Brunner; Ueli Maurer 
Sozialdemokratische Partei der 
Schweiz 
SP; Sozialdemokraten Hans-Jürg Fehr;  
Christian Levrat 
Christlich-Soziale Partei CSP Monika Bloch Süss 
Evangelische Volkspartei EVP Ruedi Aeschbacher;  
Heiner Studer 
Lega dei Ticinesi Lega; LdT Attilio Bignasca;  
Giuliano Bignasca 
solidaritéS SoAL - 
Liberale Partei der Schweiz Liberale; LPS Claude Ruey; Pierre Weiss 
Bürgerlich-Demokratische Partei BDP Hans Grunder 
U
n
it
ed
 K
in
g
d
o
m
 
Conservative Party Conservatives; Tories David Cameron;  
Caroline Spelman 
Democratic Unionist Party DUP Ian Paisley; Peter Robinson 
Liberal Democrats Lib Dem Menzies Campbell; Nick Clegg; 
Simon Hughes; Ros Scott 
Party of Wales Plaid Cymru; Plaids Dafydd Iwan; Ieuan Wyn Jones 
Scottish National Party Scottish Nationalists Ian Hudghton; Alex Salmond 
Social Democratic and Labour Party SDLP; Social democrats  Mark Durkan 
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Table A4.6 Political parties considered in the content analysis (continued) 
 Party Other identifiers Presidents / leaders 
U
n
it
ed
 K
in
g
d
o
m
 
Ulster Unionist Party Unionist Party; UUP Reg Empey; John White 
United Kingdom Independence Party UKIP Nigel Farage; Paul Nuttall;  
John Whittaker 
Labour Party Labour Dianne Hayter; Cath Speight 
Respect Party – The Unity Coalition Respect Party; Respect Kay Philips; Linda Smith;  
Salma Yaqoob 
Sinn Féin - Gerry Adams 
Independent Kidderminster Hospital 
and Health Concern 
Health Concern; Ind KHHC Richard Taylor 
Co-operative Party Co-operatives; Co-ops Gareth Thomas 
U
S
A
 
Democratic Party Democrats Howard Dean 
Libertarian Party Liberals Bill Redpath 
Republican Party Republicans; GOP; G.O.P.; 
Grand Old Party 
Mike Duncan 
Notes: a) Kevin Rudd and John Faulkner counted as prime minister and minister, respectively; b) Wilhelm 
Molterer and Josef Pröll counted as ministers; c) Alfred Gusenbauer and Werner Faymann counted as chancellor 
and minister, respectively; d) Nicolas Sarkozy, Xavier Bertrand and Patrick Devedjian counted as president and 
ministers, respectively; e) Hervé Morin counted as minister; f) 13 Christine Boutin; g) Angela Merkel counted as 
chancellor; h) Frank-Walter Steinmeier counted as minister; i) Bertie Ahern and Brian Cowen counted as 
Taoisigh (Irish prime ministers); j) Mary Harney counted as minister; k) John Gormley counted as minister; l) 
Pita Sharples and Tariana Turia counted as ministers; m) John Key counted as prime minister; n) Winston Peters 
counted as minister; o) Jim Anderton counted as minister; p) Peter Dunne counted as minister; q) Rodney Hide 
counted as minister; r) Helen Clark and Phil Goff counted as prime minister and minister, respectively. 
 
 
 
Table A4.7 Descriptive statistics of media function indicators for the content level 
 Indicator Min. Max. Mean St.dev. Variance N 
V
er
ti
ca
l 
Share of articles covering politics 7.86 75.93 35.78 14.39 207.05 50 
Watchdog 1 0.00 37.73 20.01 7.31 53.47 50 
Watchdog 2 0.00 42.23 23.52 9.45 89.39 50 
Balance of constitutional branches 1 0.77 0.98 0.90 0.05 0.00 50 
Balance of constitutional branches 2 0.50 0.97 0.77 0.14 0.02 50 
H
o
ri
z.
 
Equal coverage of political parties 0.54 0.91 0.78 0.08 0.01 50 
Proportional coverage of political parties 50.71 70.01 61.25 4.65 21.62 50 
Share of articles covering at least two parties 11.05 55.49 33.65 10.25 105.16 50 
Number of parties mentioned per article 0.09 0.52 0.23 0.12 0.01 50 
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Table A5.1 Characteristics and composition of the large country sample clusters (5-year 
panel factors) 
 
Cluster 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Vertical function 1.292 1.140 -0.374 -0.601 -0.555 
Horizontal function – quantitative diversity 1.173 -0.470 2.629 -0.474 -0.140 
Horizontal function – qualitative diversity 1.100 -0.237 -0.058 1.167 -0.574 
Number of country-periods 12 48 14 37 77 
Cluster compositions:      
Finland, Norway 1990-2008    
 
Australia, Japan, Netherlands, UK, USA  1990-2008   
 
Denmark  1995-2008   1990-1994 
South Korea  2000-2008  1995-1999 1990-1994 
Cyprus, Malta   1990-2008  
 
Bulgaria   1995-2008  1990-1994 
Switzerland 2000-2008  1990-1999  
 
Luxembourg 2005-2008  1990-2004  
 
India, Israel, Mexico    1990-2008 
 
Hungary, Paraguay, Slovenia    1995-2008 1990-1994 
France, Germany  2000-2008  1990-1999 
 
Turkey    1990-1999 2000-2008 
Slovakia  2005-2008  1995-2004 1990-1994 
Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Costa Rica, Hon-
duras, Panama, Peru 
    1990-2008 
Portugal    2005-2008 1990-2004 
New Zealand, Poland, Belgium, Croatia, 
Greece, Spain, Uruguay 
 2005-2008   1990-2004 
Czech Republic    2000-2004 
1990-1999, 
2005-2008 
Mongolia    2000-2008 1990-1999 
Austria, Canada, Ireland, Italy, Sweden  2000-2008   1990-1999 
Iceland 2005-2008 2000-2004 1990-1994  1995-1999 
Notes: cluster analysis of the factor scores based on the analysis of the indicator values from the large country 
sample, averaged across five years (see left section of table 5.1); figures: average factor scores per cluster; bold 
figures: score > 0; grey cells: highest score per item; countries are sorted according to longest adherence to clus-
ters 1 to 5. 
  
Appendix 
  
 
 289 
Table A5.2 Characteristics and composition of the small country sample clusters (5-year 
panel factors) 
 
Cluster 
 
1 2 3 4 
Vertical function 0.616 1.250 -0.866 -0.510 
Horizontal function – quantitative diversity press -0.133 0.529 0.537 -0.515 
Horizontal function – quantitative diversity TV 1.446 -0.844 0.511 -0.449 
Horizontal function – qualitative diversity 0.169 -0.357 -1.045 0.672 
Number of country-periods 17 21 20 38 
Cluster compositions:     
Germany 1990-2008    
Netherlands, Switzerland 1995-2008  1990-1994  
Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, UK  1990-2008   
Cyprus   1990-2008  
Croatia   1990-2004 2005-2008 
Austria, Belgium, Ireland 2000-2008  1990-1999  
Czech Republic  2005-2008 1990-1994 1995-2004 
Slovenia 2005-2008  1990-1994 1995-2004 
Bulgaria, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Spain    1990-2008 
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia   1990-1994 1995-2008 
Notes: cluster analysis of the factor scores based on the analysis of the indicator values from the small country 
sample, averaged across five years (see left section of table 5.2); figures: average factor scores per cluster; bold 
figures: score > 0; grey cells: highest score per item; countries are sorted according to longest adherence to clus-
ters 1 to 4. 
 
 
 
Table A5.3 Explaining vertical media function performance (small country sample) 
 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 
Coef. (S.E.) 
 
Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  
Media freedom 0.065 (0.018) ** -0.001 (0.022) 
 
0.234 (0.060) ** - -  
Press regulation - -  - -  0.525 (0.216) * - -  
Population - -  0.002 (0.006) 
 
- -  - -  
GDP p.c. - -  0.065 (0.017) ** - -  - -  
Executives-parties - -  - -  - -  0.431 (0.280) 
 Federal-unitary - -  - -  - -  -0.214 (0.269) 
 Constant -5.198 (1.478) ** -1.393 (1.541)  -20.384 (5.426) ** 0.179 (0.283) 
 
Model Properties 
      
   
   
R
2
 0.363 
  
0.635 
  
0.547   0.164 
  
Adjusted R
2
 0.334 
  
0.581 
  
0.478   0.035 
  N  24 
  
24 
  
16   16 
  Notes: unstandardized OLS estimators; *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05, + p ≤ 0.10; dependent variable: 
overall mean values factor scores of the small country sample. 
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Table A5.4 Explaining horizontal media function performance: quantitative press diversity 
(small country sample) 
 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 
Coef. (S.E.) 
 
Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  
Media freedom 0.027 (0.022) 
 
0.038 (0.029) 
 
0.147 (0.049) ** - -  
Press regulation - -  - -  0.018 (0.174)  - -  
Population - -  -0.025 (0.008) ** - -  - -  
GDP p.c. - -  -0.008 (0.022) 
 
- -  - -  
Executives-parties - -  - -  - -  0.559 (0.217) * 
Federal-unitary - -  - -  - -  -0.048 (0.208) 
 Constant -2.134 (1.794)  -1.349 (1.719)  -12.675 (4.378) * -0.497 (0.219) * 
Model Properties 
      
   
   
R
2
 0.061 
  
0.399 
  
0.615   0.346 
  
Adjusted R
2
 0.018 
  
0.309 
  
0.556   0.245 
  N  24 
  
24 
  
16   16 
  Notes: unstandardized OLS estimators; *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05, + p ≤ 0.10; dependent variable: 
overall mean values factor scores of the small country sample. 
 
 
 
Table A5.5 Explaining horizontal media function performance: quantitative TV diversity 
(small country sample) 
 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 
Coef. (S.E.) 
 
Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  
Media freedom 0.039 (0.021) 
+ 
0.009 (0.033) 
 
0.018 (0.088)  - -  
Press regulation - -  - -  0.067 (0.314)  - -  
Population - -  0.005 (0.009) 
 
- -  - -  
GDP p.c. - -  0.029 (0.025) 
 
- -  - -  
Executives-parties - -  - -  - -  0.064 (0.203) 
 Federal-unitary - -  - -  - -  0.722 (0.195) ** 
Constant -3.125 (1.726) 
+ 
-1.445 (2.278)  -1.337 (7.898)  -0.407 (0.239) 
 
Model Properties 
      
   
   
R
2
 0.131 
  
0.203 
  
0.004   0.542 
  
Adjusted R
2
 0.092 
  
0.084 
  
-.149   0.472 
  N  24 
  
24 
  
16   16 
  Notes: unstandardized OLS estimators; *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05, + p ≤ 0.10; dependent variable: 
overall mean values factor scores of the small country sample. 
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Table A5.6 Explaining horizontal media function performance: qualitative diversity (small 
country sample) 
 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 
Coef. (S.E.) 
 
Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  
Media freedom 0.022 (0.022) 
 
0.029 (0.036) 
 
-0.027 (0.089)  - -  
Press regulation - -  - -  0.124 (0.317)  - -  
Population - -  0.004 (0.009) 
 
- -  - -  
GDP p.c. - -  -0.007 (0.027) 
 
- -  - -  
Executives-parties - -  - -  - -  0.056 (0.314) 
 Federal-unitary - -  - -  - -  -0.035 (0.302) 
 Constant -1.787 (1.812)  -2.230 (2.485)  2.241 (7.973)  0.147 (0.318) 
 
Model Properties 
      
   
   
R
2
 0.043 
  
0.052 
  
0.074   0.003 
  
Adjusted R
2
 -0.001 
  
-0.090 
  
-0.068   -0.151 
  N  24 
  
24 
  
16   16 
  Notes: unstandardized OLS estimators; *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05, + p ≤ 0.10; dependent variable: 
overall mean values factor scores of the small country sample. 
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Figure A6.1 Country-specific scatter plots on the basis of the factor scores in table 6.1 
Australia 
  
Austria 
  
Canada 
  
Notes: Country of interest in black; larger symbols with grey shades represent the mean of the newspapers from 
the respective country; data points from other countries in grey. 
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Figure A6.1 Country-specific scatter plots on the basis of the factor scores in table 6.1 (con-
tinued) 
France 
  
Germany 
  
Ireland 
  
Notes: Country of interest in black; larger symbols with grey shades represent the mean of the newspapers from 
the respective country; data points from other countries in grey. 
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Figure A6.1 Country-specific scatter plots on the basis of the factor scores in table 6.1 (con-
tinued) 
New Zealand  
  
Switzerland 
  
United Kingdom 
  
Notes: Country of interest in black; larger symbols with grey shades represent the mean of the newspapers from 
the respective country; data points from other countries in grey. 
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Figure A6.1 Country-specific scatter plots on the basis of the factor scores in table 6.1 (con-
tinued) 
United States  
  
Notes: Country of interest in black; larger symbols with grey shades represent the mean of the newspapers from 
the respective country; data points from other countries in grey. 
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Table A7.1 List of indicators used to construct the dependent variables 
Hypothesis Name Definition Source(s) 
H1a Meanpart Mean level of participation in % of registered 
electorate in legislative and/or presidential elec-
tions and/or national referenda 
IDEA; IPU; and others 
Petition Share of survey respondents who indicate having 
signed petitions 
AsB; AsnB; CSES; EB; 
EES; ESS; ISS; LAPOP; 
LB; WVS  
Demons Share of survey respondents who indicate having 
attended lawful demonstrations 
See “Petition” 
H1b Repturnined Representative electoral turnout in terms of educa-
tion and income 
See “Petition” 
Repturngeag Representative electoral turnout in terms of gender 
and age 
See “Petition” 
Repaltined Representative alternative participation (signing 
petitions, attending lawful demonstrations) in 
terms of education and income 
See “Petition” 
Repaltgeag Representative alternative participation (signing 
petitions, attending lawful demonstrations) in 
terms of gender and age  
See “Petition” 
H2 CPI Corruption Perceptions Index: overall extent of 
corruption (frequency and/or size of bribes) in the 
public and political sectors 
Transparency Interna-
tional 
H3 Union Trade union density Golden et al. (2009); 
ILO; OECD; Visser 
(2011); and others 
Memenviron Share of survey respondents indicating that they 
are member in and/or actively spend time for an 
environmental or animal rights organization 
EB; ESS; LB; WVS 
H4 Issuecongr Congruence between left-right positions of voters 
and left-right positions of parliamentarians (meas-
ured by party positions). 
CMP; CSES; EB; EES, 
ESS; ISS; LAPOP; LB; 
WVS; and others 
Poldismin Index of political discrimination of minority 
groups concerning equal representation (reversed) 
MAR 
Notes: For more details see the Democracy Barometer codebook (Bühlmann et al. 2011b); the variables names 
correspond to the ones in the codebook. Sources: AsB = Asia Barometer; AsnB = Asian Barometer; CMP = 
Comparative Manifestos Project; CSES = Comparative Study of Electoral Systems; EB = Eurobarometer; EES = 
European Election Study; ESS = European Social Survey; IDEA = International IDEA; ILO = International 
Labour Organization; IPU = Inter-Parliamentary Union; ISS = International Social Survey; LAPOP = Latin 
American Public Opinion Project; LB = Latinobarómetro; MAR = Minorities at Risk Project; WVS = World 
Values Survey. 
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Table A8.1 Explaining political participation by media performance (panel RE GLS analysis) 
 
Level of participation Equality of participation 
 
Coef.        (S.E.) 
 
Coef.      (S.E.)  
VF 4.022 (1.294) ** -0.167 (1.455)  
HF: QND 2.473 (1.069) * 0.181 (1.187)  
HF: QLD -1.500 (0.762) * -0.547 (0.889)  
Political interest 0.290 (0.063) *** 0.183 (0.074) *
 
PR system -3.253 (3.072)  -2.849 (3.327)  
Compulsory voting 14.126 (3.336) *** 0.933 (3.447)  
Switzerland -21.771 (10.366) * -7.716 (10.635)  
United States -13.323 (10.522)  0.348 (10.824)  
Period 1995-99 -2.242 (0.903) * 1.007 (1.081)  
Period 2000-04 -8.143 (1.468) *** -0.698 (1.738)  
Period 2005-08 -13.455 (1.974) *** -4.484 (2.316) 
+ 
Constant 39.874 (4.548) *** 60.527 (5.176) *** 
Model Properties       
Wald statistic 168.34   39.73   
R
2
 0.477   0.139   
N  188   188   
Notes: unstandardized RE GLS estimators; *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05, + p ≤ 0.10; VF = vertical me-
dia function; HF = horizontal media function; QND = quantitative media diversity; QLD = qualitative media 
diversity; PR system = proportional representation system; reference category time periods: period 1990-94. 
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Table A8.2 Explaining transparency by media performance (panel RE GLS analysis) 
 Static model Dynamic model 
 
Coef. (S.E.)  Coef. (S.E.)  
VF 1.131 (0.204) *** - -  
HF: QND 0.738 (0.123) ***
 
- -  
HF: QLD -0.073 (0.095)  - -  
VF (t-1) - -  1.192 (0.244) *** 
HF: QND (t-1) - -  0.725 (0.146) *** 
HF: QLD (t-1) - -  -0.078 (0.104)  
Media freedom 0.022 (0.009) * 0.043 (0.011) *** 
GDP p.c. 0.005 (0.010)  0.006 (0.011)  
Period 1995-99 -0.164 (0.121)  - -  
Period 2000-04 -0.551 (0.189) ** -0.253 (0.134) 
+ 
Period 2005-08 -0.863 (0.247) *** -0.505 (0.204) * 
Constant 4.693 (0.741) *** 3.147 (0.909) *** 
Model Properties       
Wald statistic 160.35   216.83   
R
2
 0.725   0.767   
N  188   141   
Notes: unstandardized RE GLS estimators; *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05, + p ≤ 0.10; VF = vertical me-
dia function; HF = horizontal media function; QND = quantitative media diversity; QLD = qualitative media 
diversity; reference category time periods: period 1990-94 (static model) / period 1995-1999 (dynamic model). 
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Table A8.3 Explaining civil society strength by media performance (panel RE GLS analysis) 
 Static model Dynamic model 
 
Coef.   (S.E.)  Coef.  (S.E.)  
VF 4.305 (1.593) ** - -  
HF: QND 3.665 (0.920) ***
 
- -  
HF: QLD -2.754 (0.749) *** - -  
VF (t-1) - -  2.524 (1.774)  
HF: QND (t-1) - -  4.012 (1.023) *** 
HF: QLD (t-1) - -  -2.083 (0.727) ** 
Generalized trust 0.058 (0.068)  0.128 (0.068) 
+ 
GDP p.c. 0.002 (0.077)  0.005 (0.073)  
Nordic countries 18.901 (3.917) *** 18.276 (3.982) *** 
Former socialist countries 6.286 (2.942) * 1.687 (2.999)  
Period 1995-99 -3.482 (0.903) *** - -  
Period 2000-04 -7.781 (1.442) *** -3.136 (0.836) ***
 
Period 2005-08 -11.391 (1.853) *** -5.598 (1.339) *** 
Constant 25.158 (3.173) *** 19.367 (3.261) *** 
Model Properties       
Wald statistic 189.86   154.37   
R
2
 0.636   0.665   
N  188   141   
Notes: unstandardized RE GLS estimators; *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05, + p ≤ 0.10; VF = vertical me-
dia function; HF = horizontal media function; QND = quantitative media diversity; QLD = qualitative media 
diversity; Nordic countries = value 1 for Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, value 0 otherwise; 
Socialist past = value 1 for Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, 
value 0 otherwise; reference category time periods: period 1990-94 (static model) / period 1995-1999 (dynamic 
model). 
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Table A8.4 Explaining representation by media performance (panel RE GLS analysis) 
 Static model Dynamic model 
 
Coef.   (S.E.)  Coef.  (S.E.)  
VF 8.492 (1.914) *** - -  
HF: QND 5.677 (1.585) ***
 
- -  
HF: QLD 1.857 (1.273)  - -  
VF (t-1) - -  9.565 (2.450) *** 
HF: QND (t-1) - -  6.433 (1.888) *** 
HF: QLD (t-1) - -  4.711 (1.382) *** 
Political Interest -0.209 (0.096) * -0.170 (0.121) 
 
PR system 6.803 (4.647)  4.755 (5.690)  
Period 1995-99 1.109 (1.492)  - -  
Period 2000-04 -1.777 (2.277)  -2.255 (1.625) 
 
Period 2005-08 -6.578 (2.990) * -7.402 (2.662) ** 
Constant 74.782 (6.547) *** 78.724 (7.972) *** 
Model Properties       
Wald statistic 38.62   34.75   
R
2
 0.256   0.231   
N  188   141   
Notes: unstandardized RE GLS estimators; *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05, + p ≤ 0.10; VF = vertical me-
dia function; HF = horizontal media function; QND = quantitative media diversity; QLD = qualitative media 
diversity; reference category time periods: period 1990-94 (static model) / period 1995-1999 (dynamic model). 
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02/2006 – 05/2007 Research assistant to Prof. Wolfgang Merkel and Dr. Marc Bühlmann 
SNSF Project: „Democracy Barometer“ 
NCCR Democracy, University of Zurich 
 
03 – 12/2005 Research assistant to Prof. Sibylle Hardmeier 
SNSF Project: „Do opinion polls enhance political representation? A 
comparative approach“  
Department of Political Science, University of Zurich 
 
 
 
 
Scholarships and Awards 
 
02/2010 Scholarship for prospective researchers of the Swiss National Science 
Foundation.  
Purpose: 1-year research stay at the Columbia University, New York 
 
09/2008 + 10/2011 Knowledge Transfer Award of the NCCR Democracy, University of Zurich 
 
 
 
 
Further Education 
 
11/2012 Media training for researchers 
 MAZ – Die Schweizer Journalistenschule, Lucerne 
 
03/2011 Behavior workshop „Civil courage” 
Prof. Veronika  Brandstätter-Morawietz 
University of Zurich 
 
09 – 12/2010 Seminar „Making Publics” 
Prof. Michael Schudson 
Columbia University, New York 
 
07/2008 Course on „Causal Models and Structural Equations“ 
Prof. Peter Schmidt 
 Summer School in Social Science Data Analysis, University of Essex 
 
02 – 05/2008 Course on „Quantitative Analysis” 
Prof. Simon Hug 
 University of Zurich 
 
10 – 11/2007 English course on „Writing Research Papers for Publication (Arts & Social 
Sciences)” 
 Dr. Wendy Swanson 
 University of Zurich 
 
10/2005 Workshop on „Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)“ 
Dr. Carsten Q. Schneider  
 Social Science Research Center, Berlin  
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Further activities 
 
06 – 08/2011 Country expert for Switzerland for the international research project „Va-
rieties of Democracy (V♦Dem)“ of the Quality of Government Institute, 
University of Gothenburg 
 
06/2008 – 09/2009 Deputy coordinator of the NCCR peer group Stepping Stone, which 
promotes the advancement of women within academia and organizes 
various related activities 
 
09/2008 + 09/2009 Participation in the „Researcher’s night“ of the University of Zurich and 
the ETH Zurich 
 
03/2008 Participation in the „Parcours of knowledge“, an exhibition of interdisci-
plinary research in the context of  the 175th anniversary of the University 
of Zurich 
 
 
 
 
Skills 
 
Languages:  - German (mother tongue)  
 - English (fluent, written and spoken)  
 - French (fluent, written and spoken)  
 - Spanish (good, written and spoken) 
 - Italian (basic) 
 - Latin (intermediate certificate) 
 
Software: - Office: Word, Excel, Access, PowerPoint, OpenOffice 
- Statistical software: Amos, fsQCA, MLwiN, R, SPSS, Stata 
- Graphic design: Photoshop 
